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ABSTRACT 
 
WHEN TWO BECOME ONE: 
SACRAMENTAL WOES AND THEOLOGICAL ANXIETY IN MEDIEVAL 
REPRESENTATIONS OF MARRIAGE 
Elizabeth Churchill 
 
E. Ann Matter 
 
This dissertation traces the long, winding, and problematic road along which 
marriage became a sacrament of the Church.  In so doing, it identifies several key 
problems with marriage’s ability to fulfill the sacramental criteria laid out in Peter 
Lombard’s Sentences: that a sacrament must signify a specific form of divine grace, and 
that it must directly bring about the grace that it signifies.  While, on the basis of 
Ephesians 5, theologians had no problem identifying the symbolic power of marriage 
with the spiritual union of Christ and the Church, they never fully succeeded in locating a 
form of effective grace, placing immense stress upon marriage’s status as a signifier.  As 
a result, theologians and canonists found themselves unable to deal with several social 
aspects of marriage that threatened this symbolic capacity, namely concubinage and the 
remarriage of widows and widowers.  For, just as concubinage possessed the dangerous 
ability to signify the one-to-one unity of Christ and the Church (and the pressure for exact 
symbolic conformity prevented theologians from imposing a formal marriage ceremony 
distinguishing the two), second marriages threatened to off-set the sacrament’s precarious 
numeric balance, wherein Christ and his heavenly bride are forever joined as two unique 
but entirely unified entities. 
 This dissertation also contends that awareness of these problems was embedded in 
the larger medieval discourse about matrimony, and can be detected in literary depictions 
of marriage, marriage-making, and quasi-marital situations.  It thus explores attitudes 
towards marriage in several prevalent literary genres, with an eye towards how each 
genre handles the sacramental problems outlined above.  While the these literary 
treatments are all perceptibly impacted by the lacunae within sacramental discourse, they 
each display this impact in specific ways, depending upon social context and wider 
generic features and customs.  In highlighting this discursive interplay, this dissertation 
finally seeks to illuminate the sense in which what we think of as “marriage” is a highly 
constructed conceptual entity, the result of much conversation, contention, and invention. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“To her lord, or rather father; to her husband, or rather brother; from his handmaid, or 
rather daughter; from his wife, or rather sister: to Abelard, Heloise.”1 
 
 In addressing her first letter to Abelard, Heloise presents him with both a 
challenge and a personal history lesson, unspooling the various contradictory roles they 
have accrued throughout their long and circuitous relationship. Her “brother” in the 
Christian vocation to which they have mutually pledged themselves, he is also her 
spiritual “father” via his founding of the convent in which she now serves as Prioress.  
And while this latter position might also account for his status as her “Lord,” it is also 
owing to another lingering tie which Heloise is particularly anxious he remember: their 
furtive, pre-conversion marriage, which has rendered him always and forever her 
“husband.”   
Abelard, for his part, responds by tapering this list of personal entanglements 
from three to one, reducing Heloise to simply his “dearly beloved sister in Christ.”2 Their 
marriage, their famous affair, the complicated power dynamics that have shaped their 
shared narrative: all of this, for Abelard, has been nullified by their religious vows, 
through which he hopes to save both his reputation and his soul.  From his perspective, 
Heloise has ceased to be his bride the moment she became a “bride of Christ,” a point he 
makes clear in the salutation of his final “personal letter.”3 Yet, in a sense, it is Heloise 
who manages to have the last word in this dizzying negotiation, addressing her third letter 
with an ironclad, irrefutable summary of their relationship: “To her only one after Christ, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Domino suo, imo patri; conjugi suo, imo fratri; ancilla sua, imo filia; ipsius uxor, imo soror: Abaelardo, 
Heloissa. Abelard and Heloise, Epistolae, Patrologia Latina 178, col 181. All English translations taken 
from The Letters of Abelard and Heloise, trans. Betty Radice (New York: Penguin, 1974). 
2 Heloissae dilectissimae sorori suae in Christo, Abelardus frater eius in ipso.  PL 178, col 187; Radice, 56. 
3 Sponsae Christi servus ejusdem.  PL 178, col. 139. 
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from his only one in Christ.”4  For, while Christ is certainly the common denominator in 
their newfound religious bond, so too is he abundantly present in their ties as man and 
wife, given the sacramental principle that “husbands are to love their wives just as Christ 
loves the Church.”5 
At the heart of this correspondence is one of the most contentious social and 
theological questions of their day: what it meant for two people to be married to each 
other.6  Like their contemporaries, both Abelard and Heloise arrive at strikingly divergent 
answers to this question, creating a set of competing perspectives that are neither 
internally coherent nor mutually exclusive.  For Abelard, matrimony was a source of both 
legitimacy and public shame, rectifying the disgrace of Heloise’s out-of-wedlock 
pregnancy while simultaneously destroying his chances as a public scholar.7  On a deeper 
level, it was also a double-edged spiritual sword, expiating the sin associated with the 
“wretched pleasures” he enjoyed with Heloise just as it gave these pleasures dangerously 
free reign over his soul.8   
Heloise, who shares Abelard’s concerns about the public aspect of their marriage, 
is famously far more apprehensive about the “chains” that public matrimony would place 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Unico suo post Christum unica sua in Christo. PL 178, col 191; Radice, 63. 
5 Ephesians 5:25. 
6 The zeitgeist quality of Abelard and Heloise’s letters, and their tendency to take up what seem to be stock 
roles culled from contemporary discourse, lead to a longstanding debate about whether their 
correspondence was real, or whether Heloise herself was a real person.  These doubts were largely put to 
rest with Peter Dronke’s seminal article “Abelard and Heloise in Medieval Testimonies,” and are in fact 
irrelevant to my argument, as it is the very contextual nature of their perspectives which I wish to 
emphasize. 
7 As a cleric in minor orders, Abelard was expected, though not required, to remain unmarried.  Both he 
and Heloise discuss this problem at length in a conversation he relates in his Historia Calamitatum; Heloise 
confirms, though slightly amends, this version of events in her first letter to Abelard. 
8 Throughout his letters, Abelard draws strikingly little distinction between his and Heloise’s pre-and-post 
marital sexual encounters, describing them universally as base and sinful.  The reference cited above is 
drawn from a particularly brutal moment in his second letter to Heloise: “I took my fill of my wretched 
pleasures in you, and this was the sum total of my love.” Abelard, Epist. 5; Radice 85. 
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on her freely-given love, particularly through its introduction of material and financial 
affairs.9  And yet, while she too purports to feel shame for the lusts they indulged 
together, it is these very chains that provide a substitute for the physical union she and 
Abelard can no longer enjoy, binding them together as her lingering desires persist 
unsatisfied and unrequited. For Heloise, their conjugal ties exist above and beyond the 
existence of Abelard’s genitalia, a view potentially due to the fact that she imagines their 
marriage in a way that Abelard never does: as a sacrament.10  It is this bond, and its 
implication of indissoluble person-to-person unity, that underlies her salutation to 
Abelard at the start of her second letter, in which they are “unico” and “unica” to each 
other.  It is also, however, the source of this statement’s central asymmetry, for while 
their marriage bond has rendered them “unicus/ unica in Christo,” Abelard is now also 
rendered “unicus post Christo,” via the subsequent “marriage” of Heloise’s religious 
vows. 
If both Abelard and Heloise struggle to resolve these ambiguities, it is perhaps 
because, in the hazy theological atmosphere surrounding their letters, there were no easy 
answers to be found.  Writing some forty years after the attempted divorce and temporary 
excommunication of Philip I, during which the Church strove to assert its claims over 
marriage as a sacred union, Abelard and Heloise were still a decade shy of Peter 
Lombard’s definitive declaration of marital sacramentality, in which marriage became 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 In her first letter, Heloise plaintively assures Abelard that she sought “only you, nothing of yours,” 
deriding women who, in seeking a husband of means, offer themselves “for sale.” She also revises 
Abelard’s version of her reasons for rejecting marriage, explaining that one of her main reasons for doing 
so was her preference of “freedom over chains.” 
10 Heloise is the only one to refer to their marriage as a sacrament, and does so only once: “Cui quidem 
tanto te majore debito noveris obligatum, quanto te amplius nuptialis foedere sacramenti constat esse 
astrictum.”  PL 178, col 184. 
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one of the seven holy entities which are “so great a sign of the grace of God and the form 
of invisible grace, that it bears its image and exists as its cause.”11  It would be still more 
than a century before Thomas Aquinas would step in to provide a clear explanation of 
how the sacrament of marriage fits into this formula—that is, what exactly it signifies, 
and how it “causes” this particular form of grace.  Alongside the increasingly technical 
work of theologians, of course, were the more practical efforts of canon lawyers, who 
sought to outfit this numinous symbolism with a socially realistic and enforceable legal 
definition.  Lombard and Aquinas’s marital sacrament was thus eventually buttressed by 
Alexander III’s canonical marriage requirements, stipulating that marriage was formed 
and solidified (just as, in theology, the conjugal sacrament was signified) by the verbal 
consent of the married couple.  Writing at the inception of all this, Abelard and Heloise 
embodied many of the questions that canonists and theologians had yet to answer, as well 
as those that would haunt marital theory for centuries to come. 
This dissertation explores one of the fundamental problems at the core of 
Medieval conjugal theology; namely, how the symbolic intricacies of the marital 
sacrament are squared with marriage as a human social institution.  In particular, it traces 
the struggle to mould marriage within the ever more specific conditions for full 
sacramentality, wherein a sacrament must not only signify a specific grace imparted by 
the New Law, but also actively bestow this grace on the believer.  While marriage 
enjoyed an almost automatic position among Lombard’s eventual septenuary list (owing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Sacramentum enim signum est sacrae rei: Quid igitur hic signum est, et quae est res sacra huius signi. 
Sententiae 4 D 22 c 2  CCSL-A. King Philip I’s attempt (in 1094) to divorce his wife and marry his 
mistress is cited by George Duby as one of the first and most important clashes of the “ecclesiastical” and 
“aristocratic” models of marriage, particularly due to the vociferous objections to this divorce by Ivo of 
Chartres. Georges Duby, Medieval marriage: Two models from twelfth-century France, trans Elborg Foster 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991).  
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to its designation as such by both Paul and Augustine) it was never entirely clear how it 
met his definition, particularly the need to impart the grace that it signifies.  Everyone 
agreed (from the time of Tertullian) that marriage signified the spiritual nuptials of Christ 
and the Church, it was near impossible to specify how the joining of two human beings 
could bring about this spiritual truth.  Even after the question was “settled” by Aquinas, 
who more or less equated matrimony’s salvific power with its remission of sexual sin, 
doubts persisted as to whether such grace was equal to that of the other sacraments, thus 
casting doubt on marriage’s sacramental status as well. 
The net result of these misgivings was that they placed enormous pressure on 
matrimony’s signifying power, which was in itself not unproblematic.  Simply put, if 
marriage represents the union of Christ and the Church, it should be both indissoluble and 
unrepeatable, sustained by the very love and fidelity that emanates sui generis from both 
partners.  This is challenging in that, first, it would seem to invalidate the remarriage of 
widows and widowers, a practice that was specifically sanctioned by Paul on two 
separate occasions.  Second, linking marriage to the self-sustaining Christ-Church union 
left no room for a mandatory marriage ceremony, rendering holy matrimony effectively 
indistinguishable from concubinage.  So central are these issues that they underlie the 
precipitous marital negotiations of Abelard and Heloise. It is, indeed, Abelard’s attempt 
to cast Heloise as a “holy widow” that constitutes one of the main points of their dispute, 
as he echoes the traditional Christian exhortation to subsume her dangerously awakened 
sexuality in a “new marriage” to Christ. It is Heloise, however, who points out the 
numerical precariousness of this image, for once unicus and unica have become split, 
there is always the destabilizing possibility of a post—the dangerous potential for an 
6	  
	  
unwieldy third party, even if this third party happens to be Christ. And it is of course also 
Heloise who famously raises the conceivably greater holiness of unofficial partnerships, 
both due to the unavoidable connection between marriage and money and the more 
freely-given quality of unmarried love.  This evaluation drives both her brash statement 
that she would prefer being Abelard’s “concubine or whore” to his wife, as well as her 
extremely evocative claim that, while Abelard is bound to her by the sacrament of 
marriage (such as it existed at the time), they are all the more deeply bound by virtue of 
“the love I have always borne you…a love which is beyond all bounds.”12 
The anxiety produced by these discrepancies was palpable, and perceptible 
outside of theological circles.  This dissertation also examines the various ways in which 
the problems of marital sacramentality (and the theological angst that accompanied them) 
seeped into other forms of discourse, particularly literature and law.  Canon lawyers, 
tasked with establishing marriage’s sacred status on a social and legal level, became the 
direct inheritors of these theoretical quandaries, which concretely affected how they 
chose to legislate conjugal life.  Due to the theological impossibility of mandating a 
wedding ceremony, canonists were forced to accept spoken consent as the sole 
requirement for marital validity, forcing them into an uneasy confrontation with the 
issues of concubinage, abandonment, and bigamy.  The problem of widowhood also fell 
largely to canonists, who labored to find a place for theology’s deeply ambivalent attitude 
towards second nuptials. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 “Et eo te magis mihi obnoxium, quo te semper, ut omnibus patet, immoderato amore complexa sum.” PL 
178, col. 184; Radice 50. 
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Combined, these two centers of anxiety deeply impacted the way marriage was 
portrayed in literature, particularly portrayals of widowhood and concubinage.  The 
theological equivocation on these topics provided the backdrop against which marital 
plotlines played out, with authors utilizing this material as their genre, subject matter, and 
personal perspective dictated.  Almost invariably, these individual depictions can be 
linked with a larger attitude (either individual or contextual) towards marriage or the 
Church establishment in general.  What to do with a widow, or an ambiguously-partnered 
“wife,” will largely depend on what an author wishes to say about the ecclesiastical 
atmosphere that created her, and the extent to which he or she wishes to expose the 
theological fault lines at the core of her religious identity.  Hence the abrupt death of 
Roland’s Aude, before she can so much as hint at destabilizing the sacramental 
construction (and corresponding ideological system) that the author clearly seeks to 
protect.  Hence too the endless gallivanting (and eventual remarriage) of Gautier le Leu’s 
bawdy veuve, whose grotesque incarnation of theological anxieties perfectly exemplified 
Gautier’s general tendency towards religious parody. 
Exploring these topics also requires dialoguing with several “big picture” 
theoretical issues: gender, genre, and the perambulatory nature of discourse.  In treating 
the latter, I am guided by Foucault’s notion of “discursive polyvalence,” wherein the 
spread of a particular idea is envisioned as “a complex and unstable process, whereby 
discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a 
stumbling-block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy.”13  In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Michel Foucault The History of Sexuality, v. 2, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), 
100 
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this way, the sacramental structure of marriage becomes both an agent of the Church’s 
ideological dominance and a threat to its ideological coherence, reflecting the cracks in 
general sacramental logic which corollary discourse is constantly threatening to break 
apart.  I view marital sacramentality, then, not only as a specific collection of ideas 
developed by Augustine, Peter Lombard, and others, but as one of Foucault’s 
“comprehensible systems,” wherein “the logic is perfectly clear, the aims decipherable, 
and yet it is often the case that no one is there to have invented them, and few who can be 
said to have formulated them.”14 This is not to say, of course, that specific authors cannot 
be cited in the development of conjugal sacramentality, or that specific points of 
intertextuality cannot be located between theological, legal, and literary texts.  It does 
mean that, in analyzing the connection between these discursive modes, I am less 
interested in locating these particular overlaps than I am in charting the development of 
more global interactions and responses, whereby different textual agendas appraise and 
deconstruct each other. 
Another major implication of this approach to discourse is that my focus will be 
limited to the world of words, with human the realities of married life left to the various 
historians whose work is cited throughout the proceeding chapters.  The past five years 
have seen the publication of several thorough and insightful studies of the social margins 
of medieval marriage, such as Ruth Karras’s study of Parisian concubines or Sara 
McDougall’s look at the widespread connection between clandestine marriage and 
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bigamy.15  My aim is to contribute to this field by illuminating the ideological climate 
that accompanied these societal conditions, and by demonstrating how these ideas 
migrated from one textual milieu to another.  In so doing, I am guided by the belief that 
the history of representation constitutes a revealing and necessary brand of history, and 
that, with Kathryn Gravdal, “we must examine the crucial connection between a 
historical institution and its literary depiction” in order to fully understand that 
institution.16 
My engagement with the remaining two “big ideas,” gender and genre, is greatly 
simplified by the fact that they are widely recognized to be linked.  I take Simon Gaunt’s 
point that medieval genre groupings are generally “predicated on distinct 
ideologies…[that] may only be fully elucidated by studying the way mediates the sex/ 
gender system of its culture.”17  As one of the primary ways of mediating gender and 
sexuality, marriage obviously figures prominently in medieval genre politics, largely 
because of the enduring Christian tendency of (to borrow a phrase from Elizabeth Clark) 
“using women as tools to think with.”18  Thus, the various problems within sacramental 
theology are generally discussed in terms of the women who will “cause” them, meaning 
that women remain the focus in literary depictions of these issues.  These considerations 
have greatly aided me in navigating the highly contentious realm of medieval gender 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Ruth Mazo Karras, Unmarriages: Men, Women, and Sexual Unions in the Middle Ages (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012); Sara McDougall, Bigamy and Christian Identity in Late Medieval 
Champagne (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013). 
16 Kathryn Gravdal, Ravishing Maidens: Writing Rape in Medieval French Literature and Law 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1991), 15. 
17 Simon Gaunt, Gender and Genre in Medieval French Literature (Cambridge University Press, 1995),17. 
18 Elizabeth Clarke, “Thinking with Women: The Appeal to ‘Woman in Pre-Nicene Christian Propaganda 
Literature,” in The Spread of Christianity in the First Four Centuries: Essays in Explanation, ed. W.V. 
Harris (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 43-52. 
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studies, particularly with regard to the suspiciously nineteenth-century parameters 
assigned to courtly romance and chanson de geste.  Thus, while my last two chapters are 
structured according to traditional literary genre groupings, I have treated these groups as 
cohesive only to the extent each one displays a generally unified attitude towards women 
and marriage—which, as Gaunt theorizes, they largely do. 
My exploration of this topic is divided into two broad sections, the first analyzing 
the way these problems arise in theology and law, the second examining how they are 
incorporated and depicted in literature. In Chapter One, I trace the inception of the 
conjugal sacrament throughout Patristic thought, from the shadowy allusions of Paul to 
its inclusion in Augustine’s tripartite “marriage goods.”  In so doing, I emphasize the 
fundamental—and surprisingly controversial—contributions of Tertullian, whose 
conception of marriage as a human reflection of the Christ-Church union both locked 
theologians into a numerically inflexible one-to-one ratio, and left them with an enduring 
(and unwelcome) remnant of his quasi-heretical rejection of second marriages. 
Chapters Two and Three demonstrate how theologians struggled to cope with the 
lacunae of their Patristic inheritance, and how these struggles directly precipitated 
problems of marital legislation. Special attention is paid to the insurmountable challenges 
posed by evolving notion of effective grace, and how theologians’ solutions to these 
obstacles were often at odds with the legislative needs of canonists and courts.  These 
chapters also locate specific moments of anxiety and awareness, wherein Church writers 
confront their collective inability to square the conjugal sacrament.   
The extreme complexity of this process—whereby marriage was declared 
sacramental, and whereby this sacramentality was incorporated into law—is attested by 
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the recent thousand-page tome of Philip Reynolds, published in June of this year.  
Surveying the myriad twists and turns of marriage’s sacramental journey from Augustine 
to the Council of Trent (1463), Reynolds laments “I realized even before I started writing 
this book that it would have to be very long,” a sentiment with which this dissertator most 
certainly sympathizes.19  While the intricate detail of Reynolds’ account certainly is not 
replicated here (partially so that these theological perspectives may be made to share 
space with their literary counterparts), I do hope to add to his endeavors by emphasizing 
two crucial points which he does not: the importance of Tertullian’s contribution to 
marriage’s sacramental narrative, and the intense pressure placed on the conjugal 
signifier due to matrimony’s dubious ability to confer grace. 
Chapters Four and Five are devoted to the literary perspective on these theological 
“marriage problems,” with the focus divided between texts where marriage is an agent of 
pathos and those where it is an agent of laughter.  In Chapter Four, I examine genres in 
which marriage plays out as either a backdrop or a corollary to military life; coarsely put, 
where marriage is portrayed within the implied constraints of feudalism.   Thus, my 
analysis of these texts identifies points of dialogue with various theological incongruities 
(which they generally choose to either conceal of expose) as well as their reaction to 
aristocratic marital norms, which also formed a main point of contention within canon 
law.  This chapter focuses on three primary groups of texts.  I begin by discussing cases 
of marriage, betrothal, and domestic life in the Old French chansons de geste, epic poems 
composed between 1100 and 1150 recounting the great military exploits of the 
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Press, 2016), xxv. 
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Carolingian aristocracy.  While the importance of women and marriage in this genre has 
been traditionally underestimated, its deep engagement with Christian doctrine has not, as 
these texts have long been considered to bear some connection, formal or informal, to the 
ecclesiastical establishment.20   
Next, I explore the relationship between marriage and love in twelfth and 
thirteenth century romans, encompassing the concept traditionally referred to as “courtly 
love.”  While this label is avoided due to various critical concerns—namely, that the 
qualities and criteria assigned to “courtliness” can be seen directly to emanate from the 
nineteenth-century scholarly culture that created them—these texts are nonetheless 
perceptibly linked by elements of shared tone and subject matter, in particular the 
foregrounding of love within a military and political environment, and a tendency to 
portray love as an overpowering, all-consuming experience.21 
Finally, this chapter investigates some of medieval literature’s most eccentric 
meditations on love and fidelity: the quasi-marital adventures of Troilus and Criseyde, as 
recounted by Boccaccio and Chaucer.  Drawn from a sparse, several-line account within 
Benoît de Saint-Maure’s Roman de Troie (1165), these two expanded accounts test the 
boundaries of the Christian matrimony vis-à-vis non-marital partnerships, positioned 
along the safely non-Christian sidelines of a re-imagined Homeric Troy.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 This notion has been under discussion since the early 20th century, when Joseph Bédier raised the 
possibility of chansons de geste being composed to accompany and explain various pilgrimage sites.  See .  
Joseph Bédier, Les Légendes épiques.  Recherches sur la formation des chansons de geste, 4 vol. (Paris: 
Champion, 1908-1913) and Michel Zink, Introduction à la littérature française du Moyen Âge (Paris: 
Librarie Genérale Française, 1993), 39-43 
21 For nineteenth-century origins of “courtliness” see David Hult, "Gaston Paris and the Invention of 
Courtly Love." Medievalism and the Modernist Temper, ed. R. Howard Bloch and Stephen G. Nichols 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 192-224. 
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Chapter Five takes up these questions in relation to various genres of comic 
literature, where the setting tends to emphasize domestic as opposed to dynastic family 
matters.  Here, I explore various registers of literary parody, wherein the cracks in 
marriage’s sacramental foundation are exposed (and possibly even widened) to varying 
degrees.  My point of departure is a survey of the Old French fabliaux, a set of naughty 
comic verse tales popular between the mid-twelfth and mid-fourteenth centuries.  Bawdy, 
scatological, and often hyperbolically sexual, these contes à rire22 frequently take for 
their setting the homes and bedrooms of ordinary men and women, exhibiting a focus on 
the material details of everyday life that has frequently been taken for historical realism.23  
While I make no claims about the historicity of the fabliaux, I do take them to be an 
invaluable source for popular attitudes towards marriage and domestic life, in particular 
the various complicated sexual scenarios that theology and canon law were far more 
reluctant to discuss. 
From here I address the peculiar genre of anti-marital or “misogamous” literature, 
defined by Kathrina M. Wilson and Elizabeth M. Malowski as tracts “written by and for 
male readers…for the purpose of dissuading [young men] from matrimony.”24  Such texts 
are of particular interest because they are largely presented from an explicitly clerical 
perspective, hence providing an obvious zone of contact for church attitudes towards 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 A phrase borrowed from Philippe Ménard’s famous definition of the fabliaux as texts that existed 
primarily to elicit laughter. Philippe Ménard, Les Fabliaux: contes à rire du moyen âge (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de la France, 1983). 
23 This assessment of the fabliaux as a mirror for medieval social history was developed by Marie-Thérèse 
Lorcin in Façons de sentir et de penser.  Les fabliaux français (Paris: Champion, 1979).  For other 
iterations of this theory see Charles Muscatine, The Old French Fabliaux (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1986), 160-5. 
24 Katrina M. Wilson and Elizabeth M. Makowski, Wykked Wyves and the Woes of Marriage (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 1990), 1. 
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marriage.  My focus, however, remains on a sub-group within this genre that portrays 
these issues from a humorous or even satirical point of view, complicating their 
relationship to Christian marital dogma and creating the possibility for commentary or 
critique. 
I end this chapter by discussing depictions of marriage in later medieval story 
compilations, in particular the Decameron, the Canterbury Tales, and the Cent Nouvelles 
Nouvelles.  This includes, of course, a lengthy meditation on medieval literature’s most 
famous wife, Chaucer’s Wife of Bath, whose account of her many marriages is explored 
both on its own terms and in accordance with its place within Chaucer’s larger text.  It is 
my contention that this sort of intertextual dialogue is one of the defining features of the 
portrayal of marriage offered by these compilations, creating a varied, cacophonous 
picture of matrimony reflecting the range of inconsistencies and complications making 
their way into the court system. 
This project, finally, has been completed in the midst of a particularly fascinating 
and turbulent moment in the long history of Western marriage, during which America 
and various other Western democracies have chosen to revisit the question of what 
marriage can and should look like.  During the time it has taken me to write this 
dissertation, same-sex marriage has gone from being legal in four to fifty American 
states, which is a testament both to the extremely ponderous pace of my writing process 
and to the extremely rapid pace of America’s shifting marital mores.  Throughout this 
breakneck negotiation, however, both sides have remained committed to the idea of 
marriage as a static, reified, “traditional” institution, and that in reimagining the contours 
of matrimony they are, either bravely or foolishly, bucking this tradition. Justice 
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Kennedy, in 2015 his majority opinion for Obergefell v. Hobbes (which extended federal 
protection to all same-sex marriages), repeatedly sets his ruling in opposition to the 
“traditional, biologically-rooted definition of marriage,” despite the rare 
acknowledgement that “the history of marriage is one of both continuity and change.”25  
The final purpose of this dissertation, therefore, is to illustrate the “continuity and 
change” that characterized the medieval idea of marriage, and the deep, anxious 
instability at the core of what we in the twenty-first century imagine to be the most 
traditional of traditional marriage models.  Examined on their own terms, the sources in 
this dissertation reveal more of a conversation than a tradition, through which members 
of an evolving society imagined, debated, and revised what it really meant for two people 
to be joined in matrimony. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
The Mathematics of Marriage in Tertullian, Jerome, and Augustine 
 
The Christian theology of marriage, for all of its complexities and innovations, 
was in many ways something that remained constrained by its origins.  Specifically, 
“Christian marriage” found its ineradicable beginning in the Biblical tradition: the 
sayings of Jesus and the letters of Paul, as well as the sundry perspectives of the Hebrew 
Bible.  This foundation, however, proved to be an unstable one.  Consisting of just a few 
scattered proclamations, the New Testament vision of marriage soon emerged as almost 
irresolutely vague, displaying both internal inconsistencies as well as discord with Old 
Testament marital mores.  The task of defining marriage, therefore, fell to early Christian 
exegetes and theologians, making this process of interpretation the key element in the 
creation of marriage as Christian concept.  It in fact may not be an exaggeration to say 
that there is no such thing as a “Christian marriage” per se, but rather a variety of 
different interpretive visions that would come to make up the annals of Christian marital 
theology. Put more precisely, this chapter will treat “Christian marriage” as the result of 
many different processes of interpretation: the attempts of various authors in various 
historical moments to harmonize the Biblical marriage perspectives with the discursive, 
social, and political dynamics of their age. 
 The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to examine this interpretive process in 
some of its earliest iterations, exploring the way the conversation about marriage was 
developed and defined up through Augustine of Hippo.  In this vein, its complimentary 
purpose is to demonstrate the ways in which the evolving discursive boundaries of this 
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conversation came to delimit marriage according to the sacramental formula, and how 
this vision created an enduring problem for the church in its dealings with both widows 
and concubines.  While the broad strokes of this are generally attributed to Augustine, it 
is my contention that much of his material was in fact inherited (largely unwittingly) 
from his predecessors, resulting in a set of buried gaps and inconsistencies that were 
carried forward into the medieval world.  
“Christian Marriage”: Biblical Elements of the Equation 
Marriage held an uneasy status within the New Testament.  For every passage that 
seems to endorse conjugal life, another corresponding passage appears that seems to 
discourage it as something spiritually dangerous.  Hence the first and most precipitous 
challenge that would greet early interpreters of Biblical marriage: to balance these 
positive and negative assessments of marriage while remaining true to the social and 
discursive demands imposed on them by their time.   
This balancing act was based primarily on a smattering of significant Biblical 
passages, the first of which being God’s commandment in Genesis 1:28 to “Be fruitful 
and multiply.”  While this may initially appear a resoundingly straightforward command 
(and a resoundingly straightforward endorsement of marriage), it becomes complicated in 
a Christian context for two main reasons.  The first is that, as we shall see repeatedly 
below, it was not immediately clear whether this imperative was still valid, now that the 
Jesus had come and heralded the impending end of the world. Secondly, the Biblical 
patriarchs did not always fulfill this commandment in a way that was easy for Christian 
interpreters to swallow.  The oft-discussed example of Jacob, for example, forced 
Christian thinkers to confront jointly the issues of polygamy and concubinage, obliging 
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them to maintain a delicate balance of condemning these marital practices without 
condemning the great patriarch himself. 
This task was further complicated by the fact that many New Testament marital 
instructions served explicitly to reverse the portrayal of nuptial affairs in the Hebrew 
Bible, an objective that applies especially the Gospels.  As David Hunter has nicely 
summarized, “The world into which Christianity emerged was profoundly ambivalent on 
the question of marriage.  While the earliest Christians inherited from Judaism a rich 
tradition of reflection on marriage, other currents of thought, such as apocalypticism, 
tended to run counter to that tradition.26” Jesus, to be sure, did not say much about 
marriage, but what he did say made it clear that he envisioned marriage very differently 
than his current or historical Jewish context.  Indeed, Rosemary Ruether has argued that 
much of Jesus’ energies in the synoptic gospels seems devoted to breaking up marital and 
family relationships, forming “a new eschatological community that negates the natural 
family.”27 
  One thing is clear: Jesus saw marriage as a radically indissoluble union, 
something that was not true of matrimony in either Jewish or Roman legal codes.28  Many 
of his marital pronouncements speak explicitly to this point.   Mark 10:9 and Matthew 19: 
6, for starters seem fairly straightforward endorsements of indissolubility, both declaring 
that “What God has joined let no man separate.”  In both cases, Jesus grounds this 
pronouncement in an allusion to Genesis 2:24, reminding his audience that a man and his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 David Hunter, Marriage in the Early Church (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992), 2. 
27 Rosemary Ruther, Christianity and the Making of the Modern Family: Ruling Ideologies, Conflicting 
Realities (Boston: Beacon Press, 2000), 25. 
28 James K. Brundage, Law, Sex, and Christian Society in Medieval Europe (University of Chicago Press, 
1987), 38, 51. 
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wife are to be considered “two in one flesh.” In Luke 16:18, Jesus becomes slightly more 
specific about this point, proclaiming, “Whoever divorces his wife and marries another 
commits adultery; and whoever marries her who is divorced from her husband commits 
adultery,” one of his most straightforward pronouncements on the permanence of the 
nuptial bond.  This passage is complicated, however, by the oft-quoted  Matthew 19: 9, in 
which Jesus wavers by saying that a man, in fact, may send away his wife—but only in 
cases of adultery.29  In attempting to square the laconic Gospel perspective on marriage, 
Eric Fuchs has argued that Jesus’ original point in fact had nothing to do with the legal 
allowability or disallowabilty of divorce; rather, Jesus was attempting a theological 
argument, aimed at making marriage more about “the reminder of God’s promise” and 
less about the various worldly conditions (finances, infertility) that may lead to divorce. 30  
Dominic Crossan, by contrast, sees Jesus’s marriage pronouncements as exclusively 
“public and juridical” in character, uttered simply to deny the power to adjudicate marital 
matters claimed by the Pharisees and lacking in any “moral” instruction.31 Theodore 
Mackin joins him in this assertion, claiming that “Jesus had shaped his words to function 
as a criticism of Jewish conduct contemporary with himself.”32 These conflicting 
possibilities highlight the very ambiguous nature of Jesus’ statements about marriage, and 
the various difficulties involved in using them to form a cohesive nuptial paradigm. 
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31 Dominic Crossan, “Divorce and Remarriage in the New Testament,” in The Bond of Marriage, ed. 
William Bassett (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1968), 15. 
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20	  
	  
One of the most ambiguous but ultimately significant New Testament treatments 
of marriage is gleaned from Ephesians 5: 25, “Husbands love your wives as Christ loves 
the church.”  While it is not immediately clear what kind of matrimony is implied by this 
analogy—how exactly the love between husbands and wives is meant to mirror the love 
of Christ for his Church—context seems to suggest a bond based upon both hierarchy and 
radical togetherness.  Thus, wives are instructed to “submit to their husbands in 
everything,” a directive that is predicated upon the fact that “the husband is the head of 
the wife as Christ is the head of the church.” (Ephesians 5: 22-24).  Husbands, 
meanwhile, are meant to “love their wives as they love themselves.” (Ephesians 5: 29).  
This command is justified by a double derivation: the fact that the individual members of 
the church are themselves all members of Christ’s body (Ephesians 5: 31), coupled with 
the Genesis statement that a man and his wife “become one flesh” (Ephesians 5: 32; 
Genesis 2:24).  One of the distinguishing features of the Ephesians vision of marriage, as 
Gillian Beattie has argued, is its abstract and idealized nature.  The Ephesians author is 
not particularly concerned (as both Jesus and Paul seem to be) with questions 
surrounding the tricky social and soteriological status of matrimony, such as the relative 
merits of marriage and virginity in the face of the world’s impending end.  The Ephesians 
paradigm, rather, seems to function so as to imbue marriage with a permanence lacking in 
Paul’s provisional instructions, as well as to “bestow divine sanction on a socially 
conservative, hierarchical vision of the marriage partnership.”33  Indeed, Ephesians 5: 25 
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would come to represent one of the main “divine sanctions” for matrimony in general, 
ultimately becoming the basis for the conception of marriage as a sacrament. 
 Perhaps the most thorough (and most frequently invoked) New Testament 
treatment of marriage as a social institution is found in 1 Corinthians, though, as its 
labyrinthine exegetical tradition might indicate, this passage is not particularly 
transparent.   While an intensive examination of 1 Corinthians 7 is outside the scope of 
this project, the basic points often gleaned from this passage are as follows.  Paul clearly 
opines that sexual relations, if they are to be had, are only to be enjoyed with one’s 
spouse (1 Cor. 7: 2), and for this reason instructs that both parties have an obligation to 
fulfill the sexual needs of the other (1 Cor. 7: 3).  If a respite from conjugal relations is to 
be taken, it is therefore only to be imposed temporarily and only (1 Cor. 7: 5) by explicit 
mutual consent, lest one or both parties be tempted to seek satisfaction elsewhere.   
Divorce, or any separation of the spouses, is strongly discouraged, even when only one 
person is a baptized believer (1 Cor. 7: 12).  Finally, while Paul acknowledges that it 
would be better for all who are not yet married (virgins and widows alike) to stay as they 
are—and as Paul is—he states that marriage remains a viable option for those who feel 
unable to do so, for “it is better to be married than to burn.” (1 Cor. 7: 9). 
 While, as stated above, the different readings of this passage are various, a recent, 
helpful trend in modern critical scholarship has aimed at re-positioning Paul’s words in 
their original mid first-century context.  This method is especially useful in that it sets the 
interpretive choices of later authors into greater relief.  Almost all contemporary scholars 
who take this tack choose to emphasize Paul’s eschatological leanings.  As Ruether 
succinctly puts it, “Paul’s view of sexual abstinence in relation to Christian 
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eschatological identity is ambivalent.”34  However, as Roger Steven Evans has argued, 
even the earliest interpretive treatments of Paul were grounded in a radically out-of-
context reading, universalizing terms such as “virgin” and “wife” so as to utilize them as 
broad “ontological categories.”35  Paul’s original meaning, in Evans’s opinion, was much 
more specific in nature—that is, meant only to address the individual “virgins” of Corinth 
with whom he had been corresponding, who seem to have embraced an increasingly 
radical form of asceticism.  Following a similar line of reasoning, J Edward Ellis has 
further argued that Paul’s original intention was to discourage this extreme lifestyle rather 
than promote it, and to “affirm the essential goodness of marriage and sex and, for those 
who are called to it, the goodness of celibacy.”36  Both authors, moreover, follow the 
even more widespread critical trend of seeing Paul’s larger context as a certain 
eschatological immediacy, meaning that either choice, as Paul is imagining it, is not one 
that will last very long.37 
 Another modern critical trend regarding 1 Corinthians 7 is to focus on internal 
inconsistencies within Paul’s text itself, a tactic that can also shed a great deal of light on 
choices made by later interpreters.  Peter Brown, for example, has labored to elucidate 
what he terms the “lopsided” understanding of marriage created by Paul—that is, a 
marital theology that did not seek to “praise marriage,” but rather to discourage the 
radical asceticism of his correspondents by presenting marriage as a safer alternative to 
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“unconsidered celibacy.”38  John Cavadini has made similar observations about the 
Pauline legacy, arguing that “the elements that Paul held in tension seem to have come 
somewhat undone and were represented in different strands of the later Pauline 
tradition”—one friendlier towards marriage, one more hostile.39 Likewise, David Hunter 
has argued that “from its very inception early Christian tradition was fractured on the 
question of marriage and sexuality,” a fact Hunter directly attributes to the “contradictory 
tendencies” found in Paul’s letter.40  The rhetorical strategy at work in 1 Cor. 7—
defending marriage by making it something that is “not bad” rather than something that is 
explicitly good—inspired what Brown describes as “the fatal legacy of future 
generations…an attitude that viewed marriage itself as no more than a defense against  
desire.”41   
 These modern scholarly perspectives remind us of two important points.  First, 
while the “fatal legacy” perceived by Brown can certainly be traced back to Paul’s letter, 
it was in no way the inevitable result thereof.  As much as Paul’s convoluted marital 
theology sowed the seeds for the radical ascetic rejection of marriage, it also laid the 
groundwork for various defenses of marriage and family life—a fact that is inherent in 
the very “lopsided” structure of Paul’s argument.  Secondly, Hunter’s observation of 
“contradictory tendencies” is significant in it that it largely characterizes the processes of 
interpretation to be discussed in the remainder of this chapter—on both the micro and 
macro level. In the macro sense, the inherent conflicts in Paul’s understanding of 
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marriage spawned two different exegetical camps: one friendlier towards marriage, one 
more hostile.  More narrowly, however, the contradictory nature of Paul’s argument 
(combined with the Christian belief in the absolute truth of scripture) created a parallel 
tension that embedded itself within the structure of each individual interpretative 
treatment of the passage at hand. Simply put, each author who leans towards a defense of 
marriage must also account for Paul’s potentially preferential attitude towards celibacy.  
Similarly, authors who seek to further the cause of radical asceticism must account for 
the explicit good that Paul’s affords to marriage.  Finally, all of these authors approached 
their task within a discursive context that was at an increasing distance from the first-
century Corinthian milieu for which Paul’s thoughts were originally intended—and, as 
time went on, from the eschatological fervor that pervaded this environment. 
Tertullian and “the Mathematics of Marriage” 
One author still embedded in this eschatological fervor was Tertullian, whose 
three major marital tracts (Ad Uxorem, De Exhortatione Castitas, and De Monogomia) 
represent Christianity’s most sustained attempt to grapple with the realities of conjugal 
life in the face of the impending eschaton.  Belief in the world’s immanent demise, in 
addition to preoccupation with the persecutions constantly threatening his Christian 
brethren, lead Tertullian to conceptualize marriage in a uniquely spiritual way, rejecting 
its worldly characteristics and embracing instead its potential for religious edification and 
significance.  This focus, in turn, prompted him to create one of those most enduring 
visions of matrimony in the history of Christian theology: the idea of marriage as a 
sacrament, on the basis of its unique ability to reflect certain truths about divine nature 
and unity. This section will thus explore the contextual and discursive elements that went 
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into Tertullian’s idea of marital sacramentality, as well as the implications of his theory 
for the later Christian tradition.   
One of the contentions of this chapter is that Tertullian’s contribution to the 
theology of Christian marriage has been critically overlooked. One sense in which he has 
earned frequent mention, however, is for his role in tipping the exegetical scales towards 
a preference for celibacy over conjugal sexuality—that is, for taking Paul’s relativised 
defense of matrimony to be a “lesser of two evils” scenario.  Examples of this scholarly 
perspective abound.  Ellis, for example, treats Tertullian as the dominant representative 
of this “negative” understanding of Paul, in which marriage becomes a necessary evil as 
opposed to a general good.42  For Peter Brown, Tertullian’s grudging attitude towards 
matrimony constitutes “the first concrete statement” on the superiority of celibacy to 
marriage.43 David Hunter, lastly, places Tertullian’s perspective on marriage in direct 
opposition to pro-marital apologists such as Clement of Alexandria, whose task became 
in part to break down the “sharp boundaries” between Christianity and family life that 
had been erected by Tertullian and his Patristic ilk.44 
While perspectives such as these are certainly justified, they tell a deceptively 
partial version of the story.  This is partly because Tertullian, while an innovative and 
prolific theologian, was not a particularly systematic one.  The oft-conflicting nature of 
Tertullian’s theological precepts, in addition to his tendency towards polemical 
argumentation, has led Geoffrey Dunn to argue that Tertullian’s writings are best 
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analyzed as works of literature, with primary importance given to issues of context and 
discursive strategy. 45  This is especially true of his point of view on marriage, several 
aspects of which vary considerably throughout his three major matrimonial treatises.  In 
addition to his famous about-face on the issue of second marriages, Tertullian’s nuptial 
formulae occasionally seem to display internal inconsistencies—moments in which (as 
Dunn has characterized it) the author seems to “tangle himself with his arguments.”46  All 
of this makes Tertullian’s conjugal theology somewhat difficult to pin down, and 
impossible to broadly characterize as “pro” or “anti” marriage.  For, as Kris de Brabander 
reminds us, Tertullian’s many invectives against the conjugal life are at least partially 
balanced by the closing passage of Ad Uxorem, wherein he describes “le bonheur et la 
bénédiction qui accompagne le marriage chrétien.”47  This is all to say that Tertullian’s 
marital theology is best treated with sensitivity and caution, and with close attention to 
rhetorical structure and historical context. 
One particularly pressing issue that must be addressed on this latter count is 
Tertullian’s connection with the Montanist movement, a factor that is often invoked as 
the primary impetus for his disavowal of second marriages.  According to the traditional 
narrative (gleaned largely from Jerome’s brief account of his life in De Viribus 
Illustribus), Tertullian began associating with the Montanists around 206, becoming 
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increasingly enmeshed in the movement until his death in 212.48  As far as Tertullian’s 
marital theology is concerned, the implication of this trajectory of marriage is that two-
thirds of his nuptial theology comes to be classified as “Montanist”: Ad Uxorem being 
dated sometime between 198 and 203, De Exhortatione Castitatis at 208/9, and De 
Monogomia at 210/11.49  
On the one hand this traditional chronology finds a fair amount of support in 
Tertullian’s marital works, which become increasingly pre-occupied with Montanist 
concerns such as irredeemable sin and multiple marriages.50  Since these (in addition to 
the active pursuit of martyrdom and lack of respect for Church authority) constituted the 
best-known aspects of the Montanist “heresy,” it seems reasonable to assume that 
Tertullian’s theory of marriage grew directly out of a close association with the New 
Prophecy.51  On the other hand, assumptions such as these have come under increasing 
scrutiny by contemporary scholars, as they inevitably rest on a fair amount of 
speculation.  As Dunn laments, “Tertullian’s life remains hidden in obscurity”52—a claim 
that could also easily be made about the Montanist faith itself.53  Much of what we know 
about second- and third- century Monetarism is in fact culled from Tertullian’s own 
writings, making it somewhat circular to attribute his marital mores to direct New 
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Prophetic influence.54 This paucity of evidence has lead several scholars to question 
whether or not Tertullian actually left the fold of Catholic Christianity at all—a question 
that seems to be begged by a broad sampling of Tertullian’s work.  As Dunn has noted, 
“There is much that is Montanist in [Tertullian’s] writings even before his “Montanist 
period,” such as his fascination with martyrdom and obsession the impending eschaton.55  
David Rankin, moreover, has noted several orthodox tropes in Tertullian’s later 
“Montanist” works, such as a tendency to refer to the Church (from which, as Montanist, 
he would have disassociated himself) reverently as the “Bride of Christ.”56 What does 
remain unchallenged is that Tertullian became incrementally distrustful of conjugal life in 
each of his marital treatises, and that this distrust seems to be at least topically in line 
with the broad strokes of Montanist belief. 
 Whence, then, does Tertullian’s unmistakable unease with marriage (and his 
outright disgust with second marriage) arise? What sources can we identify for 
Tertullian’s prominent anti-marital attitudes?  In the analysis that follows, I have elected 
simply to take Tertullian at his word, and to place the roots of his nuptial discomfort 
where he himself places them: in its ability to distract from spiritual realities which, with 
every passing day, become more and more pressing.  The locus of this urgency, 
moreover, is perpetually located in two particularly time-sensitive concerns: the currently 
abounding opportunities for salvation via martyrdom (which renders marriage 
impractical) and the nearness of the eschaton (which renders marriage ridiculous).  These 
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two related concerns, which by their very nature become more pressing as time wears on, 
become more and more pronounced throughout Tertullian’s works, eventually resulting 
in his utterly spiritualized, one-time-only view of marriage. 
 One aspect of these anxieties is Tertullian’s understanding of marriage as an 
exclusively this-worldly affair—that is, one that is both practically and temporally limited 
to enfleshed mortal life.  Throughout his various works, Tertullian is unfailingly clear 
about the fact that marital bonds will not be restored upon mankind’s resurrection, and 
that matrimony is “a way of life which is not found in Paradise.”57 Hence Tertullian’s 
prevailing distress about the connection between marriage and monetary affairs, and the 
inevitable “worldly concupiscence” which such a connection engenders.  This business-
like aspect of marriage directly impels Tertullian to portray it as something that is 
diametrically opposed to spiritual pursuits, and as a drain on the spiritual faculties of both 
male and female parties.  In speaking to his male readers, Tertullian waxes poetic about 
“how much better a man feels when he happens to be away from his wife,” and how his 
“appreciation for the spiritual things” is suddenly sharpened.58  To his female audience, 
he extols the “liberty” of celibacy as opposed to the “enslaving” bonds of matrimony.59  
In both cases, marriage is explicitly portrayed as the distracting force that comes between 
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the believer and his or her surety of salvation, depleting the “great stores of sanctity” 
amassed through constant focus on spiritual things.60 
 Tertullian’s negative assessment of marriage becomes all the more scathing in 
moments when he chooses to be explicit about his immediate historical context: a period 
marked by intense persecution for North African Christians, which, in Tertullian’s 
opinion, heralded the impending end of the world.61  On several noteworthy occasions, 
Tertullian invokes the prevalence of martyrdom as a reason why marriage and children 
are to be avoided.  Reproduction is, in general, an impulse that Tertullian finds suspect as 
a reason for matrimony, as the world (he wryly remarks at one point) is already plenty 
full of merchants, judges, and those “to shout ‘The Christians to the lion!”62  What is 
primarily troubling to him about children, however, is the hesitation they instill in those 
who might otherwise go willingly to martyrdom, which clearly emerges throughout all of 
his works as the “first prize” in the great soteriological contest.63  In one particularly 
telling passage, he imagines the situation this way: “Doubtless, when persecutions come, 
a man [without children] will be best prepared to meet them unencumbered.  He will be 
the most steadfast under torture.”64  Elsewhere, he is even more transparent about the 
immediacy of these concerns, exclaiming sarcastically that “We [Christians] are so sure 
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of our salvation that we have time for children!”65  For, he goes on, “Why did the Lord 
prophesy, Woe to them that are with child and that give suck, if He did not mean that on 
the day of our great exodus children will be a handicap to those who bear them?”  But 
perhaps Tertullian’s strongest, and most strongly enunciated, objection to reproduction is 
the very fact that it brings new life into the world—a world that, by his very definition of 
the faith, we should all be attempting to either ignore or flee.  As he strikingly puts it: 
“For, why should we be so anxious to propagate children since, when we do, it is our 
hope—in view, that is, of the straightened times which are at hand—that they will go to 
God before us.  We ourselves desire…to be delivered from this wicked world and 
received into the arms of the Lord.”66 
 Tertullian’s reference to “these straightened times” alludes to a further problem 
with marriage and the creation of new life: the fact that the nearness of the world’s end 
makes conjugal life both dangerous and superfluous.  In Ad Exhortatione Castitatis, for 
example, he incredulously remarks, “To think that Christians should be concerned about 
posterity—Christians for whom there is no tomorrow!”67  A similar charge of 
ridiculousness is leveled against marriage in general, as Tertullian expounds sardonically 
and at some length on the stubbornly enduring will to marry: 
Shall we have weddings every day and in the midst of nuptials be overtaken by 
the last day…?    That day will the woe pronounced over them that are with child 
and give suck be fulfilled, over the married, that is, and the incontinent; for from 
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marriage come swelling wombs and infants.  And when will there be an end of 
marrying?  I suppose, when there is an end of living!”68 
 
For Tertullian, of course, that “last day” is fast approaching, meaning that the temporal 
limitations facing current marriages are a very real problem indeed. 
 Given that eschatological concerns form such an important part of Tertullian’s 
discomfort with conjugal life, it makes sense that he would ground these concerns in a 
repeated engagement with 1 Corinthians 7, pushing all of Paul’s ambiguous waverings 
towards their most apocalyptic conclusions.  It is here, indeed, that we see most clearly 
the “anti-marital” Tertullian described by Brown and others, for it is here (treading on the 
solid foundation of Biblical exegesis) that he is most strident in his nuptial critiques. 
Paul’s permissive attitude towards marriage, he argues, was a mere concession for those 
who cannot remain celibate, made out of worldly “prudence” and on the basis of Paul’s 
own human judgment alone.  His recommendation of celibacy, by contrast, was one that 
was made “on the authority of the Holy Spirit,” thus affording far greater merit to the 
celibate life.69  Tertullian wants to be extremely clear about the fact that celibacy is Paul’s 
(and, by extension, God’s) first choice, with marriage only permitted for those who 
cannot control their carnal urges.  For, “[God] could have forbidden marriage altogether, 
and all the more credible that he should have restricted a concession which it would have 
been perfectly proper to withdraw completely.  Here, also, you ought to recognize the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Nubamus igitur quotidie, et nubentes ab ultimo die deprehendamur, tamquam Sodoma et Gomorra, quo 
die ‘uae’ illud super praegnantes et lactantes adimplebitur, id est super maritos et incontinentes ; de 
nuptiis enim uteri et ubera et infantes. Et quando finis nubendi ? Credo post finem uiuendi. De exhortatione 
castitatis 9. 5 ; Le Saint, 57-58 
69 Si quid indulserat ex necessitate, id spiritus sancti auctoritate reuocaret. De monogamia 3. 8, ed Paul 
Mattei (Paris: Cerf, 1988); Le Saint, 75. 
33	  
	  
Paraclete as your advocate, since He pleads your weakness as a reason which excuses 
you from total continence.”70 
Tertullian’s biggest gripe, however, seems to be with those who defend marriage 
on the basis of Paul’s famous proclamation that “it is better to marry than to burn.”  
Building upon the “concessive” understanding of marriage described above, Tertullian 
repeatedly questions the exact meaning of the Apostle’s comparison, as “better,” in his 
estimation, does not necessarily mean “good.”  According to Tertullian, the “good” of 
marriage “cannot be viewed as such except when it is compared with the pain of 
punishment.”71   He elaborates: 
A thing deserves to be called “good” only if it is such in an absolute sense, 
without any reference, I do not say to evil, but even to another good…But if we 
are obliged to call it “good” by comparison with something that is evil, then it is 
not so much good as it is a lesser kind of evil…In removing the term of 
comparison which makes marriage out to be better than some other evil, you 
remove the element which constrains us to speak of it as good.72 
 
In two separate instances, this reasoning culminates in the colorful proposition that, ‘it is 
better to lack one eye than two,” contributing vividly to Tertullian’s portrayal of marriage 
as a lesser of two evils .73 
 Having so colorfully described the downside to matrimony, Tertullian, of course, 
must also find a way to balance the other side of the Christian marital equation: he must 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70Facile tibi persuadebis multo magis unicas nuptias competisse Paraclito Praedicare, qui potuit et nullas, 
magisque credendum temperasse illum quod et abstulisse decuisset, qui que uelit Christus intellegas.  In 
hoc quoque Paraclitum agnoscere debes aduocatum, quod a tota continentia infirmitatem tuam excusat. De 
monogamia 3. 10; Le Saint, 76. 
71 Quale id bonum intellegendum, quod melius est poena? De monogamia 3. 4; Le Saint 73. 
72 Bonum illud est quod per se hoc nomen tenet, sine comparatione, non dico mali, sed etiam boni alterius, 
ut et si alio bono comparatum adumbretur, remaneat nihilominus in boni nomine. Ceterum si per mali 
comparationem cogitur bonum dici, non tam bonum est quam genus mali inferioris…Fit ergo iam non 
melius, et, dum non melius, nec bonum, sublata condicione quae, dum melius illud facit alio, ita bonum 
haberi cogit.  De Monogamia 3. 5; Le Saint, 74. 
73 Melius est unum oculum amittere quam duos. Ibid. Tertullian expounds an almost identical argument in 
De exhortatione castitatis 3. 
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provide reasons (in keeping with both the Pauline formula and his own theological 
principles) why marriage should continue to exist.  This is partially because not to do so 
would be heretical (as Tertullian himself acknowledges) and partially because Tertullian 
is not (evidence of the previous paragraph aside) actually anti-marriage. Throughout his 
matrimonial treatises, Tertullian emphatically asserts that he “does not reject the union of 
man and woman in marriage,” as this institution has been “blessed by God for the 
reproduction of the human race.”74  The fact that this latter imperative has now been 
“superseded by the warning “time is short” (1 Cor. 7:29) does not negate the dignity it 
affords to the institution of marriage, as it testifies to the nobility and purity of its 
divinely-sanctioned origins.75  Besides, Tertullian concedes, “we do not read anywhere at 
all that marriage is forbidden; and this for the obvious reason that marriage is actually a 
good.”76  Lastly, Tertullian wishes to distance himself from certain extreme elements of 
second/third-century asceticism: those “heretical eunuchs” whose “Puritanism” causes 
them to “repudiate marriage” altogether77. He goes on: “Continence is as worthy of 
veneration as freedom to marry is worthy of respect, since both are according to the will 
of the creator.”78 
In seeking to elaborate on these points, however, Tertullian must have 
immediately found himself in an awkward position, given that his apparent reticence to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Non quidem abnuimus coniunctionem uiri et feminae, benedictam a Deo ut seminarium generis humani 
et replendo orbi et instruendo saeculo excogitam. Ad uxorem 1. 2 ; Le Saint, 11. 
75 Vel si etiam nunc locus est uocis illius ‘crescite et multiplicamini id estsi nonum alia uox superuenit, 
tempus iam in collecto esse. De exhortatione Castitatis 6. 1; Le Saint 52. 
76 Denique prohiberi nuptias nusquam omnino legimus, ut bonum scilicet. Ad uxorem 1. 3. 2; Le Saint  12. 
77 Inter alienos spadones et aurigas tuos tandtumdem queris de domestico obsequio quantum de fastidio 
extraneo. De monogamia 1. 1; Le Saint 70. 
78 Continentia religiosa est cum licentia uerecunda, ambea cum creatore sunt. De Monogamia 1: 2; Le 
Saint 70. 
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invoke the two main Biblical defenses of matrimony (Genesis 1: 28 and 1 Corinthians 7: 
9).  Tertullian’s way of addressing this problem involved some of the earliest original 
thinking in the history of Christian marital theology, drawing on key Biblical passages 
while using them to create entirely new conjugal paradigms.  The first of these paradigms 
is his vision of marriage as a religious partnership.  The second (and eventually more 
prevalent) is his reconfiguration of marriage as a signifier of divine reality, a formula that 
would sow the seeds for marriage’s eventual status as a sacrament. 
 Tertullian’s portrayal of marriage as a spiritual partnership is laid out in an 
uncharacteristically sentimental passage at the end of Ad Uxorem, in which he imagines 
the day-to-day reality of two Christians joined in the faith . As Tertullian envisions it, 
these spouses “pray together, they worship together, they fast together; instructing one 
another, encouraging one another, strengthening one another.”79  When they want to 
spice things up they “sing to one another, striving to see which one of them will chant 
more beautifully the praises of their Lord.”80   Such exaltations, apparently, do not fall on 
deaf ears, for Tertullian asserts that “Christ rejoices” at such a union, and that “to such as 
these [spouses] he gives his peace.”81 Tertullian is clear throughout the passage that the 
kind of union he is describing ultimate conjugal ideal, the complete fulfillment of the 
dictum that “they shall be two in one flesh.”82   
More frequently, however, Tertullian defends the institution of marriage on the 
basis of its prime importance within the order of divine/human history; specifically, its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Simul orant, simul vonutantur, simul ieniunia transigunt, alterutro docentes, alterutro exhortantes, 
alterutro sustinentes. Ad uxorem 2. 8. 7, ; Le Saint, 35. 
80 Sonant inter duos psalmi et hymni, et mutuo prouocant, quis melius Domino suo cantet. Ad uxorem 2: 8, 
8; Le Saint, 35. 
81 Talia Christus uidens et audiens gaudet.  His pacem suam mittit. Ibid. 
82 Nulla spiritus carnisue discretio, atquin uere duo in carne una. Ad uxorem 2. 8. 7; Le Saint 70. 
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ability to exhibit (or even prefigure) certain truths about the spiritual nature of things.  In 
making this case, Tertullian frequently employs the word sacramentum, a term that was 
fast gaining traction among Latinate Christian authors as a means of conveying various 
types of sacred significance.  Since, however, Tertullian’s way of using the term was 
rather particular (and could vary rather wildly depending on context), it is first necessary 
to gain a broader understanding of Tertullian’s overall conception of sacramentum, and 
how he invoked it to create a coherent portrayal of marriage. 
 As has often been recognized, Tertullian was among the first Christian authors to 
heavily utilize the term sacramentum, and played a crucial role in how the word came to 
be defined and applied in the Christian theological tradition.  Occasionally employed as a 
translation for the Greek term mysterion, sacramentum also bore along with it its pagan 
roots, wherein it denoted a solemn (often military) oath.83  As Christine Mohrmann and 
Réné Braun both note, Tertullian’s usages of the term most frequently conform more to 
its Greek origins: a visible or material manifestation of “vérité cache à notre intelligence 
et reveler par Dieu.”84  Often, as Braun observes, the specific contents of this “vérité 
cachée” correlates to specific Christian dogmas such as the revelation or the Trinitarian 
mystery—or, even more frequently and specifically, “l’union mystique des Chrétiens 
avec leur Dieu.”85  His understanding of sacramentum, however, is not limited to these 
connotations.  As Mohrmann remarks, Tertullian’s usage of sacramentum also 
occasionally veers towards the Roman military context, taking it to mean a sacred vow or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 See Christine Mohrmann, “Sacramentum dans les plus anciens textes chrétiens,” Harvard Theological 
Review 47 (1954), 141-152. 
84 Réné Braun, Deus Christianorum: Recherches sur le vocabulaire doctrinal de Tertullien (Paris: Études 
Augustiniennes, 1977), 435.  Morhmann, 142. 
85 Braun, 440 and 443. 
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an oath made under divine aegis.86  Finally, Tertullian shows a very sporadic tendency to 
imbue sacramentum with official, ritualistic implications, closely approximating the way 
the word would come to be commonly understood in Christian liturgy and theology.  
Tertullian’s works, as indexed by James Morgan, display four “sacraments” conceived of 
in this way: baptism, confirmation, Eucharist, and marriage.87   
 While the use of sacramentum in Tertullian’s marital treatises is somewhat varied, 
they are generally in line with this numinous sense of verité cachée.  Specifically, he uses 
sacramentum to illustrate matrimony’s relation to truths of a spiritual nature—most 
commonly, the union between God and his people.  This usage appears with great clarity 
in this passage from De Exhortatione Castitatis, in which marriage becomes a 
sacramentum of both God’s oneness and man’s primordial nature: 
When the Apostle interprets the text, They will be two in one flesh, in its 
relationship to Christ and the Church, he is thinking of the spiritual nuptials 
between Christ and the Church, in which Christ is one and his Church is one.  We 
see here the second giving of the law of monogamy, and a forceful one, in that it 
comes from both the primordial origins of human society but also from the very 
sacrament of Christ [Christi sacramentum].  In both instances we draw our origins 
from a monogamous union, carnally through Adam, spiritually through Christ.88 
 
Here, Tertullian imbues marriage with so much significance as to make it the lynchpin in 
the narrative of human salvation history.  Marriage, due to its privileged place in the 
divine order, becomes the living signifier of the two great moments of man’s creation: his 
physical generation (via the original monogamous union of Adam and Eve) and his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Mohrmann, 148. 
87 Rev. James Morgan, The Importance of Tertullian in the Development of Christian Dogma (London: 
Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1928), 127. 
88 At cum apostolus in ecclesiam et Christum interpretatur erant duo in unam carnem, secundum spiritales 
nuptias ecclesiae et Christi (unus enim Christus et una eius ecclesia), agnoscere debemus duplicatam et 
exaggeratam esse nobis unius matrimonii legem tam secundum generis fundamentum quam secundum 
Christi sacramentum.  De uno matrimonio censemur utrobique, et carnaliter in Adam et spiritaliter in 
Christo. De exhortatione castitatis 5. 3-4; Le Saint 51.  
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spiritual re-generation (through Christ’s joining himself to his spiritual spouse, his 
Church and all it’s members).  Elsewhere, Tertullian allows this mystical significance to 
determine the very social shape of human marriage, as the conjugal sacrament becomes a 
perfect mirror image of the divine-human bond: 
But you will say that the Holy Patriarchs contracted multiple marriages, not only 
with legitimate wives but with concubines.  Thus, isn’t it lawful for us to remarry?  
Certainly, it is lawful—if your marriages are types or symbols of some future 
thing [typi futuri alicujus sacramenta], or if the old command increase and 
multiple is still valid in our own day and not superseded by the warning that the 
time is short, that it remaineth that they also who have wives act as if they had 
none…But now, in these latter times, He has restricted what he allowed before 
and revoked the indulgence which He had then permitted.89 
 
While acknowledging that marriage (specifically the Biblical portrayals thereof) can take 
many social forms, Tertullian simultaneously limits the acceptable structure of Christian 
matrimony to its ability to reflect God’s covenant with humanity.  When the operative 
clause of that covenant was “be fruitful and multiply,” multiple marriages were allowed 
(even simultaneously) so as to facilitate reproduction; now that God’s promise to the 
world centers around its impending end, reproduction is considerably less important, 
meaning that the number of allowable marriages should be restricted so as to reflect this 
fact.  In a sense, Tertullian molds marriage into a model for all of human salvation 
history—a tactic that would later be taken up (albeit with greater symbolic exactitude) by 
Augustine. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Sed et benedicti, inquis, patriarchae non modo pluribus uxoribus, uerum etiam concubinis conuigia 
miscuerunt.  Ergo propterea nobis quoque licebit innumerum nubere?  Sane licebit si qui adhuc typi 
alicuius futuri sacramenti supersunt, quod nuptiae tuae figurent, uel si etiam nunc locus est uocis illius 
Crescite et multiplicamini id est, si nondum alia uox superuenit, tempus enim collecto est, restare, ut et qui 
uxores habeant tamquam non habentes agant…Nunc vero sub extremitatibus temporum compressit quod 
emiserat et reuocauit quod indulserat. De exhortatione castitatis 6. 1; Le Saint 52. 
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 While Tertullian’s description of marriage as a sacramentum is limited to his 
second two marital works, it seems to build on an idea that had been germinating since 
the opening chapters of Ad Uxorem: the mystical mathematics that seem to link human 
(monogamous) marriage with God’s plan.  As in the passage above, Tertullian begins by 
contrasting contemporary nuptials with marriage under the Old Law: “Although 
figurative language is used in speaking of both Church and Synagogue, we may rectify 
this conundrum by simply saying that it was necessary in the past that there be practices 
which alter had to be abolished or changed…Just as, at a later date, the Word of God was 
to replace the Law and introduce spiritual circumcision.”90  In this instance, however, he 
moves on to justify this logic on the basis of a sort of supernatural equation, whereby 
marriage becomes defensible on the grounds of it’s divinely-ordained expression of 
oneness: 
This is a charge they must be prepared to answer who, among other perversions of 
doctrine, teach their followers to divine those who are two in one flesh, opposing 
the will of Him who first subtracted woman from man, in the mathematics of 
marriage, added two together again who had originally been substantially one.91 
 
Over the course of his marital works, this “mathematical” aspect of marriage—i.e. its 
transformative ability to derive “oneness” out of “twoness”-- becomes even more 
precisely defined as a reflection of divine reality.  It also becomes a major supporting 
argument for Tertullian’s campaign against remarriage.  In De Exhortatione Castitas, for 
example, Tertullian remarks that ‘[Jesus] says, They will be two in one flesh—not three or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Sed licet figuraliter in synagoga ecclesia intercesserit, ut tamen simpliciter interpretemur, necessarium 
fuit instituere, quae postea aut amputari aut temperari mererentur…item mox legi succedere habebat Dei 
sermo, circumcisionem inducens spiritalem. Ad uxorem. 1. 2. 3, ; Le Saint, 11. 
91 Viderint qui inter cetera peruersitatum suarum disiungere docent carnem in duobus unam, negantes eum, 
qui feminam de masculo mutuatus, duo corpora ex eiusdem materiae consortio sumpta, rursus in se 
matrimonii compactione compegit. Ad uxorem 1. 3, 1; Le Saint 12. 
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four.  If there were three or four they would not really one flesh, nor two in one flesh.  
They will be such only if their union is formed once and for all.”92 This rhetorical trend 
culminates in De Monogamia, with Tertullian’s assertion that, “We admit one marriage 
just as we admit one God.”93  Even without invoking the term sacramentum, therefore, 
Tertullian has come to see marriage and God as intricately linked, with the former 
serving mainly to reflect and glorify the latter. 
Just as his symbolic understanding of matrimony grows stronger as his works 
progress, so too does his opposition to second marriages.  This makes particular sense 
since his use of the word sacramentum (and his figural understanding of marriage in 
general) is almost always presented in the context of an attack on the remarriage of 
widows or widowers, thus giving the strong impression that  the “sacrament” of marriage 
is strictly a one-time deal.  Thus, what begins in Ad Uxorem as “a great obstacle to 
holiness” has become by De Monogamia nothing short of “adultery,” placed utterly 
outside the very definition of marriage.94  In Ad Uxorem, he advises his wife that to 
remarry after the death of her spouse (him!) would be a missed opportunity for spiritual 
“liberty” and “continence.”95  In De Monogamia, he addresses the same hypothetical 
scenario by wondering to which of her two husbands (should she remarry) will she be 
playing the adulteress. His final conclusion is that it would be both. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92Denique erunt inquit duo in carne una, non tres, neque quattuor.  Alioquin iam non una caro nec duo in 
unam carnem. De exhortatione castitatis 5:2 ; Le Saint 51.  
93Unum matrimonium nouimus sicut unum Deum. De monogamia 1. 2; Le Saint 70. 
94 Quantum detrahant fidei, quantum obstrepant sancitati nuptiae secundaw, disciplina ecclesiae et 
praescriptio apostoli declarat. Ad uxorem 1.7. 4 ; Le Saint, 20. Compare with his much harsher assessment 
of second marriages in De Monogamia 10: 7: Aliud habebit in spiritu, aliud et in carne.  Hoc erit 
adulterium, unius feminae in duos uiros conscientia.  Le Saint, 93. 
95 Ad uxorem 1. 7. 2.  See footnote 36 above. 
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 This trajectory lays bare exactly how central the prohibition of second marriages 
was to Tertullian’s marital theology, and how closely tied this prohibition was to his 
conception of matrimony as a sacrament.  If marriage is to be legitimated through 
adherence to a symbolic pattern, it must hold to that pattern completely, without 
allowances for worldly social necessities.  And, if this pattern is determined to be the 
union between Christ and his Church, then remarriage becomes, in essence, not marriage 
at all, but rather nothing more than an awkward, sinful remainder hanging off to the side 
of the Tertullian’s perfect matrimonial equation.   
 It is this very question of the validity of remarriage that, in many ways, 
determined Tertullian’s legacy within the realm of marital theology.  On the one hand, by 
disallowing second marriages, Tertullian assured his own exclusion from this 
conversation in the proceeding centuries.  As was mentioned above, the prohibition on 
remarriage after the death of a spouse was one of the specific aspects of Tertullian’s 
Montanism to be declared heretical—no insignificant detail, given that Montanism in 
general seemed to contain few other doctrinal abnormalities.  As Eric Nestler notes, a 
thorough analysis of extant Montanist works (Tertullian’s among them) reveals almost 
total compliance with what would eventually become Catholic doctrine, with two major 
exceptions: its encouragement of the active pursuit of martyrdom, and its harshness 
towards the remarriage of widows.96  What’s more, to disallow second marriages is to 
openly flout three explicit Pauline decrees, all of which clearly state that widows are 
permitted to remarry at will.97 Since both points, as we have seen, formed an integral 
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97 Paul’s explicit authorization of remarriage is found in 1 Cor 7:39, Romans 7:3, and 1 Tim 5:14. 
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portion of Tertullian’s position on matrimony as a whole, it stands to reason that his 
marital theology would not fare particularly well in the developing Catholic tradition. 
 There is another sense, however, in which Tertullian proved to be deeply 
influential in the formulation of “Christian marriage” as a concrete entity; specifically, 
his very conception of matrimony as a sacramental union.  In particular, Tertullian’s 
theology would eventually serve as one of the most prominent sources for Augustine’s 
concept of the sacrament of marriage—that is, the marital paradigm that would become 
official church doctrine for the next thousand years.  The irony of this is not to be missed.  
As Philip Reynolds has put it, if Tertullian is to be credited with creating the sacramental 
“marriage bond” as it eventually came to be defined, is in itself “a product of Montanist 
eschatology,” silently affirming and carrying forward one of the few principles (the 
prohibition of remarriage) that made Montanism heretical.98 
 Tertullian’s conception of marriage, therefore, emerges in the Christian tradition 
as something of a theological catch-22.  On the one hand, its main structural principle—
marriage as a sacramental entity—came to be both accepted and incorporated into the 
subsequent ecclesiastical conception of matrimony.  On the other hand, the chief logical 
conclusion of this principle—the prohibition of multiple marriages—was rejected as 
heretical.  The combined effect of this conundrum, as the latter half of this chapter will 
show, is that Tertullian became a rather troublesome silent partner in the evolution of 
Christian marriage as a doctrinal entity, with his position on remarriage enduring as the 
perfidious Trojan horse that would come to vex the ecclesiastical discourse on matrimony 
for centuries to come. 
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Jerome’s Adversus Jovinianum: Subtracting the Sacrament 
One of the most prominent authors to absorb and carry forward Tertullian’s 
theological influence was Jerome, whose late fourth-century marital treatise Against 
Jovinian bears the unmistakable traces of Tertullian’s particular distaste for matrimony.  
Jerome, as David Hunter points out, provided the main “theological afterlife” for 
Tertullian’s ascetic vision, “imitating” and incorporating Tertullian’s main points without 
directly naming their dubious source.99  As Philippe Henne further observes, this “nefaste 
influence” did not go unnoticed by subsequent authors, who swiftly relegated Jerome’s 
treatise to the theological fringes in much the same way they had with Tertullian’s.100  
Indeed, Jerome’s idea of matrimony is strikingly similar to that of his predecessor, 
denigrating conjugal life almost to the point of absolute prohibition.  Like Tertullian, 
Jerome maintained a darkly suspicious view of procreation and the distractions of 
domestic life. And, like Tertullian, he justifies these suspicions through a corrective if not 
antagonistic reading of Paul.  Jerome distinguishes himself from Tertullian, however, by 
drastically downplaying marriage’s sacramental character—a major, fundamental 
difference with far-reaching implications for his overall theology of marriage. 
 Against Jovinian was, in many ways, a text that was somewhat over-determined 
by its discursive origins. Composed after Jovinian’s public condemnation by Pope 
Siricius, Jerome’s tract was designed as an explicit attack on a man (Jovinian)whose 
teachings had already been flagged as doctrinally suspect, and which Jerome especially 
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considered “a vile heap of blunders.”101  Jovinian’s specific “blunders” (lost in their 
original form, known primarily from Jerome’s arguments against them) were numerous, 
but Jerome centered his indignation on one that he found particularly odious: the 
assertion that “virgins, widows, and married women, who have been once passed through 
the laver of Christ, if they are on a par in other respects, are of equal merit.”102  Jerome’s 
rhetorical objective, therefore, is clearly determined from the outset: he must dismantle 
Jovinian’s argument by proving that married Christians, while potentially saved through 
baptism, gain markedly less heavenly clout than their virginal or continent counterparts.  
 In this endeavor, the stakes were visibly high, particularly for a writer of 
Jerome’s ascetic persuasion.  As Henne notes, high Roman society in this period 
remained deeply suspicious of asceticism—particularly female asceticism, a fact that had 
deep implications for most of Jerome’s close personal relationships.103  Indeed, much of 
Jerome’s extant writings consist of correspondence with upper-class virgins and chaste 
widows, partially intended as a defense of their way of life. Peter Brown, moreover, has 
hinted at some slightly more insidious motivations for Jerome’s hostility towards 
marriage, as upper class women, when freed from the financial and domestic 
responsibilities of family life, made up Jerome’s most powerful benefactors.104  Whatever 
his reasons, they lead Jerome to attack Jovinian’s assertion with especial vigor, coming 
down hard on the side of virginity at the rhetorical expense of marriage. 
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Indeed, what Jerome ended up producing turned out to be one of the most strident 
anti-marital tracts in all of Christian discourse, tipping the scales of the matrimonial 
balancing act sharply towards the side of celibacy.  While admitting at the outset that he 
is “anxious to strike a blow for virginity” Jerome also attempts to insert a certain degree 
of moderation, claiming (much like Tertullian) that he does not fall into the camps of 
those heretics who “disparage marriage” and “think all intercourse impure.”105  Almost 
immediately, however, he seems to abandon this perspective in favor of a ringing 
endorsement of celibacy, entirely at the expense of conjugal life.  If the church, for 
example, were to be imagined as a “great house,” virgins and celibate people would be 
the prized “vessels of gold and silver”; married believers, by contrast, are depicted as the 
far less valuable “vessels of wood and earthenware.”106  Like Tertullian, he denies that 
marriage bonds persist after death, and thus comes to see matrimony as rather pointless—
“for if death be the end of marriage, why not embrace the inevitable?”107  As the treatise 
progresses, Jerome’s anti-marital attitudes become even more pronounced, to such an 
extent that marriage emerges almost as a species of fornication. Paul’s grudging 
allowance of marriage, he argues, only serves to demonstrate that “God loves virgins 
more,” for “they willingly give what was not commanded of them.”108 In perhaps the 
most rhetorically biting jab at married life in the entire treatise, he interprets a passage 
from Revelation to mean that “all who have not preserved their virginity, in comparison 
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1.13; Fremantle, 357 
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of pure and angelic chastity and of our Lord Jesus Christ Himself, are defiled”109—
perhaps as close as a fourth-century theologian could come to an outright ban on 
marriage without skating into clear heretical territory. 
Most pervasively, however, Jerome casts the general aspersion that matrimony 
represents a set of “bonds” that prohibit one from enjoying the “freedom” of the continent 
ascetic life—much in the same way that Tertullian presents marriage as the major 
impediment to martyrdom.  As he puts it, “Moreover, he who when called by the Lord 
had not a wife and was free from the bondage of wedlock, he is truly Christ’s 
bondservant. What happiness to be the bondservant, not of a wife but of Christ, to serve 
not the flesh, but the spirit!”110 A crucial part of this freedom, moreover, is the 
independence to sacrifice oneself entirely to God—“to offer oneself as a whole burnt 
offering, much like Tertullian’s martyrs.  This is not to suggest, of course, that aversion 
to sex and anti-feminism were not defining features of Jerome’s marital theology, and 
they did not significantly shape major aspects of his vision of marriage.  It is to suggest, 
however, that his theology was complex and supple enough to allow for a diverse array of 
motivations and influences, and that he was in a uniquely good position to be influenced 
by Tertullian. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that Jerome’s construction of his marital theology 
mirrors that of Tertullian in several crucial aspects, particularly his mode of mode of 
scriptural exegesis.  Jerome is strikingly similar to Tertullian, for example, in his 
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treatment of the famous Pauline declaration that “it is better to marry than to burn”—
which is to say, he uses it to argue that marriage (unlike virginity) is not in and of itself 
something “good.”  Like Tertullian, he takes especial issue with the conditional nature of 
Paul’s statement, maintaining, “I suspect the goodness of that thing which is forced into 
the position of being only the lesser of two evils. What I want is not a smaller evil, but a 
thing absolutely good.”111  And, like Tertullian, he even conveys his disapprobation 
through a series of vivid bodily analogies, as in the following passage: 
The reason why it is better to marry is that it is worse to burn. Let burning lust be 
absent, and he will not say it is better to marry. The word better always implies a 
comparison with something worse, not a thing absolutely good and incapable of 
comparison. It is as though he said, it is better to have one eye than neither, it is 
better to stand on one foot and to support the rest of the body with a stick, than to 
crawl with broken legs.112 
 
In moments such as this, Jerome’s exegetical strategy becomes so strong as to 
take on what Evans has termed a “corrective” approach, manipulating the Pauline text to 
“make Paul say the opposite of what he is actually saying.”113  Or, as Rosemary Ruether 
has put it, “Jerome turned Paul’s cautious allowance of marriage into a flat 
negotiation.”114 In general, this tendency expresses itself in Jerome’s overriding position 
that Paul’s conjugal permissions are somewhat regrettable moments of indulgence—or, 
as he puts it, “The Apostle’s wish is one thing, his pardon another. If a wish be expressed, 
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it confers a right; if a thing is only called pardonable, we are wrong in using it.”115  The 
intensity of Jerome’s interpretive slant, combined with the specific ways in which this 
slant mirrors that of Tertullian, suggests a strong degree of influence and affinity between 
the two authors. 
 Jerome also partially echoes Tertullian in his manner of rehabilitating Christian 
marriage—or rather, the ways in which he balances out his overall censorious portrayal 
of matrimony by finding ways for it to be at least partially good.  Specifically, Jerome 
accomplishes this by creating a matrimonial ideal based exclusively on joint worship and 
mutual Christian values, to the deliberate exclusion of any more worldly components.  
“The kind of wedlock [God] enjoins,” according to Jerome, is one in which “husbands 
and wives are to dwell together according to knowledge, so that they may know what 
God wishes and desires.”116  The main difference between Jerome’s perspective and 
Tertullian’s, however, is that Jerome is absolutely explicit about the fact that sex is to 
have no part in this idealized conjugal vision—so much so that abstinence from sex 
becomes the defining feature of his idea of a “good” marriage.  “If we abstain from 
intercourse,” he argues, “we give honor to our wives: if we do not abstain, it is clear that 
insult is the opposite of honor.”117  Ideally, even the randiest of wives can be tamed into 
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 Adversus Jovinianum 1. 8; Fremantle, 352. 
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conjugal abstinence.  With some patience, he advises, “your spouse will become a sister,” 
an image that encapsulates Jerome’s ultimate picture of married bliss.118  
 Jerome’s rejection of marital sex, moreover, relates directly to the biggest 
divergence between his marital theology and that of Tertullian: the fact that Jerome does 
not see marriage as a sacramental union.  While he does, briefly, consider the potential 
sacramental significance of the conjugal bond, he swiftly turns it into yet another 
opportunity to champion virginity, writing: 
Christ in the flesh is a virgin, in the spirit once he is married. For he has one 
Church, concerning which the same Apostle says,” Husbands, love your wives, 
even as Christ also loved the Church.” If Christ loves the Church holily, chastely, 
and without spot, let husbands also love their wives in chastity. And let everyone 
know how to possess his vessel in sanctification and honour, not in the lust of 
concupiscence, as the Gentiles who know not God.”119 
 
Thus, Jerome’s formulation of the marital sacrament, and the salvific implications 
thereof, is one that directly eliminates sex from the equation.  Rather than viewing 
marriage’s sacramental significance as something that rehabilitates matrimony in general, 
Jerome uses this image to champion chaste marriage in particular, and to the deliberately 
exclude consummated conjugal unions.  The logical implication of this point (that Christ 
and the Church are virginal and chaste) is that unchaste marriages are not sacramental, 
and hence do not benefit from the redemptive association with the union between Christ 
and his church. 
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 Obviously, this narrow definition of marital sacramentality has vast repercussions 
upon other aspects of Jerome’s marital theology—most notably, his perspective on 
widowhood and remarriage.  Perhaps as a result of Tertullian’s influence, Jerome at least 
partially upholds the position that marriage is less holy the second time around, arguing 
that Christ himself established this principle by attending only one marriage celebration, 
and that Paul’s allowance of multiple marriages was by way of grudging concession, not 
blessing.120   At the same time, however, his refusal to see marital sex as sacramental robs 
him of the firm one-to-one model on which to ground this position, resulting in dizzying 
leaps of logic such as the one below: 
The first Adam was married once: the second was unmarried. Let the supporters 
of second marriages show us as their leader a third Adam who was twice married. 
But granted that Paul allowed second marriages: upon the same grounds it follows 
that he allows even third and fourth marriages, or a woman may marry as often as 
her husband dies. The Apostle was forced to choose many things which he did not 
like. What he says is something like this—God indeed permits marriage, He 
permits second marriages, and if necessary, prefers even third marriages to 
fornication and adultery. But we who ought to present our bodies a living 
sacrifice, holy, acceptable to God, which is our reasonable service, should 
consider, not what God permits, but what He wishes: that we may prove what is 
the good and acceptable and perfect will of God. It follows that what He merely 
permits is neither good, nor acceptable, nor perfect.121 
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Once marital sex has placed outside the realm of “what God wishes,” marriage itself 
becomes subject to something of a theological free-for-all.  Without a sacramental 
formula to distinguish and dignify the marital institution, all marriages are placed on the 
same desacralized playing ground—for, after the “living sacrifice” of one’s body has 
been sullied, what is there left to preserve?  This passage becomes all the more 
incongruous when considered from the perspective of Jerome’s larger intellectual and 
biographical context (discussed earlier), which gave him every reason to celebrate chaste 
widowhood.  That he misses the opportunity to do this, choosing instead to emphasize the 
universal undesirability of all marriages, represents the theological corner into which he 
has painted himself by distancing marriage from sacramental significance.   
 Jerome’s marital theology, like that of Tertullian, enjoys something of a mixed 
legacy.  On the one hand, his evident distaste for marriage was so strong as to essentially 
exclude him from the annals of orthodox matrimonial theology, with its attempts to find 
balance and sanctity in human conjugal relations.   In Rosemary Ruether’s words, the 
Adversus Jovinianum immediately became such “an embarrassment to [Jerome’s] 
colleagues” that it was essentially buried in the proceeding centuries.122   While stray 
selections from the Adversus Jovinianum can be found in various later discussions of 
marital law and theology (such as, for example, Gratian’s Decretum) it was almost 
immediately placed on the periphery of Christian orthodoxy, especially as marriage came 
to be included in the increasingly crystallized tradition of sacramental marital theology.  
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Adversus Jovinianum 1. 15. Fremantle, 359. 
122 Ruether, 45. 
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The main reason for Jerome’s marginalization, however, was the swift  response to 
Adversus Joviniam by Augustine  of Hippo, whose De Bono Conjugali was an explicit 
attempt at theological damage control directly promoted by Jerome’s treatise.  
Augustine’s treatise is generally considered as an attempt to find a “middle ground” 
between Jerome and Jovinian, tempering the extravagant austerity of Jerome’s position 
while retaining the key components of his ascetic flavor.  Augustine’s prime method of 
accomplishing this, as we will see below, was to re-incorporate the sacramental formula 
introduced by Tertullian, hence effectively excluding Jerome’s marital vision from 
subsequent theological discourse. 
 There is another sense, however, in which Jerome’s conception of marriage 
remained even more influential than the one put forward by Augustine, though this 
influence existed almost entirely outside of orthodox theological channels.  As John 
Oppel has persuasively argued, Jerome’s treatise remained a dominant undercurrent in 
literary discourse up through the end of the middle ages, profoundly impacting medieval 
antifeminist and anti-marital attitudes.  In Oppel’s opinion, “If the middle ages was 
hostile to marriage, as is sometimes asserted, and was bitterly anti-woman, some of 
this—or at least, some of the tendencies insofar as they are characteristically medieval—
can be attributed to the influence of Jerome’s work.”123  The enduring afterlife of 
Jerome’s treatise—and in particular its key role in literary attacks against women and 
marriage—will be significant to this dissertation for two reasons.  First, it illuminates an 
important strain of medieval counter-discourse surrounding questions of marriage—a 
discourse that displayed a willingness and desire to engage with worldly and gender-
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related issues that the official church discussion ignored.  Second, the continued 
evocation of the Adversus Jovinianum demonstrates that this counter-discourse originated 
from within the annals of ecclesiastical dialogue itself.  While Jerome’s position was 
unpopular, it was never judged to be heretical, and his overriding orthodoxy (not to 
mention his high theological profile) placed his treatise well within the acceptable 
Christian fold.   
 As later authors began to weave together an official vision of Christian marriage, 
Jerome’s treatise would thus emerge as a something of a loose theological thread. 
Excluded from the ecclesiastical discourse on matrimony, the Adversus Jovinianum 
would nonetheless take on increasing importance in less-official milieu, particularly 
among authors whose prevailing interests lay in the daily trials of gender dynamics and 
quotidian domestic life.  By his willingness to engage in realities ignored by the 
sacramentally-grounded church formula, Jerome earned himself a lasting position on the 
fringes of the clerical conversation, his treatise remaining a testament to the rejected 
building blocks of the emerging sacramental formula. 
Augustine’s Balanced Equation 
Augustine’s contribution to the Christian theology of marriage cannot be 
overstated.  As Philip Reynolds has remarked, “No Latin theologian during the patristic 
and medieval periods wrote as extensively or thought as deeply about the nature and 
purpose of marriage as Augustine did.  No one else was as influential.”124  Simply put, 
Augustine created the concept of “Christian marriage” as it henceforth came to be 
imagined, and thus directly shaped all aspects of the medieval discourse about 
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matrimony.  Eric Fuchs, in his exhaustive study of Christian theories of marital sexuality 
and love, remarks that Augustine “shaped the conversation about marriage for one 
thousand years to come,” creating a model that proved remarkably impervious to shift in 
time and social context.125  From a legal perspective, James Brundage has argued that 
“Augustine’s underlying belief in the intrinsic sinfulness of carnal desire and the sensual 
delight that accompanied sexual union became a standard premise” in the development of 
canon law and the legal definition of marriage.”126  Finally, there is no question as to 
Augustine’s influence in the subsequent theological understanding of marriage, as 
Seamus P. Heaney makes clear by asserting that “the Augustinian definitions of 
sacrametnum, which were to figure largely in the scholastic development of the theology 
of marriage, were the point of departure for medieval sacramentology.”127 
While most modern scholars share these sentiments—and fully affirm the 
importance of Augustine’s marital formula—there is also the consensus that Augustine’s 
originality consisted not so much in creating an idea of marriage ex nihilo, but rather in 
the inventiveness with which he incorporated and adapted existing theories of matrimony.   
According to Margaret Miles, Augustine “created no new Christian dogmas” on the 
regulation of human sexuality.  His innovation, rather, lay in the freshness and sensitivity 
he applied to the intellectual tradition that he had inherited—the ”painstaking systematic 
articulation” through which he responded to the “repressed longing of human beings for 
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wholeness” between soul and body.128  This opinion is echoed by Peter Brown, who 
argues that Augustine’s contribution to the Christian conception of sex was to shift the 
emphasis onto the individual human person, reformulating the theological understanding 
of sexuality so as to consider the entirety of the human constitution.129  We might 
characterize Augustine’s theology of sexuality—and hence, by extension, his theological 
formula for marriage—as something of a humanized fusion of the trends and theories that 
came before him.  Augustine’s formula sought to rectify the various contradictory 
tendencies in his immediate theological environment, created with an attention towards 
human needs and frailties and a desire to incorporate these imperfections into the 
Christian understanding of sex. 
The fact that Augustine’s theory of matrimony was shaped by the larger Christian 
conversation about marriage and sex is something that is apparent throughout his marital 
treatises.   As Augustine makes clear in his Retractions for De Bono Conjugali, this work 
was intended as a direct response to both Jovinian and Jerome, attempting to quell the 
“rumors and whisperings” regarding the relative merits of marriage and virginity that had 
been sweeping throughout Rome.130  While Augustine confirms the obvious fact that his 
own position on matrimony was developed in opposition to Jovinian’s (i.e., the idea that 
“the merits of holy virginity and chaste marriage are equal”), he also places himself 
somewhat in conflict with the Jerome, lamenting that “in responding to Jovinian it was 
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not possible to praise marriage but only to vilify it.”131  Contemporary scholars have 
generally agreed that Augustine opted for the middle path in the Jerome/Jovinian debate, 
though some (such as Peter Brown) have argued that “distancing himself from Jerome” 
was Augustine’s first priority.132  Whatever Augustine’s exact relation to the positions of 
Jovinian and Jerome, it is clear that his conception of marriage was partially formed by 
this dispute, and by the theological moderation with which he attempted to resolve it. 
Augustine’s theological surroundings were further complicated by the participation of 
several fringe groups in the conversation about marriage, groups who were soon to be 
deemed heretical largely through Augustine’s own efforts.   What’s more, the ferocity of 
Augustine’s anti-heretical struggles gave his own thoughts a certain malleability, as the 
specific contours of his marital formula seem to shift to meet the challenges posed by 
each particular interlocutor.  De Bono Conjugali, for example, displays various markers 
of Augustine’s struggle against the Manichaean sect, which was in its final stages at the 
time this work was penned.  Against the Manichee belief that human sexuality constituted 
a barrier to salvation, Augustine casts sexuality as an integral part of  the divine order, 
with sexual procreation explicitly defined as its “one worthy outcome.”133 Augustine was 
forced to re-evaluate this position, however, some fifteen years later, when his contest 
with the Pelagian bishop Julian compelled him to re-think the specific degree of 
“goodness” he was willing to accord to human sexual relations.  In his c. 421 treatise De 
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Nuptiis et Concupentia was also attempting to defend and advance his position on 
sexuality and original sin, countering the Pelagian view that “infants born of the flesh 
have no need of Christ’s medicine, through which sins are healed” with his emphatic 
assertion that “all children, whoever their parents, are under the power of the devil unless 
they are born again in Christ and transferred out of the shadows into his kingdom, as he 
was not born of the union of the two sexes.”134 The result of this latter objective, 
according to various scholars, is a certain darkening of Augustine’s attitude towards 
marital sexuality.135  One aspect of Augustine’s darker take on sex is the increasingly 
restrictive logic he comes to apply to his assessment of sexual goodness.  This is to say 
that rather than emphasizing the goodness of sex because of its procreative potential, 
Augustine’s later works (De Nuptiis et Concupentia chief among them) resoundingly 
state that procreation is the only possible condition under which sex can be anything 
other than sinful, emphasizing instead the depraved and uncontrollable nature of human 
sexual desires.  The secondary effect of this position is that it separates marital goodness 
from the sexual acts that take place within a marriage. Augustine in fact makes this latter 
implication clear on several occasions, asserting that “in that marriage produces good out 
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of evil [of carnal concupiscence) it is glorified; because without marriage this good 
cannot come to be, marriage has reason for shame.”136      
 Before delving into Augustine’s formula itself, however, it is necessary to 
examine one final contextual force that is often brought to bear on his marital theology: 
the story of Augustine’s own quasi-marital misadventures, as recounted in his 
Confessions.   The potential relevance of the Confessions as a source-text often proves 
irresistibly obvious. In addition to the pages of lamentation Augustine expends on his 
decades-long struggle with lust (frequently invoked as the driving force behind his 
distrustful attitude towards sex), there is his sparse but significant description (Conf. 
4.2.2) of his longtime sexual companion, with whom he “personally experienced the vast 
difference between the pleasing bond of marriage, entered into for the sake of having a 
children, and the kind of pact that is made for libidinous pleasures.”137  The apparent 
confluence between Augustine’s reflections on his own life and his formulation of 
Christian marriage has traditionally caused scholars to interpret Augustine’s marital 
theology biographically, treating the eventual shape of his matrimonial formula as a 
direct result of his own life experience.  Brown, for example, characterizes Augustine’s 
thoughts on concubinage in De Bono Conjugali as the author “allowing himself to feel 
again about [his concubine],”138 while Philip Reynolds cites Book Four of the 
Confessions as support for his own interpretation of Augustine’s theory of 
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concubinage.139  Other scholars, however, have grown distrustful of this biographical 
approach, viewing the Confessions less as a faithful recording of Augustine’s life and 
more as a stylized portrait written to serve his various rhetorical agendae.  In this vein, 
Paula Fredriksen has argued that the Confessions represents not so much an 
autobiography as an expression of his “theological opinions,” 140 wherein his life is used 
as an exemplar whereby to demonstrate and further these beliefs.  By this logic. 
Augustine’s description of his concubine cannot be used as a biographical corollary for 
his theoretical treatment of concubinage, as it is not necessarily a truthful representation 
of his feelings, motives, or even the events themselves. 
I am inclined to follow Fredriksen’s lead in my own work with the Augustinian 
corpus, and will therefore decline to invoke Confessions 4.2.2 as an accurate portrait of 
Augustine’s own sexual experience, or as potential psychological motivator for his 
marital theology.  At the same time, I do not think that this passage can be ignored 
outright, especially when attempting to understand Augustine’s formulation of Christian 
marriage as a process of discursive development.  The fact that Confessions was penned 
in 397 (four years before De Bono Conjugali) in fact makes his description of his 
concubine one of Augustine’s earliest meditations on the nature of marital relations—and 
in particular, that which distinguished marriage from concubinage.  My intention, 
therefore, is to view Confessions 4.2.2 as a moment of rhetorical rather than biographical 
importance.  While this passage may not provide insight into Augustine’s own 
experiential connection with marriage, it does constitute a significant step in his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 Reynolds, 305. 
140 Paula Fredriksen, “Paul and Augustine: Conversion Narratives, Orthodox Traditions, and the 
Retrospective Self,” Journal of Theological Studies 37 (1986), 22.  
60	  
	  
construction and reification of marital ties, representing various key discursive factors 
that would come into play in his later theoretical works. 
Augustine’s theology of marriage begins from the simple premise that marriage is, in 
and of itself, good—not merely good “by comparison with fornication,”141 but imbued by 
God with the intrinsic goodness of being “the first natural link of human society.”142  The 
fact that marriage is less spiritually beneficial than virginity (a point that is never called 
into question throughout the whole of Augustine’s writing on marriage) does not prevent 
married persons from participating in this goodness—one major way in which he both 
echoes and differentiates himself from the theologies of both Tertullian and Jerome.   
Further, Augustine conceptualizes “holy virginity” in such a way so as to allow marriage 
to occasionally come out on top.  This is to say, he consistently privileges inner virtues 
such as obedience over the physical condition of virginity, saying “The matron who is 
more obedient is to be preferred to the virgin who is less so.”143   Even when directly 
addressing his celibate brethren, Augustine is clear that an honest married person will 
always trump a hypocritical virgin: “[These celibate women] would like to marry, and the 
reason why they do not marry is because they cannot do so with impunity.  They would 
do better to marry than to burn, that is to be ravaged in their inmost hearts by the flame of 
lust.”144 
The reason that Augustine was able to seem so strikingly marriage-positive 
(particularly given the distrust of sex and family life that permeated his theological 
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surroundings) is that all of this was carefully balanced by his tripartite theory of marital 
goodness: proles (children), fides (mutual fidelity) and sacramentum.  Simply put, 
distributing the goodness of marriage across three separate categories allowed Augustine 
to define the conjugal good in such a way that, while it could easily accommodate sexual 
activity, it did not depend on sexual consummation for either its existence or its 
goodness.  Because not all of Augustine’s marriage goods involve any sort of sexual 
activity, it was possible for Christians to be married with no sex at all. Augustine’s most 
straightforward summation of his marriage goods is as follows:  “Therefore the good of 
marriage in every nation and throughout mankind lies in the purpose of procreation and 
in the fidelity of chastity; but so far as the people of God are concerned, it also lies in the 
sanctity of the sacrament.”145 
The first of these goods, procreation, has something of a nebulous status within 
Augustine’s marital theology as a whole.  Augustine never wavers in his assertion that 
the production of offspring (for all the evil of carnal concupiscence it may entail) is 
something good—a point that distinguishes him greatly from both Tertullian and Jerome.  
Unlike his predecessors, Augustine does not see the new covenant as a de facto 
nullification of the divine imperative to “be fruitful and multiply,” though he does 
concede that an end to all human procreation would not necessarily be a bad thing.  Were 
this to take place, he reasons in De Bono Conjugali, “then the city of God would be filled 
much more speedily and the end of the world would be hastened.”146  Operating under the 
assumption, however, that such an event is unlikely to take place, Augustine finds a 
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purpose for procreation within this new and final phase of salvation history: to produce 
more souls who can ultimately be baptized into the city of God.  This notion becomes 
increasingly important towards the latter end of Augustine’s career, and reaches its fullest 
development in De Nuptiis et Concupentia: “ For [married Christians] have the intention 
of engendering children who will be born again, so that those who are born of children of 
the world may be reborn as children of God.”147 Thus, Augustine makes the “good” of 
new human life contingent upon this new human’s baptism.  In so doing, he manages to 
create a degree of difference between the sexual act and the true “good” that comes from 
procreation. 
This is not to say that Augustine does not confront the sexual realities of procreation, 
particularly in a post-lapsarian world.  As a result of Adam’s sin, sexual lust “assumes 
power not only over the whole body…but also internally,”148 resulting in an ultimate loss 
of spiritual control whereby sin becomes inevitable.   Augustine is adamant, however, 
that the incorporation of carnal concupiscence in no way sullies the goodness of 
marriage: “Even with the addition of this evil, the goodness of marriage could not be 
destroyed.” Rather, marriage retains its good nature by absorbing the lust of both parties 
and transforming it for a noble objective.  As he says in De Bono Conjugali: “Marriages 
promote this further good: carnal or youthful incontinence…is applied to the honorable 
task of begetting children, and so intercourse within marriage engenders something good 
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from the evil.”149 Even though it is technically wrong to have sex for reasons other than 
procreation (i.e., to use one’s spouse for the satisfaction of lust) is “pardonable” due to 
the mercy God demonstrated in creating the institution of marriage.150   
 One further implication of Augustine’s ambiguous treatment of procreation is 
that, in the final analysis, it comes to be explicitly portrayed as unnecessary (or even 
extraneous) in the make-up of a valid marriage.  As Augustine clearly states:  
Let it not be said that the marital bond is broken between those who, by mutual 
consent, decide to abstain from sexual relations.  In fact, it will be firmer, as they 
have entered in an even greater pact, in which love and harmony is not sustained 
by the pleasures of fleshly joining, but by the voluntary affection of souls.151 
 
This notion does not result (as it does in Jerome) in the utter exclusion of sexual relations 
for Augustine’s marital paradigm; by and large, he always writes with the understanding 
that marriage will involve at least some sex, and thus at least some lust.  What it does 
result in, however, is the later medieval debate on whether consummation (and thus 
procreation) need take place at all for a marriage to be fully affected, or whether consent 
of the two parties alone constituted full marital validity.   
The other main way in which Augustine dealt with the presence of lust between 
married couples is the development his second good: mutual fidelity or chastity.  While 
Augustine occasionally interprets this to mean a sense of kindness and equanimity 
between the spouses, it is more generally presented as a sort of spiritual insurance policy, 
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150 Augustine argues that Paul does not “pardon” marriage, but rather the sin of sexual intercourse via 
marriage. De bono conuigali 11.12. 
151 Quibus uero placuit ex consensu ab usu carnalis concupiscentiae in perpetuum continere, absit ut 
uinculum inter illos coniugale rumpatur; immo firmius erit, quo magis ea pacta secum inierunt, quae 
carius concordiusque seruanda sunt nin uoluptariis corporum nexibus sed uoluntariis affectibus animorum. 
De nuptiis et concupiscentia 1.11. 
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put in place to make sure that neither party sins by seeking sexual fulfillment outside of 
the marriage: “So married couples owe fidelity to each other not merely in performance 
of the sexual act to bring forth children…but also in ministering, so to say, to each other, 
to shoulder each other’s weakness, enabling each other to avoid illicit sexual 
intercourse.”152 It is in this vein that Augustine introduces the corollary concept of the 
“marriage debt:” the responsibility of each spouse to consent to sexual activity whenever 
(and under whatever circumstances) the other is feeling randy.  So insistent is Augustine 
on the importance of this mutual duty that he forbids both wives and husbands from 
permanently abstaining from sex without the other’s consent—despite the extreme 
approbation with which he otherwise views sexual abstinence.  
Finally we come to the third and most complex of Augustine’s marital goods: the 
“sacramental significance” of the union between husband and wife.  That this is the most 
important component of Augustine’s conjugal formula cannot be doubted, as the author 
himself places it above his other marriage goods: “In the marriages of our Christian 
women, the sanctity of the sacrament takes precedence over the fertility of the womb.”153  
The sacramentality of marriage, indeed, provides Augustine with a crucial balancing tool 
relative to his other two goods, as it creates an utterly non-sexual sort of glue with which 
a marriage can be held together.  As Augustine makes plain, sacramentality means 
(among other things) that a marriage can continue to exist even when the spouses have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152Debent ergo sibi coniugati non solum ipsius sexus sui commiscendi fidem liberorum procreandorum 
causa….uerum etiam infirmitatis inuicem excipiendae ad illicitos concubitus euitando. De bono conuigali 
6.6. 
153 In nostrarum quippe nuptiis plus ualet sanctitas sacramenti quam fecunditas uteri. De bono conuigali 
18.21. 
65	  
	  
ceased to have all physical contact, thus providing a crucial link between the sexual and 
non-sexual components of marriage.154  
It should be noted at the outset that it is not automatically clear what Augustine meant 
by describing marriage as a “sacramentum,” since his definition of the term, while 
tremendously influential, was also notoriously vague.  Broadly defined as “a sign that 
brings something else before the senses” and “a visible form of invisible sacrifice,” a 
sacrament for Augustine could be a wide variety of things, from the Nicene Creed to the 
kiss of peace.155 Moreover, on the few occasions on which he did set out to catalogue 
sacramental church rites, marriage was notably absent.156  This fact has piqued the 
interest of various modern scholars, who interpret this omission in several different ways.  
Emile Schmitt, for example, argues that the reason Augustine decides not to list marriage 
as a sacrament of the church is that he defines it as an active, ongoing state, as opposed to 
a specific ritual moment.157  John Conbere, meanwhile, postulates that this omission 
relates directly to Augustine’s discomfort with the sexual nature of marriage, thus 
rendering it too “profane” to hold the status of a sacramental rite.158 
One complicating factor in all of this is that Augustine does, on several occasions, 
directly compare the “sacramentum” of marriage to that conveyed via baptism—a rite 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 See De nuptiis et concupiscentia 1.10, cited above. 
155 Signum est enim res praeter speciem, quam ingerit sensibus, aliud aliquid ex se faciens in cogitationem 
uenire.  De doctrina christiana 2:1.1, CCL 32; Sacrificium ergo uisibile inuisibilis sacrificii sacramentum, 
id est sacrum signum est.  De ciuitate dei 10. 5, CCL 47. 
156 The enumeration of church sacraments had not advanced much between the lifetimes of Tertullian and 
Augustine, and was generally not (as John Conbere has noted) a matter of much concern until the early 
medieval era. John Conbere, “Sexuality, Death, and Sacramental Theology,” The Saint Luke’s Journal of 
Theology 28 (1985), 113. 
157 Emile Schmitt, Le Mariage chrétien dans l’oeuvre de saint Augustin: une théologie baptismale de la vie 
conjugale (Paris: Etudes augustiniennes, 1983), 218-20. 
158 Conbere, 121. 
66	  
	  
which he most definitely does consider to be an official “sacrament” of the church.  For 
example: “Just as someone excommunicated for having committed a crime retains the 
sacrament of rebirth, even if he is never reconciled with God,  a wife who has been 
divorced for committing adultery retains the bond of the marital sacrament within herself, 
and she does not lose that bond even if she is never reconciled with her husband.”159 The 
key element in this analogy seems to be that both marriage and baptism confer something 
that is radically indissoluble, a fact that has often been seen as the defining feature 
Augustine’s conjugal sacramentum.  Philip Reynolds, for example, has argued that the 
most frequent meaning of sacramentum in Augustine’s marital writings is related to the 
permanence of the marriage tie (vinculum), and that this permanence was one of 
Augustine’s main objectives in imagining marriage as a sacrament.160 Indeed, this usage 
is strikingly constant throughout Augustine’s marital treatises.   In De Bono Conjugali, 
wherein he offers his most succinct classification of the marital goods, his definition of 
“the sanctity of the sacrament” hinges precisely on its indissolubility: “[the good of 
marriage] lies also in the sanctity of the sacrament, by reason of which is forbidden for a 
woman, for so long as her husband lives, to marry another.”161  Likewise: “Beyond any 
doubt the thing signified by this sacrament is that the man and the woman united in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159 Sicut enim manente in se Sacramento regenerationis, excommunieatur cujus quam reus criminis, nec 
illo Sacramento caret, etiam si nunquam reconcilietur Deo:ita manentein se vinculo foederis 
conjugalis,uxoi;dimillitur obcausam fornicatioiiis, nec carebit illo vinculo, etiamsi nunquam reconcilietur 
viro; carebit autem, si mortuus fuerit vir ejus. De Aulterinis Coniungiis 2.5, PL 40, 473. 
160 Reynolds, 281. 
161 Etiam in sanctitate sacramenti, per quam nefas est etiam repudio discentem alteri nuberi, dum uir eius 
uiuit. De bono conjugali 24.32. 
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marriage persevere inseperarably in that union as long as they live, and it is not permitted 
that one be sent away from the other, except for the cause of fornication.”162 
 What is particularly striking about the preceding passage is the sentence that 
immediately follows it, which serves as Augustine’s explanation as to why the marriage 
bond possesses this permanence: “This [indissolubility] is, after all, what is preserved 
between Christ and the Church, namely, that, while Christ lives and while the Church 
lives, they are not separated by any divorce for all eternity.”163  Thus, human marriage is 
indissoluble because it is a direct, living reflection of the equally indissoluble union 
between Christ and his Church, as is suggested by Ephesians 5:12 (“Husbands love your 
wives as Christ loves the Church”).  By understanding the implications of Ephesians 5:12 
in this way, Augustine is drawing a direct parallel between the social shape of human 
marriage and the theological shape of the divine “marriage,” a move that Schmitt has 
seen as creating a two-tiered system of marital sacramentality.164  Augustine’s conception 
of the conjugal sacramentum as a permanent link (his sacramentum minimum) is thus 
upheld and demonstrated by its connection to the marital sacramentem magnum: the 
sense in which marriage serves as a reflection of the Christ-Church paradigm.  According 
to Schmitt, conjugal ties thus retain their strength because they are reinforced by 
something sacred.  This, in turn, leads us to the second major meaning of sacramentum in 
Augustine’s matrimonial writings: a visible reflection of an invisible thing—in this case, 
the relationship between Christ and his Church as manifested by the human marital bond. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
162 Huius procul dubio sacramenti res est, ut mas et femina conubio copulati quamdiu uiuunt 
inseparabiliter perseuerent nec liceat excepta causa fornicationis a coniuge coniugem dirimi. De nuptiis et 
concupiscentia 1.10. 
163 Hoc enim custoditur in Christo et ecclesia, ut uiuens cum uiuente in aeternum nullo diuortio separetur. 
ibid 
164 Schmitt, 257. 
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 In depicting human marriage according to the Christ-Church paradigm, Augustine 
draws an extremely precise kind of parallel.  This is to say, he allows the sacred truth of 
what marriage signifies to determine the contours of the conjugal union in the human 
social realm.  The first implication of this reading is the indissolubility clause described 
above. The second, and more complex, implication is the way in which marriage is made 
to fit the exact specifications of the Christ-Church relationship at each specific moment in 
salvation history, mirroring these specifications exactly in both form and meaning.  Take, 
for example, Augustine’s explanation of polygamy within Old Testament marriages.  On 
the one hand, the permissibility of such unions for Biblical patriarchs appears merely as a 
practical matter, as the easiest and surest way to fulfill the commandment to be fruitful 
and multiply: “When certain [patriarchs] were allowed to have multiple wives, the reason 
was to increase the number of offspring.”165  Augustine’s main method of interpreting 
Biblical polygamy, however, is to see it as an expression of spiritual truth, reflecting the 
nature of the divine-human bond at each exact moment in history: “Similarly, we read 
that none of the holy women served two or more living husbands…Several women can 
be made pregnant by one man, but one woman cannot become plurally pregnant by a 
number of men…This is why souls have only one true God: a soul can indeed commit 
fornication with many false gods, but it cannot be made fruitful.”166 This is also the logic 
that Augustine uses to explain why polygamy is now prohibited for men and women of 
faith: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165 Quando quibusdam etiam singulis plures habere concessum est, ubi ratio fuit prolis multiplicandae, non 
variandae appetitio voluptatis. De nuptiis et concupiscentia 1.8. 
166 Ita duobus seu pluribus maritis uiuis nullam legimus seruisse sanctarum…Plures enim feminae ab uno 
uiro fetari possunt, una uero a pluribus non potest…Ideoque non est uerus deus animarum nisi unus; una 
uero anima per multos falsos fornicari potest, non fecundari. De bono coniugali  17. 20. 
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In the future, the one city will be composed of many souls who have one soul and 
one heart in God, and after this earthly pilgrimage it will be the perfection of our 
unity…For this reason the sacrament of marriage in our time has been reduced to 
one husband and one wife.167 
 
What is striking in all of this is how similar Augustine’s theory of sacramentality 
appears to Tertullian’s, a resemblance also noticed by Reynolds and Schmitt.168  Like 
Tertullian, Augustine sees marriage as intrinsically linked to the broader features of the 
Christian meta-narrative, and as a manifestation of the spiritual realities in which these 
features are most fully realized.  And, like Tertullian, Augustine uses this reflection to 
imbue marriage with an extreme degree of permanence. All of this remains true despite 
Augustine’s attempts to distance himself from the overall distrust of conjugal ties that 
drove Tertullian’s work, and that he was not particularly invested in the valorization of 
martyrdom that, in turn, create this distrust.  
The first of these practical problems is in relation to remarried widows, who 
violate Augustine’s mathematics of marriage in much the same way they do Tertullian’s.  
Throughout his marital writings, Augustine is clear that sacramentality equals extreme 
indissolubility, and that the only thing that can possibly destroy the marital bond is the 
death of one of the spouses.  He is also clear, however, that when marital ties are finally 
dissolved in this way the surviving spouse is free to remarry, even in the most spiritually 
dubious circumstances: “At the death of the husband to whom a woman was truly 
married, [a woman] can enter into a true marriage with the man with whom she had been 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 Sed quoniam ex multis animis una ciuitas futura est habentium animam unam et cor unum in deum, 
quae unitatis nostrae perfectio post hance peregrinationem futura est…propterea sacramentum nuptiarum 
temporis nostri sic ad unum uirum et unam uxorem redactum est. De bono coniugali 18. 21. 
168 See Reynolds, 282 and Schmitt, 216 
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previously living in adultery.”169  In stressing the acceptability of remarriage, moreover, 
Augustine explicitly sets himself in opposition to the position of Tertullian.  In his 414 
treatise De Bona Viduatis (composed in response to the queries of one particular widow, 
Juliana), Augustine takes a pointed swipe at “the loud, senseless puffed-up cheeks of 
Tertullian,” who “who slanders second marriages by calling them illicit, whereas the 
apostle, with a sober mind, conceded that they were permitted.”170   
Augustine continues to defend remarriage throughout his examination of 
widowhood, using essentially the same logic through which he upheld the goodness of 
marriage itself: that remarriage is good, but chaste widowhood is better.  For example: 
“The excellence of [the chaste widowhood] that you have chosen does not condemn 
second marriages, but means that they are honored less.. In the same way, the excellence 
of holy virginity, which your daughter chose, does not condemn your one single 
marriage.”171  Once again, Augustine seems to have found a perfect middle-ground 
between total marriage-positivism and the harsh asceticism of his predecessors, 
upholding the acceptability of remarriage while making chastity the better option. 
Where Augustine runs into trouble, however, is when he attempts to square this 
permission to remarry with the larger marital sacrament, which he had so strictly defined 
as the indissoluble, monogamous union of Christ and the Church.  This anxiety is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169 Denique mortuo viro cum quo verum connubium fuit fieri verum connubium potest cum quo prius 
adulterium fuit. De nuptiis et concupiscentia 1.10. 
170 Hinc enim maxime Cataphrygarum ac Nouatianorum haereses tumuerunt, quas buccis sonantibus, non 
sapientibus etiam Tertullianus inflauit, dum secundas nuptias tamquam inlicitas maledico dente concidi, 
quas omino licitas apostolus sobria mente concedit. De bono uiduatis 4.6, ed. Joseph Zycha, CSEL 41, 
310. 
171 Quapropter hoc primum oportet ut noueris, bono, quod elegisti, non damnari secundas nuptias, sed 
inferius honorari.  Nam sicut bonum sanctae uirginitatis, quod elegit filia tua, non damnat unas nuptias 
tuas, sic nec uiduatas tua cuiusquam secundas.  Ibid. 
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especially palpable when Augustine attempts to graft remarriage onto the Christian meta-
narrative, in which marriage had come uniquely to signify Christ’s singular bond with his 
people: 
You are living in the final age…If therefore you had chosen to marry again it 
would not be out of obedience to a prophecy or in accordance with the law, but 
for the simple reason of your own incontinence…A careful investigation of 
Christian teaching reveals that in these present times, unless incontinence 
provides an obstacle, even first marriages should be condemned…Now that Christ 
has given the word and been resurrected, there are already so many children of all 
races waiting to be born spiritually.”172 
When taken in isolation, Augustine’s assessment of second marriages versus 
chaste widowhood is perfectly logical, and entirely confluent with his relativised 
understanding of marital good as a whole.  When forced to consider these sorts of unions 
as a reflection of spiritual reality, however, Augustine ends up sounding remarkably like 
Tertullian, going even so far as to question the validity of first marriages.  In fact, 
Augustine himself deigns to admit that multiple marriages make him uneasy, despite the 
fact that he can find no scriptural basis for disallowing them: “I would not dare to 
condemn any marriage, but neither would I say that great number of them is no cause for 
shame…Who am I to decide where the limit lies, when I can see that the apostle did not 
set one?”173  Augustine’s tone here is almost helpless, as though he is fighting to square 
his own inclinations with the guiding rule of scriptural precedent.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172 Tu autem, quae et filios habes et eo saeculi fine uiuis…Profecto, si secundas nuptias adpetisses, nullum 
prophetiae nel legis obsequium, nullum prolis saltem carnale desiderium, sed solius incontinentiae fuisset 
indicium….Nam diligenter interrogata doctrina christiana et primas nuptias iam isto tempore, nisi 
incontinentia sit inpedimento, contemnaendas esse respondet…Post resurrectionem praedicationemque 
Christi, quando iam ex omnibus gentibus filiorum spiritaliter gignendorum tanta suppetit copia. De bono 
uiduatis 8.11 
173 Nec ullas nuptias audeo damnare nec eis uerecundiam numerositatis auferre…Qui putem definiendum, 
quod apostolum nec uideo definisse?De bono uiduatis 12.15. 
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The second difficulty within Augustine’s overall marital system was the status of 
concubines. This is partially due to the fact that concubinage most definitely has the 
ability to realize at least one of Augustine’s marriage goods: the procreation of children.  
Augustine acknowledges this, and takes the official position that, in essence, it doesn’t 
matter, as the goodness of the marriage lies in the institution itself—not the individual 
conduct of those who enter into it. Take, for example, the following passage, in which 
Augustine something of a “best-case scenario” for the taking of a concubine: 
It is the same with temporary possession of concubines: even if they have 
intercourse to produce children, it does not make their concubinage lawful.  On 
the other hand, even if wives play the wanton with their husbands, that does not 
put a stigma on the status of marriage..174 
 
The fact that a man may enter into a relationship with a concubine with nothing but the 
noblest of intentions (and indeed, one of the goods of marriage) in mind thus does not 
excuse the fact that he engaged in sex outside of the institutionalized safety of marriage.  
Augustine is adamant about this point, and about the fact that sex is only truly excused 
within the confines of marriage: “So too if temporary concubines have intercourse for the 
sake of having children, they do not thereby make their concubinage right; and married 
women who are lascivious with their husbands do not make the institution of marriage 
responsible for their guilt.”175   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
174 Sed tamen, si forte ad tempus adhibita concubina filios solos ex eadem commixtione quaesiuerit, nec sic 
ista coniunctio vel earum nuptiis praeponenda est quae ueniale illud operantur.  Quid sit nuptiarum 
considerandum est, non quid sit nubentium et immoderatius nuptiis utentium. De bono coniugali 14.16. 
175 Ita nec concubinae ad tempus adhibitae, si filiorum causa concumbant, iustum faciunt concubinatum 
suum, nec coniugatae, sic cum maritis lasciuiant, nuptiali ordini crimen imponunt. Ibid.  While 
Augustine’s engagement with the question of concubinage is often directed at women, there are moments 
in which he addresses the behavior and responsibilities of men who associate with concubines—namely, 
his Sermon 392, often cited in early canon law, in which he advises his audience: “Sufficiant vobis aut 
uxores aut nec uxores: concubinas vobis habere non licet.”  PL 39, 170. 
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It’s worth noting the striking parallel here with Augustine’s anti-Donatist 
writings, wherein he also argued that it was the integrity of the sacrament (in this case, 
baptism) and not the conduct of those celebrating it that counted for sacramental efficacy.  
Such similar logic reveals how thoroughly integrated marriage was within Augustine’s 
larger sacramental framework, despite his reluctance to include it in his rare lists of 
official sacraments.  It also points to a problem that would come to haunt the medieval 
theologians who followed Augustine’s conjugal theology; namely, that marriage consists 
only in the bond between the married parties themselves, who, no matter their conduct, 
are solely responsible for creating and maintaining the crucial signification of the 
“marriage” between Christ and the Church. 
It is perhaps due to this lack of clear distinction that Augustine’s tone softens 
when he turns to confront concubines on a more personal level, exhibiting much of the 
ambivalence that was evident in his discussion of widows and remarriage. When 
addressing the spiritual status of concubines themselves Augustine becomes almost 
downright forgiving, particularly if their liaisons resulted from a genuine desire for 
children. While such a woman has sinned, he would be hard-pressed “to refer to her as an 
adulteress,” and the nobility of her intentions may render her more “honorable” that some 
lusty matrons, who abuse the institution of marriage with their constant sexual 
demands.176 He thus openly raises the possibility of a concubine being inwardly “better” 
than her married sisters, with just the thin layer of the marital institution keeping her 
within the technical realm of sin. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176 Verumtamen si ei tori fidem seruet et, cum ille uxorem duxerit, nubere ipsa non cogitet atque a tali 
prorsus opere continere se praeparet, adulteram quidem fortassis facile appellare non audeam. De bono 
coniugali 5.5. 
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To further complicate matters,  it is not immediately plain what precisely 
differentiates concubinage from Augustine’s definition of marriage, and it is difficult for 
even Augustine himself to locate an official, structural boundary-marker.  While he 
somewhat laconically decrees that those “who had not been rightly united” may remedy 
their error through “a subsequent honorable agreement,” he does not go on to proscribe 
the exact form or nature of such a pact.177  His prevailing definition of a valid marriage 
seems to consist in the marriage goods itself, a formula which, in its intense 
preoccupation with behavioral and spiritual conditions, neglects to add an obligatory 
ceremonial component.   Augustine never pinpoints the specific moment at which a 
marriage officially begins—at which a couple’s procreative potential and mutual fidelity 
become cloaked in the marital sacramentum. If we were to seek to understand, on the 
basis of the preceding passages, what precisely differentiated a wife from a concubine, 
we might settle upon the temporary nature of the concubinage arrangement. The 
hypothetical man in this scenario takes a concubine “for a time”; she is clearly described 
as “temporary.”   
These above factors combine to create an uncertain middle-ground between 
marital and non-marital unions, as Augustine makes plain in the following passage: 
A further question often raised is when a man and a woman, neither of them 
married to anyone, have sex with each other not to have children, but merely to 
indulge in intercourse because they cannot control their lust.  But they show 
fidelity to each other in that the man does not have sex with another woman, nor 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177 Posse sane fieri nuptias ex male coniunctis honesto postea placito consequente manifestum est.  De 
bono coniugali 15.17.  As Judith Evans Grubbs points out, this suggestion was also commonly featured in 
contemporary Roman marital law, as emperors from Constantine onward “allow[ed] retroactive 
legitimation of wives and children in relationships that should have been marriage, not concubinage, in the 
first place.” Grubbs, “Marrying and Its Documentation in Later Roman Law,” in To Have and to Hold: 
Marrying and Its Documentation in Western Christendom 400-1400 (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 
89. 
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the woman with another man….Doubtless without absurdity it can indeed be 
labeled a marriage, provided, to that they do not avoid having children.178 
 
The fact that Augustine never actually utilizes the term concubina in this passage 
(which could easily be seen as describing concubinage) illustrates the thin theoretical ice 
on which he is skating.  Indeed, what he is saying here comes dangerously close to 
asserting that there is little to no difference between marriage and lifelong, monogamous 
concubinage, a fact that would only be accentuated by referring to the woman above as a 
concubina.  The fact that he instead chooses to refer to her obliquely reveals a potential 
locus of anxiety within his conjugal paradigm; specifically the dubious difference 
between a wife and a concubine.   
This passage appears even more complex when compared with Augustine’s 
description of his own non-marital partnership in the Confessions.  Here, Augustine also 
declines to utilize the word concubina, defining this woman instead as “a woman whom I 
had not by that which is called legitimate marriage,” or “she with whom I habitually 
slept.”179  In James O’Donnell’s opinion, this woman was in fact “his wife in all but 
name,” speculating that the only reason their union was not considered official was the 
relative class difference between them.180 Augustine, however, attributes the non-marital 
state of their relationship according to their lack of procreative intentions (regardless of 
the fact that they did, in fact, have a son).  As he famously put it:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178 Solet etiam quaeri cum masculus et femina, nec ille maritus nec illa uxor alterius, sibimet non filiorum 
procreandorum sed propter oncontinentiam solius concubitus causa copulantur ea fide media, ut nec ille 
cum altera nec illa cum altero id faciat….Et potest quide, fortasse non absurde hoc appellari conibium, si 
usque d mertem alicuius eorum id inter eos placuerit….non tamen uitauerint ut uel nolint sibi nasci filios. 
De bono coniugali 5.5. 
179 Unam habebam, non eo quod legitimum vocatur coniugio cognitam. Confessions 4.2.2. Interea mea 
peccata multiplicabantur, et avulsa a latere meo, tamquam inpedimento coniugii, cum qua cubare solitus 
eram. Confessions 6.15.25. 
180 James O’Donnell, Confessions: Commentary on Books 1-7, v.2 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) 381-2. 
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With her I learned through my own experience what a vast difference there is 
between right and proper marriage, which has been entered into for the sake of 
having children, and a pact based on lustful desires, wherein the birth of a child is 
not intended, although once born he compels his parents to love him.181 
 
What is immediately striking about this description, especially when viewed alongside 
the preceding passage from De Bono Conjugali, is that Augustine predicates the non-
marital status of his relationship on their lack of intention to have children—despite the 
fact that (four years later in De Bono Conjugali) he would eventually cease to see a 
couple’s lack of intention to procreate as a barrier to their being deemed “married.”  One 
reason for this may lie in certain details that Augustine is choosing not to disclose above.  
It has frequently been speculated that Augustine and his partner did engage in some sort 
of contraceptive practice, as they produced only one child over the span of a thirteen-year 
relationship.182  This would mean that Augustine and his concubine “did something 
wrong to prevent the birth of children,” and thus make this passage confluent with the 
description of quasi-marriage presented in De Bono Conjugali. Whatever the reason, it is 
clear that Augustine vacillated somewhat on this issue in his earliest writings on 
marriage, a sign of its thorny status within his marital theology. 
Another, more subtle clue to the way in which Augustine conceived (either 
consciously or unconsciously)183 of the difference between concubines and wives can be 
found in what actually happens to his partner in the Confessions, and how Augustine 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181 In qua sane experirer exemplo meo, quid distaret inter coniugalis placiti modum, quod foederatum esset 
generandi gratia, et pactum libidinosi amoris, ubi proles etiam contra votum nascitur, quamvis iam nata 
cogat se diligi.  Confessions 4.2.2. 
182 See Brown, Augustine of Hippo, 61. 
183 In making assertions of this sort I am directly following Margaret Miles, who has noticed a host of what 
she terms “unconscious” tendencies within Augustine’s thought.  Augustine, according to Miles, was a 
writer especially plagued by suppressed thoughts and assumptions, which can be observed occasionally 
bubbling to the surface of his otherwise perfectly systematized theological works.  See Miles, Augustine on 
the Body, 129. 
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portrays this chain of events.  After living with her faithfully for nine years (much to his 
mother’s disapproval), Augustine finally decides to cast her aside in favor of a legitimate 
marriage—a decision he explicitly portrays as a social rather than a moral one.184  When 
Augustine at last consents to the prospect of marriage it is a direct result of his mother’s 
pressure, with no consideration of, “how the goodness of marriage is the result of the 
duty to honor the discipline of matrimony and raise children.”185  It is at this point that 
Augustine’s partner is sent away—not because he repents of their relationship’s moral 
implications, but because she has now officially become “an impediment” to his 
engagement.186 
 If the details of Augustine’s personal life do not meet the standards he was 
attempting to set for good Christian behavior, they are nonetheless perfectly confluent 
with the practices and expectations of contemporary Roman society, who would have 
seen no cause for shame in his lengthy monogamous partnership or social-climbing 
betrothal.  As will be discussed at greater length in the following chapters, Roman law 
defined marriage by the loose, ambiguous criterion of maritalis affectio: the ongoing 
intention of both spouses to remain married to one another.187  In this context, the 
primary (perhaps only) differentiating factor between marriage and concubinage was the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
184 For the social implications of Augustine’s decision see J.J O’Meara, The Young Augustine (London: 
Brill, 1980), 129.  Also Larissa Carina Seelbach, “Augustine on Concubinage and Women’s Dignity,” 
Studia Patristica 43 (2003). 
185 Neutrum enim nostrum, si quod est coniugale decus in officio regendi matrimonii et suscipiendorum 
liberorum, ducebat nisi tenuiter. Confessions 6. 12. 22 
186 Confessions 6. 15. 25; see footnote 156 above.  Constantinian marriage legislation indeed forbid a man 
to keep a wife and a concubine simultanously, so the dismissal of Augustine’s companion is historically 
understandable.    See Beryl Rawson, “Roman Concubinage and Other De Facto Marriages,” Transactions 
of the American Philological Association 104 (1974), 297-305, Grubbs, Law and Family in Late Anqituity: 
: The Emperor Constantine’s Marriage Legislation (Oxford University Press, 1995), 298. 
187 Fourth and fifth century law defined marriage as the free consent of two legally eligible parties. No 
ceremony was required, but the occasion was often marked by a ceremonial deductio in domum, the leading 
of the bride to her new husband’s home.  Grubbs, Marrying and its Documentation, 47-8. 
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relative social status of the parties, as Roman legal codes were extremely specific as to 
which classes were allowed to intermarry.188  “Brides” were therefore distinguished from 
“concubines” by the extent to which they matched the social position of their partner, 
with some sort of parental or dotal agreement generally tacked on among the higher 
classes.189 It was not at all unusual, moreover, for a young man to bide his time with a 
lower-class partner until he was prepared for the domestic and financial responsibilities 
of a paterfamilias, and laws existed to sort out the status of any children produced 
through this sort of premarital union.190  Most importantly, all of this legislation was 
devoid of moral judgment, treating such partnerships as a perfectly acceptable source of 
companionship, household stability, and progeny.191 
 Augustine thus emerges as an entirely typical example of fourth-century Roman 
conjugal and domestic norms—perhaps too much so for his own comfort.  In reimagining 
marriage as a union grounded in lifelong fidelity and sacramental symbolism, he had 
attempted to create something that was radically different from the dissoluble, class-
conscious unions of secular Roman society, in keeping with the Church’s extremely 
divergent ideas about property, class, and sex.  Within this framework, his own story 
becomes a pointed counterexample, and he is careful throughout the Confessions to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
188 For Roman marriage and class restrictions, see Grubbs, Law and Family in Late Antiquity, 261-3; 
Rawson, 304. 
189 According to Susan Treggiari, the line between marriage concubinage was precariously thin, so much so 
that “the lack of intention of one partner suffices to reduce the union to concubinatus, conceivably 
unbenownkst to the other.”  Treggiari, “Concubinae,” in Papers of the British School at Rome 49 (1981), 
61. 
190 Treggiari points out that concubinage could confer a a comparatively adventageous status on a lower 
class woman, as it was a legally recognized status that generally permitted children a share of their father’s 
estate.  Treggiari, 60. For Augustine’s situation as an example of this practice, see Brown, Augustine of 
Hippo, 61 and O’Donnell, Confessions: Commentary, 379-84. 
191 In addition, Grubbs has convincingly argued that post-Constantinian laws facilitating marriage and 
legitimization of children aren’t meant to demean or discourage concubinage, but merely to aid in the 
production of legitimate heirs.  Grubbs, Law and Family in Late Antiquity, 279. 
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portray it as such.  However, what he ended up creating was, functionally and legally, 
almost identical to Roman marriage: a consent-based partnership, consisting primarily in 
the mutual will of the parties.  What’s more, his formulation of marriage as a spiritual, 
symbolically-laden bond left no room for dowry or contractual requirements, thus 
eliminating some of the main components that separated Roman matrimony from simple 
cohabitation.   
 With social status and dowry out of the picture, all that remained for 
Christian theologians was the principle of mutual consent (maritalis affectio).  While a 
sole reliance on this concept was entirely confluent with the spiritualized Christian notion 
of matrimony, it came with the adverse effect of making marriage socially 
indistinguishable from lifelong concubinage.  The fact that Augustine realized this, and 
the fact that he found it troubling, can be made to account for the way in which he 
portrays his non-marital relationship in the Confessions, as well as his persistent 
ambiguity he displays in defining and distinguishing concubinage. 
 It was this ambiguity that would become the most unwelcome inheritance 
of medieval thinkers, as theologians and canon lawyers strove to fill in the gaps left by 
Augustine’s formula.  In so doing, they were also forced to confront the logical 
difficulties embedded in this formula, and to square them with the social realities of their 
own day.  It is the argument of this chapter that in so doing they were wrestling not just 
with Augustine, but with the preceding thinkers and theories that went into the 
development of his marital theology.  In attempting to balance the unwieldy marital 
equations of both Tertullian and Jerome, Augustine also paradoxically ensured their 
survival, carrying them forward as awkward remainders into the theological future. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Building a Mysterion: The Construction of Marriage as a Sacrament 
 
For the last fifty years, the narrative about marriage in the middle ages has been 
dominated by a story of gradual assimilation, whereby the church managed to 
disseminate and enforce its marital policies against a vast array of previously secular 
practices.  This understanding found its genesis in the various marital studies of Georges 
Duby192, who argued that medieval matrimony was defined by a struggle between an 
“aristocratic” model of marriage that privileged worldly concerns and an “ecclesiastical” 
model that emphasized the married couples’ spiritual needs and religious duties.  Duby’s 
thesis received a noteworthy addendum in the work of Jack Goody, who saw the church’s 
insistence upon the “ecclesiastical model” as a means of increasing its own wealth and 
power at the expense of the aristocracy.193  It is not surprising that this way of thinking 
has attracted its fair share of critics in recent years, particularly on the grounds that 
clerical and aristocratic identities were by no means mutually exclusive.194  There is also 
the increasingly prevalent awareness that, as Ruth Mazo Karras has recently argued, “in 
every dispute over the validity of marriage, there were churchmen and laymen on both 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
192 See especially Georges Duby, Medieval Marriage: Two Models from Twelfth Century France, trans. 
Elborg Foster (Baltimore: John’s Hopkins University Press, 1987) and The Knight, the Lady, and the 
Priest: the Making of Modern Marriage in Medieval France, trans. Barbara Bray (New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1983). 
193 Jack Goody, The Development of the Family and Marriage in Europe (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983).  See especially pg. 59. 
194 Michael Sheehan, for example, has argued that high-powered clerics were recruited from among the 
ranks of the aristocracy, and thus the two classes were often of the same mind on most marital questions.  
See Sheehan, “Marriage of the Unfree and the Poor,” in Marriage, Family, and Law in Medieval Europe: 
Collected Essays, ed. James K. Farge (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), 216. 
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sides,” a condition resulting from the general lack of a unified opinion about marriage 
among either social milieu.195  What has remained influential, however, is Duby’s general 
notion of the “Christianization” of European ideas about marriage, along with the idea 
that laypeople eventually came to understand and accept the Church’s marital doctrines.   
Historical Considerations 
	  
To be sure, the church would have found plenty to disapprove of among early 
medieval marriage customs, which mostly comprised a scattered mélange of Roman and 
Germanic traditions.  First of all, there was the pervasive tendency to see nuptials as a 
process of negotiation between the couples’ parents, a practice leftover from Roman law 
that ran in direct contradiction to the church’s growing insistence on the freely-given 
consent of the actual married parties.  There was also, perhaps more troublingly, a 
general lack of compliance with the Christian doctrine of indissolubility, as both Roman 
and Germanic marriages contained built-in provisions for divorce.  While Late Antique 
marriage bonds do not seem to have been broken with the frequency that Christian 
apologists would have had us believe, Roman law codes also included detailed divorce 
legislation, with no proof of adultery or abuse required on the part of either spouse.196 
Germanic law codes made marriages somewhat more difficult to dissolve, though still 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
195 Ruth Mazo Karras, Unmarriages: Men, Women, and Sexual Unions in the Middle Ages (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), 5. 
196Judith Evans Grubbs has argued that ideals of marital indissolubility were prevalent in pre-Constantian 
Roman law, though these ideals rested exclusively on marriage’s value as a means of social stability, and 
were by no means compulsory.  See Judith Evans Grubbs, Law and Family in Late Antiquity: The Emperor 
Constantine's Marriage Legislation (Oxford University Press, 2000), 54-65. For an alternative perspective, 
see Susan Treggiari, “Divorce, Roman Style: How Easy and Frequent Was it,” in Marriage, Divorce, and 
Children in Ancient Rome, ed. Beryl Rawson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 31-46.  For 
examples of Roman divorce provisions see Codex Justinianus [CJ] 5.24.1, 5.12.15, 5.16.18, 5.17.4, 5.18.8, 
5.21.2, Corpus Iuris Civilius, vol 2, edited by Paul Keuger (Clark, NJ: The Lawbook Exchange, reprint 
2010);  Digesta Justinianus [DJ], 23.2.12.3, 23.2.45.5, 23.3.48.1, 23.3.63, Corpus Iuris Civilius vol 2, 
edited by Theodore Mommsen (The Lawbook Exchange). 
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offered relatively consequence-free options if the complainant was male. Burgundian 
law, for example, imposed a mere fine of twelve solidi upon men who put away their 
wives for reasons other than adultery or witchcraft, and allowed them to do so freely if 
they could furnish proof of these crimes.197  The Visigothic Code, which maintained a 
somewhat more prohibitive attitude towards divorce, nonetheless permitted men to 
“unjustly” divorce their wives for the simple price of returning the woman’s dowry, 
which they were free to keep if they were able to demonstrate just cause for the 
separation.198   
Perhaps the most difficult issue for the church to confront was the widespread 
tolerance of extra-marital sexuality, a practice that (in both Roman and Germanic 
cultures) was restricted only by the relative social status of the parties.  In general, this 
meant that high-class men were free to pursue relations with women of lower social 
status, and that neither party would be penalized for enjoying such a dalliance.  Roman 
law did put some limits on the sexual activities of the senatorial class, as well as the 
amount that could be bequeathed on children produced outside of marriage. It mattered 
little whether the man himself had a spouse at the time, as, in both cultures, “adultery” 
occurred only when the female partner was married. It was women, of course, who saw 
the greatest constraints placed upon their sexual activity—particularly upper-class 
women, whose sexuality was reserved for marriage alone. None of these restrictions, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
197 Women, on the other hand, were sentenced to be “smothered in mire” for the crime of leaving their 
husbands.  See The Burgundian Code, trans. Katherine Fisher Drew (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1972)34. 1-3, pg. 41. 
198 The only legitimitae cause for divoce listed in the Visigothic Code is adultery, but even if a woman were 
put off for “unjust” reasons she would not be allowed to marry again.  This is perhaps in keeping with the 
Code’s larger (and must lenghtier) maxim on divorce, “Ne inter coniuges divortium fiat.” Lex 
Visigothorum 3.6.1-2, in Leges Visigothorum, edited by Karolus Zeumer, Monumentae Germaniae 
Historicae, Tomus 1 (Laepzig, 1902), 166-169. 
83	  
	  
however, emanated from a place of moral judgment, or from an effort to control the 
sexual act itself.  Rather, the focus remained on preserving the intricate balance of class 
and inheritance structures, and finding a place for extra-marital sex within this system. 
In addition to these casual relationships, both Roman and Germanic societies also 
allowed for a more permanent sort of non-marital partnership: concubinage, the profusion 
of which would soon become the single greatest thorn in Christian marital theology’s 
side.  The Roman institution of concubinage was, as we have seen, a tremendous 
influence on the conjugal ideas of Augustine, who had to confront the issue on both a 
personal and a cultural level.  As in short-term sexual relationships, Roman concubinage 
was restricted only by class distinctions of the parties, and was protected by various legal 
and social traditions.  The Germanic equivalent of concubinage, friedelehe, is somewhat 
more difficult to pin down, largely because marriages themselves were so much more 
loosely defined.  In Regine le Jan’s estimation, friedelehe could comprise anything from 
an undowered marriage to a polygamous union to a loosely-monogamous domestic 
arrangement—the latter roughly corresponding to the Roman notion of concubinatus.199  
In all instances, these partnerships maintained deep roots within the overall fabric of 
domestic and sexual life, eventually finding a tacit (though enduring) place within the 
Christian notion of marriage.   
If this situation saw little change between the years 500 and 1100, it is partially 
because ecclesiastical authorities displayed little interest in changing it.  Bogged down in 
matters of ecclesiology and the ever-evolving Trinitarian doctrine, early medieval 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
199 Régine Le Jan, Famille et pouvoir dans le monde franc (VIIeme-Xeme siècle): essai d’anthropologie 
sociale (Paris: Publication de la Sorbonne, 1995), 270-2; see also Brundage, Law, Sex, and Christian 
Society, 128-30. 
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theologians had little interest in regulating the sexual habits of the laity, holding instead 
to the idealization of virginity adopted by their Patristic forebears. 200  Even Isidore of 
Seville, who did tackle the subject, spent much of his De Conjugatis insisting that Adam 
and Eve remained chaste in Paradise, as “the goods of marriage are not to be equated 
with those of virginity or a widow’s continence.”201 Isidore’s preference for virginity is 
even exceeded by that of Rabanus Maurus, who (channeling Tertullian) insists that “be 
fruitful and multiply” has been superseded by the warning that the end is near.202  
Just after the turn of the millennium, several forces collided to make Church 
authorities turn their attention to questions surrounding matrimony—in addition to the 
possible financial motivations posited by Goody and Duby.  There was, first of all, the 
famous surge in lay piety chronicled by André Vauchez, which forced the church to 
address the spiritual needs of the “third order” and to expand its doctrine accordingly.203  
After the late eleventh century these concerns were joined by those of the Gregorian 
reformers, who, in their efforts to curtail clerical sexuality, strove to provide a clearer 
picture of the conjugal life available to the laity.204  Challenges to sacramental logic, such 
as that posed by Berengar of Tours, also provoked Church authorities to clarify what 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
200  See Glenn W. Olsen, “Marriage in Barbarian Kingdom and Christian Court, Fifth through Eleventh 
Centuries,” in Christian Marriage: A Historical Study (New York: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 
2001), 146-152. 
201 Ideo que nec peccatum nuptias dicimus, nec tamen eas bono virginalis continentiae vel etiam vidualis 
coaequamus. Isidore of Seville, De Ecclesiasticiis Officiis Lib. II, 20, PL 83, pg. 810.  
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supernae gratia benedictionis instituit. Sed magis honoranda, majori est benedictione digna virginitas, 
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Rabanus Maurus, Commentarius in Genesim 1.14, PL 107, pg. 461. 
203 André Vauchez, Les laïcs au Moyen Age: Practiques et expériences religieuses (Paris: Cerf, 1987).  
204 For the connection between reformers and sacramental theology, see Thomas M. Finn, “The 
Sacramental World in the Sentences of Peter Lombard,” Theological Studies 69 (2008), 559-582. 
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exactly they meant by a “sacrament,” the sacrament of marriage included.205  Finally, the 
growing threat of Catharism prompted a natural brightening in the way clerics discussed 
marriage and sexuality, since a wholesale endorsement of virginity now appeared 
dangerously ascetic (if not downright heretical). 
Once Church authorities began to interest themselves in marriage, they also began 
instituting a variety of mechanisms to communicate their fledging marital theology.  
Penitentials, and later, confessors’ manuals, were developed to help priests advise their 
parishioners on conjugal matters, particularly the always-tricky question of when and 
how a married couple might fulfill their marriage debt.206 Preaching, as D.L. D’Avray has 
demonstrated, constituted another important means through which the Church broadcast 
its ideas about marriage, particularly with the advent of “mass-scale” mendicant 
preaching.  Here, D’Avray argues, marriage became a popular symbol for conveying “the 
strength of the bond between God and humanity,” which in turn reinforced the notion of 
human marriage as indissoluble. 207 
The Church also attempted to insert itself into how marriages were contracted, an 
aim that it accomplished with varying degrees of success.  Dotal charters, which canon 
law greatly encouraged, were increasingly imbued with ecclesiastical language, invoking 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
205 See E. Ann Matter, “Orthodoxy and Deviance,” in The Cambridge History of Christianity Volume 3, ed. 
Thomas F.X Noble and Julia M.H. Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 510-30. 
206 Michael Sheehan, “Choice of Marriage Partner in the Middle Ages: Development and Mode of 
Application of a Theory of Marriage,“ Marriage, Family, and Law in Medieval Europe, 25, Brundage, 
Law, Sex, and Christian Society 152-67, Jacqueline Murray, “Gendered Souls in Sexed Bodies: The Male 
Construction of Female Sexuality in Some Medieval Confessors’ Manuals,” in Handling Sin: Confession in 
the Middle Ages, edited by Peter Biller and A.J. Minnis (York Medieval Press, 1998), 79-93. 
207 D.L. d’Avray, Medieval Marriage: Symbolism and Society (Oxford University Press, 2005), 17. 
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matrimony’s divine origins and sacred purpose.208  Clerical authorities also began urging 
couples to solemnize their union through a priestly blessing, a practice that had been 
somewhat sporadically adopted prior to the thirteenth century.  In contrast to the early 
medieval model (which generally involved a private ceremony, often at the couple’s 
bedside), the blessings the church began promoting after 1100 were to take place in full 
public view, sparking the popularly-known designation (repeated famously by the Wife 
of Bath) of marriage “at chirche dore.”209 
One of the great disagreements of medieval marriage studies is the extent to 
which this blessing was successfully imposed, as well as what exactly these ceremonies 
would have looked like.210  No standardized text existed to provide the firm contours of 
the marital liturgy, and (for complex reasons to be discussed in the subsequent chapter) 
the church had no way of knowing, much less recording, how many couples married 
publically.  Rituals varied widely across cultures and geographic regions, as did the 
degree of clerical involvement in the marriage process.211  The fact that this picture did 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208 In his study of Frankish dotal charters, Philip Reynolds sees a spike in “sacred preambles” around the 
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Philip L. Reynolds, “Dotal Charters in the Frankish Tradition,” To Have and To Hold: Marrying and Its 
Documentation in Western Christendom, 400-1600, edited by  Philip L. Reynolds and John Witte Jr. 
(Cambridge University Press, 2007), 134-148.  
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many historians argue that evidence is far too spotty to posit any sort of widespread lay participation in 
marriage rites, based on lack of liturgical regularization and ongoing invectives against clandestine 
marriage.  See Philip L. Reynolds, “Marrying and Its Documentation in Pre-Modern Europe,” 1-42; 
Michael M. Sheehan, “Theory and Practice: Marriage of the Unfree and Poor,” 211-16; Brundage, Law, 
Sex, and Christian Society 135-7, 183-5. 
211Reynolds, “Marrying and Its Documentation,” 19-25. 
87	  
	  
not become clearer after the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215, which made a public 
blessing obligatory, is one of the central issues to be explored in the two following 
chapters.   
Regardless of how many marriages were publically celebrated, missals from the 
later Middle Ages display an increasing awareness of sacramental principles, and a desire 
to transmit and enact these principles through the marital liturgy.  This was true of both 
the blessing contained within the nuptial mass and the variety of church-door vows and 
rituals that emerged from the eleventh century onward.  The Gregorian Sacramentary, 
which replaced the Leonine Sacramentary as the standard liturgical text in the early ninth 
century, added explicitly sacramental language to the nuptial benediction, blessing those 
who are entering into “the sacrament prefigured by nuptial bond of Christ and the 
Church.”212  Likewise, after the fourteenth century, couples were regularly asked to swear 
to both the indissolubility of their union and their free consent in contracting it, reflecting 
(albeit in a somewhat delayed fashion) the theological consensus that consent both 
signified and created the marriage bond.213 
All of these modes of church involvement, however, might be said to spring from 
a single (albeit complicated) source: the increasingly collaborative relationship between 
sacramental theology and canon law.  The rise of medieval universities (in particular 
those of Paris and Bologna) allowed both theology and canon law to develop as 
sophisticated, unique areas of specialization, and also created an ideal breeding ground 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
212 Deus qui tam excellenti mysterio coniugalem copulam consecrasti, ut Christi et eclesiae  praesignares 
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manuscrits, edité par Jean Deshusses (Éditions Universitaires: Fribourg, Suisse, 1971), 310.  For usage of 
the Gregorian Sacramentary in medieval marriage rites, see Ritzer 245-50; Molin et Mutembe 214-223. 
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for cross-pollination between the two disciplines.214  As a result, theologians gained a 
practical framework for their often numinous sacramental notions, just as canonists 
gained a firm ideological basis on which to ground their legal compilations.  As an 
additional result, the Church found a clear-cut channel for communicating their marital 
ideas to the laity, flowing from the classroom to the legal annals to (from the fourteenth 
century onward) the developing system of ecclesiastical courts.215   
The effect of canon law upon sacramental theology can be detected almost as 
soon as the former emerged as an individualized type of discourse; that is, just after the 
publication of Gratian’s Decretum (c. 1140).  As Marcia Colish has noted, Gratian’s 
masterwork had a profound influence on the sacramental system promulgated some ten 
years later by Peter Lombard, in particular his treatment of penance and marriage.216 
Gratian’s vast array of source material, as well as the itemized and systematic way in 
which he presented it, aided the Lombard in accomplishing what had eluded his 
theological predecessors: establishing a set criteria through which the sacraments could 
be enumerated and analyzed.  Canon law also provided a real-life perspective for 
theologians to draw upon, which proved crucial in rendering their idea of marriage 
relevant and applicable.  Thomas Aquinas, for example, drew heavily upon thirteenth-
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century case law in his articles on free versus compulsory consent, incorporating 
Alexander III’s famous criterion of “fear that would cause a steady man to fall.”217 
 Likewise, canon law saw also itself deeply transformed by the theological 
advances of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, perhaps to an even greater extent than by 
the “Roman law revival” of roughly the same period.  Clearer theological guidelines 
meant clearer boundaries between different modes of Christian living, allowing canonists 
to better address, in Stephan Kuttner’s words, the “supernatural mystery which manifests 
itself in the structural forms of social life.”218  This especially applied to canonists’ 
treatment of marriage, which, even in the great schematized tome of Gratian, appeared as 
an uneven and oft-contradictory collection of dicta.  Just twenty years after the probable 
date of his Decretum (and almost directly on the heels of Lombard’s Sentences) canonists 
had begun to preface their conjugal rulings with a theological primer of sorts, explaining 
the abstract symbolic principles upon which these rulings would be based.219   
The innovations of scholastic theology also helped canon lawyers to clarify and 
support their individual points.  When Ivo of Chartres, at the dawn of the twelfth century, 
wished to make the argument that marriage bonds were unbreakable until death, he had 
only snippets of Augustine’s marital treatises to offer support, reproduced verbatim with 
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no supplemental analysis.220  By the time Hostiensis (whose Summa Area dates to 
roughly 1253) sought to make the same case, he had a wealth of theological reasoning 
upon which to ground his contentions, including complex symbolic logic drawn from 
linking the sacraments marriage and baptism.221 It is this sort of disciplinary give-and-
take has prompted Ian P. Wei to envision theology and canon law as the “armor and 
weaponry” of the ecclesiastical agenda, producing the necessary tools for spreading and 
enforcing the evolving body of dogma.222 
What is difficult to determine, however, is the success this “armor and weaponry” 
might have had against the unsavory conjugal practices outlined above, in particular 
divorce and concubinage.  Even as both canon law and theology reached the height of 
their sophistication, there is evidence that many couples either did not understand Church 
marital policies or chose to manipulate these rules for their own purposes.  The annals of 
canon law itself are littered with cases of individuals seeking to either enforce or extricate 
themselves from a hazily-contracted marriage, as well as opportunistic lotharios 
attempting to gain conquests through false promises.223  This confusion is also borne out 
by the records of ecclesiastical courts, where canon law collided with both human nature 
and the stubborn persistence of local custom.  Well into the sixteenth century, courtrooms 
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remained crowded with pregnant would-be brides, demanding recognition of marriages 
their “grooms” said had never taken place.224  Often, courts also had to contend with 
ignorance or defiance on the part of both parties, in particular couples who had chosen to 
enter into a union without the proper formalities.  These “clandestine” marriages 
remained some of the most commonly punished sexual offenses up through the middle of 
the sixteenth century, suggesting that the Fourth Lateran Council’s interdiction of such 
unions had been to little effect. 
Thus, while authorities could prohibit divorce by excommunicating formally-
married spouses who chose to separate and remarry, they could do little to counter the 
more surreptitious version of this scenario: couples who had clandestinely “married” in 
order to keep their options open for the future.  As Ruth Mazo Karras has recently 
demonstrated, medieval couples continued to make use of “the gray and ambiguous” 
margins of marriage well after the Church’s policy on indissolubility was firmly in place, 
enjoying both the stability of a monogamous pair bond and the possibility of a more 
advantageous union.  Often, courts chose to deal with such couples by issuing a judgment 
of abjuration sub pena nubendi, stipulating that they were to either separate or publically 
marry within a fixed period of time. 225 Should they choose the former, however, nothing 
prohibited either party from formally marrying at will. 
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Yet it was concubinage that posed the far more pernicious threat to Christian 
conjugal doctrine, particularly since the official reaction to it was so scattered and 
indecisive.  In some regions the practice seemed to be not only tolerated but legally 
protected.  Parisian courts, despite doling out several punitive decisions against couples 
living in concubinage, also seemed to reserve punishment for couples who caused trouble 
that went beyond the simple fact of cohabitating.226  Iberian authorities went one step 
further by allowing women to enter into a “carta de compaña de mesa y cama,” whereby 
she would be paid a fixed sum for cohabitating (and sleeping) with a man for a fixed 
period of time, and any children produced through this union would be assured his 
financial support.227  Of course, all of this ran counter to the Church’s formal definition 
of concubinage as nothing more than simple fornication, which it was able to impose 
through a variety of public-shaming practices.  The ritual of “churching,” which cleansed 
and reintegrated a new mother back into the congregation, became increasingly restricted 
to publically-married women, thus identifying and excluding women in more irregular 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
226 One striking example provided by Karras is that of Georges and his concubine Pierette, who, in the 
midst of a public quarrel, “pulled out [Georges’] testicles or pulled them so that blood flowed. Karras, 
Unmarriages, 155. For concubinage in Paris see also Karras, “The regulation of sexuality in the late 
Middle Ages: England and France,” Speculum 86.4 (2011), 1010-1039.  This tolerance was also exhibited 
by Bolognese judges, who allowed couples to cohabitate so long as they remained monogamous. See Carol 
Lansing, “Concubines, Lovers, Prostitutes: Infamy and Female Identity in Medieval Bologna,” in Beyond 
Florence: The Contours of Medieval and Early Modern Italy, edited by Paula Findlen, Michelle M. 
Fontaine, and Duane J. Osheim (Stanford University Press, 2003), 85-100.  Finally, this footnote would not 
be truly epic without mention of the curious absence of the term “concubine” (or its equivalents) from 
English court records, which has been generally chalked up to the overall English “exceptionalism” in all 
marriage litigation.  See. Charles Donahue, “The Canon Law on the Formation of Marriage and Social 
Practice in the Later Middle Ages,” Journal of Family History 8 (1983), 144-158. 
227 Eukene Lacarra Lanz, “Changing Boundaries of Licit and Illicit Unions: Concubinage and Prostitution,” 
in Marriage and Sexuality in Medieval and Early Modern Iberia, edited by Eukene Lacarra Lanz (New 
York: Routledge, 2002), 158-194. 
93	  
	  
circumstances.228  On a practical level, however, a non-married partner’s status seemed to 
have depended on a complex web of factors, chiefly her personal behavior and her 
community’s willingness to accept it.229 
By the high Middle Ages the church also found itself with a marital problem of its 
own making: what to do about the remarital possibilities of widows.  On the one hand, 
post-twelfth-century canon law affirmed a widow’s right to marry the partner of her 
choosing, and guaranteed her a portion (typically one third) of her late husband’s estate.  
Widows theoretically could, and often did, find themselves in an enviable position: 
independent, financially secure, and (unlike their virgin or married counterparts) able to 
represent themselves in legal and fiscal decisions.  But whether or not a woman achieved 
this position depended on a complicated set of circumstances, which often took the 
decision to remarry out of her hands.  While widows in lower social classes were often 
forced into second marriages purely out of monetary concerns, upper-class women were 
frequently told whether (and who) to remarry by their superior feudal lords.230  Any 
misstep could cost the widow a hefty amount of her resources and privileges, including 
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custody of her children.231  Widows were also regularly forced to fight for what was 
theirs on a financial front, as her in-laws could have a variety of reasons for keeping her 
inheritance out of her hands, particularly if it consisted largely of real estate.  Unless her 
late husband had left behind a generous and detailed will, it was not uncommon for a 
widow to find herself in court in order to reclaim something so basic as her dowry—the 
bare minimum of what was due to her after her husband’s death.232 
In negotiating these affairs, widows also had to contend with a vast and 
contradictory nexus of social expectations, which often seemed to limit their already 
narrow options.  The widely-circulated “educational” manual of Juan Luis Vives, for 
example, advises widows that “a good woman does not bring the arguments of a litigant 
into court…even to the detriment of her possessions.”233  Rather, Vives enjoins the 
widow to live a life entirely dedicated to the memory of her late husband, viewing any 
subsequent marriage as a base concession to lust.234  Vives’ sentiments are perhaps the 
culmination of several centuries’ worth of pressure for a widowed woman to act as her 
deceased husband’s spiritual cheerleader, an expectation which, as Katherine Clark points 
out, can be directly linked to the illustrious “birth of purgatory.”235 In the best-known 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
231 See Sue Sheridan Walker, “Widow and Ward: Feudal Law of Child Custody in Medieval England,” in 
Women in Medieval Society, ed. Susan Mosher Stuard (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1976), 159-72 
232 See Sue Sheridan Walker, “Litigation as Personal Quest: Suing for Dower in the Royal Courts, circa 
1272-1350,” in Wife and Widow in Medieval England, edited by Sue Sheridan Walker (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1993), 81-108, Janet Loengard, “’Which May Be Said to Be Her Own: 
Widows and Goods in Late Medieval England, in Medieval Domesticity: Home, Housing and Household in 
Medieval England, edited by Maryanne Kowaleski and P.J.P. Goldberg (Cambridge University Press, 
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233 Juan Luis Vives, The Education of a Christian Woman: A Sixteenth Century Manual, translated and 
edited by Charles Fantazzi (University of Chicago Press, 2000), 281. 
234 Ibid, 259, 285-9. 
235 Katherine Clark, “Purgatory, Punishment, and the Discourse of Holy Widowhood in the High and Later 
Middle Ages,” Journal of the History of Sexuality 16 (2007), 169-203. 
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example of this trope, that of Guibert of Nogent’s mother, the widow in question not only 
endures a posthumous confession of adultery from her husband, but gamely agrees to 
pray for his soul, offering up “almost daily masses, prayers, and tears.”236 
While this “holy widow” archetype was most certainly encouraged, it was 
nonetheless somewhat difficult to navigate.  Exceptional cases such as Guibert’s mother 
notwithstanding, Christian monasticism offered few official opportunities for the widow 
who wished to remain in prayerful continence, the antique tradition of ordo viduarum 
having died out by the early middle ages.237  Indeed, renouncing the world could prove a 
tricky proposition for any woman with children, as she now found herself caught between 
the expectations placed upon her as a widow and those enjoined on her as a mother.  
Even the saintly widow Angela of Foligno waited until after the death of her children to 
pursue her mystical calling, and Margery Kempe (whose case is far from exemplary) 
consistently sees childrearing as a hindrance to her vigils and visions.238  The fact is that a 
single, sexually mature woman remained a dangerous possibility within medieval society, 
especially when there was no cloister in which to place her.  Without the protection of her 
husband’s reputation,  a woman became vulnerable even (and perhaps especially) if she 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
236 Self and Society in Medieval France: The Memoirs of Abbot Guibert of Nogent, edited by John F. 
Benson (University of Toronto Press, 1970), 92. 
237 For the ordo viduarum and its disappearance, see Clark, “Purgatory, Punishment, and the Discourse of 
Holy Widowhood,” 172-5; Eric Palazzo, “Bénédiction et consécration des veuves au cours du haut Moyen 
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expressed a wish to remain unmarried.239  In the end, there were really very few ways in 
which to be a “good widow,” as each criterion seemed to conflict with a disparate host of 
others. 
Perhaps the main root all of this confusion, however, was the corresponding 
degree of uncertainty within the annals of sacramental theology, wherein widows and 
concubines remained a perpetually difficult topic.  Despite the growing clarity with 
which marriage was coming to be envisioned as a sacrament, theologians encountered a 
great deal of difficulty making these two groups of women fit into the picture, meaning 
that they had no clear answers to share with their colleagues in the legal realm.  The 
specific features of this struggle, therefore, represent a key factor in the overall 
construction of medieval marriage, with implications extending far beyond the abstract 
theological domain. 
The Theological Process 
	  
In order for medieval writers to speak precisely about marriage as a sacrament, 
they first had to find a precise way of defining the term sacramentum itself, a process that 
was by no means complete by the dawn of the scholastic period.  Medieval theologians 
had inherited a range of meanings from their antique predecessors, all of which were used 
interchangeably throughout early medieval texts.  Was it the Augustinian notion of 
“sacred virtues” hidden within corporeal things (championed by Rabanus Maurus), or 
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was it the more Biblically-rooted notion of “liturgical rite when an action is performed in 
such a way that it is understood to signify something that ought to be received in a holy 
way” (posited by Isidore of Seville)?240  These two senses were used interchangeably up 
through the twelfth century, leading to the frustrating impression, voiced by Hugh of 
Saint Victor, that almost anything could be a sacrament.241 
If sacramentum emerged as a hazy concept throughout the annals of early 
medieval literature, the same might easily be said of matrimonium or coniugium, 
particularly regarding the extent to which such terms bore sacred or sacramental 
implications.  Under the influence of Augustine, marriage continued to be called a 
sacrament by many writers in this period, through the exact terms of its sacramentality 
were rarely defined.  Early medieval authors tended to spill much more ink addressing 
the practical parameters of conjugal life than they do pondering its sacramental 
significance.  Isidore’s Etymologies, for example, devotes exactly zero of its thirty 
subheadings on coniuges to questions of sacramentality, focusing instead on issues such 
as dowry agreements and precisions of marital vocabulary.242  The same holds true for 
later authors such as Ratramus and Johannes Scotus Eriugena, whose treatments of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
240 Sub tegumento corporalium rerum virtus divina secretius salutem eorumdem sacramentorum operatur, 
unde et a secretis virtutibus vel sacris, sacramenta dicuntur, Rabanus Maurus, De Clericorum Institutione 
24, PL 107; Sacramentum est in aliqua celebratione, cum res gesta ita fit ut aliquid significare intelligatur, 
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marriage concentrate primarily on specifying who can get married and how they should 
go about doing so.243   
When theologians did attempt to pin down the exact contours of the conjugal 
sacrament, they invariably fell back upon the understanding of sacramentality as “a sign 
of a sacred thing”—and in particular upon the patristic identification of this “sacred 
thing” with the union between Christ and the church.  This was true even in the case of 
Isidore, who had so carefully emphasized ritual action in his general definition of 
sacramentum:  
The sacrament that exists between the married couple is spoken of as such 
because the church cannot be divided from Christ just as a wife cannot be 
separated from her husband.  Therefore the sacrament that exists between Christ 
and the church also exists inseparably in any single joining between men and their 
wives.244 
 
Isidore thus echoes Augustine both in terms of the signification of the marital sacrament 
(the Christ-Church union) and the primary effect of this signification (the indissolubility 
of the human conjugal bond).  In so doing, he was also grounding himself in an extremely 
conservative (if not outright literal) interpretation of Ephesians 5, which once again 
freighted the matrimonial sacramentum with an exclusively figurative meaning.  As 
Walafrid Strabo put it, “Let us accept that between husband and wife, just as between 
Christ and the Church, there is now not two, but one flesh, as in a head joined to a 
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marriage. See Johannes Scotus Eriugena, In Epistolam I Ad Corinthios, PL 103 126-46, and Ratramnus 
Corbensiensis, Contra Graecorum, 4.4 PL 121, 318. 
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body…This was that sacrament of spiritual unity that was spoken of as literal conjugal 
union in Genesis.”245   
 Interestingly, it was Hincmar of Reims who offered the most precise pre-
scholastic definition of the matrimonial sacrament, as well as the first major Church 
intervention into aristocratic marital affairs.  Hincmar came down hard on the side of 
marital indissolubility in the famous attempted divorce and remarriage of Lothar I, 
arguing that, while both spouses are still alive, the Pauline command that “the man hath 
not power over his body” (1 Cor. 7:4) prevented him from “using his genitals” with 
others.246  Hincmar’s tough stance with Lothar might be seen as a direct result of his 
remarkably clear notion of conjugal sacramentality, wherein “the nuptial bond has in it 
the sacrament of Christ and the Church…because of the sexual joining of the couple.”247  
Lothar’s remarriage, therefore, would violate the main sacramental element of his first 
nuptials, assuming that both would be consummated.  This sacramental formulation made 
Hincmar sacramental theology’s first “consummationist,” introducing an idea that would 
be contentiously repeated throughout theology and canon law. 
Throughout the twelfth century ecclesiastical writers gradually accrued a 
collection of firm criteria for both defining and enumerating sacraments, most famously 
crystallized in the Sentences of Peter Lombard.  Building upon the basic Augustinian 
notion of a sacrament as a sacrae rei signum, the Lombard and his contemporaries began 
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to place restrictions on exactly what kinds of signs could rightfully count as sacraments.  
As the Lombard noted, “all sacraments are signs, but not all signs are sacraments,” as it is 
only those signa given through divine revelation which have the potential to fit the 
sacramental bill.248  The Lombard further winnowed down the list of sacramental 
contenders by specifying that sacramental signs consist of both words and physical 
elements, such as the water and priestly blessing that comprise the full sacrament of 
baptism.249   
Twelfth-century theologians also narrowed the sacramental field by being more 
selective about what these signs could signify.  A consensus arose fairly early that the 
sacrae res in question must be ones that pertain exclusively to the New Law, thus 
eliminating anything that owed its significance exclusively to the time before the coming 
of Christ. Thus, according to the Lombard, the “sacred thing” signified by all of these 
signs was, at the most basic level, grace, a blessing brought into the world by Christ and 
“emanat[ing] from the virtue of his death and passion.” 
It was this alignment of sacramentality with grace, moreover, that brought about 
perhaps the most important criterion for the church-sanctioned sacrament: the 
requirement that sacraments must not only signify grace, they must effect the specific 
kind of grace they signify.  As Hugh of St. Victor somewhat bulkily summarized these 
terms  “[a sacrament is] a corporeal or material element set before the senses without, 
representing by similitude and signifying by institution and containing by sanctification 
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Lombard, Sententiae in iu libris distinctae 4.1.3. CCSL-A (online edition, http: www.brepols.net) 
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some invisible and spiritual grace.”250  In the Lombard’s more streamlined formulation, a 
sacrament became “that which is so great a sign of the grace of God and the form of 
invisible grace, that it bears its image and exists as its cause.”251 This ability to confer 
grace, finally, found its ratification in the authoritative work of Thomas Aquinas, who 
defined a sacrament simply as “a sign of a sacred thing insofar as it makes men holy.”252 
By then, the definition of sacramentum had become firm and clear: a sign, consisting of 
both verbal and physical elements, signifying the grace of the New Law and effecting the 
grace that it signified.253 
Throughout this process ecclesiastical writers never doubted that marriage would 
be included in the sacramental fold—despite the fact that it met exactly none of these 
criteria.  First of all, marriage was not exclusively a sign of the New Law, having been 
instituted in pre-lapsarian Eden before even the Old Law had been established.  
Theologians were quick to address this lacuna, pointing out that matrimony served 
certain “Christian” salvific functions that made up for its idiosyncratic timeline.  In 
Hugh’s words: “The institution of marriage is twofold: one before sin, as an office, the 
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other after sin, as a remedy; the first was so that nature might be multiplied; the second, 
so that human nature might be supported and sin kept to a minimum.”254 
A second (and perhaps more successful) way of differentiating the marriage of the 
New Law was to was to emphasize the ways in which this new “Christian” matrimony 
differed from the unions of the Old Testament.  Specifically, theologians were careful to 
mark the transition from dissoluble, multiple-partner marriages to indissoluble, 
monogamous ones.  As Peter Abelard put it: “It should be known that at one time many 
things were allowed in this sacrament which now are not allowed, since in the Old 
Testament many women were allowed for one man, so that they people of God might 
increase... But now this is not allowed since the people of God are already numerous 
enough.”255   
By taking this tack, theologians also followed Augustine in making the sign-
signifier relationship key to the understanding of marriage as a sacrament, as well as the 
familiar one-to-one ratio that undergirded this connection.  For Albertus Magnus, for 
example, the transition from polygamy under the Old Law to monogamy under the New 
Law could be conveniently mapped onto the corresponding evolution of the Christian 
worship community, as “the scattered churches were to be joined as the spouse of 
Christ.”256  Thus, matrimony’s place within the New Law came to be at least partially 
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predicated on its ability to reflect the union between God and man via its social 
formation, placing a tremendous amount of stress upon its status as a signifier. 
This strategy, with its Augustinian foundations, met little opposition in itself.  Yet 
it was rendered somewhat problematic by the existence of yet another deficiency within 
marriage’s sacramental makeup: a sense of uncertainty in the crucial relationship between 
signified and signifier.  While theologians, following Paul and Augustine, universally 
identified the sacra res of marriage as the union of Christ and the church, the 
corresponding signum proved surprisingly problematic—particularly in its compliance 
with the materia et verba formula set down by the Lombard.  
One contender for the marital signum was consummation of the marriage by the 
couple, partially because, by the twelfth century, this had already gained a great deal of 
traction within canon law. For theologians, consummation recommended itself due to its 
obvious symbolic precision.  In the words of the anonymous twelfth-century tract Deus 
de cuius priccipio fine tacetur, the sexual union of man and wife represented a perfect 
imitation of the invisible union between Christ and the Church, given that both bonds 
united their individual constituent into “one body.”257 This notion came with the extreme 
disadvantage, however, of desacramentalizing marriages that had not been consummated, 
including (most problematically) that of Mary and Joseph.  Thus, as Hugh of St. Victor 
argued, unconsummated marriages may be considered ever more sacramental than 
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consummated ones, as they match more exactly the sort of incorporeal spiritual link of 
marriages res sacramenti.258 
As a result, post-Victorine theologians attempted to find ways to integrate 
consummation into the second popular option: the consent of the married couple.  In its 
most developed formulation, this idea involved dividing both the signified and the 
signifier into a bi-partite structure: the spiritual union between Christ and the Church, 
signified by unconsummated unions, and the physical union of Christ with humanity (the 
incarnation), signified by consummated marriages.  This idea was key to Peter Lombard’s 
construction of the marital sacrament, and was also readily adopted by subsequent 
authors attempting to clarify the connection between marital sign and signifier. 259   
Alexander of Hales even managed to use this formula to address the pesky question of 
unconsummated marriages and indissolubility, arguing:     
Marriage is the sacramentum of the union of Christ and the church, indeed it is 
the sacramentum of the union of human nature with the divine.  It is also the 
union of Christ with the faithful soul.  After the first of these unions, marriages 
became indissoluble, as at no time would Christ ever recede from the church.  For 
always he is within all persons.  After the second of these it was even more 
indissoluble, as the human nature he had taken on he would not send away.260 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
258Si magnum est quod in carne, magnum non est: imo multo maius quod in spiritu est?  De sacramentiis, 2. 
11. 3 PL 176. Pg. 481.  As Thomas M. Finn points out, this perception of unconsummated marriages as 
“imperfect,” and hence dissoluble, never really goes away, possibly because Lombard did not properly 
address it in his sacramental theory of marriage. See Thomas M. Finn, “Sex and Marriage in the Sentences 
of Peter Lombard,” Theological Studies 72 (2011), 41-69. 
259 Copulata est ergo sponso spiritualiter et corporaliter, id est carite et conformitate naturae.  Huius 
utriusque copulae figura est in coniugio: consensus enim coniugun copulam spiritualem Christi et 
Ecclesiae, quae fit per caritatem, significat; commixtio vero sexum illam significat, quae fit per naturae 
conformitatem.  Peter Lombard Sententiae 4.1.4. 
260 Matrimonium est sacraentum unionis Christi et Ecllesiae; item est sacamentum unionis humanae 
naturae cum divina; item est sacramentum unionis Christi cum fideli anima.  Post primam autem unionem 
manet quaedam indissolubilitas, quia numquam Deus omnino recessit ab Eclessia. Alexander of Hales, 
“Quaestio de repudio et divortio” transcription via Killian Lynch, “Alexander of Hales on the Efficacy of 
Matrimony,” Franciscan Studies 11 (1951), 69-130. 
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This solution became problematic, however, in that it created the confusing notion that 
marriage was in fact two separate sacraments—one signified by consummated marriages, 
the other signified by the sexual bond of consummated ones.  Such was in fact the exact 
contention of Hugh of St. Victor when he first addressed this division, stating: “In 
marriage a twofold sacrament exist[s]: on in carnal intermingling, the sacrament of 
association which exists between Christ and the Church; the other in conjugal 
association, the sacrament of that association which exists between God and the soul.”261	  	  	  
Hugh’s opinion was popular enough to be followed by near contemporaries such 
as Guy of Orchelles, but also confusing enough that it proved a sticking point for his 
successors, particularly those who sought to limit the sacramental number to seven.262  
What’s more, this notion of matrimony as a “double sacrament” made things difficult for 
all those who wished to draw a more precise liaison between the signum and res 
sacramenti in marriage—a matter of increasing importance as sacramental doctrine 
developed and stabilized.  By the early thirteenth century theologians had begun to 
actively refute the “double sacrament” theory, often by drawing parallels between 
marriage and other, more well-established sacraments.   Peter of Poitiers, for example, 
argues that marriage is “one sacrament” in exactly the same way that the Eucharist is one 
sacrament—for just as the bread and wine each individually function to represent one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
261 In conjugio duplex sacramentum constarett.  Unum in commixto carnali, sacramentum illius societatis 
quae est inter Christum et Ecclesiam, alterum in societate conjugali, sacramentum illius inter societatis 
inter deus et aninam. De sacramentis 2.11.8. PL 176, pg. 494. 
262 In matrimonio enim ex coniunctione animarum representatur sacramentum unionis fidelis animae ad 
Christum. ..Iterum, ex coniuncte duorum corporum in matrimonio representatur unio duarum naturam in 
Christo.  Guy of Orchelles, Tractatus de Sacramentis C 9 a 2, edited by D & O Van den Eynde 
(Bonaventure, NY, 1953), pg. 200. 
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part of the larger sacrament of communion, so too do consent and consummation each 
represent different facets of the larger divine-human bond.263    
 Yet without a doubt the trickiest, most enduring stumbling block in marriage’s 
road to sacramentality was its dubious ability to “effect that grace which it signified.” 
While medieval writers generally agreed that marriage conferred some form of 
“remedial” grace—that is, the grace of excusing the carnal concupiscence between 
married partners—post-Lombardian theology called for a more positive and specific sort 
of sanctifying power.  In the case of marriage this requirement presented a particularly 
potent riddle—for how exactly were the nuptial relations of a human couple supposed to 
“bring about” the union between Christ and humankind?  
 Some chose to confront the issue by simply accepting the possibility that marriage 
did not confer any real grace—beyond, that is, its universally recognized remedial 
properties. Such is the approach of Peter Abelard, who flatly asserts that “assuredly 
[marriage] is a sacrament, but it does not confer any kind of gift as the others do, but 
rather is a remedy for evil.  It is given for the purpose of restraining incontinence, thus 
the great one [Paul] calls it an indulgence.”264  The fact that nuptials constitute such an 
anomaly apparently poses no problem for Abelard, who goes on to enumerate marriage’s 
other sacramental properties—including and especially its strength as a symbolic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
263 “ Sacramentum est hic consensus animorum et carnalis copula, nec sunt duo sacramena, sed unum 
sacramentum unionis Christi at Ecclesiam…Sicut vides quod species panis et vini non sunt duo 
sacramenta, sed unum: species panis significant corpus Christi et non sanguinem; species vini sanguinem 
et non corpus.” Sentarium 5. 14. 
264 Nunc de conjugio dicendum est, quod quidem sacramentum est, sed non confert aliquod donum, sicut 
caetera faciunt, sed tamen mali remedium est Datur enim propter incontinentiam refrenandam; unde magis 
ad indulgentiam pertinet. Peter Abelard, Epitome theologiae christianiae 31. 
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entity.265  For Abelard, the entirety of marriage’s sacramental status emanates from its 
symbolic possibilities, reflecting the perfect one-to-one union of Christ and the 
Church.266 
 Abelard’s strategy would become significantly more problematic with the 
adoption of Peter Lombard’s sacramental doctrine at the dawn of the thirteenth century, 
which both assured marriage’s sacramental status and forced it into an uneasy 
confrontation with the requirement of efficacy.  The great irony of this situation, 
however, is that the Lombard himself remains extremely elusive on the exact relationship 
between marriage and effective grace, so much so that, as Marcia Colish notes, there is 
“debate as to whether Peter truly extends his definition of sacrament in general to 
marriage, or whether his treatment of marriage is asymmetrical with his treatment of the 
other sacraments as a means of grace.”267 Indeed, while Lombard finds that “some 
sacraments (like baptism) both act as a remedium against sin and confer fortifying grace,” 
he also concedes that “others only exist as a remedium,” with marriage the only 
sacrament ever included in this latter category.268  It is this sort of lopsided treatment that 
caused Seamus P. Heaney to conclude that Lombard “did not consider marriage to be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
265 It is worth noting, however, that Abelard’s general sacramental theory placed efficacy outside of the 
sacraments themselves and rather in the passion of Christ that initiated and sustained them; it is therefore 
somewhat less surprising that he attributed no efficient grace to marriage.  See Gallagher, Significando 
Causant, 56. 
266 Sacramentum est Christi et Ecclesiae, quia sicut uxor unius viri et vir unius uxoris, sic Christus unius 
sponsae, id est Ecclesiae sponsus est et Ecclesia unius sponsi, id est Christi sponsa. Abelard, Epitome, 31. 
267 Colish, Peter Lombard, vol 2, 53. 
268 Quorum alia remedium contra peccatum praebent et gratiam adiutricem conferunt, ut baptismus; alia in 
remedium tantum sunt, ut coniugium; alia gratia et uirtute nos fulciunt, ut eucharistia et ordo. Peter 
Lombard, Sententiae 4, d. 2, c. 1. 
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efficacious in the realm of grace,” leaving the matter instead to be decided by his 
theological successors.269 
 Later solutions, however, proved scattershot at best.  Some writers, such as Peter 
of Poitiers, stumbled into the Lombardian trap of simply affirming marriage’s 
sacramentality without clarifying the specifics, particularly regarding matrimony’s ability 
to affect the unique form of grace it symbolized.  Indeed, Peter’s blank assertion that 
marriage “brings about the union of Christ and the Church” seems to rest solely on the 
fact that it is a sacrament of the New Testament, with no explanation offered as to how 
human unions might effect this momentous spiritual truth.270  Others, such as William of 
Auvergne and Hugh of St. Cher, attempted to locate marriage’s sacramental efficacy in 
the nuptial blessing offered by the priest—joining, in Hugh’s words, “the intentions of 
those contracting matrimony” with the “virtue of the priestly blessing.”271  This reliance 
on the priestly blessing, however, came with its usual set of difficulties, not least of 
which was the fact that it resulted (as William acknowledged) in the de-sacramentalizing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
269 Seamus P. Heaney, The Development of the Sacramentality of Marriage from Anselm of Laon to 
Thomas Aquinas (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1963), 97.  One recent 
dissenting opinion is that of Thomas M. Finn, who concludes  (based on a somewhat creative reading of De 
Bono Conjugali) that Lombard is in fact following Augustine in according a very specific sort of efficient 
causality to marriage—an “inner reality” in which “the indissoluble union” of Christ and the church comes 
about via the married couple’s mutual fidelity.  See Thomas M. Finn, “Sex and Marriage in the Sentences 
of Peter Lombard,” Theological Studies 72 (2011), 41-69. 
270 “Item, conjugium est sacramentum novi testamenti.  Ergo efficit quod figurat: ergo efficit unitatem 
Christi et Ecclesiae.” Sentarium libri quinque, c. 14. 
271 In aliis saramentis virtute sacramenti confertur gratia vel augemtum gratiae sed non in matrimonio 
virtute matrimonii confertur gratia. Aliquando tamen datur vel virtute sacredotalis benedictionis vel 
propter intentionem contrahentium. Hugh of Saint Cher, Commentarium in sententias 4 D 26.  Cited in 
Heaney, 114. 
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of unblessed nuptials—which, in accordance with consent theory, should be fully 
recognized as sacramental.272 
 In the end, the winning strategy involved a return to matrimony’s remedial 
qualities, along with an attempt to give them a more active sanctifying effect.  Such was 
the approach introduced by Bonaventure and refined by his successor, St. Thomas 
Aquinas, who managed to largely settle the issue until the larger challenges of the 
Reformation.  For Bonaventure, the marital remedium is what enables conjugal partners 
to live out Augustine’s marriage goods, providing them with the strength to remain 
sexually exclusive and the freedom to sinlessly beget children.273   As such, marriage 
becomes an efficient cause of grace in the same way as the sacrament of penance, 
“joining souls” both to each other and to God by removing the sinful barrier between 
them.274  Bonaventure’s resolution proves limited, however, in that it is still largely 
dependant on the good intentions (and good behavior) of the human participants, whose 
mutual fidelity remains the main result of the marital remedium.  It also remains deeply 
contingent upon the priestly blessing, which Bonaventure (despite his best attempts to 
avoid the issue) describes as the “ratifying” agent for marriage’s active spiritual grace. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
272 Neuter autem eorum modorum sacramentalis est; quod enim facit matrimonium virtute sua essentiali, 
hoc est, contrarietate, aut quod facit merito suo, non facit virtute sacramentali, sive virtute benedictionis et 
orationis, quem consuervit super nubentes.  William of Auvergne, Tractatus de sacramento matrimonii, 9, 
Opera Omnia Tom. 1 (Orléans-Paris, 1674; Reprint Frankfurt, Minerva, 1963), 525. 
273 “Et ideo tertio modo dicendum, quod suscipientibus hov sacrmentum detur remedium, quantum est de 
ratione sacramenti, quod excusat coitum et facit illud esse veniale...Nunc tempore legis novae non tantum 
praestat illud remedium, sed etiam aliquod gratiae donum digne suscipientibus, utpote his qui ex caritatis 
consensu uniuntur ad procreandum prolem ad divinum cultum.” Bonaventure, Commentaria in quoator 
libros Sentarium, 4. D. 26. A. 2, q. 2, Opera Omnia Vol 1, 668. 
274 Ad illud quod obiicitur, quomodo efficit quod figurat, dicendum quod figurat coniunctionem animorum 
primo et hanc efficit, Bonaventure, Commentarium in quator libros sentarium, 4 D 26 a2 q2, Opera Omnia 
4, Quaracchi Edition (Collegio San Bonaventura, 1887), 668. 
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 Aquinas, in formulating his own notion of the conjugal sacrament, strove to 
incorporate Bonaventure’s emphasis on marriage’s remedial power while enhancing its 
status as an independent agent.  In so doing he also sought to assimilate marriage into his 
more precise understanding of sacramental grace, which distinguished between grace 
conferred via the participation of the recipients (ex opere operantis) and that which 
operates via its own sanctifying merits  (ex opere operato).  Sacraments of the New Law 
fell squarely into the latter category, thus invalidating Bonaventure’s equation of the 
marital remedium with good conjugal behavior.275 Aquinas further stipulated that, while 
all sacraments bring about some sort of grace, they do so solely as instrumental causes, 
their shared principle cause being the passion of Christ. Such a formulation proved 
crucial for matrimony in that it exempted it from actually causing the Christ-Church 
union, but rather simply transmitted its effects to those partaking in the sacrament.276 
Thus, marriage becomes efficient in that it “gives a man the grace without which 
he cannot becomingly use his wife for the procreation of children.”277  Unlike 
Bonaventure, however, Thomas sees this remedium as operating directly upon 
concupiscence as a root cause, as opposed to combating lust on a day-by-day basis. For 
Aquinas, therefore, accepting the efficacy of marriage is no different than accepting the 
efficacy of baptism—for just as the baptismal water “imprints a character” that leads to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
275 This would have, of course, left the possibility for sanctification via the priestly blessing, but this invited 
obvious problems involving marriage’s symbolic reflection of Christ and the Church (who of course did not 
require an officiant at their “wedding ceremony”).  This is likely why Aquinas rejected this portion of 
Bonaventure’s argument, as well as all such solutions to the problem of marital grace.	  
276 Contra concupiscentiam potest praestari rededium dupliciter.  Uno modo, ex parte ipsius 
concupiscentiae…Et sic remedium praestat matrimonium per gratiam.  Alio modo, ex parte actus 
eius…Summa Theologica 3 Suppl Q 42 A 1 r. 4. 
277Unde cum in matrimonio detur homini ex divina instiutione facultas eutendi uxore sua ad procreationem 
prolis, datur etiam gratia sine qua id convenienter facere non potest, Summa Theologica 3 Suppl Q 42 A3 
R. 
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the infusion of grace, so to do “the words of consent” effect a bond which similarly 
confers grace upon those so united.278 
Aquinas’ theory was almost immediately adopted as Church doctrine, allowing 
for the Tridentine affirmation of marital grace several centuries later.  It was, however, 
not without its detractors.  As early as 1285, Peter Olivi attacked the idea of marital 
sacramentality on the specific basis of its inability to confer grace, arguing that it 
remained simply a sacred sign in the same way as the Temple or Moses’ burning bush.279  
Though Olivi himself was quickly quashed, his ideas saw a revival by the early 
fourteenth-century Spiritualist movement, forcing the church to revive the debate at the 
Council of Vienna in 1311.280 But perhaps the most strident challenge to marital grace 
came from the great fourteenth century thinker Duns Scotus—all the more striking given 
that Scotus, as le Bras notes, “submits, in all things, to the doctrine of the church.”281 
Indeed, while Scotus carefully affirms that “the Church communally holds the that 
marriage is seventh among the sacraments,” he goes on (at some length) to aim the brute 
force of his reasoning at matrimony’s vital organs, in particular its long-debated 
relationship to sacramental efficacy.282  Indeed, Scotus hints that his only reason for not 
entirely de-sacramentalizing matrimony is fear of being branded a heretic, and grudgingly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
278 Sicut habet acqua baptismi quod corpus tangat et cor abluat, ex tactu carnis Christi, ita matrimonium 
hoc habet ex hoc Christus sua passione illud repraesentavit…Summa Theologica 3 Suppl Q 42 A 3 r 1. 
279 G. Le Bras, “Mariage  (dans l’église latine après 1000), Dictionnaire de la théologie Catholique 9, ed. 
A. Vacant, E. Mangenot, and E. Amann (Paris: Librairie de Letouzey et Ané, 1927), 2212. 
280 ibid 
281 Le Bras, 2213. 
282 Sed quia communiter tenet Ecclesia Sacramentum Matrimoniii esse septimum inter Ecclesica 
Sacramenta, et de Sacramentis Ecclesiae non est aliter sentiendum quam sentit Ecclesia Romana, extra de 
haereticis.  Ad abolendam: ideo dici potest, quoad contractui matrimonii annexit Deus Sacramentum 
proprie dictum, saltem pro lege Evangelica, alioquin non esset Sacramentum novae legis.  Quaestiones in 
Librum Quartum Sententiarum, D 26 Q1, Joannis Duns Scoti, Opera Omnia, vol 19, (Paris: L Vivés, 
1894). 
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concedes that marriage must be a sacrament since the Church deems it so.283   Scotus’ 
most piercing objection concerns the equation of efficient grace and remedium, given that 
unconsummated marriages (most notably that between Mary and Joseph) would contain 
no such carnal concupiscence on which this sort of grace could operate.284 While Scotus 
eventually upholds the church doctrine of full marital sacramentality, he does not by 
resolve the problem of grace. Rather, he simply reaffirms marriage’s status as a sacrae 
rei signum, and in particular to the “indissoluble bond” both created by and reflective of 
this sacred reality.285 
The underpinnings of Scotus’ approach—and indeed, the reason why the 
sacrament of matrimony managed to survive several centuries of scholastic wear-and-
tear—may be located in a parallel discursive strand, which found itself effectively buried 
beneath of triumph of marital grace.  This line of thought involved obfuscating the 
challenges of sacramental efficacy by placing emphasis on marriage’s signifying 
power—a sleight of hand generally employed by authors who were unable to locate any 
sort of conjugal sanctifying ability.   
This strategy was key to the marital theology of Peter Abelard, who, as we saw 
above, flatly denied marriage’s ability to confer grace.  As a seeming counterbalance, 
Abelard grounded his vision of marital sacramentality in a strikingly firm emphasis on 
this one-to-one ratio, for “just as a woman is a wife of one man and a man a husband of 
one wife, so too is Christ the husband of one spouse—which is the church—and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
283 See footnote 282 above. 
284 Praeterea, in matrimonio Joseph et Mariae non oprtuit ponere excusantia ista, nec universaliter in 
spirituali matrimonio videlicet, cum pari voto castitatis conjugum.  Quaetiones D31 Q1. 
285 Sacramentum est ipsum indissolubile vinculum, et forma permanens contractus.  Ibid. 
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Church is the spouse of one husband—who is Christ.”286 In this vein, he also displays an 
especial intolerance for the polygamous unions of the Old Testament, which he sees as 
violating both natural law and the base structure of the sacrament.287 
This approach can be observed with striking regularity over the course of the next 
two centuries, always in cases where the author has either denied or declined to approach 
the question of sacramental efficacy.  Master Simon (who, despite his relative obscurity 
as a historical figure, left behind the tremendously influential Tractatus de Sacramentiis 
of c. 1160) spills a great amount of ink expounding upon the perfect similitude between 
human nuptials and the Christ-church bond, stating “just as a man and a woman, through 
becoming one flesh, produce one flesh (through the procreation of children), so too do 
Christ and the Church join in one flesh so that Christ, in the Holy Church, might multiply 
his spiritual offspring.”288 He spills exactly zero drops of ink, however, explaining, how 
marriage might be effective in the realm of grace—a striking omission in his mid-twelfth 
century context.  The anonymous author of the Deus de cuius fine tacetur is overt in his 
contention that  “marriage is not made as the other sacraments were”—that is, with 
specific sanctifying abilities.289  What he does find in abundance are ways in which 
nuptials neatly reflect the Christ-Church union: both are of “one body,” both are without 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
286 “Sacramentum est Christi et Ecclesiae, quia sicut uxor unius viri et vir unius uxoris, sic Christus unius 
sponsae, id est Ecclesiae sponsus est et Ecclesia unius sponsi, id est Christi sponsa.” Abelard, Epitome, 21. 
287 “Etiam tunc regibus non licebat multas, sed unam habere, ut subditis suis providere possent. Si enim 
multas haberent, earum sollicitudine animus impediretur et ita minus providerent. Quod vero David et 
Salomon multas habuerunt, plane contra legem fecerunt.” Ibid. 
288 “Sicut enim vir et mulier in carne una ad carnem unam, id est sobolem procreandam, copulantur, sic 
Cristus et Ecclesia in una carne sunt et sic Christo operante spirituals in sancta Ecclesia filii 
multiplicantur.”  Master Simon, Tractatus de Sacramentis, in Maître Simon er son groupe, edited by H. 
Weisweiler (Louvain: Speicilegium sacrum Lovaniense 17: 1937), 48. 
289 Coniugium namque non ita videtur propter remedium fuisse inventum ut cetera sacramenta.  
Transcription via “Le Recueil des sentences, “Deus de cuius principio et fine tacetur” et son remaniement,” 
H. Weisweiller, Récherches de la théologie ancienne et mediévale 5 (1933), 270. 
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end, and both are characterized by a hierarchy in which “Christ reigns over the Church” 
just as a man should reign over his wife.290 
 Yet nowhere is this tactic more explicitly utilized than in the thought of 
Alexander of Hales, who was writing as the concern over marriage’s capacity to cause 
grace was reaching its fever pitch.  While Alexander does somewhat sporadically affirm 
that marriage may sanctify in some way, he elsewhere reverses this opinion, offering no 
explanation for the discrepancy.  He does, however, offer why marriage’s lack of grace 
may be less problematic, stating:  
Marriage does not confer grace, either in its construction or its reception, and because of 
this it is ordered after all of the other sacraments, yet while it is lesser with respect to 
efficient grace it is greater with respect to its signification.  It signifies the union of Christ 
and the Church, or the union of the divine person with human nature, and there is no 
greater signification  among creatures.  And while therefore a sacrament should have in 
itself that which is both the sign and the cause, it should also be more of a cause [of 
grace] than a sign…On the other hand, the signification of this sacrament is greater or 
equal than that of the other sacraments, and so with respect to signification it is placed 
before them.291 
 
In other words, marriage’s inability to confer grace is trumped by its abundant ability to 
signify spiritual truth—and in its especial ability to reflect the sacred Christ-Church 
paradigm. 
 Alexander’s ideas lingered even after grace became an obligatory part of the 
conjugal sacrament, finding a particularly interesting afterlife in the writings of his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
290 Nam nuptias Christi et ecclesie significat quia Christus et ecclesiae unum corpus sunt.  Christus tamen 
preest et regit.  Ibid, 273. 
291 Hoc autem sacramentum non confert gratiam gratum facientem, etiam digne suscipienti.  Et propter hoc 
ordinatur post alia sacramenta, tamquam illud quod est minoris efficiae in disponendo ad gratiam, licet sit 
maius in significando.  Significat enim coniunctionem Christi et Ecclesie, vel unionem divinae naturae cum 
humana, quibus significatis nihil est maius in creaturis.  Cum ergo sacramentum habeat in se quod sit 
signum et causa, plus habet ex eo quod est causa quam ex eo quod est ultimum sacramentum; nam, si 
secundum rationem signi esset, cum huius sacramenti maius sit signatum vel aequale, preponeretur 
pluribus aliis sacramentiis.  Alexander of Hales, Glossa in quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi,D 
26, q 2,  Quaracchi Edition (College of S. Bonaventure, 1957), pg. 446.. 
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student, Bonaventure.   In his struggle to find a source of marital grace, Bonaventure 
displays a striking tendency to fall back on the idea of marriage as an enduring one-to-
one relationship, and thus also its essential makeup as a signum: “Concupiscence inclines 
one to wish for multiple partners, since a lustful man is not content with one woman.  But 
in matrimony grace is given to a man so that he wishes only to be with his wife, and in 
this way he eschews the possibility of having many women through exclusive sexual 
relations.”292  Marital grace, therefore, operates solely to preserve the oneness whence 
marriage draws its signifying power, just as Christ unites the various members of his 
church into one faithful spouse.293   
The net result of this tendency was that it placed a tremendous amount of stress 
upon the already unstable relationship between the conjugal sign and signifier, making it 
all the more crucial that human marriages perfectly and precisely mirrored the divine 
union they signified.  Marital sacramentality remained viable, therefore, only so long as 
couples remained within the narrow criteria set out by the church: monogamy, free 
consent, indisputable (but hopefully humdrum) consummation.  Equally unproblematic 
were couples whose behavior lay completely outside the bounds of sacred matrimony: 
bigamous marriages, adultery, simple fornication.  What presented a serious challenge, 
however, were those unions that found themselves on the margins of the precariously 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
292 Ratione enim expressionis consesus in individuam consuetudinem vitae, et ratione benedictionis 
Ecclesiae, cuius est sacramenta debite tractare, sublevatur anima a corruptione concupiscentiae 
inordinata, et datur gratia ad copulam singularem et a copularum utilem et ad copulam inseparabilem.  
Bonaventure, Commentarium in Sent. 4 D 26, a 2 q 2, Opera Omnia 4, 668. 
293 Ad illud quod obiicitur, quomodo efficit quod figurat, dicendum quod figurat coniunctionem animorum 
primo et hanc efficit, non primo uniendo, sed magis, sict confessio contritionem, et doc iterum quodam 
modo efficit coniunctionem cum deo, quia, si membrum membro magis initur, per consequens etiam magis 
unitur christo.  Sed in eucharistia dum membra magis uniuntur christo et per consequens magis uniuntur 
ad invicem, unde christo incorporantur, et sic patet differentia.  Ibid. 
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defined conjugal sacrament, in particular the familiar Patristic riddles of concubinage and 
second marriages.  In a medieval context these partnerships proved all the more 
dangerous in that they quite clearly fulfilled some portions of the marital sacrament while 
violating others, resulting in the accidental inclusion of the concubines, and the accidental 
exclusion of the remarried widows. 
The Sacramental Defect: Concubines and Widows 
 
On the one hand, the concubine proved quite an easy woman to exclude from the 
standards of good Christian behavior, especially given the foundation that had already 
been laid by Patristic thinkers.  Once licit sexual activity was restricted to married 
partners alone, concubinage became nothing more than simple fornication, a point that 
(as seen in the previous chapter) had already been clear in the writings of Augustine and 
Jerome.  This exclusion became all the more deep-seated , however, as the sacrament of 
marriage became a more definite entity, in that marriage was now the only conduit for the 
special form of grace that excused carnal concupiscence.  While for earlier medieval 
authors the concubine remained only a nebulous source of “pollution” and shameful 
concession to lust,294 by the scholastic period she had become a more definite sort of 
threat, as (in the Lombard’s words) “one avoids fornication by having a wife, not a 
concubine.”295  Thus Bonaventure’s lengthy argument that concubinage is maintained 
against both natural and sacred law, for marriage is the only way in which post-lapsarian 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
294 See Isidore of Seville, Quaestiones in Genesim, 20: Namque per Ruben primogenitum populus 
primogenitus Israel ex circumcisione significatur, qui torum concubinae polluit.  PL 83, 253;  Bede, 
Hexameron Lib 4: Quod autem ad rem pertinet gestam, nullo modo est inferendum, inurendum 
de hac concubina crimen Abrahae, usus est ea quippe ad generandam prolem, non ad explendam 
libidinem.  PL 91, 155. 
295 Bonum est non tangere, sed tamen propter fornicationem vitandam unusquisque habeat suam, non 
alienam, uxorem, non concubinam.  Peter Lombard, In Epistolam I Ad Corinthios, 7, PL 191, 1587. 
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humans can only avoid the chaotic impulses of lust.296  Aquinas goes one step further by 
classifying concubinage as a criminal act of fornication, making the concubine a one-way 
ticket to moral sin.297  
Despite all this easy vilification, the concubine proved  a much more difficult 
woman to define, as demonstrated by the sundry usages of the term throughout the annals 
of medieval theology.    After the eleventh century she could, of course, be the consort of 
a priest, but this still left a wide variety of lay unions that were grouped under the terms 
concubinatus or contubernium.298  Many of these interpretations can be traced back to 
Old Testament exegesis, wherein concubinage appeared with troubling regularity.  Much 
ink was spilled, for example, excusing Abraham for having taken a concubine, which he 
did (theologians are eager to point out) for procreation and not for lust.299  Many writers 
also chose to interpret Old Testament concubinage in an allegorical sense, with results 
that were always less than flattering for the concubine.  Abimilech’s concubine, for 
example, is regularly imagined as a prefiguration of the Synagogue, the cast-off 
predecessor to Christ’s true wife, the Church. 300 David’s concubines, meanwhile, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
296 See Bonaventure Commentaria D33 A 1 Q1, Opera Omnia 6, 302-8. 
297Aquinas  Summa Theologica. 3 Suppl Q 65 A 3 & A 4. 
298 The great innovator in applying the term concubine to priest’s consorts was Peter Damian: Illorum vero 
clericorum feminas, qui matrimonia nequeunt legali jure contrahere, non conjuges, sed concubinas potius, 
sive prostibula congrue possumus appellare.  Contra Intemperentes Clericos 2, PL 145, 590. 
299 See Isidore of Seville, Expositiones in Genesim 20, PL 83, pg 253.. Peter Damian, Contra Intemperantes 
Clericos 3, PL 145, pg. 392 ; Alcuin, Interrogtaiones et responsiones in Genesin, PL 100, 541; 
Bonaventure, Commentarium D 33 Q 1 a 1, Opera Omnia 6, 303. 
300 One particularly evocative example is provided by Isidore: Concubinam hoc in loco Synagogam vocat. 
Quae in novissimis temporibus Antichristo est creditura…Eritque filius ancillae, id est, Synagogae illius 
peccatricis, quia qui peccatum, inquit, facit, servus est peccati. Expositiones in Jugem 6, PL 83, 386. See 
also Bede, Hexameron 4 (in which Agar is the Synagogue and Sarah is the Church), PL 91, 155; Rabanus 
Maurus, Commentaria in Librum Judicum 2.10; and finally Bonaventure, Commentaria D25 Q3 a2 (in 
which the synagogue is described as Christ’s pre-marital concubine so as to defend him from a possible 
charge of bigamy), Operia Omnia 6, 206. 
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become symbols of Christianity’s various heretical churches and movements, banished to 
theological mistressdom by the triumph of Orthdoxy.301 
In all of these readings one prominent theme is that of multiplicity, as the 
concubine is almost always imagined as one consort among many.  When pondering the 
long-settled question of whether Christians are permitted to have concubines, theologians 
almost always give recourse to the principle that divine law restricts believers to one 
sexual partner apiece, thus negating the possibility of concubinage as a monogamous 
domestic partnership.  Aquinas, in his Summa Theologica, even classifies concubinal 
relations under his question on “plurality of wives,” effectively blurring the line between 
concubinage and bigamy.  In this way, medieval theologians seemed to deliberately 
distance themselves from the Roman idea of concubinage represented in the thought of 
their Patristic forebears, in which concubinage was by necessity a monogamous (if 
possibly temporary) union. 
If medieval thinkers chose not to portray concubines as monogamous partners, it 
is not because this sort of union had ceased to exist. As Karras has recently shown, cases 
monogamous cohabitation can be detected in Paris court records well into the sixteenth 
century.302 Rather it is because the stakes had been raised by the precarious composition 
of their own matrimonial formula, which (as we saw above) was too reliant on the exact 
symbolism of consent and consummation to structurally annex a required priestly 
blessing.  Thus, a woman who entered into a conjugal union without dowry or blessing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
301 See Rabanus Maurus, Commentaria in IV Libros Regum 2.5: Concubinae vero ejus significant 
haereticorum ecclesias, quae sub Christi nominis titulo se manere gloriantur; sed quia propter carnalia 
lucra Christum sectantur, non conjuges, sed concubinae vocantur.  PL 109, 82; Peter Damian, Epistola 13; 
Alan of Lille, Contra Waldenses 20, PL 210, 395. 
302 Karras, Unmarriages, 194-201. 
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could be considered a fully legitimate wife, to the great chagrin of the very theologians 
who had set the aforementioned sacramental criteria.   
The resulting ambivalence can be observed as early as Hugh of St. Victor, who, a 
firm consentist, had vociferously argued that “where one’s own will and legitimate vow 
assist even without all these other things [betrothal, blessing, ceremony, etc] there can be 
legitimate marriage.”303 Hugh essentially throws up his hands, however, when he turns to 
confront the full implications of this definition—namely that it left a husband free to 
replace his first “wife” with a second, more officially procured partner. Hugh’s solution 
(which would be unanimously reversed by later writers) was essentially to sweep 
problematic unions under the carpet, arguing “those things which lie hidden should never 
prejudice the manifest and especially those which cannot be changed without grave 
scandal; rather it is more expedient that in manifest affairs scandal should be guarded 
against and regarding hidden thing recourse should be had to grace and mercy.”304 
Hugh’s successors proved somewhat more adept at keeping up sacramental appearances, 
though they came no closer to solving the logical conundrum at hand.  One strategy, 
introduced by Peter Lombard, was to insist upon the “words of consent” as the efficient 
cause of the marital sacrament.305  This stipulation also allowed Lombard to draw a 
theoretical line between marriage and simple cohabitation, arguing that it was by 
verbalizing their intentions that a couple displayed the sincerity befitting the conjugal 
sacrametum magnum. What Lombard was not able to do, however, was to insist upon a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
303 Tunc siquidem voluntas propria suffragaverit, et legitima vota succerrerint, cum id quod in occulto 
fecerent sponte utrique in manifesto profitentur De Sacramentis 2.11.6. 
304 ibid 
305 Efficiens autem causa matrimonii est consensus, non quilibet, sed per uerba expressus; nec de futuro, 
sed de praesenti. Lombard, Sentarium 4. D 27. 2. 
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mechanism for publically proclaiming these words, as, by his formulation, “the substance 
of the sacrament is consent in the present tense, which alone is sufficient for contracting 
matrimony.”306 Lombard’s reticence on this matter was echoed by his theological heirs, 
as later writers seemed content to leave the problem half solved.  By the time of Aquinas, 
it was standard to penalize informally contracted unions (typically by imposing a period 
of penance) while roundly affirming their validity.  As Aquinas explains, “just as in the 
other sacraments certain things are essential to the sacrament, and if they are omitted 
there is no sacrament, while certain things belong to the solemnization of the sacrament, 
and if these be omitted the sacrament is nevertheless validly performed, although it is 
a sin to omit them.” 307  On this account, “consent expressed in words of the present 
between persons lawfully qualified to contract makes a marriage, because these 
two conditions are essential to the sacrament.”308 
The more monogamous associations with the term concubina, meanwhile, were 
gradually transferred to the notion of matrimonia clandestina, a term which appeared 
with increased regularity from the twelfth century onward.  The clandestine wife took on 
most of the features of the faithful domestic concubine: the lack of dowry, the lack of 
ceremony, the troubling possibility that her arrangement might turn out to be temporary.  
Her existence, however, afforded theologians a crucial buffer between consent-based 
marriage and concubinage, shielding matrimony from the centuries of moral vitriol that 
accompanied the concubine and her partner. Clandestine nuptials,” therefore, allowed the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
306 Auctoritatibus probat quod consensus solus faciat matrimonium. Ibid. 
307 Sicut in aliis sacramentis quaedam sunt de essentia sacramenti, quibus omissis non est sacramentum, 
quaedam autem ad solemnitatem sacramenti pertineent, quibus omissis verum perficitur sacramentum, 
quamvis pecet qui omittit: ita etiam consesus expressus per verba praesenti.. matrimonium facit.  Summa 
Theologica Q 45 A5 Resp. 
308 ibid 
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concept of marriage to remain sacramentally intact, while leaving the practical results of 
this conceptual compromise, once again, to the canon lawyers. 
Yet nowhere is the anxiety over unblessed unions more evident than in the records of the 
Council of Trent: moment at which the Church officially declared marriage to be a 
sacrament, and finally decided to make the marriage ceremony necessary for conjugal 
validity.  With the momentous tametsi decree, the council sweepingly declared all 
unofficiated, unwitnessed unions to be null and void, a step that had been attempted, but 
never formally made, by their predecessors at the Fourth Lateran Council.    The final 
version of this decree buttresses its position through a lengthy catalog of moral and social 
predicaments, highlighting the ability of clandestine marriages to create arrangements of 
dubious permanence.309  In choosing to prevent these problems, however, council 
attendees were also keenly aware that they were putting the sacramental structure of 
marriage in jeopardy.  Antonius Cochier argues that clandestine nuptials contain “all that 
is required” in order to signify the union of Christ and the Church, hence fulfilling the 
criteria for sacramentality.310 Even more explicit were the objections of Antonius de 
Gragnao, for example, argued that clandestine matrimony could not be banned without 
“disrupting the true sacrament,” consisting as it did of “consent as its form, and [the 
spouses’] bodies as its material.”311   The fact that the council decided to affirm the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
309Concilium Tridentium, Diariorum, actorum, epistularum, tractarum nova collectio, ed. S. Merkle, S. 
Ehses, T. Freudenberger, A. Postina, et. al, vol 9, pars 6. (Freidburg: Herder, 1901-1980), 398. 
310 Quoad secundum articulum comprobavit, clandestina matrimonia esse vera matrimonia, cum in eis ea 
sin, quae ad vera matrimonia requiruntur, ibid, 398. 
311 Ecclesiam non posse irritare matrimonia clandestina ergo et non expedit ut fiat clandestinum iam 
contractum.  Ecclesia enim non potest irritare verum sacramentum, sicut potest esse clandestinum 
matrimonium, in quo possunt concurre omnia necessaria ad sacramentum, quae sunt consensus et verba 
uti forma, corpora erorum uti material, inistri ipsi contrahentes, ibid, 407. 
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tametsi decree despite these extremely fundamental concerns demonstrates just how 
vexing the implications of clandestine marriage had become, and how social and 
theological issues, in the end, still proved mutually exclusive. 
Widows, by contrast, enjoyed an ostensibly comfortable status within medieval 
marital theology, bolstered by the Pauline proclamation that they should be free to 
remarry at their own discretion.312  So secure were theologians in this tenet that they 
rarely found need to address it in the early stages of marriage’s sacramental development, 
only taking interest when the topic began gain traction in canon law.  When theologians 
did begin to address the widow’s rights and responsibilities, they were unwavering in 
their support for second marriages, and equally unwavering in their assertion that such 
nuptials conveyed all the sacramental benefits of the widow’s first union.  Peter 
Lombard, for example, decrees second and even multiple marriages to be lawful, citing 
the authority of both Augustine and Jerome.313  Later authors, such as Bonaventure, were 
careful to clarify that successive marriages came with all of the standard conjugal 
allowances, most importantly the ability to sinlessly beget children.314  Several decades 
later Aquinas repeated this reassuring verdict almost verbatim, adding that “marital 
intercourse is excused by the marriage goods which are fidelity, offspring, and sacrament; 
therefore a second marriage is a sacrament.” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
312I Cor. 7: 39. 
313 “Sciendum est etiam quod non solum primae vel secundae nuptiae sutn licitae, sed etiam teriae et 
quartae non sunt damnandae.” Sentarium 4. 42. 9. 
314 “Dicendum, quod non tantum secundae nuptiae, sed etiam teriae et quartae et ampliores sunt licitae, 
dum tamen fiant bono sine, scilicet propter prolem generandam, vel propter fornicationem vitandam, vel 
propter necessitatem suam sustentandam, ut cum contrahavit vir cum muliere, utupsum foveat, vel e 
converso.”  Commentaria in Sentarium,” 4. 42.3.1. 
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Matters became more complicated, however, when theologians turned to confront 
the sacramental significance of these marriages, particularly with regard to the one-to-one 
ratio set in place by the conjugal sacrae rei signum.  In its first iteration, this discussion 
revolved primarily around marriages of the clergy—or more precisely the marital history 
of certain clergy members, once clerical marriage prohibitions gained ground.315  These 
concerns, on one level, emanate from the nebulous Pauline dictum that “a bishop should 
be a man of one wife,”316 which had been taken from very early on to mean that 
remarried men should be barred from clerical office.  
On a deeper level, however, such anxieties are also clearly linked to what D.L. 
D’Avray has termed a “symbolic value rationality”317—that is, a regard for the sacred 
math through which marriages become sacramental.  Such considerations are clearly on 
display in the writings of Peter Damien, who takes up the extremely valid question of 
why men with “bigamous” backgrounds are rejected from the priesthood while men with 
concubines are allowed to continue on.  The matter, Damien explains, is not so much one 
of “sin” as it is of sacramental integrity, for “just as Christ…is a man of one bride—the 
Holy Church, who is beyond doubt a virgin—in this way a priest must be a man of one 
wife, so that he may be the uppermost spouse.”318  In rejecting the bigamist, the Church is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
315 Post-Gregorian reform this meant that the clergy in question were only those in minor orders, whether 
others continued to marry or not.   
316 1 Timothy 3:2. 
317D’Avray, Medieval Marriage, 132. 
318 Sicut enim Christus, qui est pontifex futorum bonorum et verus sacerdos iuxta ordinem Melchisedech, 
qui videlicet obtulit agnum proprii corporis in ara crucis Deo Patri pro salute mundi, vir est unius sponsae, 
totius scilicet sanctae aecclesiae, quae proculdubio virgo est, quia fidei integritatem inviolabilter servat, 
ita quilibet sacerdos unius uxoris vir esse praecipitur, ut illius summi sponsi praeferre imaginem videatur.  
Petet Damian, Letter 28, Die briefe des Petrus Damiani, edited by ed. Kurt Reindel (Munich; Monumenta 
Germaniae Historica, 1983), 264. 
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therefore “guarding” the “mystical rule” of marriage, which is clearly violated by the 
inclusion of a third party.319 
Damien’s solution—that bigamists were to be rejected because they infringe upon 
the form of the sacrament—was to become standard among his successors, who rounded 
it out using an increasingly precise sacramental logic.  Hugh of Saint Victor, for example, 
argued that “a cleric more honorably upholds the bond of Christ when he has been 
married to one single woman, in the same way that Christ has been joined to one single 
Church.”320  Peter Lombard offers an even clearer symbolic explanation, for “according 
to many fathers of the church wives signified that in the future all Churches, and all of the 
people who belong to them, will be subject to one man, Christ—so too our leaders, our 
bishops, should be “men of one wife,” signifying that all people have been joined in unity 
under Christ’s leadership.”321   Aquinas, finally, puts the point even more succinctly, as 
“the sacrament of matrimony signifies the joining of Christ to the Church, which is a 
union of one man and one woman; and in this way the perfection of the sacramental 
signification requires that in the same way one man be joined to one wife, and one wife 
be joined to one man.”322 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
319 In bigimis itaque non mensura pecatti, sed forma potius inquiritur sacramenti atque in eorum 
reprobatione non reatus ulciscitur sed mistica veri sacerdotii regula custoditur. Ibid. 
320 “Honestius enim vicem Christi gerit episcopus qui junctus est soli mulieri sicut uni ecclesiae juctus est 
christus.” Summa Sentarium 7.11. 
321 “Et sicut plures antiquorum Patrum uxores significaverunt futuras ex omnibus gentibus Ecclesias, uni 
viro subditas, id est Christo, ita noster antistes, id est episcopus, unius uxoris vir significat ex omnibus 
gentibus unitatem uni viro subditam, id est Christo.” “In epistolam ad Titum, “PL 192, 386. 
322 “Sacramentum autem matrimonii significat conjunctionem Christi ad Ecclesiam, quae est unius ad 
unam; et ideo requiritur ad perfectam significationem sacramenti ut vir sit tantum unius vir, et uxor tantum 
unius uxor; et ideo bigamia, quae hoc tollit, irregularitatem inducit.” Commentaria in IV Libri Sentarium 
D 27 Q 3 a 1.  CCSL-A. 
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Such pronouncements, however, begged a troubling question: if second marriages 
endangered the sacrament when entered into by clerics, why should this be any less true 
of lay marriages—which were grounded, after all, in the exact same symbolic rationale? 
This caused especial disquietude in that the strongest testaments to the sacramentality of 
these unions (such as those of Bonaventure and Aquinas) rested squarely upon the marital 
sacrament’s weakest link: the dubious ability of marriage to confer grace via its status as 
a remedium. Acknowledgement of this problem became gradually more prominent as 
marital theology progressed, forcing theologians to square their sacramental architecture 
with the full spectrum of conjugal life.  Earlier authors expressed these concerns by 
simply citing those of their Patristic predecessors. Peter Lombard, for example, chose to 
hedge his theological bets with a passage from Ambrose, quoting “second marriages lack 
glory even in the present [life]” to balance out his own permissive stance.323 Augustine’s 
famous proclamation that second marriages are “an embarrassment” became another a 
popular choice.324  By digging into the distant past for opprobrium about second 
marriages, medieval theologians managed to distance themselves from this pressing—and 
still current—symbolic problem, displacing this disapproval onto the traditions of the 
Patristic era. 
Yet the real challenge emerged when theologians began to confront the 
sacramentality of second marriages in their own terms.  The problem, once again, proved 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
323 Ambrosius etiam dicit quod primae nuptiae tantum a domino sunt institutae, secundae uero sunt 
permissae. Et primae nuptiae sub benedictione dei celebrantur sublimiter, secundae uero etiam in 
praesenti carent gloria.  Sententiae 4 D 42 a7. 
324 See, for example, Hugh of Saint Victor: Nec solae primae vel secundae nuptiae sunt licitae; sed etiam 
tertiae et quartae et aliae, juxta Augustinum qui dicit: De tertiis et quartis et ultra de plurimis nuptiis solent 
homines movere quaestionem. Unde breviter respondeo, nec me ullas nuptias audere damnare nec 
verecundiam numerositatis auferre. Summa Sentarium 7:21, PL 176, 172.  
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to be the incongruity between these unions and the one-to-one sacramental ratio, rendered 
all the more manifest by the growing anxiety over marriage’s ability to confer grace.  
Bonaventure, tackling this issue in his commentary on the Sentences, carefully affirmed 
that second unions were perfectly sacramental “in themselves,” containing both the 
expression of legitimate consent that constitutes the sacramental signum as well as the 
remedial properties described above.  The problem, however, arises when these marriages 
are placed in comparison with either partner’s first union, wherein “they provide a less 
complete reference to the signification of the sacrament.”  As he frames the objection: “In 
second marriages there is a division of flesh on the part of either the man or the woman; 
but Christ is undivided, and, in the same way, the church remains the undivided wife of 
one sole spouse, who in who in turn represents the undivided union of divine and human 
nature.”325   
The compromise for Bonaventure was to point out that second marriages, while 
tolerated, remained ineligible for the priestly blessing—a custom of unknown origin that 
began to receive increased mention as sacramental concerns progressed.  Thus, second 
marriages retained the core components of the marital sacrament while lacking its added 
honor and dignity.  The problem of their “incomplete signification,” however, remains 
unresolved.  
This withholding of the nuptial blessing is striking enough on its own, given the 
lengths to which the Church was currently going to make a public benediction a key 
component of a valid marriage.  What is all the more remarkable, however, is the sense in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
325 “Item, in secundis nuptiis est carnis divisio ex parte viri vel mulieris; sed Christus est indivisus, et 
Ecclesia similiter indivisa et unius solius sponsa, et humana natura a divina est indivisa.” Commentaria in 
Quator Libros Sentarium 4, d 42, a 3 q2. 
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which the aforementioned problem of signification was left to linger over the next few 
centuries of marital theology.  Albertus Magnus couched his own defense of second 
nuptials in an almost verbatim repetition of Bonaventure, arguing that these unions “are 
sacramental, though they do not have perfect signification.”326   
This ambivalence is echoed by even the great theological problem-solver 
Aquinas, who is even more explicit in admitting the symbolic challenges posed by 
successive unions.  According to Aquinas, “although the second marriage, considered in 
itself, is a perfect sacrament, yet if we consider it in relation to the first marriage, it is 
somewhat a defective sacrament, because it has not its full signification, since there is not 
a union of only one woman with only one man as in the marriage of Christ and the 
Church.”  Again, Aquinas brings up the compromise of the omitted priestly blessing, 
framing this as a concession for this lack of symbolic exactitude.327  He avers, however, 
that such a formality would be perfectly appropriate for couples in which the bride is a 
virgin, for "though Christ has but one Church for a spouse, there are many persons 
espoused to him."328 In treating unions without this fortunate gender dynamic, Aquinas 
deigns only to repeat that they constitute a defectum sacramenti,  a sacramental defect.329 
 One interesting development over the course of this conversation is the gradual 
shift towards gender-neutral language, as the panic over remarried widows expressed by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
326 “Dicendum, quod sacramentum sunt, sed non adeo perfectae significationis.” Albertus Magnus, 
Commentaria in Quator Libros Sentarium 4. d42. a17. 
327 Summa Theologica, Book 3 Supplement, Q 63 A 2, r 2. 
328Quia Christus, etsi unam Ecclesiam sponsam habeat, habet tamen plures personas desonsatas in una 
Ecclesia. Summa Theologica 3 Suppl Q 63 A 2 r 2, Opera Omnia 3, pg. 129. 
329 Secundum matrimonium, quamvis in se consideratum sit perfectum sacramentum, tamen in ordine ad 
primum consideratum habet aliquid de defectu sacramenti, quia non habet plenam significicantionem, cum 
non sit una unius, sicut est in matrimonio Christi et Ecclesiae.  …et propter hoc quando mulier secundo 
nubit, nuptiae non benedicuntur, propeter defectum sacramenti.  Ibid. 
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Tertullian and Augustine became a more pervasive anxiety about remarriage in general.  
This is especially striking given the social context, since, as described above, the 
potential instability of successive marriages was an issue that primarily impacted women.  
As we will see in Chapters Four and Five, the “gendered” version of this discourse is also 
prominently preserved in literature, wherein it is widows, not widowers, who become the 
primary test cases for the advisability of remarriage.  The non-gendered language of 
theologians is thus especially evocative, demonstrating just how deeply this problem 
penetrated the structure of the marital sacrament itself.  While larger gender dynamics 
can never, of course, be entirely divorced from male writers’ opinions about marriage, 
here they are clearly not the main factor, revealing a sacramental defect that applies 
equally to both sexes.  
This designation of defectum sacramenti therefore becomes the final word on the 
remarriage of widows and (as of the thirteenth century) widowers, capping off a 
millennium’s worth of hesitancy and suspicion.  Neither perfectly sinful nor perfectly 
sacramental, these women existed as a threat to the very building blocks of the marital 
sacrament, cogs in an increasingly complex piece of theological machinery.  Like 
concubines and mistresses, they saw their status become the stuff of debate, scandal, and 
ridicule throughout various discursive traditions.  And, like concubines, they found 
themselves under the auspices of tortuous and contradictory legal tradition, which served 
to carry the concerns of the theological sphere out into the secular world. 
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CHAPTER 3 
The Bride and Groom Come Down to Earth: The Sacramental Theory 
of Marriage in Canon Law	    
 
One of the generally accepted truths about medieval canon law is that it went 
through a process of “Romanization” beginning in the mid-twelfth century, gradually 
taking on the formal and juridical spirit of newly rediscovered codes of Justinian.330  
With respect to marriage, however, this is only partially true.  While canonical treatments 
of marriage do come to exhibit the streamlined rescriptum model found in Roman legal 
texts, they were far more deeply influenced by developments in sacramental theology, in 
terms of how they both understood and approached marriage as a legislative concept.  
From the twelfth century onward, canons dealing with marriage were accompanied by 
increasingly sophisticated sacramental framework, drawn directly from contemporary 
theological notions. Likewise, sacramental concerns often provided the contours for the 
legal shape of matrimony—how it was contracted, how it was adjudicated, and under 
what conditions it might be dissolved.  The one glaring exception, as we shall see, was 
the canonical perspective on concubinage, wherein the Roman distinction between a 
concubina and an ancilla long outlasted its actual social relevance.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
330 This idea is so widespread as to almost defy citation, but its basic elements can be traced mainly to the 
thought of Stephan Kuttner, who describes canon law as “one of the most effective instruments in the 
reception of roman law.”  See Kuttner, “Some Considerations on the Role of Secular Law and Institutions 
in the History of Canon Law,” in Studies in the History of Medieval Canon Law (Brookfield, VT: 
Variorum, 1990), 278-306 and, “Harmony from Dissonance.” 
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Ivo, Burchard, and the Christianization of Marriage Law 
Canonists in the period before Gratian (c.1140) faced a unique set of challenges in 
discussing matrimony, not least of which stemmed from the fact that the church had yet 
to promulgate a cohesive idea of marriage (as discussed in the previous chapter).  For 
pioneers such as Burchard of Worms (965-1025) and Ivo of Chartres (1040-1115) little 
was clear beyond the fact that marriage somehow reflected the mystical union between 
Christ and the Church, a notion that they (like their theological contemporaries) mainly 
used to bolster the principle of conjugal indissolubility.  Both cite Leo I’s dictum that “on 
account of the couple’s sexual joining, conjugal ties have within them the sacrament of 
Christ and the Church.”331  Thus, married Christians create a bond whose legal standing 
can be linked directly back to Christ’s union with the Church, rendering their pact 
unbreakable by association.  
 For Burchard, this is the sole use of the word sacramentum in the entirety of his 
marriage canons.  Ivo, by contrast, displays a much more thorough engagement with the 
concept of conjugal sacramentality, a fact perhaps attributable to Ivo’s own deep personal 
involvement in various marriage cases.332  In addition to citing Augustine’s illustrious 
“three goods” passage from De bono conjugali (a mainstay on the theological scene of 
this period as well),333 Ivo used Augustinian thought to present a firmer and more 
nuanced picture of marital indissolubility.  He includes, for example, Augustine’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
331 “Unde cum societas nuptarium ita ab initio consituta sit, ut praeter sexuum conjuctionem haberet in se 
Christi et Ecclesiae sacramentum…” Burchard Decretum 9.1, PL 140, 816; Ivo Decretum 8.74, PL 161, 
599 and Panormia 6.23, ibid, 1247. 
332 Ivo’s personal involvement on the early 12th century marriage scene was such that he actually found 
himself jailed for his opposition to King Philip I of France’s second marriage.  Juicy details may be found 
in Georges Duby, Medieval Marriage: Two Models from the Twelfth Century, trans. Elborg Foster 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977).  
333 Decretum 8.15 (PL 161, pg. 587), Panormia 6.30 (ibid, pg. 1250).  See also pages 60- 65 of this text. 
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comparison of marriage to baptism (discussed at length in the previous chapter), in which 
the conjugal bond persists between separated spouses just as the baptismal mark remains 
upon the soul of the apostate.334  On the whole the word sacramentum appears thirty-five 
times in the combined marriage canons of the Panormia and Decretum, most often used 
to convey some sense of the bond’s indissoluble nature. 
 This recourse to sacramental imagery helped Ivo somewhat in facing the second 
major challenge facing pre-Gratian canon law collections: early medieval Europe’s 
panoply of conflicting marital traditions, all of which presented different ways of 
contracting and envisioning marriage.  On the whole, this diversity of opinion left 
canonists with three major options.  The first, championed largely in the Germanic 
societies, afforded prime importance to the betrothal process, through which parties 
became almost irrevocably joined.335  Both Visigothic and Frankish law imposed 
penalties for broken engagements, while Burgundian and Visigothic codes list some sort 
of betrothal arrangement as an essential element of marriage.336  Secondly, perspectives 
differed on the importance of sexual consummation in the formation of a marriage, with 
some Germanic cultures making it the final step in the ratification of a union initiated by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
334 Decretum 8.13 (PL 161, pg. 586)  For Ivo’s use of Augustine to establish marital indissolubility, see also 
8. 9, 8.12, and 8.15. 
335 The process of Kafehe, by which a bride was purchased and incorporated into her husband’s family, 
seems to have been the ideal mode of marrying in most Germanic cultures.  See Brundage, Law, Sex, and 
Christian Society, 128-29, Regine Le Jan, Famille et pouvoir dans le monde franc (VIIeme-Xeme siècle): 
essai d’anthropologie sociale (Paris: Publication de la Sorbonne, 1995), 264-5, Suzanne Wemple, Women 
in Frankish Society: Marriage and the Cloister, 500 to 900 (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1981), 31-
38. 
336 For severity of betrothal, see Laws of the Salian Franks 65a; Leges Visigothorum 3.1.2 ed Karolus 
Zeumer, Leges Nationum Germanicarum, Tomus 1, ( Hannoverae et Lipsiae: Impensis Bibliopolii 
Hahniani, 1902); Burgundian Code 51. 3-5. 
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betrothal.337  Finally, there was the enduring Roman notion of a marriage made and 
upheld by maritalis affectio: the simple intention of the couple to be married to one 
another.  
Burchard and Ivo include examples of all three of these customs in their canonical 
collections, in addition to early Christian attempts to impose their own hazy idea of 
marriage. Both mention various differences among the different Germanic customs, 
particularly with regard the requirement of a betrothal or dowry.338  Both also display a 
familiarity with the Theodosian Code, though choose, interestingly, not to cite any of its 
marital dictates.339  Ivo, in fact, becomes an early harbinger of the “Roman law revival” 
by including several citations of Justinian, displaying a nuanced grasp on the Roman 
process of marriage-making.340  The assumption would be that such customs would be 
subordinated to the Church’s own marital policies, but the canons included by Burchard 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
337 For Germanic consummationism and its influence upon the development of Christian marriage, see 
Glenn W. Olsen, “Marriage in Barbarian Kingdom and Christian Court, Fifth through Eleventh Centuries,” 
in Christian Marriage: A Historical Study (New York: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 2001), 146-
212, Philil Reynolds, Marriage in the Western Church: The Christianization of Marriage During the 
Patristic and Early Medieval Periods (New York, Brill, 1994), 328-61. 
338 Both Ivo and Burchard include a canon from the Council of Tibur explaining the difference between 
Frankish and Saxon marital customs, and that neither my give grounds for divorce.  Burchard, Decretum 
9.76; Ivo, Decretum, 8.213.  Ivo includes a further explication of how fornication is to be managed amongst 
the Francs, Burgundians, and others.  Ivo, Decretum 8.224. 
339 Burchard cites Theodosian law just once, in discussing women’s rights to represent themselves in court 
(an interesting choice for our purposes): Burchard, Decretum 8.85. Ivo (who cites the code more amply) 
repeats this citation in Decretum 8.85.  Both provide a faithful rendering of Theodosian Code 2.12.5.  
Neither Burchard nor Ivo cite the code with respect to marriage proper. 
340 Ivo, Decretum 9.20 (consent as active agent in engagements and marriage)9.62 (freewomen cannot be 
kept as concubines), 9.68 (children follow their mother’s status), 9.123(anyone accused of adultery with a 
servant is to be publically shamed), 9.246 (women can’t remarry when husbands are in captivity). Unlike 
the Theodosian Code, Justinian’s works were not cited at all in canon law collections dating from before 
1090, making Ivo a true innovator in this regard.  It is however highly unlikely that he came into contact 
with Justian’s law codes in their original form; rather, Ivo’s citations of Justinian seem to come exclusively 
from a non-extant Italian sentence collection known as the Pandectarum.  See Charles Radding and 
Antonio Ciaralli, The Corpus Iuris Civilis in the Middle Ages: Muscripts and Transmission from the Sixth 
Century to the Juristic Revival (Boston: Brill, 2007). 
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and Ivo do not provide a clear picture as to what exactly these policies would be.341  In 
some canons, betrothal emerges as an essential component of a valid union; Ivo, in his 
letters, famously goes so far as to make a betrothal agreement analogous to marriage.342  
In others, priestly involvement seems to be the key, in particular the nuptial blessing that 
was to become such a sticking point in subsequent canon law.343  At no point do either 
Burchard or Ivo attempt to collate one single, cohesive idea of what marriage was or how 
it was made, placing them in sharp contrast with their twelfth century, post-Lombardian 
counterparts. 
 In Ivo’s work, one option does surface slightly above the fray: consent, which 
consistently emerges as the one element without which a valid marriage cannot exist.  In 
privileging this method Ivo draws from Christian and secular sources, seeming to 
conflate both notions of consent.  From John Chrysostom (via Pope Nicholas I), he takes 
the idea that “marriage is made by will, not by coitus.”344  From Justinian we have the 
even more explicit notion that “if someone takes a wife with marital affection, without 
any instruments of betrothal, he may not repudiate her…”345  The long-held scholarly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
341 One additionally confusing element, as Theodore Mackin points out, is Ivo’s attachment to his own 
Frankish traditions, which is apparent in both his collections and his letters. Theodore Mackin, The Marital 
Sacrament (Mahwah, NJ: The Paulist Press, 1989), 265. 
342 For canons necessitating betrothal or dowry agreement, see Burchard, Decretum 9.1, 9.2, 9.6; Ivo 
Decretum 8.139, D 8.4, 8.6, D 8.140, Panormia 6.6.  For Ivo’s strident stance on betrothal see Ivo Letter 
99, PL 162,118-19.and Christophe Rolker, Canon Law and the Letters of Ivo of Chartres (Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), pg. 214-15. 
343 Burchard, Decretum 9.5, 9.7; Ivo, Decretum 8.145, 8.146. 
344 Matrimonium non facit coitus, sed voluntas.  Decretum 8.17 PL 161, 588. 
345 Si quis sine dotalibus instrumentis, affectione maritali uxorem duxerit, non audeat sine causa legibus 
cognita repidium ei mittere.  Decretum 8.34, PL 161, pg 591. Corresponds roughly to Codex Justinianus 
5.4.22: Si donationum ante nuptias vel dotis instrumenta defuerint, pompa etiam aliaque nuptiarum 
celebritas omittatur, nullus aestimet ob id deesse recte alias inito matrimonio firmitatem vel ex eo natis 
liberis iura posse legitimorum auferri, inter pares honestate personas nulla lege impediente consortium, 
quod ipsorum consensu atque amicorum fide firmatur, Corpus Iuris Civilius, vol 2, edited by Paul Keuger 
(Berlin: Weidmann, 1888). 
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consensus, however, is that Ivo and his colleagues were primarily influenced by the 
Roman idea of maritalis affectio in promoting consent as the effective agent in marriage, 
which they assimilated without distinction into the emerging Christian idea of marital 
formation.346 
 On a conceptual level this recourse to pure maritalis affectio worked nicely 
alongside the Christian doctrine of marriage, such as it existed in Ivo’s time.  A union 
that was created and sustained by the ongoing will of the parties bore some clear 
symmetry to the Augustinian vision of “a single soul and a single heart turned to God,“ 
which had been inherited by both canonists and theologians.347 On a practical level, 
however, it brought with it several major practical difficulties, especially when 
divorced348 from its  original social context.  Roman law stipulated only that marriage 
was “a union of a man and a woman in a shared way of life,” and required no ceremony 
for those who wished to so join.349  As Judith-Evans Grubbs and Susan Treggiari have 
demonstrated, the Roman definition of maritalis affectio worked largely because it would 
have been immediately clear who was married and who was not, depending upon the 
relative social status of the partners.350 Indeed, Roman legal codes are littered with 
restrictions upon unions between the various classes, drawing a clear social line between 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
346 See A. Esmein, Le Mariage en Droit Canonique (Paris: L. Larose et Forcel, 1891), 97; Jean Gaudemet, 
Église et cite: Histoire du droit canonique (Paris: cerf, 1994), 560-4; Rolker adds a slight nuance in that Ivo 
uses Roman law texts at proof “without adopting the Roman law concept of marriage,” Rolker, Canon Law, 
213. 
347 Augustine, De Bono Conjugali 18.21. 
348 All puns in this dissertation are intended. 
349 Nuptiae sunt coniunctio maris et feminae et consortium omnis vitae, divini et humani iuris 
communicatio. Digesta Justinianus 23.2.1, Digesta Justinianus, Corpus Iuris Civilius vol 1, ed Theodore 
Mommsen (Berlin: Weidmann, 1888), pg. 319.  For consent as sine qua non of Roman marriage see DJ 
23.1.11, 23.2.2; CJ 5.4.6, 5.4.13, 5.4.22. 
350 Judith Evans-Grubbs, “Marrying and Its Documentation in Later Roman Law,” in To Have and to Hold: 
Marrying and Its Documentation in Western Christendom 400-1400 (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 
95-113 and Susan Treggiari, “Contubernales in CiL 6,” The Phoenix 35: 1 (1981), 42-69. 
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marriage and other monogamous sexual unions.  Even Justinian, whose marriage 
litigation was markedly more egalitarian, plainly delineates which classes of women 
would be off-limits to men of the senatorial class, and bars any kind of marriage between 
slaves and freepersons.351  Thus, a domestic relationship between two freepersons was 
presumed to be marriage, regardless of whether or not they had publically celebrated it as 
such. 
 Early canonists retained some vestiges of class orientation, citing a popular canon 
of Leo I in which valid marriage is defined as “between equals.”352  More often, however, 
they sought to square their idea of matrimony with the Pauline dictate that “slave and 
free” are one in Christ—and hence too in the human bond that symbolizes his union with 
all humanity.  Hence the decretal of Pope Julius I (included by both Ivo and Burchard), 
declaring that “as there is one father for all of us in heaven, whether we be rich or poor, 
slave or free…there is for all of us one Law, regardless of our condition.”353  On a 
juridical level, however, such egalitarianism robbed the Christian notion of maritalis 
affectio of its one distinguishing characteristic within the Roman legal system: matching 
status of the partners.  
  Canonists thus found themselves in a tricky position with maritalis affectio as 
their sine qua non.  On the one hand, it was obviously their preference that the couple’s 
consent be marked by some sort of public ceremony, and that the church be involved in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
351 CJ 5.4.3, 5.4.15, 5.4.28pr, 5.4.281, 5.4.28.3, 5.5.3; DJ 23.2.27, 23.2.28. 
352 Burchard Decretum 9.1; Ivo Decretum 8.139.  Ivo includes some additional class restrictions in 
Decretum 8.57 and his letter 253, see PL 162, 250. 
353 Omnibus vobis unus est pater in coelis, et unusquisque dives et pauper, liber et servus, aequaliter pro 
se, et pro animabus eorum rationem daturi sunt. Quapropter omnibus cujuscunque conditionis sint, unam 
legem, quantum ad Deum, habere non dubitamus. Burchard 9.18, PL 140,  818; Ivo Decretum 8.156, PL 
161, 618. 
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this ceremony to the greatest extent possible.  The ideal marriage, as described in an oft-
cited letter of Nicholas I, is one in which the bride and groom are each presented by their 
parents, publically exchange vows, and are then blessed by the bishop before spending 
their wedding night in a state of pious chastity.354  On the other hand, one aspect of this 
symmetry between the Christian theological and Roman legal concept of marriage is that 
neither could logically impose such solemnities, as Ivo’s colleagues in sacramental 
theology were just beginning to discover. 
 Ivo grudgingly concedes this point by citing the Roman maxim that a valid 
marriage may be effected “without instruments—that is to say, anything beyond the 
consent of the couple.”355  Much more often, however, he deigns to include canons 
condemning these sorts of unions, which here gain their enduring label of matrimonia 
clandestina.  All in all, five of Ivo’s canons declare that no Christian couple should 
“clandestinely” contract marriage, with several specifying that marriages should be 
celebrated publically and with all of the proper solemnities.356 The fact Burchard 
included none of these canons, despite the fact that they all would have likely been 
available to him, demonstrates the mounting anxiety about unsolemnized unions in Ivo’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
354 Qualis esse debeat uxor quae habenda est secundum legem: virgo casta et desponsata in virginitate, et 
dotata legitime, et a parentibus tradita, et a sponso et a paranymphis accipienda, et ita secundum legem et 
Evangelium publicis nuptiis honeste in conjugium liquide sumenda: et omnibus diebus vitae nisi ex 
consensu et causa vacandi Deo nunquam propter hominem separanda, et si fornicata fuerit dimittenda; sed 
illa vivente altera non deducenda, quia adulteri regnum Dei non possidebunt, et poenitentia illius per 
scripturas recipienda. Burchard, Decretum 9.2, PL 140 pg 875; see also Ivo Decretum 8. 4. 
355 Si quis sine dotalibus instrumentis, affectione maritali uxorem duxerit, non audeat sine causa legibus 
cognita repudium ei mittere. Ivo, Decretum 8. 34, PL 161, pg.591.  Corresponds roughly to CJ 5.4.22, 
5.4.13. 
356 Ivo Decretum 8. 141;  Panormia 6. 6 , 6.31, 6.5, 6.6, 6.9. 
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era.357   None, of these canons, however, declares marriages contracted privately to be 
invalid, and Ivo simply allows them to stand alongside other canons that clearly state that 
marriage may be made by consent alone. 
 It is perhaps for this reason that early canonists had such a difficult time tackling 
the issue of concubinage.358 Indeed, it is here that they differed most from their roman 
predecessors, for whom concubinage had been a morally neutral way of maintaining a 
relationship between partners of different classes.359   Canon law, however, immediately 
cast concubines in a much more disapproving light, owing largely to the opprobrium they 
had inherited from their patristic sources.  Augustine, for example, furnished them with 
an outright prohibition on the taking of concubines, even if a man is simply biding his 
time (as Augustine himself did) until a suitable marriage partner is found.360 From 
Ambrose they gained the additional clarification that Old Testament concubinage should 
not be taken as a license for contemporary Christians, as the practice, under the dictates 
of the New Law, now took on the clear implications of “adultery.”361  This prohibitive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
357 The most strident of these prohibitions, Pope Hormistas’ decree that “no Christian should marry 
secretly,” (Panormia 6.5) was promulgated in the early 6th century.  Indeed Burchard cites Hormisdas 
elsewhere, as in Decretum 8.23. 
358 Jean Gaudemet, who has also noted this link between Roman “simple consentism” and reluctant 
toleration of concubines, calls Ivo’s theory of marriage “une solution déplorable.”Église et cité, 562. 
359 The closest Roman law codes come to condemning concubines are statutes dictating inheritance, 
wherein concerns are raised about resources taken away from the man’s legitimate children.  See 
Theodosian Code 4.6.7-8. Code Théodosien I-XV, in Les lois religieuses des empereurs Romains de 
Constantin à Théodose II, Tom 2, texte latin, T Mommsen, P. Meter, et P. Krueger, traduction française 
Jean Rouge et Roland Delmaire (Paris, Cerf, 2009). Otherwise, evidence from wills, funerary inscriptions, 
and other forms of surviving documentation show concubinage to be a perfectly well-respected form of 
partnership, provided it did not encroach upon a man’s legitimate family.  See Treggiari, “Contubernales in 
CiL 6,” The Phoenix 35: 1 (1981), 42-69 and “Concubinae,” in Papers of the British School at Rome 49 
(1981), 59-81. 
360 Burchard 8.15, Ivo Decretum 8. 153, Panormia 6. 153. 
361Mulier igitur tua si talibus moribus praedita est ut mereatur consortium, mereatur et nomen uxoris. 
Praesta concubinae tuae libertatem, et nomen uxoris, ne tu adulter sis potius quam maritus.  Ivo Decretum 
8. 30, PL 161, 590. 
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attitude had also begun to appear in consular decisions available to canonists, with the 
Council of Arles (314) banning it as an offense on par with bigamy.362 
 Yet with the class distinctions governing marriage erased, there remained little to 
legally differentiate marriage from concubinage, producing a grudging sense of tolerance. 
A plurality of concubines impeded ordination in exactly the same way as a plurality of 
wives (the larger implications of which will be addressed in the discussion on remarriage 
below).363  Even more telling is the creeping realization that a concubine could, in fact, 
fulfill all of the basic juridical functions of a wife, in particular the ability to maintain the 
one-to-one ratio that defined marital fidelity.   Much of this can be traced back to 
Augustine’s own famously ambivalent attitude towards concubines, in De bono conjugali 
in which he (as was discussed in chapter one) bestows quasi-matrimonial status upon the 
faithful, fecund concubine.364  By the eleventh century this elision between concubinage 
and marital “oneness” could also be gleaned from more contemporary sources. The 
Fourth Council of Toledo (633) decreed that a man who has limited himself to “one 
woman,” should not be barred from receiving communion, regardless of whether this 
woman be his wife or concubine.365 Ivo also included a particularly evocative passage 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
362 Nulli liceat ullo tempore duas uxores habere, sed neque unquam concubinam. Ivo, Decretum 8.155, PL 
161, pg. 618;  Burchard Decretum 9.17, PL 140 pg. 81.8. 
363 Burchard 9. 29, Ivo Dectretum 8.32. 
364 Ivo Decretum 8.65, Panormia 6.27. 
365 Si quis habens uxorem fidelem, concubinam habeat, non communicet. Caeterum is qui non habet 
uxorem, et pro uxore concubinam habet, a communione non repellatur, tantum ut unius mulieris, aut 
uxoris, aut concubinae  (ut ei placuerit) sit conjunctione contentus. Alias vero abjiciatur, donec desinat, et 
ad poenitentiam revertatur. Ivo, Decretum 8. 64 (PL 161, pg. 598), Panormia 6.49 (ibid, pg. 1251) 
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from Isidore of Seville, asserting that a Christian may have either a wife or a concubine 
so as he restricts himself to “one of each.”366 
 One way in which canonists remedied this contradiction was to urge those who 
had concubines to marry them post-haste, an option that had also existed in  Roman law 
(albeit for pecuniary, as opposed to moral, reasons).367  Much more frequently, however, 
they attempt a sort of linguistic sleight-of-hand, addressing issues pertaining to 
concubines by referring to them with the now-outdated designation of ancilla.  Indeed, 
concubines remain ancillae to a startling degree throughout the annals of early canon law, 
despite legal and social realities to the contrary.  By the tenth century female slaves had 
legally entered the marriage market, and, as Susan Mosher Stuard points out, they likely 
comprised a rather low percentage of concubines even by the late antiquity.368 Indeed, it 
is now common historical opinion that it was the dos that made for the primary 
distinction between a wife and a concubine, with the fixed social caste system of Roman 
law no longer relevant or applicable. 
 Several instances of the word ancilla emanate from Old Testament sources, in 
which concubinage and slavery were indeed quite closely aligned and (in contrast to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
366 Christiano dico non plurimas, sed nec duas simul habere licitum est, nisi unam tantum aut uxorem, aut 
certo loco uxoris, si conjux deest,concubinam. Ivo, Decretum 8.66,PL 161, 598; Panormia 6.50, ibid, 1251. 
367 This notion that a concubine and her children might be legitimated through marriage emerges with the 
Christian rule of Constantine, but, as Evans-Grubbs has convincingly argued, Constantine’s legislation had 
much more to do with inheritance lineage than it did with the sanctity of marriage.  See Codex Jusinianus 
5.27.5 and Evans-Grubbs, Law and Family in Late Antiquity.  For Christian interpolation of this law, see 
Ivo, Decretum  8.30, 8.32, 8.34, and 8.36, as well as his Epistola 16, PL 162, 37. 
368 For marriagability of ancillae, see Burchard, Decretum 9. 18 & 9.27, Ivo Decretum 8.52, 8.53, and 8. 
156, Panormia 6.111 & 6.37.  See also Susan Mosher Stuard, “Qui natus est de ancilla mea" in Medieval 
Church Law: Proceedings of the tenth international congress of medieval canon law, ed. Kenneth 
Pennington  (Città del Vaticano: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 2001), 653-673. 
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Roman concubinage) generally constituted some sort of extra-marital relationship.369  Far 
more baffling, however, is the casual interpolation of the Roman concept of 
concubinage—without, as Ruth Karras notes, much accounting for the differences 
between Roman and Christian concubines. 370  Ivo incorporates Justinian’s dictum that “a 
relationship with a freewoman is presumed to be marriage,” an assumption which relied, 
of course, on the unmarriagability of Roman slaves.371  Concubinae and ancillae are also 
offhandedly linked in a variety of Christian sources, the most suggestive of which is an 
oft-quoted letter of Pope Leo I (Ivo, in fact, includes it in his Decretum twice).  As Leo 
puts it, “Not every woman joined to a man is a wife, for not every son is an heir of his 
father.  The bonds of marriage between freepersons were instituted by God before the 
beginnings of Roman law. And so a wife is different from a concubine, just as a 
freewoman (libera) is different from a slave girl (ancilla).372  This forthright 
identification, alongside canons that merely assumed servile status, served to further 
obscure the concubine’s exact role, placing her in some hazy space between slavery and 
wifehood.373   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
369 Early Christian thinkers were particularly fxated on the story of Abraham and Hagar, which is used in 
several canons to address the relationship between concubines, their children, and inheritance.  See 
Burchard, Decretum 9.1; Ivo Decretum 8.30, 8.139, Panormia 6.35. 
370 Karras further notes that some such canons emanated from areas in which slavery no longer existed, 
adding to the confusion surrounding the canonical use of ancilla.  See Karras, “Marriage, Concubinage, and 
the Law,” in Law and the Illicit in Medieval Europe, edited by Ruth Mazo Karras, Joel Kaye, and E. Ann 
Matter (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), 117-129. 
371 Ivo, Decretum, 8. 62, Panormia 6.48. 
372 Non omnis mulier viro juncta uxor est viri, quia nec omnis filius haeres est patris. Nuptiarum autem 
foedera inter ingenuos sunt legitima, et inter aequales, et multo prius hoc ipsum Domino constituente, 
quam initium Romani juris existeret. Itaque aliud est uxor, aliud concubina; sicut est aliud ancilla, aliud 
libera . Burchard Decretum 9.1 (PL 140, pg. 815), Ivo Decretum 8.139 (PL 161, pg. 615), Panormia 6.35 
(ibid, pg. 1250).  Other selections from the letter found in Decretum 8. 74. 
373 From Ambrose: Dicat aliquis: Uxorem non habeo, ideo mihi ancillam sociavi… Si igitur ancillae filius 
haeres non est, ergo nec filius est. Cur autem quaeritur tale conjugium de quo susceptus filius nec 
successionis possit haeres esse, nec sanguinis?... Mulier igitur tua si talibus moribus praedita est ut 
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 Such inconsistencies could, of course, be the result of genuine confusion on Ivo’s 
part, and the overall rocky transition from Germano-Roman tradition to Christian law.  
They could also be included out of the assumption that, as various historians have 
speculated, marriage in this period was more of a social understanding than a legal status, 
and that most distinctions between wives and concubines would be made on an informal, 
case-by-case basis.374  In their immediate context, however, these elisions of concubina 
and ancilla read as an attempt to shield the increasingly sacrosanct institution of 
marriage, obscuring the extent to which marriage now shared ground with this unsavory 
domestic union.  Thus, Roman legal norms functioned to protect the budding theological 
idea of marriage, which, in it required neither social stratification nor obligatory public 
ceremony. 
 Widows too found themselves pinched by this collision of Christian and secular 
ideology.375  As in sacramental theology, early canon law focused exclusively on the 
constraints and responsibilities that were to be placed upon bereaved women, gradually 
adopting a more gender-neutral tone as the problem of remarriage came to be more 
theoretically framed.  In the collections of Ivo and Burchard, the issue was addressed as a 
social one, absorbing all of the suspicion and implied misogyny of the current legal and 
social climate. Roman and Germanic traditions, to be sure, had not made things 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
mereatur consortium, mereatur et nomen uxoris. Praesta concubinae tuae libertatem, et nomen uxoris, ne 
tu adulter sis potius quam maritus.  Ivo, Decretum 8. 30, PL 161, 590.  See also 8.31 and 8.71, which 
proceed from the assumption that a concubine would be servile.  
374 It should also be noted that, whatever the legal situation, social tolerance of concubines seems to have 
remained farily high in this period, extra-marital concubines included.  See Olsen, “Barbarian Kingdom,” 
164; Le Jan, Famille et Pouvoir, 202; Brundage, Law, Sex, and Christian Society, 145. 
375 Suzanne Wemple notes that, as a result of this legal climate, widows had a particularly rough time under 
both Merovignian and Carolingian rule, as they were reliant upon appointed “defenders” to manage their 
estate and family after their husband’s death.  See Wemple, 97-106.  
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particularly easy for the second-time bride, though their restrictions seemed to emanate 
from a place of relative moral neutrality.  Roman law forbade a woman from marrying 
within one year of the death of her husband, and spelled out elaborate stipulations on how 
she might use her first husband’s estate.376  Germanic law seemed to discourage 
remarriage by making it more expensive, requiring the prospective groom to pay a fine 
and ask permission from the deceased husband’s family.377  Many of these provisions 
found their way into early canon law, where they were amplified by the Patristic distrust 
of widows and remarriage.   Both Burchard and Ivo, for example, cite Jerome on the 
notion that “where these is more than one husband, the idea of a single husband is 
destroyed.”378 Thus, a widow still suffered mightily (as she had under Roman law) for 
remarrying within her mandated “mourning period,” and risked the loss of her title, 
money, and even her children for remarrying at all.379  Yet now she also found herself 
legally grouped in with whores and adulteresses, as well as subject to a remarkable 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
376 See CJ 5.9.1, 5.9.2, 5.9.3-6.  These prohibitions, it should be noted, were also balanced by certain 
protective measures upon a widow’s right to remarry, specifically against relatives who should wish to 
impede such marriages so as to increase their own inheritance.  See C Th 3.7.1, CJ 5.4.18.2.  Franz 
Pellaton, however, finds late Antique law to be especially discouraging of remarriage, particularly when 
compared with earlier statutes.  See Pellaton. “La veuve et ses droits: de la base antiquité au haut moyen 
age,” dans Veuves et veuvage dans le haut moyen age, ed. M. Parisse (Paris: Picard, 1993), 51-98.  Socially 
speaking, as Michel Humbert has noted, remarried widows had the advantage of not being divorcées, which 
afforded them a bit of social clout.  They did, however, suffer in comparison with the social ideal of the 
univira.  See Michel Humbert, Le remariage à Rome (Milan: A. Giuffre, 1972), pgs. 57-75. 
377 See Pactis Legis Salicae 44.1-12, 100. 1-2, Lex Visigothorum 3.2.1. 
378 Ubi fuerit numerus maritorum, ibi vir proprius unus esse desistit.  Burchard, Decretum 9.25, PL 140 pg 
819; Ivo Decretum 8.163, PL 161, pg. 619. 
379 Ivo’s prohibitive statutes on remarriage include “infamy” for remarrying within a one-year mourning 
period (Decretum 8.272), potential loss of power over children (Decretum 8. 274) and a mandatory fasting 
period for all remarried couples (Decretum 8.162). 
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amount of suspicion that any vow of chastity she may make would be broken due to lack 
of self-control.380   
 To be sure, the Pauline authorization of remarriage was still in full effect.  Also 
present, however, was Augustine’s famous ambivalence about multiple marriages, now 
joined by several more contemporary canons reminding us that remarriage was only 
allowed as a “concession to lust.”381 In their immediate context these caveats were not 
grounded in any explicit theological reasoning—or at least, none that tied the problematic 
nature of remarriage back to the conjugal sacrament.  Yet traces of this ideology can be 
gleaned in canons regulating clerical marriage, where a twice-married bride impeded a 
cleric’s ability to ascend into higher orders.  Like their colleagues in theology, canonists 
based their prohibitions on that Pauline notion that “a bishop should be a man of one 
wife,” and that an additional husband on the woman’s part disrupted this perfect ratio.  
Their primary concern, however, seemed to have much more to do with “oneness” than it 
did with “wifeness,” as concubines too constituted such an impediment.  The logic 
behind this, as explained by Ambrose, was that a bishop’s personal history needed to lend 
itself to a tendency towards undivided fidelity, as was to be preserved between him and 
the “one unified Catholic church.”382  As we shall see, such arguments only became more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
380 Ivo cites Jerome’s categorization of the “vidua, meretrix, ejecta,” wherein the 3 types of women are 
distinct but still part of the same grouping. Decretum 8: 297As Katherine Clark points out, pervasive 
anxiety about “holy widows” breaking their vows is likely related to the breakdown of antique ordo 
viduarum, meaning that any vows of chastity would be up to the widow herself to keep, without the 
church’s supervision.  See Katherine Clark, “Purgatory, Punishment, and the Discourse of Holy 
Widowhood in the High and Later Middle Ages,” Journal of the History of Sexuality 16 (2007), 169-203.   
381 For example, Burchard, Decretum 9.21, which specifies that second marriages are only allowed because 
of human weakness. 
382Si ad superficiem tantum litterae respiciamus, prohibet bigamum episcopum ordinari. Si vero ad 
altiorem sensum conscendimus, inhibet episcopum duas usurpare Ecclesias. Et si adhuc introrsus 
profundiora perscruteris, monet ne per catholicum dogma sensum inveniatur episcopus habere haereticum, 
sed Christianam tantum catholicam et orthodoxam sibi associet fidem, et unius uxoris tantummodo et 
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theologically complex as canon law developed, employing borrowed reasoning from the 
discussion on secular remarriage within sacramental theology. 
Gratian and His Commentators 
By the time Gratian compiled his Decretum in the early 1140’s, the Roman law 
revival was supposedly in full swing.  It is surprising, therefore, that Roman legal 
discourse is no more present in Gratian’s marital corpus than it was in Ivo’s—nor does it 
make a particularly triumphant reappearance in the work of Gratian’s commentators.  
This may be due to the possibility (raised most recently by Anders Winroth) that Gratian 
simply did not know Roman law as well as had been previously assumed, drawing his 
citations of the Corpus Iuris Civilis exclusively from Ivo’s Panormia.383  What is 
indisputable is that Gratian and his Decretists drew far more deeply from contemporary 
developments in sacramental theology than they did from any legal source, with the 
sacramental substance becoming their main criteria for marital validity. 
 Gratian, like his predecessors, derived the bulk of his material on conjugal 
sacramentality from Augustine, though he did independently use the term in his 
expositions to several canons.  The sacramentum, he argues, is one of the elements that 
renders Mary and Joseph’s marriage “complete,” compensating for the lack of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
catholicae Ecclesiae vir episcopis vocetur. Ivo Deretum 8. 292, PL161, pg. 617.  There was also Jerome’s 
contention that a man whose union violated the one-to-one ratio of conjugal life approached his ordination 
with a “divided” soul. Ivo, Decretum 6.832 
383 Winroth argues that scholars have overestimated the extent to which Roman law had circulated in 
Bologna at the time that Gratian composed his Decretum.  See Anders Winroth, The Making of Gratian’s 
Decretum (Cambridge University Press, 2000), 146-170.  Winroth elsewhere notes that the majority of 
“Gratian’s” Roman law citations are not found in the first recension, and that many of the references found 
in the first recension are misattributed. Anders Winroth, “Roman Law in Gratian and the Panormia,” in 
Bishops, Texts, and the Use of Canon Law around 1100: Essays in Honor of Martin Brett, ed by Bruce 
Brasington and Kathleen G. Cushing (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2008), 183-90. 
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“substance” of consummation (a distinction to be discussed at greater length below). 384 
Elsewhere the marital sacramentum is somewhat ambiguously linked to sexual 
exclusivity (particularly on the woman’s part), which, when absent, renders marriage 
indistinguishable from adultery.  Thus, for Gratian the sacramental nature of marriage 
seems to be the singular component that sets it apart from all other unions, in addition to 
conferring the sense of indissolubility already put in place by Augustine.  
Gratian’s commentators, by contrast, were far more elaborate in their engagement 
with the conjugal sacramentum, the likely result of Peter Lombard’s clarification of 
sacramental theory circa 1150.  The earliest Decretist, Paucapalea, prefaces his 
commentary on Gratian’s marital canons with a lengthy explication of what marriage 
means in a sacramental context, namely “the sharing of all aspects of life, in accordance 
with divine and human law…so that they may have one church, one sanctuary, one 
home.”385  Later authors (benefitting perhaps from a wider diffusion of Lombard’s 
Sentences) display an even more sophisticated engagement with sacramental principles.  
Both Rolandus and Stephen of Tournai base their definitions of marriage upon the idea 
that it symbolizes the union between Christ and the Church, with Stephen lifting several 
phrases directly from Lombard’s Sententiae.386  Twelfth-century commentator Rufinus 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
384 Sed perfectum intelligitur non ex offitio, sed ex his que comitantur coniugium, ex fide uidelicet, prole et 
sacramento. Gratian, Decretum, C27 Q2 c39, Decretum Magistri Gratiani, edited by Emil Friedberg, 
Corpus Iuris Canonici, vol. 1 (Leipzig: Bernhard Tauchnitz, 1879. Reprint Graz: Akademische Druck- u. 
Verlagsanstalt, 1959), 1074. For the problematic relationship between chaste marriage and consent theory, 
see Penny S. Gold, “The Marriage of Mary and Joseph in the Medieval Ideology of Marriage,” in Vern L. 
Bullough and James Brundage eds, Sexual Practices and the Medieval Church (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus 
Books, 1982), 102-117. 
385 Matrimonium est consortium omnis vitae, divini and humani uiris comminicatio…ut sit una ecclesia, 
unus chorus, una domus, et similia. Summa Paucapalaea, C 27, Die Summa des Paucapalea über das 
Decretum Gratiani, ed. Johann Friedrich von Schulte (Giessen: Emil Roth, 1890), 110. 
386 Rolandus, Summa, C27 Q2, Stephen of Tournai Summa C27.  As Seamus Heaney notes, much of 
Stephen’s language here is in fact borrowed directly from Peter Lombard; Heaney points in particular to the 
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even tackles the increasingly tricky question of whether or not the marital sacrament 
confers grace, concluding that “the sign of the union of Christ and the church is not 
brought about by marriage, but merely represented, just as the sacrifices of the Old 
Testament prefigured the justification of the wicked, without bringing it about.”387 
 This became the principle lens through with Gratian and his Decretists evaluated 
the two main contenders for marriage formation left before them: consummation and 
consent.  While betrothal certainly remained part of this conversation, it was now only 
considered to the extent that it manifested consent between the parties, with all of the 
previously emphasized solemnities (dowry agreement, parental participation, etc), now 
considered extraneous “to the substance of the sacrament.”  Thus, whether or not these 
thinkers supported consummationism (following Gratian) or consentism (following Peter 
Lombard) depended directly upon how they best thought the Christ-Church union was 
reflected in the human marriage, which in turn decided the legal issue of a union’s 
dissolvability. 
 Gratian, who included canons supporting both sides, famously comes down on the 
side of consummation, arguing that, while betrothal “initiates” marriage, it is through 
consummation that it becomes “ratified” and hence indissoluble.388  One of the principle 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
phrase “sic ecclesia Christo copulantur voluntate et naturae conformitate, quia et idem vult cum eo ipse 
formam assumpsit de natura hominis Huius utruisque copulae figura est in coniugio.”  Heaney, 36.  As 
Jean Gaudemet has noticed, Steven ad Rufinus also incorporate Hugh of St. Victor’s notion of marriage as 
a double sacrament, demonstrating how confused and fragile the sacramental doctrine was during this 
period. See Gaudemet, “L’évolution de la notion de ‘sacramentum’ en matière de mariage,” Revue de droit 
canonique 41 (1991,) 78. 
387 Signum est coniunctem Christi et ecclesiae non effectum, sed dumtaxet representativum, sicut sacrificia 
pro peccata in veteri testamento iustificationem impii figurabant, quam tamen nequaquaquam efficiebant.  
Summa Rufini C32, q2, Summa Decretorum, ed. Heinrich Singer (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schoningh, 1902. 
Reprint Aalen: Scientia, 1963), 482. 
388 Gratian, Decretum, C 27 Q 2 c 34. 
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texts on which he rests this argument, moreover, is the famous dictum of Leo I, now 
paraphrased to read “without sexual intercourse, marriage does not contain the sacrament 
of Christ and the Church.”389  Such sacramental reasoning was enthusiastically taken up 
by Gratian’s successors.  Paucapalea squarely identifies the marital sacrament with the 
couple’s “carnal union,” a physical parallel to the joining of “the bridegroom (Christ) and 
his bride the Church” borne out through the clerical hierarchy.390  Rolandus’s 
consummationism is even firmer and more theologically grounded, as “marriage 
perfected by carnal joining contains in it the sacrament of Christ and the Church.  And it 
is the signification of this union that decides whether a human bond contains in it the 
sacrament of Christ and Church, for which reason betrothals are not known as 
matrimony.”391 
 Consentists employed a similar strategy in developing their ideas of marital 
formation, echoing many of the points espoused by Peter Lombard.  Stephen of Tournai, 
who equates the efficient cause of marriage with “consent expressed in the present 
tense,”392 locates the conjugal sacrament in the couple’s “joining of wills” which mirrors 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
389 Cum societas nuptiarum ita a principio sit instituta, ut preter conmixtionem sexuum non habeant in se 
nuptiae Christi et ecclesiae sacramentum, non dubium est, illam mulierem non pertinere ad matrimonium, 
in qua docetur non fuisse nuptiale misterium. Gratian, Decretum C27 Q2 c17. Gratian again references this 
passage in his exposition to C27 Q2 c40, clarifying that it should be understood to mean that there is no 
valid marriage without sexual intercourse. 
390 In prima decretorum parte de spirituali coniugo, videlicet inter sponsum et sponsam ecclesiam, i.e. inter 
clericos et ecclesiam…sunc de corporali matrimonio, ut est carnalis coniunctio, tractatamus. Paucapalea, 
Summa, C27, 111 
391  Matrimonium enim carnali coniunctione perfectionem Christi et ecclesiae sacramentum continere 
dicitur. Utriusque siquidem copula coniunctionem Christi et ecclesiae significat, unde sponsa dicitur non 
pertinere ad matrimonium, quod contineat in se Christi et ecclesiae sacramentum.  Rolandus, Summa C 27 
Q2, Summa Magistri Rolandi. Mit Anhang Incerti auctoris quaestiones, ed. Friedrich Thaner (Innsbruck: 
Wagner, 1872), 140. 
392 Efficiens causa matrimonii est maritalis consensus de praesenti per verba expressus.  Stephen of 
Tournai, Summa C27,. Die summa über das Decretum Gratiani, ed. Johann Friedrich von Schulte (Giesen, 
1891. Reprint Aalen: Scientia, 1965), 235. 
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“the spiritual joining of Christ and the Church in charity”.393 Rufinus (harkening back to 
the “double sacrament” theory of Hugh of Saint Victor) used sacramental imagery to 
strike a middle ground between these two rival camps: consent represented the individual 
soul’s coming to God, whereas consummation symbolized “the union Christ and the 
Church, joined in one flesh in the womb of the virgin.”394  In each of these cases, the 
main issue at hand was whether or not such a union would be counted as indissoluble, 
and whether or not such indissolubility would be considered enforceable by an 
ecclesiastical court. 
 This sacramental logic, however, left Gratian and the Decretists in an extremely 
tricky position when it came to clandestine marriages, just as it had for the theologians 
whose ideas they were borrowing.  In taking on sacramental symbolism, twelfth-century 
canonists had also inherited the increasingly anxious need to make the signifier match the 
signified, ruling out any elements that destroyed this perfect parallelism.  Thus, while 
Gratian includes canons strongly suggesting different types of public ceremony, he also 
limits his criteria for marital validity to those he had posited for its sacramental nature—
namely, sexual union preceded by an exchange (public or private) of consent.395 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
393 Consensus enim coniungum copulam spiritualem Christi et ecclesiaw, quae fit per eiusdem ecclesiae 
caritatem, significat. Ibid. 
394 Sicut enim in coniugio duo sun, desponsatio scil. Et carnis commixto, ita et ibi duo sacramenta 
consurgunt: unum I desponsatione, alterum in carnis commixtione.  In desponsatione representatur 
sacramentum anime ad Deum, ut, sicut tunc sponso sponsa adiungitur per consensum…In Carnis vero 
commixtione latet sacramentum Christi et ecclesiae, ut quemadmodum vit cum uxore una caro efficitur, ita 
Christus cum ecclesia una caro et una persona factus esse credatur in utero virginali.  Rufinus, Summa C 
27 q2. 
395 C 30 q 5 c1 contains the same letter from Pope Evaristus that Ivo and Burchard had included to spell out 
perfect bridal conditions: dowry, parental consent, public ceremony.  Gratian also includes Pope Nicholas’ 
letter (C30 q5 c3) spelling out the ideal steps through which betrothal and marriage out to be carried out, 
which describes a similar process.  C 30 q5 c4-5 are in a similar vein.  C 30 q 5 c11 explicitly ties the 
prohibition upon clandestine marriages to the difficulty of providing proof, as “when one party denies 
conjugal affection towards the other, this cannot be disproved.”  All this is to be contrasted, howevever, 
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 This ambivalence grew more pronounced among Gratian’s commentators, who 
relied even more greatly upon sacramental principles.  Rolandus, who had identified the 
causa of marriage as consummation,  argues that all public solemnities are “more 
important for the decorum, rather than the power, of the sacrament,” an opinion that is 
followed verbatim by his consentist colleague Stephen of Tournai.396  Stephen also 
tackles the problem from the always contentious angle of parental consent, admitting that 
parents (while ideally on hand) have no official role in deciding a union’s validity.  
Rather, their involvement in the marriage ceremony “does not make the substance of the 
sacrament, but only consent of the married parties in the present tense, according to the 
laws of the church, [which now supersede the laws of the courts].”397  While each 
canonist spent time discouraging these sorts of unions (and encouraging public 
instruments such as marriage contracts and church ceremonies) they also invariably held 
to the same party line—that such unions, once contracted, should not be dissolved.398 
 This being the case, it is no surprise that Gratian and his commentators continued 
to struggle with the question of concubinage, which now appeared even more legally 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
with the end of C 30 q5 c3, in which informally contracted marriages are affirmed to be valid, and C 28 q 2 
c17, in which Gratian declares them to be “ratified,” the same term he applies to unions that (through 
consummation) had fulfilled the criteria for sacramental validity. 
396  Haec enim in matrimonion magis fiunt ad decorem sacramenti quam ad auetoritatem.  Rolandus, 
Summa C30 q 5, 151. Rolandus later confirms that such solemnities are not necessary for marital validity: 
demonstratur quae sint observanda in matrimonio contrahendo, quae licet omnia non interveniant, non 
minus tamen inter eos erit matrimonium, ibid. .Stephen cosigns all of this by simply glossing C30 q 5 with 
Rolandus sequitur.   
397 Solus dicit ad remotionem consensus patris, sine quo seeundum leges, si filius 
est in potestate, non erit ratum matrimonium eius; vel excludit solemnitates, quae requiruntur in eoniugio, 
et non pactionem coniugalem. Nam substantiam quidem sacramenti non solennitates faciunt, sed consensus 
de praesenti expressus seeundum leges eeclesiasticas; nam matrimonia reguntur hodie iure poli, non iure 
fori. Stephen of Tournai, Summa, C 27 q 2, 237. 
398 Some variation of the standard language of “Clandestina ergo coniugia contrahi non debent, si vero 
contracta fuerint, non seperabuntur” may be found in the Summae to C30 q5 of Rufinus, Rolandus (hence 
Stephen of Tournai), and the Summa Parisiensis C 30 q5. 
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indistinguishable from marriage. Gratian, like Burchard and Ivo before him, found no 
shortage of authoritative canons condemning the practice, to which he added his own 
prohibitions.399  His Decretists, however, took a somewhat more forgiving stance, due 
largely to the fact that they had difficultly distinguishing concubinage from marriage.  
Paucapalea, while denouncing concubinage per se, also admits that this could make for a 
fairly confusing situation, given that a woman taken by a man without nuptial ceremonies 
could also (by law) be a wife held in full marital affection.400  Marital affection also 
proves the sticking point for Rufinus and the author of the Summa Parisiensis, who both 
concede that any stable, permanent union sustained in this faction must be viewed by the 
church as marriage.401  Thus, multiple concubines continued to impede ordination in the 
same fashion as multiple marriages, with the added post-reform caveat that no partner 
should be currently sharing the prospective cleric’s bed.402 
 What is perhaps more surprising is the extent to which canonists continued to 
associate concubines with ancillae, despite the fact that marriage between social classes 
had become even more legally unfettered.  It was by this point standard doctrine that 
slave status could only impede a marriage if the free party had entered into the marriage 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
399 See Gratian D 33 c6 (Augustine’s Audite, carissime sermon, quoted by both Ivo and Burchard), C32 q2 
c5, C 36, q1 c2. 
400 Sed concubina, pro cuius commixtione quis ordinari non prohiberai, illa intelligitiir, quae legalibns 
cessantibus instrumentis unica est et coniugali affectu adsciscitur. Affectas hanc coniugem facit, lex 
concubinam vocat. Paucapalea, Summa, D 26, pg. 24. 
401 Si vero unam concubinam maritali affectu habeat cum legitima, sive ante sive post [baptismum], 
bigamus iudicatur, quia idem esy illa quod uxor, licet leges nomine concubinae appellent. Summa 
Parisiensis D33, The Summa Parisiensis on the Decretum Gratiani, edited by Terence P McLaughlin 
(Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1952), pg. 32. 
 Rufinus explicitly links such unions with clandestine marriage: Sed quomodo clandestina coniua contrahi 
non debent, cum Christiano perittatur habere concubinam, quam tamen maritali affectu cognoscat.  
Rufinus, Summa, C30 q5, pg 468. 
402 Gratian D 33-34, Paucapalea, Summa D 33-34, Rolandus, Summa D33-34, Summa Parisiensis D 33-34, 
Rufinus D 33-34. 
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unawares—and even then, the marriage automatically became legitimate if sexual 
intercourse followed  this dénouement.403  And yet, ancilla continued to be used as 
substitute terminology for concubina, particularly when discussing the niceties of extra-
marital cohabitation and procreation.  Thus, an ancilla could be a woman was taken up 
either before, after or in place of a wife, a woman from whom one might seek children in 
case of infertility, or a woman whose child would lie outside the legitimate line of 
succession.404  In almost every case, the canonists’ treatment of these women is curt and 
prohibitive, displaying none of the grudging tolerance reserved for concubinae. Once a 
concubine is identified as an ancilla, for example, Rolandus is able to make the judgment 
that concubinage is  “against divine institutions,” whereas his previous usages of the term 
(in D 33 & 34) had merely elided concubinage with wifehood in ordination cases.405  
 As in earlier canon law, this lexical slippage seems partially attributable to the 
canonist’s Roman or biblical sources, wherein ancillae and concubinae would have been 
functionally indistinguishable.  It cannot, however, be completely explained in this vein, 
as canonists displayed an increasingly acute awareness of the differences between their 
system and that of their source material, particularly regarding class distinctions.406  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
403 Gratian C 29 q2 c 2-3; Paucapalea Summa C29 q 2 Rolandus, Summa C29 q2; Rufinus, Summa C 29 q2; 
Stephen of Tournai, Summa D34. 
404 Gratian D 34, c8,  C 32 q 4 c9, C 32 q 2 c 11-12;Rolandus, in commenting upon C 32 q 4, utilizes the 
terms concubina and ancilla interchangeably, whereas Gratian had limited himself to ancilla only, with the 
same tactic on display in Summa Parisiensis C32 q2. 
405 Compare C 32 q4 (Legibus humanis concubarius coitus videtur fore permissus, verum divinis 
institutionibus constat fore prohibitus, pg. 176) wherein a concubine was identified with an ancilla, with D 
33 (Secundas nuptias post baptisma stipulatus vel concubina habens ad sacrum ordinem non accedat, pg. 
7).  
406 Gratian, as argued above, most likely took the bulk of his roman law citations from Ivo’s Panormia, 
which does not directly address the connection between class and validity.  He does, however, include a 
stray citation from Isidore of Seville clearly marking the difference between free-born and servile 
concubines, making it clear that he understood the Christian redefinition of concubinage even as he lapsed 
into the Roman one (Gratian C 32 q 4 c15).  His commentators seemingly had more direct access to Roman 
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There may be some truth to Brundage’s claim that canonists were operating from “the 
doubtless realistic assumption…that servant girls routinely became involved in sexual 
relationships with their masters,”407 but this assumption does not appear in any of the 
contemporary cases cited by Gratian or the decretists.  They do not, for example, cite any 
of the copious Roman legal dicta spelling out how the laws of marriage and inheritance 
could apply to the relationship between a freeman and his slave.  Rather, the twelfth-
century canonists’ usage of ancilla seems to emanate from an amplified version of the 
concerns that drove their predecessors: the need to find a way of dividing concubinage 
from marriage, especially as the two institutions became less and less legally divisible.  
 Widows, by contrast, saw their legal situation improve drastically with the advent 
of Gratian’s Decretum, a development that would initially seem at odds with the 
increasingly suspicious attitude of theologians. Gratian and the decretists took concrete 
steps to place themselves more directly in line with Pauline doctrine on remarriage, and .  
Gone are the stiff penalties for remarrying (within any period after the husband’s death), 
as well as the comparisons of widows to prostitutes and adulteresses.  While Gratian 
maintains the position that multiple marriages are permitted only as an indulgence of 
human incontinence, his focus remains on the fact that they are, indeed, permitted, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
legal texts (the Corpus iuris civilis in particular) and hence are more specific about points of Christian 
divergence (as well as cases in which the information contained in a canon was based on a Roman secular 
custom).  See Rolandus, Summa C30 q5; Stephen of Tournai, Summa C29 q 2; Rufinus, Summa C29 q2, C 
32 q4.  Interestingly the sole decretists not to fit this paradigm is Paucapalea, who simultaneously endorses 
the Roman notion of “marriage between equals” and  upholds the Christian position that servititude does 
not exlude one from marriagability. See Paucapalea, Summa C27 q2 c50(Dicitur autem connubium, cum 
aequales in nuptias coeunt, ut puta cives romani pari utique dignitate, pg. 116) and C 29 q2 (Quod autem 
servilis conditio non repellat istuma matrimonio, sic potest probari. Valde maius atque dignius est 
coniugium Christi et ecclesiae, quam viri et mulieris matrimonium. A tali vero coniugio neminem repellit 
servilis conditio. In Christo 
enim Iesu nec iudaeus nec graecus nec servus nec liber, pg. 119).  He also, strangely, does not interchange 
the terms ancilla and concubina. 
407 Brundage, Law, Sex, and Christian Society, pg. 298. 
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should not be interfered with by any member of the community.408  The major exceptions 
concerned widows being supported by the church and young widows who had taken 
vows of chastity, who were subject to the persistent suspicion that libidinous urges would 
overcome their pledge of continence.409  While later canonists would focus on remarriage 
proper, reflecting the shift towards gender-neutral language observed in theology, 
Gratian’s focus remains on widows themselves, in keeping with the social restrictions 
that still affect all varieties of unmarried women. 
 This is not to say, however, that contemporary sacramental concerns were absent 
from canonists’ treatment of widows and remarriage.  Rather, they were imbedded in a 
slightly less expected place: the regulations on ordination and marital history.  Here, at a 
safe distance from the practical implications of the secular “marriage treatise” of causae 
27-36, canonists gave free reign to the theological challenges imposed by multiple 
marriages, employing logic that (like their colleagues in theology) could apply to 
laypeople and clerics alike. While their starting point remained the Pauline dictum that “a 
bishop should be a man of one wife,” their focus quickly shifted to the sacramental 
makeup of marriage itself, and the sense in which a remarried widow violated this 
numerical balance.  For even if the cleric in question remained a one-woman man, the 
multiple marriages of his new bride tipped the symbolic balance dangerously off-kilter.  
Hence the familiar logic (included explicitly by Rufinus) that “the bigamist is not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
408 C 27 q 1 c 38, C 31 q 1 c-11-12. 
409 On church support see Gratian C31 q 1 c10; On viel anxiety see 26  q. 1. c. 1,  C 26. q. 1 c 7-8, C 26 q 1 
c 16-17, C 27 q1 c. 24; C27 q 1 c 34.  Gratian also includes an early version of the idea that second nuptials 
should not be “publically” blessed, to become more prevelant of canon law of the following century.  See C 
31 q 1 c 9. 
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prohibited from ordination because of sin, but because of the standards of the 
sacrament…since he is not able to generate the sacrament of Christ and the Church.”410   
 By placing all of this at arm’s length from their secular marriage regulations, 
canonists managed to safeguard their permissive (and properly Pauline) outlook on 
second marriages, and avoided destabilizing these unions by painting them as non-
sacramental.  For those who read their work in toto, however, this portrait of remarriage 
as a sacramental menace would be deeply registered, and would have a palpable effect on 
the portrayal of widows within various literary contexts.   
Alexander III and	  the	  Consentist	  Solution	  
By the early thirteenth century, Christian marital law had reached a new degree of 
clarity, owing largely to the pivotal (and highly influential) decrees of Pope Alexander 
III.  The Alexandrian marriage model, categorically accepted by canonists up until the 
Council of Trent, lay to rest the debates of the previous century, predicating marriage 
formation upon one uncontested formula: mutual consent, verbally expressed in the 
present tense, with or without witnesses or subsequent consummation.411  Once a couple 
had exchanged consent of this nature, their union became both legitimate and 
indissoluble, impervious to any successive vows.  In this vein, betrothals came to be  
defined as “consent in the future tense,” and could be unconditionally dissolved so long 
as the parties’ vows remained couched in future terms.  Such a union could become 
permanent, however, if sexual intercourse followed this future-tense promise, at which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
410 Bigamus ordinari prohibetur non propter culpam sed normam sacramenti…quia Christi et ecclesiae 
sacramentum gerere amodo non poterit.  Rufinus, Summa, D 34, pg. 79.  See also Summa Parisiensis, D 
34.  
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point the couple became automatically enveloped in a full nuptial bond.  Once 
established, this model determined conjugal law at every stage of its implementation, 
from papal decrees down to local ecclesiastical courts—the latter of whom, as several 
recent studies have shown, consistently followed canonical principles in adjudicating 
marriage cases.    
 If thirteenth-century canonists benefited from a greater degree of certainty in their 
marital mores, it is because they also benefited from a greater degree of consistency in 
their theological foundations.  By the time Gregory IX was compiling his Decretals (c. 
1234), marriage had been firmly established among the seven sacraments, thanks largely 
to the increasing dissemination of Lombard’s Sentences throughout the preceding seventy 
years.  As such, canonists could now firmly ground their marital theories in the notion 
that marriage reflected both the spiritual and physical union of Christ and the Church, 
affording them a means of settling the issue of consummationism versus consentism412. 
Drawing on the theological formulae perfected throughout the latter half of the twelfth 
century, post-Alexandrian canonists reached a sort of bipartite compromise: consent 
represented the union of Christ and the soul, while consummation plus consent 
represented the incarnation. Both, then, were legitimate and indissoluble.  Or, as 
Raymond of Penyafort put it, “For just as there is a union of souls and bodies between 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
412 For expressions of this idea see Hostiensis, Summa Aurea 4.21: Nam per coniunctoionem animorum 
significatur coniuncto fidelis anime ad Deum; per coniunctionem vero corporum, coniunctio Christi et 
ecclesiam. (Venice, 1574), pg. 1245. 
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spouses, so the church is joined to Christ in will and nature because it wills the same as 
he, and he assumed human nature.”413 
 In assimilating the theological achievements of the twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries, post-Alexandrian canonists also inherited the questions and uncertainties that 
underlay these constructions.  One particularly thorny point was the still-unstable 
relationship between conjugal sign and signifier, and the struggle to find one concrete, 
identifiable signum within the numinous domain of the couple’s consent.  For 
theologians, this problem had manifested itself as a debate about whether the requisite 
consent existed within the words spoken or the actual inner intent of the each party, and 
whether one sort of consent could remain effective in the absence of the other.414  Though 
Peter Lombard’s blank assertion that “the efficient cause of matrimony is consent 
expressed in words”415 seemed clear enough, there soon arose the disturbing possibility 
that such words might not necessarily articulate one’s true feelings or intentions, a cause 
for great anxiety over marriage’s sacramental stability.  For Peter of Poiters, such inner 
discord (while a mortal sin) has no effect on either the words spoken or the dignity of the 
sacrament, just as one who approaches baptism with false intent does not diminish the 
rites administered.416  Later opinions proved more sensitive to the potential nuances at 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
413 Raymond of Penyafort, Summa on Marriage 2.15, translated by Pierre J. Payer (Toronto: Pontifical 
Institute for Medieval Studies, 2005), pg. 27.  
414 To glean the major effect of these 12th century theological developments on canon law, we can also turn 
our attention backwards to the consent theory displayed by Gratian, wherein the the emphasis remained on 
external markers of consent such as vows and betrothal.  See Raymond G. Decker, “Institutional Authority 
versus Personal Responsibility in the Marriage Sections of Gratian’s A Concordance of Discordance 
Canons,” The Jurist 32 (1972), 51-65. 
415 Efficiens autem causa matrimonii est consensus, non quilibet, sed per verba expressus, nec de futuro, 
sed de presenti….  Item si consentiat mente, et non exprimat verbis vel aliis certis signis; nec talis 
consensus efficit matrimonium.  Sentences 4.27.3 
416 Quaritur etiam an consensus verborum sine consensu animorum faciat matrimonium.  Et dicunt quod 
conjugium est inter sic consentientes, sed peccant mortaliter qui sic copulantur…Non ideo tamen deperit 
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play, such as coercion or fraud on the part of at least one spouse.417  The final answer, 
furnished by Aquinas, was that consent must be expressed in words, but that words 
without true inner consent did not effect a valid marriage, as “intention is necessary in all 
the sacraments.”418 
  For post-Alexandrian canonists (who found themselves writing amidst the throes 
of this debate) the potential inefficacy of verbal consent had some troubling practical 
implications.  As nearly everyone from Gregory IX to Hostiensis pointed out, words of 
consent were absolutely necessary so that marital validity could be evaluated by the 
court, in case of inheritance or some other dispute.419  And yet, all hewed closely to the 
theological insistence upon inner intent as a validating agent for these words, even in 
situations wherein heart and mouth proved to be at odds.420 In cases of coercion, for 
example, Alexander III ordained that verbal consent could be invalidated if it had been 
spoken “through such a fear that it would cause a steady man to fall,” a decree included 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
ipsa dignitas sacramenti.  Sicut verum baptismum suscipit qui fictus accedit…” Peter of Poitiers, Sentarium 
5.16.  PL 211, pg. 260. 
417 For example, Guy of Orchelles, Si autem ibi sit coactio, ut si pater puellae vel princeps minetur ei 
mortem nisi consentiat, talis consensus non facit matrimonoim….Si autem ibi sit dous…non est ibi 
matrimonium. Tractatus de Sacramentiis 221,  ed. PP Damiani and Odulphi van den Eynde O.F.M, (St. 
Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institue, 1953), 198. 
418 Interestingly, Aquinas’ decision draws a similar paralell between marriage and baptism to the one 
invoked by Peter of Poiters, but posits an exact reversal of intent’s role in the causality of each.  According 
to Aquinas, “Wherefore just as were a person to receive the outward cleansing, with the intention, not of 
receiving the sacrament, but of acting in jest or deceit, he would not be baptized; so, too, expression of 
words without inward consent makes no marriage.”  Summa Q 45 A4, R 
419 Gregory IX’s comment sed verba requiruntur quoad probationem became somewhat standard.  If the 
parties could not speak, some other visible sign of consent was required.  Decretals 4.1.25.  See also 
Bernard of Pavia, Summa de Matrimonio 1, Johannis Teutonicus, Apparatus Glossarum in Compilationem 
Tertiam 4.3, , ed. Kenneth J Pennington, Work in progress hosted and updated by Kenneth Pennington, 
Catholic University of America (http://faculty.cua.edu/pennington/edit401.htm), Hostiensis, Summa Aurea 
4.3. 1 
420 Goffredus of Trano, in fact, nearly repeats Guy of Orchelles’ musings on this subject verbatim, arriving 
at the selfsame conclusion: Contrahitur matrimonium corde et ore dum aliqui core et ore consentiunt in 
matrimonium et mutuo se concedunt unum alii et mutuo se suspiciunt ….verba interveniunt apta ad 
matrimonium contrahendus anumus tamen non consentiat.  Non contrahitur matrimonium… Summa super 
titulis Decretalium 1.14, (Lyon, 1519. Reprint Aalen: Scientia, 1968), 173. 
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by Gregory IX and upheld by his successors.  Adjudicating such criteria, however, 
proved a somewhat heavy burden, exposing the many uncertainties surrounding the legal 
standing of feelings.  As Hostiensis noted, judging based on intentions placed jurists in 
the unwitnessed realm of their claimants’ souls, wherein the truth was just as often 
deliberately hidden as it was revealed.421 Such considerations, however, seemed utterly 
vital from a theological perspective—for, as Innocent III had noted, “there are those who 
doubt that something spiritual can be contracted by words alone.”422 
 Much of this confusion crystallized around Alexander’s letter Tua nos duxit, in 
which he attempted to adjudicate a case wherein a man contracted—and later 
consummated—a marriage for fraudulent purposes.423  In Alexander’s summation, this 
rather enterprising suitor managed to break down his “bride’s” resistance by exchanging 
present-tense consent under a false name, “not believing a marriage to have taken place 
as he did not intend to contract it, but only to have carnal intercourse.”424  To the question 
of whether or not a marriage exists under such circumstances, Alexander responds with 
an uncharacteristic degree of ambivalence.  On the one hand, the combination of present-
tense vows plus consummation should mean that a legitimate marriage has been 
contracted.  On the other, the man did not genuinely “intend or consent to take her as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
421 Ex hoc arguo, quod in iudico aminae, loquitur in quo nec testes requiruntur, sed de omnibus 
quantumcumque occultis consitenti fides habetur …nec est verisimile, quod ibi falsitas suggeratur, vel 
veritas occultitur. Hostiensis,  Decretalium librum commentaria 4. 26.  (Venice, 1581). 
422 Quum ab aliquibus dubitetur spirituale contrahi solis verbis.  Gregory IX, Decretals 4.1.25, Liber 
extravagantium decretalium, ed. Emil Friedberg, Corpus Iuris Canonici, vol. 2 (Leipzig: Bernhard 
Tauchnitz, 1881. Reprint Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt, 1959), 670. 
423 Included by Gregory as Decretal 4.1.26 
424 Non credens esse coniugium eo, quod ipse non vocaretur hoc nomine, nec haberet propositum 
contrahendi, sed copulam tantum exsequendi carnalem…  ibid. 
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wife”—though, Alexander adds a bit wryly, “we do not see how this could be clear to 
you.”425 
In the end, Alexander privileges internal consent over his own external criteria, as 
“on one side there was only fraud, absent of all true consent, without which the conjugal 
bond cannot be effected.”426  His successors largely followed him on this point, in 
particular the notion that “the substance of the conjugal contract” cannot exist without 
mutual consent of souls.427  They were not, however, entirely without reservations.  
Innocent IV, seizing upon Alexander’s aside about the unknowability of the groom’s true 
intentions, argues that “the judgment of souls” is something better accomplished in the 
confessional as opposed to the courtroom.428 Hostiensis’s doubts are even more 
pronounced, pointing to the dangerous precedent set in place by such a policy.  If absence 
of inner consent is upheld as legitimate grounds for annulment, then any regretful 
husband or wife could simply claim “I wasn’t serious” therefore “making a mockery out 
of matrimony.”429  Though both Hostiensis and Innocent faithfully upheld Alexander’s 
ruling, their misgivings are telling, particularly as regards the extent to which sacramental 
confusion impacted and undermined legal decision-making.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
425 Quum praefatus vir praedictam desponsaverit mulierem in propria persona et sub nomine alieno, quo 
tunc vocari se finxit, et inter eos sit carnalis copula subsecuta, videtur forte pro coniugio praesumendum, 
nisi tu nobis expresse scripsisses, quod ille nec proposuit, nec consentit illam ducere in uxorem, quod 
qualiter tibi constiterit non videmus.  Ibid. 
426 Nec forma contrahendi coniugium valeat inveniri, quoniam ex altera parte dolus sollummodo adfuit, et 
defuit omnino consensus, sine quo cetera nequeunt foedus perficere coniugale.  Ibid. 
427 See Raymond of Pennyafort, Summa 2.4, Innocent Hostiensis, Commentaria 4.1.26, Innocent Apparatus 
in Quique Libros Decretalium 4.1.26, Goffredus de Trano, Summa 4.1.11. 
428 Alii contrarium dicunt, scilicet, quod protestatio sufficit, ut non probetur matrimonium, sed ideo dicit 
papa, quod not videtur quandocunque, sibi hoc constet, quia cum nullus interfuerit sponsalibus de 
protestatione sibi contestare non potuit, ut in foro ecclesiae iudicare posset non fore matrimonium, sed in 
foro animae iudicare potest, ubi iudicatur secundum confessionem, sed in foro ecclesiae secus est. Innocent 
IV Apparatus in quinque libros Decretalium 4.1.26 (Frankfurt, 1570), 446. 
429 Aluiquin quilibet posset illudere matrimonio iam contracto et dicrere, ludens feci.  Hostiensis, Summa 
Aurea 4.10. 
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In a larger context, the sum of these uncertainties can be traced back to a deeper 
problem within marriage’s sacramental identity: theologians’ anxiety over the inability to 
locate a source of efficient grace.  Canonists’ awareness of this dilemma can already be 
gleaned in the work of Rufinus, who (as noted above) simply declares, à la Peter Abelard, 
that matrimony contains no sanctifying power.  By the time of Gregory IX, however, the 
debate over marital grace had reached something of a fever pitch, as efficient grace had 
now become a fixed component of the sacramental formula. As such, thirteenth century 
canonists inherited theologians more compensatory bent; specifically, the tendency to 
stress the perfect alignment between conjugal sign and signifier to the exclusion of any 
other necessary elements.  In a canonistic framework, this symbolic emphasis collided 
with canon law’s own longstanding debate about the efficacy of consent and 
consummation in and of themselves, particularly in relation to formal factors such as 
dowry, parental consent, and the heavily-endorsed nuptial blessing.  In short, these 
sacramental concerns made it all the more difficult for canonists to deal with the problem 
of clandestine marriages, even as the troubles caused by such unions became even more 
clearly documented. 
 On an official level, clandestine marriages should have been stamped out by the 
second quarter of the thirteenth century, as they had been explicitly forbidden by the 
Fourth Lateran Council of 1215.  In a strongly-worded canon, the council specified that 
all nuptials were to be “publically announced in church by the priest, at an appropriate 
interval so that anyone with the will or the ability may oppose the union due to a 
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legitimate impediment.”430  While the council’s main concern seemed to be preventing 
consanguineous unions, canonists came up with plenty of reasons of their own why secret 
nuptials were a bad idea, many of which seem drawn from direct practical observation.  
The legitimacy of children was one common source of unease, as absence of proof could 
easily call their status into question.431  There was also the sense that people who 
contracted marriage secretly generally did so because they had something to hide, a 
situation which, in Raymond of Penyafort’s words, “exposed the church to scandal.”432  
Hostiensis, with his characteristic frankness, also voiced concerns about the “wandering” 
nature of the human soul, which, with no public marriage impediments on record, could 
easily find its way to another partner in maritalis affectio.433 
 All of these objections, however, were grounded in the broader awareness that a 
marriage without witnesses simply could not be confidently judged as legitimate 
matrimony—or more specifically, it could not be differentiated from simple, profligate 
contubernium.  Most canonists decreed that, in the absence of proof, contubernium 
should be presumed in such cases rather than marriage; some, such as Goffredus de 
Trano, even went so far as to suggest that those so joined should be separated. There was 
also the idea that such couples could rectify the situation by  publically marrying post-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
430 Quare specialem quorundam locorum onsuetudinem ad alia generaliter prorogando, statuimus ut cum 
matrimonia fuerint contranhenda, in elesiis per presbyteros publice proponantur, competenti termino 
praefinito, ut infra illum qui voluerit et valuerit legitimum impedimentum opponat.  Concilium Lateranese 
IV: 51.  In Les Conciles Ecuméniques: Les Décrets, T II-1, Nicée I à Latran V, edité par A Duval, B. 
Lauret, H Legrand, J. Moingt, et B. Sesboüé (Paris: Cerf, 1994), 550. 
431 See Bernard of Pavia, Summa 4.3, Innocent IV Apparatus 4.3.2, Hostiensis Summa Aurea 3. 4 
432 Alias autem clam facere ut qui celavit adversario neque ei denunciavit si mos timuit euis controversiam, 
aut debuit timere. Goffredus de Trano, Summa 4.3.1; see also Raymond of Pennyafort, Summa 2.14 
433 Hostiensis, Summa Aurea 4.3.3: [Clandestina matrimonia] prohibentur etiam propter periculum 
animarum, quia mutata voluntate alterius sponsorum non potest fieri fides iudici., 1288. 
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haste, thus erasing any doubts about legitimacy of children, inheritance, etc.434  That 
clandestine marriage caused significant confusion can be attested by the elaborate 
proscriptions spelled out for bringing a marriage suit against a purported spouse, found in 
collections from Tancred of Bologna (c. 1240) onward.  It can be further (and perhaps 
more powerfully) attested by various European court records, wherein, according to 
Richard Helmholz, enforcement of a clandestine marriage contract remained the most 
commonly brought suit throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.435 
It is incredibly revealing, therefore, that not a single canonist actually went so far 
as to declare clandestine marriages null and void—and that all, on the contrary, took 
pains to assert the legitimacy of such unions.  Part of this stance can be traced back to the 
Fourth Lateran Council, which not only declined to fully outlaw clandestine marriage, but 
also confused the issue by confounding unwitnessed nuptials with unions contracted 
against the interdiction of the church.436  Following the council’s lead, canonists thus 
directed the full force of their invective against those sorts of “clandestine” unions that 
were consanguineous or otherwise illicit, leaving merely unwitnessed marriages in a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
434 Hostiensis, Summa Aurea 4.4.8 
435 Richard Helmholz, , Marriage Litigation in Medieval England (Holmes Beach, FL: Wm. W. Gaunt & 
Sons, Inc. 1986), pg. 25.  For treatment of clandestine marriages by European courts, see also Mia 
Korpiola, Between Betrothal and Bedding: Marriage Formation in Sweden 1200-1600 (Boston: Brill, 2009) 
pgs.127-134, Karras, Unmarriages, 178, Charles Donahue, “The Canon Law on the Formation of Marriage 
and Social Practice in the Later Middle Ages,” Journal of Family History 8 (1983), 144-158.  Sarah 
McDougal has also recently called attention to the “crisis of bigamy” brought about by the continued 
proliferation of clandestine marriage, wherein marriages were frequently challenged by the sudden 
appearance of a secretly-married former spouse.  See Sara McDougall, Bigamy and Christian Identity in 
Late Medieval Champagne (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012). 
436 This is evident from the fact that the council discusses the punishment of priests who had officiated 
“matrimonia clandestina,” making it quite clear that they are not simply talking about nuptials that lack 
solemnities.  Unde Praedessorum nostrorum inhaerendo vestigiis, clandestina coniugia penitus in 
inhibemus, prohibentes etiam ne quis sacerdos talibus interesse praesumat.  Concilium Lateranese IV, 51. 
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strange sort of opprobrious limbo.437  In so doing, they displayed an ambivalence that was 
unmistakably similar to that exhibited their colleagues in theology, couched in 
remarkably similar terms.  Thus, official elements such as dowry, parental consent, and 
public ceremony were reluctantly cast as mere “solemnities,” essential for a marriage’s 
“honesty” but not its validity.  In their final word on clandestine unions, canonists 
remained strikingly faithful to the sacramental formula of substantia matrimonia 
consensus est, despite the aforementioned practical calamities of which they were quite 
fully aware .438 
It is no great surprise, therefore, that thirteenth-century canonists also took their 
cue from theologians in handling the problem of concubinage—that is, they basically 
stopped utilizing the term altogether. Usages of concubina in this period apply primarily 
to the consorts of clerics, whose marital illegitimacy had long since been established.439   
Gone are the discussions about whether concubines impede ordination in the same way as 
wives, as well as the possibilities of assimilating them into wifehood via maritalis 
affectio.  Gone too is the tendency to subtly confuse the concubine with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
437 After 1215 treatments of clandestine marriage often include a sort of taxonomy listing all possible ways 
in which a union could be judged “clandestine.”  The ever-thorough Hostiensis, for example, identifies 
seven types, ranging from those celebrated without witnesses or dowry to those contracted despite a serious 
impediment.  Hostiensis, Commentaria, 4.3.1.  See also Goffredus de Trano, Summa 4.3.1, Innocent IV, 
Apparatus 4.3.3. 
438 See Johannes Teutonicus Apparatus 4.3 Idest sine aliis solempnitatibus. Verba tamen sunt necessaria 
quo ad ecclesiam in hiis qui loqui possunt, ut infra eodem, uel solus, idest sine consensu parentum. 
Honestum tamen est quod assit consensus parentum;   Tancred, Summa de Matrimonio T 14, ed. Agathon 
Wunderlich, (Gottingae, 1841), pg. 15.: Solus consensus…sufficiat; Raymond of Penyafort, Summa 2.14: 
“You should not understand that there cannot be true marriage without such solemnities…In this 
sacrament, as in others, there are things pertaining to the substance such as consent…which alone suffices,” 
pg 26; Hostiensis, Commentaria 4.3.1: Ex lege divina firmatur et ideo ei non preiudicat consuetudo ut 
sup…quia nulla lex nulla consuetude legi divini postes praeiudicare …solemnitates non sunt de substantia 
de matrimonia…sed solus consensus facit matrimonia, pg. 14. 
439 See 1 Comp 3.3.11, 1 Comp 3. 2. 9; 1 Comp 3.2.2, Quinque Compilationes Antiquae, Necnon Collectio 
Canonum Lipsiensis, edited by Emil Friedberg (Liepsig: Bernhardi Tauchnitz, 1882). 
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unmarriageable ancilla, potentially because the marriageability of slaves was an issue so 
settled by the thirteenth century so as to appear in most collections by rote.440  The 
concubine’s disappearance from thirteenth century canon law is so complete that 
canonists deigned to exclude even the classic condemnations of concubinage, as if to give 
the impression that the institution had never so much as existed. 
Rather, as in theological discourse, the concubine’s role seems to have been taken 
over by the clandestinely-married wife, who now assimilated many of the warnings, 
proscriptions, and special allowances that had previously been discussed in terms of 
concubinage.  Instead of encouraging men to marry their concubines, twelfth-century 
canonists encouraged secretly married men to “remarry” their wives publically, thus 
gaining all of the benefits (full legitimacy of children, freedom from suspicion of 
fornication) that had been previously dangled before those living in concubinatus.441   
Clandestine marriage also allowed for a certain sense of fluidity between marriage 
and non-marriage, as had existed between marriage and concubinage via maritalis 
affectio.  Realizing (seemingly) that marriage laws could be tremendously confusing for 
laypeople to navigate, certain canonists allowed for a status known as matrimonium 
praesumptum, wherein at least one party genuinely believed that a marriage had been 
contracted (albeit a clandestine one).  While canonists remained mum on whether or not 
this presumption actually created a valid bond, they did specify that it legitimated any 
children produced from such a union—just as maritalis affectio had legitimated the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
440 By the time of Gregory IX, it had become commonly accepted that, first, slaves could legally marry (a 
reversal of the Roman principle that held all slave unions to be simple contubernium), and that anyone who 
married a slave, so long as they were aware of their spouse’s condition at the time of the marriage, could 
not legally divorce them because of their servile status.  See Decretals 4.9.2, 4.9.4. 
441 Gregory IX, Decretals 4.17.9. 
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children of concubines.   They did all of this, however, without ever mentioning links 
between concubinage and secret marriages, nor how functionally indistinguishable the 
two institutions had now become.   
Indeed, the one post-Alexandrian canonist to even sparingly use the word 
concubina is Hostiensis, though his usages of the term are illuminating.  One instance 
centers around a particularly confusing case presented by Alexander III in which a man, 
having promised to marry his longtime domestic partner, ends up exchanging present-
tense consent with a young neighbor after being discovered in flangrante delicto by her 
father.442  Who, then, was the man’s lawful wife?  To Alexander’s original reply, that the 
man should remain with the first woman only if intercourse had followed their exchange 
of future-tense vows, Hostiensis adds an interesting commentary: “And so, unless he was 
overtaken by a fear that would cause a steady man to fall, he gave his consent to this 
second woman, and would take back the other one as a concubine.” In addition to simply 
acknowledging the existence of concubinage, Hostiensis concedes that the legal 
difference between wives and concubines was extremely thin, often no more substantial 
than a verbal tense marker.   
Hostiensis is also fairly frank about using the term when discussing inheritance 
issues, where his predecessors had favored foggier language such as “outside of 
wedlock” or “naturally conceived.”  Thus, in commenting upon Gregory’s  4.17.1, in 
which Alexander III decides upon the legitimacy of a girl born “before her mother was 
betrothed,”443 Hostiensis adds the following remark: “The girl’s paternal uncle attempted 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
442 ibid, 4.1.15. 
443 Ante desponsationem matris suae nata fueri…Gregory IX, Decretals, 4.17.1, 718. 
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to disinherit her, saying that his brother conceived her with a concubine, with whom he 
later contracted matrimony.”  Their decisions, of course, are identical, following the 
Constantinian principal that children born out of wedlock are legitimated by the 
subsequent marriage of their parents.  Yet the combination of Alexander’s silence 
(echoed by the majority of commentators) with Hostiensis’s candor once again points to 
an interesting sort of unease in the canonical perspective on concubinage.  While 
Alexander clearly wished to distance himself from the practice (and in particular from 
any Roman tolerance thereof) Hostiensis is more willing to pull back the rhetorical 
curtain, revealing the enduring presence of concubinage as an institution within the 
Christian matrimonial fold. 
There is one more subtle reminder in Hostiensis’ work of the thin line between 
marriage and concubinage, yet in many ways it is also the most telling.  It occurs in his 
discussion of the “instruments” through which marriage should be contracted, a point that 
among other canonists had provided one of the strongest indictments of unofficiated , 
unwitnessed matrimony (see above).  While Hostiensis holds the party line, that without 
such formalities “fornication [stuprum] rather than marriage is presumed,”444 he also adds 
a subversive little flourish: two citations of Justinian’s Digest that discuss regulations of 
concubinage.  Of particular interest is his reference to Dig. 23.2.24, Modestinus’s famous 
decision that “Cohabitation with a freewoman is seen as marriage, not concubinage.”  
Positioned alongside his rueful (but tolerant) treatment of clandestine unions, this allusion 
becomes particularly evocative.  Concubinage, Hostiensis suggests, has become the dirty 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
444 Alia autem non matrimonium sed stuprum praesumiter, nisi voluntas propria suffragaverit & alia vota 
succerrerint. Hostiensis, Summa Aurea 4.2.13, 1256. 
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little secret of Church marital regulations, despite the centuries of Christian invective 
hurled at its Roman vestiges.  Without a clear theological line between clandestine and 
official marriage, canonists had, in the end, remained unable to fundamentally eradicate 
the Roman way of doing things, a fact of which they remained regretfully aware.  
Yet nowhere are the theological conundrums of the thirteenth century apparent 
than in canonists’ treatment of remarriage, more schizophrenic in this period than ever 
before.  On the one hand, widows continued their upward climb to the realms of marital 
and financial freedom, receiving almost no canonical restrictions upon their ability to 
remarry.  This is partially because it was at this moment that canonists began to take on 
the gender-neutral language of theologians, viewing second marriages as a general, 
conceptual issue.  From the Liber Extra onward, regulations of second marriages became 
both terse and permissive, tacked onto the end of the larger marital guidelines as almost 
an afterthought.  Widows were assured the right to marry whomever they pleased 
whenever they pleased, officially freed from any penalty (financial or otherwise) for 
marrying within the traditional “mourning period” imposed by Roman law.445  This was 
because, as Goffredus de Trano put it, spiritual concerns now trumped any secular (and, 
in particular, Roman) guidelines when it came to regulating remarriage, meaning that the 
main operative principle remained Paul’s dictum that it is better to marry than to burn.446  
Such allowances undoubtedly helped widows navigate the various social and fiscal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
445 See Johannes Teutonicus, Apparatus 4.16, Gregory IX Liber Extra 4.21 3-4, Goffredus de Trano, 
Summa 4.21.1-2, Innocent III, Apparatus 4.21.2-3, Hostiensis, Commentary 4.21.2-3. 
446 Matrimonium enim reguntur iure poli, non iuri fori….Propterea dici potest quod omnes prohibitiones 
quod fiunt ex aliqua causa spirituali prerer causas canonicas de matrimonio non contrahendo infra tempus 
luctus propter sanguinis turbationem.  Goffredus de Trano, Summa 4.21.2, Summa super titulis 
Decretalium (Lyon, 1519. Reprint Aalen: Scientia, 1968),195. 
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difficulties that often prompted speedy remarriage, and even permitted some to reach an 
unprecedented agree of comfort and autonomy. 
This tolerance, however, only extended so far.  Other canonical developments of 
the thirteenth century made it more pragmatically difficult for widowed women to 
remarry, particularly those who had no hard evidence that their spouse was dead.  While 
death of one’s previous spouse had of course always been the base requirement for 
widowhood, post-Alexandrian canonists greatly raised the standards of proof for 
achieving this status, making things drastically more difficult for women whose husbands 
had long been missing and presumed dead.  According to the standard set by Clement III: 
“No matter how many years this condition persists, they cannot pass canonically to 
another marriage …Nor may you permit them by the Church's authority to contract until 
they are certain that their husbands are dead.”447  Such certainty, according to subsequent 
canonists, could only be furnished by testimony of someone who had personally 
witnessed the husband’s death, which  could be difficult to obtain for various reasons.448  
That this policy lead to all sorts of questionable unions is, again, evidenced by Hostiensis, 
who addresses the question of women who marry clandestinely without proof of 
widowhood.  Hostiensis advises against separating these couples, particularly if there is 
sufficient fama attesting to the original husband’s demise.  He also, however, writes that 
such marriages should absolutely not be solemnized via public ceremony, for fear of the 
“scandal” to which they might expose the church.449   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
447 Gregory IX, Decretals 4.1.19. 
448 Innocent III, Apparatus 4.1.19, Hostiensis, Commentary 4.1.19. 
449 Sed nunquid in hoc casu publicatur matrimonium secundo contractum in ecclesia non puto: quia 
scandalum inducere posset.  Hostiensis, Commentary 4.1.19, pg. 6. 
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Perhaps the biggest shift in the canonists’ attitude towards remarriage, however, 
was their newfound anxiety about the blessing of second marriages, a concern that 
directly emanated from contemporary theological discourse.  Recall that it was during 
this period (between Lombard’s Sentences and the Summa Theologica) that theologians 
found themselves in the weeds regarding the repeatability of certain sacraments, as it was 
unclear whether each imparted an indelible “stamp” as did baptism or ordination.  Adding 
to this confusion was the fact that this blessing was still being considered as a possible 
vessel for sacramental efficacy, making its repetition all the more problematic.  
The evolution of this debate can be directly traced in canonical discussions 
remarriage throughout the thirteenth century.  Thus, for Goffredus of Trano (writing c. 
1243) the interdiction of the nuptial blessing exists simply “lest the sacrament be 
repeated,”450 with the clear indication that the blessing and the sacrament were one and 
the same. Twenty years later, Hostiensis (writing in roughly the same period as Aquinas) 
includes a strikingly more sophisticated take on the blessing’s unrepeatability. Identifying 
the marriage blessing as a “quasi-sacramental,” Hostiensis goes on to argue that it is 
technically repeatable; nevertheless, he upholds its omission from second marriages on 
the weight of tradition.451 Whatever their sacramental logic, thirteenth century canonists 
universally contend that the blessing is omitted in order to “encourage continence,” thus 
demonstrating the hesitations of Tertullian and Augustine remain alive and well.452 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
450 Quod ideo prohibitum est ne sacramentum iteretur. Goffredus of Trano, Summa 4.21.1, pg. 196. 
451 Hostiensis, Commentaria 4.21.1, 4.21.3; Summa Aurea 4.33. 
452 In Hostiensis’ words, Magistri tamen dicunt utrumque dictum ad exhortationem castitas, alias non 
vident quare haec benedictio iteranda non sit, quia benedictio quae super homines fit non prohibetur 
iterari.  Commentaria 4.21.1, pg. 48.  See also Goffredus de Trano, Summa 4.21.1. 
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 With canonists’ help, these hesitations also found their way into the more popular 
discourse on widows and remarriage, in addition to the larger conversation about 
marriage as a whole.  However complex and obtuse these sacramental principles might 
be, they had practical effects that trickled down into public life, such as the 
questionability of secret nuptials, or the consequences of marrying a widow upon a 
cleric’s career.  Thus, these theoretical issues indirectly influenced very concrete aspects 
of how people might experience or talk about marriage in real life, influencing, in turn, 
the way they wrote about it in other modes of medieval discourse.  
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CHAPTER 4 
Sacramental Ambiguities in the Literature of Love and War 
 
It has become cliché to assert that twelfth century authors “invented” the notion of 
romantic love, and that they simultaneously invented the question of how love should 
relate to the institution of marriage.  There is no doubt that the compatibility of love and 
marriage is a topic of increasing literary preocupation from the late twelfth century 
onward, most famously represented in Andreas Capellanus’s dismissive claim that 
marriage signals the death knell of love.453  This picture is complicated, however, by the 
fact that these authors were also attempting to renegotiate the boundaries of marriage 
itself, specifically with reference to the increased emphasis on sacramental oneness 
promulgated by theologians and, by extension, ecclesiastical courts.  The resulting 
uncertainty doubtless also had a great impact on Andreas, who repeatedly emphasizes 
exclusivity and limited dissolubility (including a two-year mourning period for 
“widowed” lovers) in his rules for non-marital love.454 
This chapter explores three ways in which this evolving concept of marriage was 
represented in literature, as well as the ancillary generic concerns that contributed to each 
portrayal. In particular, it explores how marriage, and the relations between men and 
women more generally, is portrayed when it is set against the competing interests of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
453 Sed et superveniens foederatio nuptiarum violenter fugat amorem, ut quorundam amatorum manifesta 
doctrina docetur. Andreas Capellanus, On Love, ed. and trans. P.G. Walsh (London: Duckworth, 1982), 
2.4. 
454 See, for example, 2.6, wherein Andreas bans simultaneous relationships, and 2.8, wherein he imposes a 
two-year mourning period in the event of a lover’s death. 
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military and political life, which imposed their own constraints on how matrimony was 
contracted.   Drawing on chansons de geste, French romance, and the Trojan romances of 
Boccaccio and Chaucer, I will argue that the problems of sacramental theology were 
entirely present in literary depictions of matrimony, creating a matrix of contradictory 
principles which authors chose to either hide or expose depending on their larger generic 
interests. 
Good Women and Better Theology: Marriage in the Chansons de Geste 
It is a long-held critical assumption that women, and the social and domestic 
sphere which they inhabit, are of little importance to the chansons de geste, relegated to 
the sidelines of the’ male-dominated military and political scenarios that comprise much 
of these tales.455  As Sarah Kay has noted, however, this idea is grounded in a 
longstanding over-reliance on the Oxford version of the Chanson de Roland, and a 
tendency to see this text as representative of a genre in which it is, in many ways, a 
narrative anomaly.456  From a more global perspective, women play an integral role in the 
family and dynastic struggles that drive many chansons de geste, particularly in their 
capacity as potential brides, wives, and widows.457  This portrayal of marriage and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
455 See, for example, W.W. Comfort, 'The Character Types in the Old French Chanson de geste', PMLA 21 
(1906), 279-434; Edmond Faral, La Chanson de Roland: Etude et analyse (Paris: Mellottee, 1934); Ann 
Tukey Harrison,  “Aude and Bramimunde: their importance in the Chanson de Roland,” The French 
Review 54 (1981), 672-679; Don A. Monson, “The Warrior’s Return in the Chansons de Toile,” Romance 
Quarterly 49 (2002), 242-9;  
456 Sarah Kay, The Chansons de Geste in the Age of Romance: Political Fictions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1995). 
457 The importance of women and marriage in the chansons de geste has been increasingly acknowlegded in 
the past thirty years, both independently and on the basis of Kay’s seminal work.  See especially Finn E. 
Sinclair, “The Chanson de Geste,” The Cambridge History of French Literature, ed. William Burgwinkle, 
Nicholas Hammond, Emma Wilson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 28-37 and “Loss, re-
figuration and death in Raoul de Cambrai,” French Studies 57 (2003), 297-310; William Burgwinkle, 
“Ethical acts and annihilation: feminine heroics in Girart de Roussillon,” Women and Medieval Epic: 
Gender, Genre, and the Limits of Epic Masculinity. Ed. Sara S. Poor and Jana K. Schulman (New York: 
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conjugal life, moreover, bears the distinctive markers of the evolving marital theology of 
their day, thus forming an essential component of the concern for Christian social and 
political dominance that pervades the chansons de geste as a whole. 
In the analysis below, I have attempted to avoid any Roland-based confirmation 
bias by analyzing it alongside other prominent portrayals of marriage and family within 
the chansons de geste.  In this process, four specific texts have presented themselves as 
especially relevant.   Of obvious importance is Bertrand de Bar-sur-Aube’s Girart de 
Vienne (c. 1180), which recounts Charlemegne’s siege of the city of Vienne, brought on 
by some extreme misbehavior on the part of a remarried widow (who also happens to be 
Charlemegne’s newly-crowned empress). It also functions as a prequel of sorts to the 
Chanson de Roland, giving us a peek at the wartime meet-cute between Roland and 
Aude, as well as the negotiations surrounding their betrothal.  The Chanson de Guillaume 
(c.1140) details both the heroic military exploits of its hero, William of Orange, and his 
especially felicitous domestic life, presided over by steadfast wife Guiborec.  In Raoul de 
Cambrai (composed in three stages over the course of the twelfth and early thirteenth 
centuries) we confront the potentially dire consequences of inheritance disputes, as the 
unfairly-disinherited hero sets off on a self-destructive rampage in order to reclaim what 
he believes to be his.  What’s more, this situation is precipitated by the precarious 
position of Raoul’s widowed mother, who faces the choice of either remarrying or losing 
her son’s lands.  Huon de Bordeaux (mid-thirteenth century) finally, presents us with 
both a chanson de geste love-match and a pre-marital conversion, as the titular hero’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 159-182; Jacques De Caluwé, “L'amour et le mariage, moteurs seconds, dans 
la littérature épique françai se et occitane du XIIe siècle,” Love and Marriage in the Twelfth Century, ed. 
Willy Van Hoecke and Andries Welkenhuysen,Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1981), 171-182. 
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quest to redeem himself at Charlemegne’s court culminates in his returning home with a 
Saracen bride. 
These texts are also typical in their emphasis on Christian dogma.  The heavily 
religious nature of chansons de geste has been a major topic of conversation since the 
work of Joseph Bédier, and spawning a myriad theories about the potential religiosity of 
their purpose and origins.458  At the surface level, it is clear that these narratives display a 
conspicuous concern with theological correctness, accompanied by an often surprising 
degree of complexity in the way that theological tropes are incorporated.459 There are, of 
course, the famous exhortations to martyrdom of Roland’s Turpin, as well as the 
heavenly conflagration that arrives to escort Roland himself to heaven. But this religious 
orientation often goes so far as to include extensive theological treatises, generally placed 
in the mouth of the story’s most admirable hero or heroine.  The Chanson de Guillaume 
affords several elaborate “confessions of faith” to its doomed hero Vivien, covering 
everything from Trinitarian theology to original sin.460  In the roughly-contemporaneous 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
458 I am referring to Bédier’s now heavily-contested theory that chansons de geste originated as narrative 
accompaniments to pilgrimage routes.  Joseph Bédier, Les Légendes épiques.  Recherches sur la formation 
des chansons de geste, 4 vol. (Paris: Champion, 1908-1913).  Questioned by scholars such as Ferdinand 
Lot as early as the 1920’s, this view has given way to a variety of theories about interconnected traditions 
of oral composition, such as Joseph Duggan’s application of Milman Parry’s thesis regarding ad-hoc, 
piecemeal recitation-composition in Ancient Greek epic poetry.  For a summary of this critical evolution, 
see Michel Zink, Introduction à la littérature française du Moyen Âge (Paris: Librarie Genérale Française, 
1993), 39-43. 
459 In this vein, Jean Subrenat has recently demonstrated that, as opposed to being a mere appendage to the 
military strength of Christian armies in chanson de geste, Christian faith and theology is the main quality 
that distinguishes Christian warriors from their Sarrasin rivals, driving the sense of Christian superiority 
that prompts the genres many tales of conversion. Jean Subrenat, “L'esprit de conversion dans les 
chansons de geste françaises,” Ce nous dist li escris ... Che est la verite. Etudes de littérature médiévale 
offertes à André Mosan, ed. Miren Lacassgne, Aix-en-Provence: CUERMA, 2000), 263-276. 
460 For example: “Deus, rei de glorie, qui me fesis né/E de la sainte virgne, sire, fustes né/ En treis persones 
fud tun cors comandé/ E en sainte croiz pur peccheurs pené, Cele e terre fesis e tere e mer, Soleil e lune, tut 
ço as comandé/E Eva e Adam pur le secle restorer./ Si verreiement, sire, cum tu es veirs Deus/ Tu me 
defent, sire, par ta sainte bunté/ Que al quor ne me puisse unques entrer/Que plein pé fuie pur la teste 
colper/Tresqu'a la mort me lais ma fei garder/ Deus, que ne la mente, pur tes saintes buntez.” La chanson 
175	  
	  
Raoul de Cambrai, it is Raoul’s mother Alais who gets to show off her theological 
acumen, prefacing what should be a simple prayer for forgiveness with a meditation on 
universal atonement.461  These texts express not just Christian supremacy but real 
theological know-how, which in turn becomes assimilated into the goodness and 
uprightness attributed to their heroes. 
This theological refinement is brought to bear on the way the chansons de geste 
imagine marriage, betraying a clear preoccupation with key sacramental principles.  In 
the chansons de geste, a “good” marriage is one that follows current sacramental thinking 
to a fault, in particular the all-important ingredients of mutual consent and lifelong 
exclusivity.462  Marriage in the chansons de geste has often been seen as a strictly secular 
and dynastic affair, and to a certain extent such a claim can be supported.463  Aude, for 
example, is regularly treated as a bargaining chip in the alliance between Roland and her 
brother Olivier, both in the Chanson de Roland (wherein she is briefly used as a threat in 
the dispute between the two comrades) and its quasi-prequel Girart de Vienne  wherein 
her engagement to Roland is used to secure peace between her family and Charlemagne 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
de Guillaume, texte établi, traduit et annoté par François Suard (Paris: Lettres gothiques, 2008), 800-812.  
See also 2034-2047, Vivien’s deathbed confession, in which he also includes a meditation on salvation. 
461 “Glorieus Diex qi en crois fustes mis/ Si com c’est voirs q’al jor del venredi/Fustes penez qant Longis 
vos feri/Por pecheors vostre sanc espandi.” Raoul de Cambrai, ed. and trans. Sarah Kay (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1992), 141-144. 
462 As Dorothea Kullmanhas observed, this general concordance with Church policy also holds true for the 
more practical dictates of canon law, such as consinguinity prohibitions. Dorothea Kullman, “Le 
rôle de l'Eglise dans les mariages épiques,” Charlemagne in the North: Proceedings of the Twelfth 
International Conference of the Société Rencesvals, Edinburgh, 4th to 11th August 1991, ed. Philip E. 
Bennett, Anne Elizabeth Cobby and Graham A. Runnalls (Edinburgh: Société Rencesvals, 1993), 177-187.  
463 Though it should be noted that certain authors, such as Linda Patterson, do concede that chansons de 
geste do engage with, and often conform to, emerging ecclesiastical marriage regulations. Linda Paterson, 
“L'épouse et la formation du lien conjugal selon la littérature occitane du XIe au XIIIe s.: mutations d'une 
institution et condition féminine,” Culture and Society in Medieval Occitania. (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), 
425-442. 
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and thereby end the siege of Vienne).464  A similar arrangement seems to have 
precipitated the nuptials of Aude’s mother, who is “given” to her father as part of a land 
deal with Charlemagne.465   
Yet such feudal negotiations seem only to be acceptable to the extent that they do 
not conflict with ecclesiastical marriage principles, and unions made exclusively on 
secular grounds are often ill-founded or suspect.  The indiscriminate wife-swapping of 
Girart de Roussillon (exchanging two royal brides who were already being used to 
solidify ties between France and Constantinople) leads to disastrous infighting between 
Charles Martel and his vassals, as do Girart de Vienne’s hastily arranged nuptials 
between Charlemagne and the fickle Duchess of Burgundy.  When Huon de Bordeaux’s 
brother marries a local lord’s daughter so as to increase his territorial holdings he 
conveniently overlooks his new father-in-law’s treacherous politics, precipitating a brutal 
conflict between the two siblings upon Huon’s return from his adventures.466  Rather than 
shoring up political and dynastic bonds, such secularized unions lead directly to violence 
and disunity, implying that true social cohesion cannot be accomplished without a 
spiritual component.467 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
464 In the Oxford Roland, Aude’s “bargaining power” is most strongly conveyed through the famous 
dispute between Roland and Olivier, in which Olivier threatens that “ma gente sorur Alde/Ne jerreiez ja 
mais entre sa brace.” La Chanson de Roland, présentation et traduction par Jean Dufournet (Paris: 
Flammarion, 1993), 1720-1.  In Girart de Vienne this idea is much more prevalent, as Olivier repeatedly 
offers Aude’s hand in return for peace.  See, for example, Bertrand de Bar-Sur-Aube, Girart de Vienne, 
publié par Wolfgang van Emden, (Paris, Picard, 1977), 5120-5. 
465 Girart de Vienne, 30-33. 
466 Huon de Bordeaux, 2509-2511. 
467 As Dorothea Kullman points out, the same could also be said of Bernier and Biautris’s marriage in 
Raoul de Cambrai, which both solidifies peace between two previously warring families and springs from 
the fully-consenting mutual desire of both parties. Kullman, “Le rôle de l'Eglise dans les mariages 
épiques,” 177-179. 
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In order for a marriage to be socially beneficial, a particular kind of relationship 
must exist between the spouses, conforming to the conjugal standards gradually emerging 
within the schools of theology.  The most lauded chanson de geste marriage, that between 
the Chanson de Guillaume’s William and Guiborec, emphatically meets all of these 
criteria, in particular via the couple’s mutual, enduring, and spiritually-motivated consent.  
We are told that Guiborec is to be admired since “there is no wife in Christendom who so 
served and honored her Lord, or believed so deeply in Christ’s word…”468 This 
symbiosis between Guiborec’s Christianity and her “good wife” status is further 
emphasized by William himself, who extols, “Great was the day when I took you for a 
wife, and great was the day when you were baptized.”469  Such focus on Guiborec’s 
spirituality could be due to the fact that she is a convert, with pagan relatives out fighting 
alongside William and Vivien in the field.  Yet, in context, such assurances of Guiborec’s 
faith seem explicitly tied to her ability to hold up her half of a Christian sacramental 
bond, possible only if both spouses form part of the body of Christ.  This same trope can 
be observed in the union of Huon de Bordeaux and his Saracen bride Esclarmonde, 
whose love for Huon (and desire to marry him) is accompanied by a spontaneous yet 
seemingly sincere conversion.470   
A socially favorable marriage is also only possible when both parties are desirous 
of the union, implying the all-important presence of mutual consent.  Such is obviously 
the case in the deeply committed bond between William and Guiborec.  While we are not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
468 “Il n'i out tele femme en la crestienté/ Pur sun seignur servir e honorer/Ne pur eshalcer sainte 
crestienté/Ne pur lei maintenir e garder,” 1486-1490. 
469 “Bone fud l'ore que jo te pris a per, E icele mieldre que eustes crestienté,” 945-7. 
470 “Pour voustre amour croirait en Damedei.” 6089. 
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privy to Guiborec’s state of mind at the moment when she married William, by the time 
the action of the story starts she is clearly a consenting party, with the author constantly 
telling us that during William’s battlefield absences she “does not forget her husband.”471  
Guiborec’s conjugal fidelity ends up having highly beneficial political repercussions, as it 
is she who holds down the fort while William is off at war and rallies his vassals to join 
the fight.472  Consent is also an important factor in the relationship between Roland and 
Aude, facilitating and ratifying the important social ramifications of their betrothal.  
While Aude’s consent is strongly implied by her reaction to Roland’s death in the Roland 
cycle in Girart de Vienne it is made a major plot point, as Aude falls in love with Roland 
at the same time as she is being dangled before him as a peace offering.  In fact, Aude 
spends much of the last quarter of the text fretting over the possibility that she may never 
get to marry Roland, making their betrothal pact (which effectively ends Charlemagne’s 
siege of Vienne) a perfect “marriage” of political and spiritual interests.473 
In this vein, chansons de geste are also strikingly intolerant of marital irregularity, 
and take pains to show that all of their “good” marriages were properly officiated.  In 
Raoul of Cambrai, the narrator introduces Raoul’s father by describing his much-
celebrated wedding to Raoul’s mother Alais, despite the fact that Alais finds herself 
widowed thirty lines into the tale.474  The betrothal of Aude and Roland, as recounted in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
471 “Dame Guiburc nel mist mie en oblier/ Ele sout en l'Archamp Willame al curb niés,” 1229-30 
472 Indeed, Guiborec even recruits troops for William’s army by promising them good and noble wives, 
solidifying her role as provider of social cohesion through marriage.  See Chanson de Guillaume, 1384-97. 
473 For example, when Aude thinks that Roland has killed her brother, and hence also their chances at 
marriage: “Ja de Rollant n’iere mes espousée/ la meillor home qui ainz ceinsist espee/ encois serai, lasse, 
nonnein velee.” 5431-5433. 
474 “De Canbrisin an droit fié le vesti/ Et mollier belle, ains plus belle ne vis/Tuit l’ostrierent et parent et 
ami/Noces en firent tex con poés oïr/Dedens la cort au fort roi Loeys/Puis vesqui tant qu’il ot le poil 
flori/Et quant Dieu plot del ciecle departi.” 23-29. 
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Girart de Vienne, is dually-officiated by both the archbishop and Roland’s uncle 
Charlemagne, portraying the perfect balance of family and ecclesiastical influence 
recommended in Gratian-era canon law.475  And when Huon of Bordeaux finally marries 
his Saracen princess Esclarmonde, both their wedding and her baptism are officiated by 
none other than the Pope himself, leaving no doubt as to the sacramental integrity of their 
bond.476 
Conversely, dubious or improper unions meet with swift disapproval, as Huon 
and Esclarmonde learn the hard way before making things official.  Upon departing for 
France with Esclarmonde as his bride-to-be, Huon receives a stern exhortation to chastity 
from his magical comrade Oberon, warning that Huon is absolutely not to consummate 
his relationship with Esclarmonde before they are properly wed.477  When the lusty young 
Huon immediately chooses to disregard this advice, the results are instantaneously 
disastrous: the lovers are shipwrecked, captured, and spend the next several thousand 
lines trying to win each other back.  Through this narrative sequence, the author both 
acknowledges and rejects the possibility of Esclarmonde as a simple war concubine, 
laying any doubts to rest through the ecclesiastical perfection of their subsequent 
marriage.   
Marital irregularity receives further censorious treatment in Raoul of Cambrai, 
through the sad back-story of Mersent, the mother of Raoul’s comrade Bernier.  Legally 
married to another, Mersent is taken by force by Bernier’s father, refusing to be married 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
475 Girart de Vienne, 6818-6824. 
476 Huon de Bordeaux, 9058-9084. 
477Jou te desfant, sor les menbres coper/Et si tres chier com tu as m’amisteit/ Que tu ne gisse ne n’aiez 
habieit/ Jusqu’a celle houre que l’avras espozér/Tout droit à Romme, la mirable citeit. Ibid, 7001-6. 
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off to yet a third man after Bernard’s father tires of her company.478  Raoul’s attacks on 
her character (he harshly refers to her as a “putain chanberiere”) seem refuted only by 
the fact that Mersent has chosen to remove herself from this chain of conjugal 
misbehavior by living out the rest of her days in a convent, claiming that Bertrand’s 
father was the only man she truly loved.479 
The strongest rejection of marital irregularity in the chansons de geste, however, 
is conveyed via their portrayal of widowhood, which seems universally designed to 
suppress the very irregularity contained in conjugal theology itself.  When a chanson de 
geste woman finds herself widowed, there is not even the slightest chance of her 
remarrying, and therefore also no chance of her upsetting the perfect sacramental design 
that chanson de geste marriage so carefully preserves.  No character represents this 
structure so powerfully as the Oxford Roland’s Aude, who, upon hearing about her 
fiancés death, perfunctorily and conveniently drops dead.480  In fact, Aude stays alive just 
long enough to reject Charlemagne’s offer of an alternative (and socially superior) 
marriage partner, thus emphatically squashing any notion of a third-party addition to her 
union.481  In so doing, she also provides a narratively miniturized paralell to Roland’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
478 Recounted by her son Bernier in Raoul de Cambrai, 1670-81. 
479 Ibid, 1328-1342. 
480 For our purposes it is interesting to note that, in the past fifteen years, Aude’s death, as well as the brief 
monologue that preceedes it, has been increasingly seen as a profound statement of female alterity within 
the male-dominated feudal system, and as a protest against the use of women as objects of exchange within 
this social realm.  See Anne Paupert, “‘Dame, ne parlez tant!’ Les mots des femmes dans la Chanson de 
Roland,” Tra Italia e Francia. Entre France et Italie. In honorem Elina Suomela-Härmä, ed. Enrico 
Garavelli, Mervi Helkkula, Olli Välikangas et Marja Ursin (Helsinki: Société néophilologique: 2006), 357-
368, and Joseph Long,  “‘Cest mot mei est estrange...’ La belle Aude and the irreducible difference of 
words,” Nottingham French Studies, 38 (1999), 114-119. 
481 “Alde respunt : ‘C’est mot mei est estrange/Ne place Deu ne ses seinz ne ses angles/Après Rollant que 
jo vive remaigne!’/Pert la culor, chet as piez Carlemagne/Sempres est morte. Deus ait mercit de 
l’anme!/Franceis barons en plurent e si la pleignent.” 3717-3722  It is striking that in the Paris Roland, 
where Aude is afforded a thousand-odd more lines of dialogue, her place in the narrative remains exaactly 
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great self-sacrifice, further linking them together on a representational plane.  The fact 
that Aude is Roland’s fiancée, not his wife, reflects an additional bit of theological 
caution, given that many early theologians and canonists (in particular Ivo of Chartres) 
remained ambivalent as to the indissolubility of betrothals.482  This fiancé-as-widow 
motif also comes into play after the death of Raoul of Cambrai’s titular character, whose 
betrothed vows to live out the rest of her days in a convent rather than marry another.483 
“Good” widows of the chansons de geste can follow a variety of paths, so long as 
they do not so much as entertain the possibility of remarrying.  Bramimonde, who spends 
most of the Chanson de Roland on the wrong religious and political side, manages to 
attain “good widow” status by not only rejecting her late husband’s religion, but also but 
rejecting the possibility of a subsequent marriage through her entrance into a convent.  A 
“good widow” may also remain in the secular world, so long as she leaves no doubts as to 
her good marital intentions.  Such is the case of Alais, Raoul of Cambrai’s quasi-saintly 
mother, who responds to the news that Louis intends to marry her off to another by 
fainting, crying, and unequivocally refusing.484  Her unswerving devotion to her son 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the same: she laments Roland’s death, pledges her fidelity, and dies. See La Chanson de Roland: The 
French Corpus, ed. Joseph J. Duggan (Turhout, Brepols, 2005), 5776-6017.  See also Duggan, “L’épisode 
d’Aude dans la tradition en rime de la Chanson de Roland,” Charlemagne in the North: 273-279. 
482 See pages 132-3 of this text.  Further, as Marianne Cramer Vos points out, the bond between Roland and 
Aude, as it is portrayed in the text “has nothing to do with the interests, the needs, or even any sort of 
arrangement between two feudal families,” placing all of the emotional force of their union on something 
more numinous. Marianne Cramer Vos, “La mort soudaine d'Aude, icône féminine, dans 
le Roland d'Oxford,” Charlemagne in the North: Proceedings of the Twelfth International Conference of 
the Société Rencesvals, Edinburgh, 4th to 11th August 1991, ed. Philip E. Bennett, Anne Elizabeth Cobby 
and Graham A. Runnalls (Edinburgh: Société Rencesvals, 1993), 375-385. 
483“’ Por seul itant qe je fui vostre amie/ N’avrai signor en trestoute ma vie.’ 
Lors chiet pasmée, tant par est esbahie/ Tos la redrese la riche baronie.” 3679-81. 
484 Dame A. vers terre s’enbroncha/Plore des iex, .j. grant soupir jeta/Ses conseillers a itant demanda: ‘Hé 
Diex !’ dist ele, ‘mal mandemant ci a !’” Raoul de Cambrai, 174-7. 
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throughout the tale (despite his various instances of bad behavior) helps solidify her 
perfect fidelity to her original marriage, and the lifelong singularity of her marital vows. 
“Bad widowhood,” on the other hand, is rarely represented in the chansons de 
geste, but when it is the repercussions are globally, almost outlandishly dire.  In Girart de 
Vienne, the recently-widowed Duchess of Burgundy immediately announces herself to be 
“bad news” by arriving at Charlemagne’s court in explicit search of a new husband, 
claiming that since “sorrow restores nothing” she needs “a living man to rule my great 
lands as is required.”485  Throughout the tale the Duchess’s mindset betrays a striking mix 
of shrewd practicality and fickleness.  Initially promised to the handsome young Girart, 
she begs social inferiority when Charlemagne attempts to claim her for himself, asking 
that she be given a husband more befitting her lower station.486  Her choice, however, 
turns out to be motivated at least as much by lust as by propriety, and when Girart rebuffs 
her many advances she is more than happy to wed Charlemagne, claiming “I would 
prefer to be crowned Queen of France, so lauded, than to remain a Duchess for the next 
fourteen years.”487  Still smarting from Girart’s rejection, she engages in a series of petty 
and spiteful actions that result in armed conflict between Charlemagne and Girart, 
culminating in the deadly siege of Vienne.  Lascivious, capricious, quick to forget her 
late husband: the Duchess-turned-Queen reads as a laundry-list of ecclesiastical “bad 
widow” stereotypes, tearing apart Charlemagne’s Christian empire just as her second 
marriage destroys the sacramental integrity of her first union.  What is interesting is the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
485 “En duel fere n’a nul recovrement/…Après le mort m’en covient .i. vivant/ car mes174-7tier a ma terre 
d’aide grant.” 1257-1262. 
486 “Vos porroiz hautement marier/ en fille a roi ou a duc ou a per/ et endroit moi me restuet a garder.” 
1311-1313. 
487 “Muez veu ge estre roine coronnee/ seul .xv. jorz, de France la loee/ que .xiiii anz duchoisse estre 
clamee.” 1406-1408. 
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degree to which these theological concerns are privileged over the Duchess’s perfectly 
legitimate feudal concerns, namely her need for a male protector and political figurehead.   
After all, the Duchess’s plea for a new husband is explicitly grounded in both tradition 
and political necessity, specifying that without a speedy remarriage (a practice that has 
been licit “since the time of Moses”) she will “lose too much of the lands that are [hers].”  
The fact that she so quickly comes to embody ecclesiastical anxieties about remarried 
women, and that these qualities cause her character to become so entirely destructive and 
reprehensible, goes to emphasize the incompatibility between these two different 
discourses on widowhood. 
The chanson de geste, on the whole, betray an extremely particular relationship to 
Christian marital theology, in particular its various slippages and anxieties.  Absent are 
the concubines and clandestine unions that so haunted the theology of this period, and 
when the possibility of such relationships is entertained, it is radically (and often 
violently) subverted.  Rather, marriage in the chanson de geste appears as a perfect, 
internally coherent ideological system, which can usually—but not always—be 
harmonized with the political and dynastic needs of feudal kingdoms. While it might be 
tempting to see such theological dominance as an early victory for Duby’s “ecclesiastical 
model,” the narrative reality does not allow for such neat distinctions, as the aristocratic 
dominance portrayed in these tales often outweighs any abstract clerical privilege.488  A 
more convincing perspective might be to orient this depiction of marriage within Sharon 
Kinoshita’s theory of a “crisis of non-differentiation” between pagan and Christians in 
the chansons de geste, wherein a variety of narrative devices are deployed “[to conceal] 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
488 Again, see Duby, Medieval Marriage: Two Models from Twelfth Century France. 
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the instability unsettling each side of the confessional divide.”489  This is because 
confessional differences, while compelling sources of conflict, are also an inherently 
unstable binary system, as they can be erased (as they occasionally are in chansons de 
geste) by conversion.  One way of concealing such instability, of course, would be 
portray Christian social life in perfect keeping with the Church’s theological dictates, and 
to suppress any internal inconsistencies that might trouble the waters. 
Romance Marriage and the Sacramental Alternative 
 In treating the role of marriage in medieval romance I do not mean to provide an 
account of “courtly” love or marriage, partially out of recognition that the idea of 
“courtliness” may well have much more to do with nineteenth-century critical concerns 
than those of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.490  Rather, my aim is to discover how 
the portrayal of matrimony changes when the action shifts from the battlefield to, yes, the 
“court,” and the relationships between men and women that are depicted therein.  Thus, I 
have narrowed my focus to, first, narrative texts, and, second, works that make romantic 
relationships a primary focus, set against the backdrop of feudal life and military conflict.  
While it is obvious that these depictions of male-female relations owe much of their 
particularity to contemporary trends in poetry and other non-narrative forms, it is also 
true that they bear clear resemblance to the emerging notion of one-on-one sacramental 
union, whereby the two lovers are united in an eternal, unbreakable bond that supersedes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
489 Sharon Kinoshita, “Pagans are wrong and Christians are right": alterity, gender, and nation in 
the Chanson de Roland,” Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies 31 (2001), 79. 
490 For two sides of the long and tortuous arguments for and against the existence of medieval “courtliness,” 
see Moshé Lazar, Amour courtois et ‘fin’amors dans la littérature du XIIe siècle (Paris: Librairie C. 
Klincksieck, 1964) and David Hult, "Gaston Paris and the Invention of Courtly Love." Medievalism and the 
Modernist Temper, ed. R. Howard Bloch and Stephen G. Nichols (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1996), 192-224. 
185	  
	  
other forms of social commitment.491  Unlike in chansons de geste, this intangible union 
is only partially integrated into the institution of marriage as a whole, and is often placed 
at odds with matrimony’s social and political aspects.  This incongruity, moreover, seems 
to result directly from the major inconsistencies within the conjugal sacrament itself, in 
particular those resulting from representational anxieties vis-à-vis the Christ-church 
paradigm. 
 A brief identification of sources is in order here, as the narrative context of the 
ensuing tales is somewhat complicated, especially as some exist in several interrelated 
versions.  Obviously, much attention is paid to the well-known Arthurian romances of 
Chrétien de Troyes (c. 1130-1190), in particular Erec et Enide, Cligés, Lancelot, and 
Yvain.  The glorification of marriage and romantic love in these texts finds an interesting 
counterpart in the roughly contemporaneous Roman d’Eneas (c.1160), an anonymous 
retelling of Virgil’s Aeneid by way of Ovid’s Metamorphoses.492  This text is especially 
noteworthy for its greatly expanded portrayal of Eneas’s bride Lavinia, who (in contrast 
to her role as a wordless marital pawn in the Latin original) transforms the bloody second 
act of Virgil’s text into a sighing, starry-eyed love story.  A slightly different perspective 
is offered by Marie de France (c. 1160-1210), whose lais forthrightly consider the 
romantic possibilities of extra-marital love.  In particular, lais have been selected that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
491 The rise of “mutual love” as an ideal in the theology and literature of this period has been noticed by 
June Hall McCash.  However, it has not yet been explored in relation to the sacramental theology of 
marriage.  See June Hall McCash, “Mutual Love as a Medieval Ideal,” in Courtly Literature: Culture and 
Context, ed. Keith Busby and Eric Kooper (Philadephia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 1990), 429-
438. 
492 For clarity, I will be distinguishing between these two texts by preserving the original spelling of their 
title characters: Aeneas for Virgil’s latin Aeneid and Eneas for the French Roman d’Eneas.  The Ovidian 
subtext of the Roman d’Eneas can be traced to Metamorphoses 13.623-14.608 (often referred to as “Ovid’s 
Aeneid), wherein Ovid retells Aeneas’s wanderings and his affair with Dido. 	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place adulterous relationships in direct opposition to marriage, creating what I refer to 
here as an “alternate” marital sacrament.  This kind of alternative, or even superior bond 
is very much apparent in the final narrative cluster under examination: the complex, 
winding story of Tristan and Isolde.  This theme is traced through the major versions of 
this story from Thomas of Britain (c. 1170), Béroul (c. 1175), Gottfried von Strassburg 
(1210), and the Prose Tristan (c.1235), wherein it emerges as one of the main 
characteristics of Tristan and Isolde’s story. 
 As in chanson de geste, marriages are often introduced as ways of gaining lands, 
titles, or power, and it is not unusual for these motivations to result in a happy match.  
Before Erec and Enide become mutually-besotted spouses, their marriage is rather dryly 
negotiated between Erec and his future father-in-law, whose sole concerns are for Enide’s 
social status and material comfort.493  The same can of course be said for the hard-won 
betrothal of Lavinia to Eneas, whose political motives for seeking Lavinia’s hand are just 
as important as in Vergil’s original text.  Even when a politically-arranged marriage acts 
as an obstacle to the lover’s true happiness, as in the case of Fénice and Cligés, practical 
considerations are still seen as more a part of the solution than the problem.  One of 
Fénice’s spoken objections to her arranged marriage with Cligés’s uncle, Aliis, is that it 
threatens Cligés's own claims to the throne, and among her many pledges of fidelity and 
love is the promise that “my love for Cligés is such that I would rather be dead and buried 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
493 Erec et Enide, 504-690, in Chrétien de Troyes, Œuvres complètes, éd. Daniel Poirion, Anne Berthelot, 
Peter F. Dembowski, Sylvie Lefèvre et al. (Paris, Gallimard, 1994). 
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than see him lose a penny of what is rightfully his.  May no child of mine ever cause him 
to be disinherited.”494 
 One of the obvious innovations of this genre—indeed, one of its defining 
features—is the extent to which lovers profess and perform their amorous sentiments, 
behavior traditionally associated with the notion of “courtly love.”  While it has long 
been recognized that such pronouncements contain a certain spiritual component, there is 
also a clear sacramental influence at play, particularly in their narrative association with 
marriage.  Romance spouses do not simply declare their passionate love and devotion, 
they dissect and codify these feelings, with the sacramental principles of indissolubility 
and numerical perfection acting as an underlying rubric.  When Lavinia reflects upon 
how much easier it would be if she could simply split her affection between Aeneas and 
Turnus, awarding its sum total on the victor, she quickly realizes that love does not work 
this way.  Love, rather, “issues exclusively from one single person to another; once you 
try to incorporate a third party, love wishes to have no part in it.”495  The bond created by 
this exchange of sentiments, moreover, is much more than just symbolic.  As Chrétien 
takes pains to explain in the case of Fénice and Cligés, true love effects an actual, 
unbreakable exchange of “hearts,” whereby, though a perfect union of desire, lovers’ 
hearts join “as many voices singing come together as one.”496  Cligés and Fénice later 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
494 “Mes je n’ai pas Cligés si vil/ que mialz ne vuelle estre anteree/ que ja par moi perdre danree/ de l’enor 
qui soe doit estre.” Cligés, 3170- 73.  In Chrétien de Troyes, Œuvres complètes. 
495 “Buene amors vait tant seulement d'un seul a altre senglement/puis qu'on i vuelt le tierz atraire/ puis n'i 
a giens amors que faire.” 8285-8287. 
496 “Bien puet estre li voloirs uns/ Et s'a adés son cuer chascuns/ Aussi con maint home divers/ Pueent ou 
chancenete ou vers/ Chanter a une concordance.” 2841-2846. 
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provide experiential proof of this principle, each claiming that their heart had followed 
the other during Cligés’s adventures at Arthur’s court.497 
 It would be a tidy picture if these claims to exclusivity and unity were entirely 
folded into the institutional aspect of marriage, and would confirm the frequent claims 
that romance (particularly that of Chrétien) sought to “Christianize” the adulterous 
passion of the troubadours.498  It is true that several aspects of Chrétien’s work support 
this idea: the high-ranking church officers who appear to officiate the unions of his 
lovers, his apparent difficulty in completing the adulterous tale of Lancelot and 
Guinevere.  There is also evidence, moreover, that Chrétien fully understood the 
difference between a legitimate and a more dubious sort of marital union, and took pains 
to place his lovers in the former category.  The clandestine elopement of Enide’s cousin, 
for example, provides a negative counter-example to the lawful bond of the two main 
protagonists, which, as Enide is quick to point out, was carried out openly with the 
enthusiastic consent of her parents.499  By contrast, her cousin’s liaison is the result of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
497 Cligés claims, “fu mes cors sans cuer an Bretaigne/ puis je parti d’alemaigne/ ne soi que mes cuers se 
devint/ mes que ça aprés vos s’an vint/ ça fu mes cuers et la mes cors” (5165-5169), to which Fénice 
responds, ““n’onques en bretaigne ne fui/ et si a mes cuers sanz moi fet/ an bretaigne ouan maint bon plet.” 
(5190-5192) 
498 It has long been argued that Chrétien was a trailblazer in the narrative linkage of love and marriage, 
which was likely (but not necessarily) influenced by contemporary theological discourse.This broad-strokes 
theory has of course seen its share of detractors, who argue that love in Chrétien’s texts often destabalises 
marriage (or vice versa).  See Karl-Heinz Bender, “Beauté et mariage selon Chrétien de Troyes.  Un défi 
lancé à la tradition,” Mittelalterstudien: Erich Köhler zum Gedenken, ed. Henning Krauss and Dietmar 
Rieger (Heidelberg: Carl Winter Universitätsverlag, 1984), 31-43; Barbara Nelson Sargent-Baur, “Erec’s 
Enide: sa fame ou s’amie’?” Romance Philology 33 (1980), 373-387; Dorothea Kullman, “Hommes 
amoureux et femmes raisonnables.  Erec et Enide et la doctrine ecclésiastique du mariage,” in Arthurian 
Romance and Gender, ed. Friedrich Wolfzettel (Amsterdam: Ropopi, 1995), 119-129; Peter S. Noble, Love 
and Marriage in Chrétien de Troyes (Cardif: University of Wales Press, 1982).  All of this may be added to 
Moishe Lazar’s blanket description of love in Chrétien as “amour courtois conjugal.”  Lazar, 100. 
499 When Enide’s cousin mistakenly refers to Erec as her “ami,” Enide curtly responds, “Bele cosine, il 
m'espousa/si que mes peres bien le sot/ et ma mere qui joie en ot.” 6242-6245. 
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clandestine vows made solely between the couple themselves—vows which so unstable 
that the young lady is forced to basically imprison her lover so as to keep him by her side. 
Yet for the most part this distinction is not so clearly drawn, even in the “marriage 
positive” works of Chrétien.  In Cligés, marital lines are blurred even in the ultra-
orthodox partnership of Alexander and Soredamours, whose mutual profession of love 
serves as a sort of “alternative wedding” to their real, church officiated nuptials.  In a 
scene that bears all of the indicators of a fully sacramental joining, Alexander pledges to 
his beloved that he is “wholly hers,” while Guinevere (their informal “officiant”), intones 
“I give you your beloved’s body, since you already possess her heart. Whether people are 
unhappy about it or not, I give you to each other.”500  This makes their actual wedding 
several lines later rather confusing and redundant, given that, according to both the laws 
of theology and the technical dictates of canon law, they are already fully married. 
All of this prefigures the dizzying complications negotiated by Cligés and Fénice, 
whose union embodies the full range of ambiguities embedded in contemporary marital 
theory.501  Already the result of a broken engagement (the implications of which are 
explored above), Fénice’s “marriage” to Cligés’s uncle Aliis is rendered potentially null 
by its lack of consummation, which, according to Fénice, means that she is “wrongly 
called by the name of wife.”  For Fénice, consummation appears to be the effective agent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
500 Alexander: “Mes puet cel estre an nul androit/ cele pucele ne voldroit/ que je suens fusse n’ele moie/ 
s’ele de li rien ne m’otroie/ totevoies m’otroi a li.” (2309-2313) To which Guinevere replies: “Je 
t’abandon/ Alixandre, le cors t’amie/ bien sai qu’au cuer ne fauz tu mie/ Qui qu’an face chiere ne groing/ 
l’un de vos deus a l’autre doing/ tien tu le tuen et tu la toe.” (2326-2331)  In Chrétien de Troyes, Œuvres 
complètes. 
501 It is the opinion of David Shirt that “the matrimonial imbrolgio in which Chrétien places his three main 
protagonists in the second part of Cligés…highlights the very same sort of thorny legal problems which his 
ecclesiastical contemporaries” were solving. David J. Shirt, “Cligés: A Twelfth-Century Matrimonial Case-
Book?”  Forum for Modern Language Studies 18 (1982), 79. 
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in a binding (and sacramental) marital bond, a point she drives home through several 
unfavorable remarks about her romance counterpart Isolde.  The fault of Isolde, 
according to Fénice, is that “one man had her heart but her body was divided between 
two,” a fate that she (Fénice) swears will never be hers as “my heart and my body will 
never be separated.”502  Theologically speaking, Fénice is of course walking a fine line, 
as it was unclear in this period whether consent or consummation effected full 
sacramental indissolubility.503  This is perhaps why, despite her assurances that she is no 
one’s “wife,” Fénice is reluctant to run off with Cligés, and why Chrétien is extremely 
coy about whether or not the lovers consummate their union during their clandestine 
sojourn.   
This ambiguity is also perhaps why Chrétien takes discernible steps to set up a 
sort of parallel marriage between Fénice and Cligés, containing all of the quasi-
sacramental bond that is notable absent from the politically-motivated union of Fénice 
and Aliis.  After the “heart exchange” noted above, Fénice pledges herself to Cligés as 
only a free single woman could do, using language that is deeply reminiscent of the “pre-
nuptials” of Alexander and Soredamours: “Yours is my heart and yours is my body, and 
no one can ever accuse me of villainy.  When my heart chose you, it gave my body to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
502 “Que ses cuers fu a un entiers et ses cors fu a dues rentiers/ ensi tote sa vie usa/ n’onques les deus ne 
refusa/ ceste amors ne fu pas resnable/ mes la moie iert toz jorz estable/ car de mon cors et de mon cuer 
n’iert ja fet partie a nul fuer.” (2135-3143)  Fénice’s frequent comparisons of herself to Isolde have of 
course not escaped the notice of contemporary scholars, particularly those who argue (as Peter S. Noble 
has) for Chrétien’s “horror of adultery” as a driving force in his portrayal of marriage.  See Noble, 31.  It 
has also been suggested that Chrétien’s engagement with the Tristan narrative results from an attempt to 
problematize the absolute distinction between love marriage and contract marriage, which he attempts to 
harmonize in the union between Fénice and Cligés.  See Alexandre Micha  “Tristan et Cligès,” in De la 
chanson de geste au roman (Genève: Droz, 1976 (63-72).  And then there is of course the simple question 
of “anxiety of influence,” due to the possibility that Chrétien himself possibly wrote a version of Tristan 
and Isolde (now lost) and therefore did everything possible to distinguish Cligés and Fénice from the 
Tristan-Isolde paradigm.   
503 See pages 104-5 of this text. 
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you as well, and promised that it would never be shared with anyone else.”504  After this, 
Fénice and Cligés continue to exhibit all of the behavior of a faithful married couple, with 
Cligés even going into a widowesque sort of mourning during Fénice’s brush with death.  
And while Chrétien does not tell us whether the lovers were sexually intimate while in 
hiding together, he does tell us that “all their desire was in common, as if they were one 
and the same,” thus assuring that the “consent” part of the equation was firmly in 
place.505  
This creation of a parallel marriage is a strategy employed again and again 
throughout romance literature, often used to attenuate or obscure an adulterous situation.  
This is certainly true of the marriage-positive Chrétien, whose Lancelot and Guinevere 
share all of the sacramental fidelity that Guinevere and Arthur lack.506  While the royal 
spouses share only one scene in the entirety of the narrative (the major action of which 
being Arthur sending his wife away as a hostage), Lancelot and Guinevere are in a 
constant transcendent state of togetherness, characterized between the same sort of heart-
body union that exists between Chrétien’s married (or eventually married) paramours.  
The famous “adulterous” tryst between Lancelot and Guinevere is punctuated by a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
504 “Vostre est mes cuers vostre est mes cors/ ne ja nus par mon essanplaire/ n’aprendra vilenie a faire/ car 
quant mes cuers an vos se mist/ le cors vos dona et promist/ si qu’autres ja part n’I avra.” 5234-5239. 
505 Einsi est lor voloirs comuns/ con s’il dui ne fussent que uns.” 6327-6328. 
506 While it is the overwhelming scholarly consensus that Chrétien was uncomfortable with his adulterous 
subject matter, scholars have long puzzled over how this discomfort manifests itself in a text ostensibly 
dedicated to celebrating their love.  Simon Gaunt, for example, sees an apologetic strategy at work, 
whereby Lancelot and Guinevere’s love sows “social and political benefits by ensuring that Lancelot’s 
great deeds of chivalry continue.”  Gaunt, Love and Death in Medieval French and Occitan Courtly 
Literature: Martyrs to Love, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 104-128. Likewise, Sandra Pierson 
Prior Sandra Pierson Prior’s observations of Chrétien’s desperate attempts to safegaurd the honor of 
Lancelot and Guienever by displacing the shame of their adultery onto others.  See “The Love that Dares 
Not Speak Its Name: Displacing and Silencing The Shame of Adultery in Le Chevalier de la Charrete,” 
Romantic Review 97 (2006). Others have argued that Chrétien’s disaproval redounded negatively on his 
portrayal of Lancelot in particular, rendering him by turns treacherous, ridiculous,  or generally 
questionable. See Noble, 65-77. 
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familiar-sounding exchange of hearts, with Lancelot leaving both his body and heart 
behind the next morning.507  Guinevere’s non-existent relationship with Arthur, 
moreover, is matched by Lancelot’s unswerving fidelity, through which he proves that, 
whatever naked and willing demoiselle may crawl into his bed, his “one and only heart 
was no longer his own for he had given it away to one woman and could not share it with 
another.”508 
This “parallel marriage” strategy is also employed by authors who are more 
discernibly comfortable with extra-marital relationships, leading to genuine confusion 
about the rules and boundaries of legal matrimony.  In the Lais of Marie de France, 
legitimate spouses are easily displaced by adulterous lovers, with the adulterous union 
clearly portrayed as truer and more indissoluble match. 509  This is especially true when 
the marriage in question is undertaken for exclusively dynastic reasons. The malmariée 
of Yonec, for example, is selected exclusively so that her husband might produce heirs 
and pass along his heritage—an aim in which he fails, in fact, as the marriage remains 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
507 “Ses cuers adés cele part tire/ ou la reïne se remaint/ n’a pooir que il l’an remaint/ que la reïne tant li 
plest/ qu’il n’a talant que il la lest/ li cors s’an vet, li cuers sejorne/ droit vers la fenestre s’an torne/ mes de 
son cors tant I remaint/ que li drap sont tachié et taint/ del sanc qui cheï de ses doiz.” Le Chevalier de la 
Charette, 4700-4709 in Chrétien de Troyes, Œuvres complètes. 
508 “Li chavaliers n’a cuer qu un/ et cil n’est mie ancor a lui/ einz est comandez a autrui/ si qu’il nel puet 
aillors prester.” (1234-1237) 
509 The exact nature of Marie’s stance towards love and marriage is famously hard to pin down.  Moishe 
Lazar considered her to be a key figure in the “moral” transformation of courtly themes as they moved 
from north to south, suggesting that she took a positive view of mariage and a dim view of adultery.  Lazar, 
174. Jean Flori has argued, Marie takes a pervasively neutral stance towards the relationship between 
marriage and love, wherein the two are neither mutually exclusive nor inevitably linked together. Jean 
Flori, “Amour et société aristocratique au XIIe siècle: l'exemple des Lais de Marie de France,” Le Moyen 
Âge 89 (1992) 17-34.  Then there is the question of whether Marie intended her portrayal of women and 
marriage as a sort of proto-feminist subversion tactic, expressing “the reaction of the misused and 
oppressed woman” within a patriarchal marriage market that trades women for purely feudal purposes,  See 
Dafydd Evans, “Marie de France, Chrétien de Troyes, and the malmariée,” Chrétien de Troyes and the 
Troubadours: Essays in Memory of the Late Leslie Topsfield, (Cambridge, St Catharine's College, 1984), 
159-171. 
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childless.510  A child is produced, however, by the lady and her shape shifting lover 
Muldumarec; their union is so perfectly fusional that he manages to assume her shape in 
order to receive the Eucharist in her place.  Thus no one objects when this child, Yonec, 
avenges his father’s death by killing his mother’s legal spouse, whom his mother, with 
her dying breath, refers to simply as “this old man.”511  In Milun, a similar act of 
vengeance is avoided by a stroke of narrative convenience, through which an extraneous 
spouse meets an extremely timely demise.  Like Yonec’s parents, Milun and his beloved 
begin a non-marital affair that results in the birth of a child, who is sent away to be raised 
in secret when the lady is married off to another.  When the child, now reunited with his 
father, learns of the circumstances of his birth, his solution is simple: “I will kill the lord 
to whom my mother is married, and I will see to it that you marry her.”512  Arriving to 
find the lord already dead, the son is so assured of the justice of this outcome that he 
unites his parents in marriage himself, as if merely confirming the “true” marital union 
that had existed all along.513 
Even more firmly displaced is the legitimate marriage of Guigemar’s adulterous 
lady, which vanishes without a trace as her extra-marital relationship takes on 
increasingly marital characteristics.  Sensing their impending separation, the lovers form 
a “covenant” in order to assure their mutual fidelity, through which they literally bind 
each other with articles of clothing that only the other might undo.  The fact that the lady 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
510 Pur ceo k'il ot bon heritag,/femme prist pur enfanz aveir/Quë aprés lui fuissent si heir (18-21). Lais de 
Marie de France, trad. Laurence Harf-Lancer, ed. Karl Warnke (Paris: Librairie Générale Française, 1990). 
511 C'est vostre pere que ici gist/Que cist villarz a tort ocist. 535-6. 
512 “Sun seignur qu’ele a ocirai/E espuser la vus ferai.” 499-500. 
513 “Senz cunseil de tute altre gent/Lur fiz amdous les asembla,/La mere a sun pere dona.” 526-8. 
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is already “bound” to another is not mentioned here, nor is it mentioned when the lovers 
are happily reunited, without apparent obstacle, at the end of the tale.514  
All this obfuscation is particularly interesting in that it exists alongside other lais 
in which marital boundaries are quite clearly defined, as are the consequences for 
transgressing them.  In Equitan, the Lord of Nantes enters an adulterous liaison knowing 
full well that he is headed down a dangerous path—one which leads to his death in a bath 
of scalding water while trying to escape from the understandably enraged cuckold.  In Le 
Fresne, the romantic entanglements are more complicated but still clear in their 
relationship to marriage.  Cut off from her aristocratic roots at birth, the story’s female 
heroine gamely enters into a domestic arrangement with her princely lover, with the 
understanding that her lower social status will prevent them from formally marrying.  
When her true identity is discovered, her beloved’s existing marriage is properly annulled 
by the archbishop, a solution that is only possible because (in accordance with the hazy 
decrees of canon law) it has not been consummated.  And then, of course, there is the 
near-bigamy of Eliduc, wherein the eponymous hero juggles a faithful wife and a long-
distance lover until the two are brought face to face, bringing the numerical instability of 
his situation to the forefront.  While it is unclear (in both theological and canonical terms) 
how Eliduc’s wife is able to simply “release” her husband from his marital bond in order 
to marry his mistress, it is clear that multiplicity of partners is a major taboo, and that 
neither relationship may continue while the other exists.515   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
514 Marie simply tells us, “A grant joie s'amie en meine/Ore ad trespasse sa peine,” strongly implying that 
Guigemar and his lady plan to live together happily ever after. 881-2. 
515 Such triangular relationships have been taken as further proof of Marie’s proto-feminist stance on 
marriage. It has been suggested by Nora Cotille-Foley Marie seeks to subvert the ecclesiastical stereotype 
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The notion of an alternative marriage also forms one of the main components of 
medieval romance’s most famous adulterous couple—Tristan and Isolde—and is stable 
enough to exist across the many of the fragmentary versions of their story.516  Just as the 
narrative famously plays with the technical nature of truth (Isolde’s trial by fire, her 
theoretically true pronouncements of fidelity while Mark watches from the shadows) it 
also plays with the technical boundaries of marriage, displacing the sacramental aspects 
of matrimony onto Tristan and Isolde’s adulterous union.517  Part of the reason that this is 
so successful is that Isolde’s marriage to Mark is so exclusively defined in political terms; 
in Gottfried von Strassburg’s version, their wedding is literally described as the joining of 
two kingdoms, with Isolde “receiv[ing] what was due to her, namely…Cornwall and 
England.”518  Tristan and Isolde, by contrast, are joined by a less formal but seemingly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
of adultery in which “love triangles mostly involved a woman, her husband, and her lover.” Nora Cottille-
Foley, “The structuring of feminine empowerment: gender and triangular relationships in Marie de 
France,” Gender Transgressions: Crossing the Normative Barrier in Old French Literature, éd. Karen J. 
Taylor (New York: Garland, 1998), 155. 
516 For a nuanced analysis of the divurgences between these major versions, see Joan M. Ferrante, The 
Conflict of Love and Honor: The Medieval Tristan Legend in France, Germany, and Italy (The Hague: 
Mouton, 1973). 
517 The marital ressonances of Tristan and Isolde’s relationship have recently been noticed by Tracy 
Adams, who argues that, by constantly speaking in technical truths about her relationship to Tristan, Isolde 
is “accusing Christian feudal society of failing to provide appropriate emotional models for lovers to the 
detriment of the individual and society.” Tracy Adams, “Love and Charisma in the Tristan et Iseult of 
Béroul,” Philological Quarterly 82 (2003), 5.  Brian Blakey has likewise explored how, by adhering to the 
historically literalist approach to oath-swearing, Béroul’s lovers remain “honorable beyond reproach.” 
Brian Blakey, “Truth and Falsehood in the Tristan of the Béroul,” History and Structure of French: Essays 
in Honour of Professor T.B.W. Reid, ed. F.J. Barnett, A.D. Crow, C.A. Robson, W. Rothwell, S. Ullman 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1972), 19-30. 
518Gottfried von Strassburg, Tristan, with the “Tristan of Thomas,” ed. and trans A.T. Hatto (New York: 
Penguin Classics, 1960), 3453. 
.  The story of Tristan and Isolde is thus alternately seen as a critique of feudal marriage schemes, or, in 
Douglas Kelley’s more neutral words, “the tragedy of the way in which a feudal marriage, a common 
source of harmony among peoples, produces strife within a family. Douglas Kelly, Medieval French 
Romance (New York, Twayne, 1993), 14.  Likewise, Peggy McCracken has noted ways in which Isolde 
plays into understandings of queenly adultery more broadly, in which Isolde’s betrayal “exposes the 
anxious tension provoked by a system that locates political order in the sexual purity of women.” Peggy 
McCracken, The Romance of Adultery: Queenship and Sexual Transgression in Old French Literature 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998), 117. 
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more binding agent: the love potion which, in an striking substitution, was intended to 
solidify the marital bond of Isolde and Mark.  In every major version of the tale, this 
potion is credited with effecting a mystical, indissoluble oneness, instantly rendering the 
lovers (in Gottfried’s text), “one heart…with a single will between them.”519 Even in 
Beroul’s version, where the potion has a two-year efficacy period, Tristan describes its 
effects as utterly consuming, making it impossible for him and Isolde to be separated 
from each other whether they wish it or not.520  And while the weakening of the potion’s 
effects might mean that Tristan and Isolde no longer feel overpowering physical desire 
for each other, it is by no means the end of their bond.  Before their impending separation 
they even engage in a quasi-marital exchange of gifts and vows, thus extending the 
indissolubility of their union beyond the potion’s effects.521 
This symbolic gift-exchange is another detail that (in various forms) is preserved 
across different versions of the narrative, and is one of the many was in which Tristan 
and Isolde participate in conjugal rituals and regulations.522  There is, of course, the 
couple’s “wedding night” after consuming the potion, which is preserved in all its 
symbolic value by the substitution of Isolde’s virginal handmaid Branigan on Isolde’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
519 Gottfried, Tristan, Hatto, 3330. Likewise, in the Prose Tristan, Tristan and Isolde are said to be of 
“totally united in feeling” Le roman de Tristan en prose, ed. Renée Curtis, v2 (Cambridge: Brewer, 1985), 
446.5-6. 
520 Q’el m’aime c’est par la poison/ Ge me ne pua de lié partir/ N’ele de moi.” 1384-6.  The Romance of 
Tristan by Beroul, ed. Stewart Gregory (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1992). 
521 In explaining the exact effects of the potion’s absence, Isolde says that while the sexual relationship 
between them might be over, she still loves Tristan and does not regret their past (Beroul, 2323-2330).  
When parting from each other, Tristan exchanges his dog Huisdant for Isolde’s ring, after pledging their 
enduring love (2681-2732). 
522 In the surviving parts of  Thomas’s version, we see Isolde bequeathing Tristan her ring so that “our love 
may never die (51),” and then Tristan rediscovering this ring, and the deep promise that came with it, after 
his regrettable marriage to Isolde of the white Hands (440-452).  The first part of this sequence is 
parallelled in Gottfried’s version (18286-18358). 
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official wedding night with Mark.523  This scenario is echoed by Tristan’s sexless 
wedding night with Isolde of the White Hands, a marriage that seemingly cannot be 
consummated because of Tristan’s existing connection with la belle Isolde.  Tristan’s 
failed marriage, in many ways, only serves to reinforce the idea of a “marital” connection 
between him and Isolde, given that the woman he has chosen is almost, but not quite, 
similar enough to his beloved to erase the problem of sacramental multiplicity524.  
Finally, as if to place the strength of their symbolic bond beyond question, there is the 
fact that Tristan and Isolde are said to die at the same moment, a fact which Marie de 
France directly attributes to the fact that their love was “so true and so pure.”525  
Of course, not all romance lovers meet such a perfectly entwined fate, which begs 
the familiar question: what to do with the surviving party once one half of their 
sacramental equation has passed on.  The answer in this case is particularly evocative, as 
it seems to reconfirm the displacement of marriage’s sacramental functions onto a 
couple’s amorous sentiments.  In brief, the more a couple is perceived to be “in love,” the 
greater the taboo on a subsequent marriage for the surviving party—most usually, the 
widow.  As in the case of Aude, the easiest way for a widow to display such good 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
523 Branigan’s bedroom switch is found in Gottfried’s version (12576-12650); in the Prose Tristan one 
given reason for the switch is that (beyond Isolde’s fears that her lack of virginity will be discovered) 
Isolde could not forget Tristan, whom she loved with all her heart.  Roman de Tristan, 485.20. 
524 Tristan’s consideration of Isolde of the White Hands as a possible “substitute Isolde” is preserved at 
length in the Oxford fragment of Thomas’s Tristan, wherein Tristan explicitly frames his marriage as a way 
to “free [himself] of the bond” (214) he shares with Isolde, given that Isolde is currently sharing the bed of 
her “wedded husband.” (221) His choice of spouse is explicitly motivated by the fact that she share’s 
Isolde’s name, a way of thinking he later deigns to be spurious when he “remembered the pact he made 
with [Isolde], (460-1)” which means that, whatever he does now, he will be betraying one of the Isoldes.  
Thus, despite the fact that he “married her in due and proper form at the church porch, (478-9)” he cannot 
rightfully consummate the union. See Tristan, ed. Gregory, pg. 9-29. 
525 Je l'ai aussi trouvée dans un livre/ l'histoire de leur amour si parfait/ qui leur valut tant de souffrances/ 
puis les fit mourir le même jour.Chèvrefeuille,7-10. See also Thomas’s Tristan, Oxford fragment 1, 3037-
3086 (Gregory edition, pg. 155-9). 
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monogamous intentions is to swiftly follow her husband to the grave.  When the 
seamlessly fusional union of Soredamours and Alexander is terminated by Alexander’s 
death, Soredamours dies almost immediately thereafter, too consumed by grief to go 
on.526  The same is true (in yet another case of parallelism between Tristan and Cligés) 
for Gottfried von Strassburg's Blanchefor, who hangs on just long enough to give birth to 
Tristan before succumbing to heartache.527  When death is not an option, protestations of 
perpetual fidelity will do in its place.  One of the ways in which Enide proves herself to 
Erec is by refusing the Count of Limours’ advances after Erec’s “death,” displaying all of 
the proper grief and steadfastness of a good Christian widow.528   
In keeping with this revised notion of romantic indissolubility, a couple need not 
be married to activate such expectations.  By dying at the same moment, Tristan and 
Isolde manage to conclusively bury any doubts as to the identity of Isolde’s true 
partner,529 avoiding the awkward possibility that Isolde might continue her dubious bond 
with Mark.  Lancelot and Guinevere each threaten suicide when the other is presumed 
dead, obviating any similar misgivings about Guinevere’s already non-existent 
relationship with Arthur.  And Yonec’s mother manages to speak volumes through her 
silent death, falling into a swoon on her dead lover’s grave after ordering the demise of 
her actual, legal husband.530 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
526 “Soredemors tel  duel en ot que aprés lui vivre ne pot/ de duel fu morte avoeques lui.” (2605-2607) 
527 Gottfried, Tristan, 1711-1750. 
528 Erec et Enide, 5497-4907.  The status of this moment as a sort of temporary widowhood has been 
noticed by Virginie Greene, “Le deuil, mode d’emploi, dans deux romans de Chrétien de Troyes,” French 
Studies 52 (1998), 257-278. 
529 Puns continue to be intended. 
530 “Sur la tumbe cheï pasmee/ En la paumeisun devia/Unc puis a humme ne parla.” 544-7. 
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These expectations become more complicated when the lady’s relationship to her 
former partner is lukewarm or uncertain, at which point the other major concerns of 
widowhood—those involving political dynasty or protection—often enter the narrative 
fray.  Such is the case for Yvain’s Laudine, who has already been made a widow when 
she is first presented to the reader.531  To be sure, Laudine initially exhibits all of the 
proper monogamous intentions, commending her husband’s soul to God and claiming 
that she will never meet his equal.532  And while she is initially adverse to the possibility 
of remarriage (claiming that, like many of her romance sisters, she would rather join her 
husband in the grave), the line of reasoning that convinces her is remarkably practical: 
“How will you defend your land, when King Arthur arrives here?”533  This concern is 
repeated by Laudine’s seneschal when he proposes her marriage to Yvain to the local 
nobility: “A woman cannot hold a shield, nor can she fight with a lance.”534  
It is only after Laudine’s remarriage has been presented as a political necessity 
(and roundly approved by the members of her court) that Chrétien confirms Laudine’s 
love for Yvain, simultaneously assuring us that their marriage was made “honorable” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
531 As Rebecca Hayward points out, romance widows in general walk a particularly fine line, given that 
their identify is defined by the mutually exclusive poles of eternal fidelity and falling freshly in love by the 
tale’s end.  Chrétien walks this line with particular caution, portraying Laudine as the perfect widow who 
only gives in to new love after heavy persuasion. Rebecca Hayward, “Between the Living and the Dead: 
Widows as Heroines of Medieval Romances,” in Constructions of widowhood and virginity in the Middle 
Ages, ed. Cindy L. Carlson and Angela Jane Weisl  (New York : St. Martin's press, 1999), 221-243. 
532“ Biau sire, de vostre ame/ ait Dex merci, si voiremant/ com onques au mien esciant/ chevaliers sor 
cheval ne sist/ qui de rien nule vos vausist.” (1286-1290) 
533 When Laudine proclaims, “Mon vuel/ seroie je morte d’enui” (1604-5), Lunete responds,  “Vostre terre, 
qui desfandra/ quant li rois artus I vendra?” (1617-18) 
534 “Fame ne set porter escu/ ne ne set de lance ferir.” (2089-9)  The strikingly pragmatic sense of 
Laudine’s decision has also been noted by Noble, who argues that Laudine’s expressed need for a male 
protector is included so as to make her subsequent marriage more palatable. Noble, 51-2. 
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through the license of Laudine’s lords.535  In the resulting domestic and political 
arrangement, Yvain is presented as having utterly supplanted Laudine’s former 
husband—in Laudine’s bed as well as in the hearts of the people—all despite the fact that 
he is the man’s killer.536  And yet, Yvain and Laudine are never said to share the kind of 
heart-and-body union enjoyed by Chrétien’s other couples, and Laudine’s “love” for 
Yvain is never deeply explored.537 While clearly peeved by her husband’s extended 
absence, her anxieties, once again, revolve much more around her kingdom’s security.  
Laudine’s remarriage, therefore, is a carefully-wrought, ambiguous affair, emphasizing 
the political imperatives for a second marriage while avoiding any inconvenient details 
that might hint at a true “double joining.” 
Without a doubt, the most complex portrayal of widowhood is that of Eneas’s 
Dido, partially because she inherits many of the tortuous complexities of Vergil’s original 
text.538  Commonly seen as a cautionary foil for the reciprocal, socially-constructive love 
between Eneas and Lavinia, Dido also embodies all of the ambivalent expectations 
imposed upon widowhood, which makes it difficult to classify her as a clear “positive” or 
“negative” example.539  On the one hand, the Eneas author does clearly portray the Dido 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
535 “Ce qu’ele feïst tote voie/ qu’amors a feir li comande/ ce don los et consoil demande/ mes a plus grant 
encor le prant/ mes a plus grant enor le prant/ qant congié en a de sa gent.” (2140-2144) 
536 “Mes or est messire Yvain sire/ et li morz est toz obliez/ cil qui l’ocist est marïez/ sa fame a, et ensanble 
gisent/ et les genz ainment plus et prisent/ le vif c’onques le mort ne firent.” (2166-2171) Chrétien de 
Troyes, Yvain, in Œuvres complètes. 
537 We are told that Yvain “left his heart behind” when he departed from Laudine to seek adventure—
though, given the length of his absence, we might easily assume that he can do without it.  See 2641-3.  
Additionally, Tony Hunt has argued that Chrétien “made yvain’s love for laudine just abut as ambiguous as 
could be” Tony Hunt, Chrétien de Troyes: Yvain (London: Grant and Cutler, 1986), 53. 
538 Again, I will be distinguishing between these two texts by referring to Virgil’s hero as Aeneas and that 
of the French tradition as Eneas. 
539 For example, Marilyn Desmond has argued that “Dido’s story….requires a narrative correction in the 
story of Lavine.” Marilynn Desmond, Reading Dido: Gender, Textuality, and the Medieval "Aeneid" 
(Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1994), 115. Nicole Chareyron has likewise claimed that Dido 
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episode so as to pave the way for Eneas’s subsequent marriage to Lavinia, leaving him as 
free as possible to form a wholly fusional bond with his new bride.  Unlike Vergil, the 
Eneas author does not depict Dido and Eneas’s moment of sexual consummation as a 
potential marriage—a possibility that, though a combination of present consent plus 
consummation, might have been both canonically and theologically valid.  This detail is 
matched by the striking absence of Creusa from Eneas’s account of his flight from Troy, 
in particular the attempted triple-embrace of her ghost.  Eneas’s marital history is thus 
narratively erased, mitigating any sacramental encumbrances that might damage his 
union with Lavinia. 
Dido’s marital history, on the other hand, is conspicuously present, in a greater 
and more deliberate sense than in the Virgilian original.  While in both the Roman 
d’Eneas and Virgil’s Aeneid, Dido has made a vow of perpetual fidelity to her late 
husband, the medieval Dido spends much more time telling us about it: thirty-five lines to 
Vergil’s fifteen.540   Moreover, while the Virgilian Dido’s vow is limited to the possibility 
of remarriage, the medieval Dido’s promise is much broader, promising “never to give to 
another the love I have pledged to my lord.”541  Such an alteration both makes it possible 
for Dido to break her vow without Eneas consenting to formally marry her, and reaffirms 
the Eneas author’s admonition (strikingly absent from Vergil) against placing faith in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and Eneas are meant to show desequilibre de faux couple.” Nicole Chareyron “Amour, couple et mariage 
dans l'Eneas,” Perspectives médiévales 14 (1988), 7-11. 
540 Aeneid 4.22-27, 4.33-40; Roman d’Eneas 1290-1325. 
541“Anceis parte terre soz mei/et tote vive me transglote/feus del ciel m'arde trestote,'/que ge altrui doigne 
m'amor,/que ge promis a mon seignor;/ge li donai, si l'ot et ait,/ne l'en sera par mei tort fait;/ge n'ai mais 
soing d'altrui amer, /que qu'il m'en estuiee endurer.” Le roman d'Eneas. Édition critique d'après le 
manuscrit B.N. fr. 60, ed and trad. Aimé Petit (Paris, Librairie générale française, 1997), 
 1312-1320. 
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women’s fidelity, as they “quickly forget the dead.”542  The Eneas author is generally 
more apt to place blame upon Dido than Vergil, who merely hints at a possible “fault” on 
Dido’s part when casting doubt upon the reality of her marriage to Aeneas.  In the 
medieval version, by contrast, we are frequently reminded that Dido has acquitted herself 
poorly through her entanglement with Eneas, an opinion that she herself eventually 
comes to share.543  When Dido turns away from Eneas during their confrontation in the 
underworld, the Eneas author tells us that she does so specifically due to the shame she 
feels at breaking faith with her first husband, “for she lied to him when she promised him 
her love.”544 
At the same time, the Eneas author also takes pains to emphasize the political and 
military challenges Dido is facing at the moment of Eneas’s arrival, which makes her 
decision to unite herself with Eneas both pragmatic and understandable.545  Military 
protection is in fact the chief advantage cited by Anna in recommending Eneas as a 
romantic partner, yet another departure from the Virgilian text.  While Vergil’s Anna 
does remind her sister about the disgruntled leaders (and spurned suitors) that surround 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
542 “Fols est ki en femme se fie,/molt a le mort tost oblie;/ja ne l'avra si bien amé, puis foit del vif tôt son 
dépo/en nonehaleir a mis le mort.” (1600-4) 
543 As David Shirt points out, part of the sense of Dido’s culpability comes from the comparative lack of 
divine intervention in the medieval tale, which place the full plame for Dido’s behavior in Dido herself. 
David J. Shirt, “The Dido episod in Eneas: the reshaping of tragedy and its stylistic consequences,” 
Medium Ævum, 51 (1982), 3-17. 
544 “Por ce qu'el li aveit mentie/ la fei que li aveit plevie.” (2657-8) 
545 The linkage between Dido’s romantic identity and political identity has also been seen as Megan Moore 
as a way of redeeming her character, as “while Dido’s critics condemn her for succumbing to her love for 
Eneas, she universally praised for her sense in seeing that as a powerful widow she must remarry.” Megan 
Moore, “Chrétien’s Romances of Grief: Widows and Their Erotic Bodies in Yvain,” in Masculinities and 
Femininities in the Middle Ages and Renaissance, ed. Frederick Kiefer (Turnhout: Brepols, 2009), 101-
116. 
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Dido on all sides, her medieval counterpart goes one step further, assuring her sister that 
her enemies “will destroy her sooner or later.”546  
 It is reasonable, moreover, that such an argument would be persuasive to Dido, 
given the lengths to which the Eneas poet goes to paint her as a devoted and competent 
leader—particularly given the perceived limitations of her gender.  The poet places 
Dido’s leadership qualities front and center, introducing her by declaring, “The lady Dido 
maintained  better than a count or marquis would have done.  No country or kingdom was 
ever better ruled by a woman.”547  The perils of this sort of gendered leadership might be 
gleaned from the lines immediately following, which recount Dido’s flight from her 
native Tyre at the threat of her murderous brother.   
For all her impregnable walls and clever diplomacy, Dido, as a widowed woman, 
is clearly not in a strong leadership position, a situation that Eneas could rectify if she 
were to marry him.  Unlike Laudine, however, she foregoes legitimate marriage in favor 
of a poorly-hidden extramarital liaison, simultaneously putting her people in jeopardy and 
conforming to the ecclesiastical stereotype of the libidinous, socially irresponsible 
widow.  It is unclear, of course, whether Dido would have done better to seek legitimate 
marriage with Eneas, given the vows of fidelity to her late husband that bind her on the 
other side.  In this way Dido’s situation perfectly embodies the feudal rock and 
theological hard place between which medieval widows often found themselves: 
encouraged to remarry in order to ensure heritage and protection, discouraged from doing 
so in order to ensure the sacramental integrity of their original marriage bond.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
546 “Por ce vos ont coillie en he/ acoillen t vos de mainte part/ confondront vos o tost o tard.” 1362-4 
547 Dame Dido tint la pais/ mielz nel traitast cuens ni mareliis/ onc ne fu mais par une femme/ mielz 
maintenue enprs ne regne. Roman d’Eneas 378-81. 
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The Curious Case of Troilus and Criseyde 
 Finally, a brief but intensive analysis must be made of medieval romance’s most 
tangled tale of non-marital relationship, the Trojan romances recounted by Boccaccio and 
Chaucer. Widowhood, concubinage, possible clandestine marriage: the story of Troilus 
and Criseyde reads as a guided tour of the margins of medieval Christian matrimony, 
wherein the marital sacrament is made present through its conspicuous absence.548  While 
it has been argued that Boccaccio’s Criseida is markedly less scrupulous than Chaucer’s 
Criseyde, both characters engage palpably with the labyrinthine social and ideological 
imperatives that govern their romantic possibilities, all of which are placed in subtle 
relation to Christian marital thought. 549  
 Most obviously, there is the invention of Criseida’s widowhood, a trait introduced 
by Boccaccio and amplified by Chaucer that guides Criseida/Criseyde’s choices from the 
instant she is introduced into the narrative.550  In Boccaccio’s text, Criseida’s widowhood 
is one of the first concrete pieces of information we are given about her, placed in 
conjunction with the weak, undefended position in which she finds herself after her 
father’s treachery.   In Chaucer’s retelling, both of these factors are palpably augmented.  
His Criseyde makes her appearance as an exaggerated sort of super widow, falling before 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
548 As with the dueling Aeneas/ Eneas narratives treated above, I will be referring to each set of characters 
through their original spelling: Troilus and Criseyde for Chaucer’s lovers, and Troilo and Criseida for 
Boccaccio’s. 
549 It has generally been argued that Chaucer sees the story of Troilus and Criseyde through more of a 
moral framework than Boccaccio, who offers,in David Wallace’s words, “an amoral fantasy of love.”  
David Wallace, Chaucer and the Early Writings of Boccaccio (Woodbridge, Suffolk: D.S. Brewer, 1985), 
74.  See also Barbara Nolan’s assessment of the Filostrato as “morally open”: Chaucer and the Tradition of 
the "Roman Antique" (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 119-154. 
550 For a fuller treatment of the relationship between the Filostrato and Troilus and Criseyde, as well as 
Boccaccio’s relationship to his earlier sources, see David Wallace, Chaucer and the Early Writings of 
Boccaccio (Woodbridge, Suffolk: D.S. Brewer, 1985), 73-105. 
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Hector “in widewes habit large of samit broun” to beg his protection, “for bothe a 
widowe was she, and allone.”551  In both versions Criseida/ Criseyde is said to live very 
appropriately for her station, though it is clear that, in Chaucer’s tale, widowhood makes 
up a much more significant portion of Criseyde’s identity.  When first glimpsed by 
Troilus, she is said to be clad “in widewes habite blak,” a detail repeated by Chaucer 
when he recounts the “shames drede” Criseyde experiences when she feels the eyes of the 
temple crowd upon her.552  Most interestingly, Chaucer also demurs on the question of 
whether or not Criseyde and her late husband produced any children, a door left pointedly 
closed in Boccaccio’s tale.553  In so doing, Chaucer deliberately leaves Criseyde 
ambiguously connected to her previous marriage, accentuating the sacramental baggage 
with which she would enter any subsequent relationship. 
 Criseida/Criseyde’s widowhood is also one of the deciding factors in her incipient 
relationship with Troilus, rendering her an available but complicated potential romantic 
partner.  In Boccaccio’s telling, her status as a widow provides Criseida’s chief initial 
opposition to beginning an affair with Troilo’s, as she claims (in perfect widowly 
fashion) that “I have still a sorrowful heart for [my husband’s] grievous death and shall 
have while I live, calling to memory his departure.”554  Just several stanzas later, 
however, Criseida begins to see widowhood as an argument in favor of abandoning 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
551 Geoffrey Chaucer, Troilus and Criseyde 96-8, in The Riverside Chaucer, ed. Larry Benson (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1986). 
552 Troilus and Criseyde, 171; 178-181. 
553 Chaucer tells us that “But whether that she children hadde or noon/I rede it naught; therfore I late it 
goon” (2.132-3) Boccaccio, on the other hand, plainly asserts that Criseida was not able to have children. 
Giovanni Boccaccio, Il Filostrato, ed. Vincenzo Pernicone, trans Robert O. apRoberts and Anna Bruni 
Seldis (New York: Garland Publishing, 1986), 1.15. 
554 “Ma poi che ‘l mio sposo/ tolto mi fu, sempre la voglia mia/ da amor fu lontana, ed ho doglioso/ il core 
ancor della sua morte ria/ ed avro mentre che sparo in vita/ tornandomi a memoria sua partita.” 2.49 
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herself to Troilo’s affections, reflecting “I am young, beautiful, lovely and gay, a widow, 
rich, noble, and beloved, without children…Why should I not be in love?”555  Criseida, it 
is important to note, does not see Troilo as a potential second husband, claiming that (for 
reasons Boccaccio chooses to leave ambiguous) remarrying at this time would be in some 
way inappropriate.  Yet Criseida rejects idea of losing the “liberty” and excitement of 
single life, for “the joy of love which is hidden surpasses greatly that of a husband always 
held in one’s arms.”556   
Yet adventure is not Criseida’s only reason for wishing to keep her liaison with 
Troilo hush-hush, despite the fact that, in Criseida’s words, “I do not so even know 
another woman without a lover…to do as others is not a sin, and no one can be 
blamed.”557  Throughout the affair, Criseida, Troilo, and Pandarus are all exceptionally 
concerned for Criseida’s reputation, in ways that seem specifically linked to her status as 
a widow.  It is directly after ruminating on the freedom permitted her by widowhood that 
Criseida wonders whether it is “propriety” that would keep her from realizing her 
feelings for Troilo, leaving us to question whether propriety was also her primary impetus 
in declaring her undying fidelity to her late husband.558  Pandarus, in attempting to 
convince Criseida of Troilo’s sincerity, imagines Troilo asking the God of Love whether 
he “hesitate[s] to kindle [his] flames under her widow’s weeds,” suggesting that it would 
be less improper to “kindle” such flames in the heart of a non-widowed woman.  All of 
this is despite (or perhaps because) of Pandarus’s assurances that Criseida’s widowhood 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
555 “Io son giovane, bella, vaga e lieta/ vedova, rica, nobile, ed amata/ sanza figliuoli ed in vita queta/ 
perché esser non deggio innamorata?” 2.69 
556 “Cosi d’amor la gioia che sia nascosa/ trapassa assai del sempre mai tenuto/ marito in braccio.” 2.73. 
557 “Io non conosco in questa terra ancora/ niuna sanza amante…E come gli altri far non é peccato/ né ne 
puo esser alcun biasimato.” 2.70 
558 “Se forse l’onesta questo mi vieta/ io saro saggia.” 2.69 
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is precisely what makes her so ripe for the picking, as “my cousin is a widow and has 
desires, and if she should deny it, I would not believe her.”559  Running beneath 
Boccaccio’s text, therefore, is the familiar notion of a widow as a sexually awakened 
woman, as well as all of the potentially dangerous avenues for her activated sexuality.  
Also at play, however, is the lack of options socially available to widows, as both 
remarriage and unmarried sex both visible threaten Criseida’s cherished sense of honor. 
Chaucer, once again, chooses to accentuate these difficulties, particularly as they 
relate to the social constraints created by Criseyde’s widowhood.  From the beginning, 
Troilus senses that the object of his desires is somehow off-limits, though both he and 
Pandarus are coy as to exactly how and why.  Troilus is in fact so concerned that he is 
reticent to tell Pandarus that it is Criseyde he fancies, fearing that “harmes mighte 
folwen”560 if his feelings become known.  When Pandarus cautions discretion, promising 
that his only worry should be for Criseyde’s “name,” Troilus continues to fret about the 
possibility of some unnamed harm he might cause his beloved, swearing that he would 
rather die than cause Criseyde anything  
that toucheth harm or any vilenye.”561   
While it has been suggested that such anxieties reflect the precarious position of 
“courtly” women more generally, there are plenty of clues that Criseyde’s situation is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
559“La mia cugina é vedova e disia/ e se ‘l negasse non gliel crederia.” 2.27. 
560 “So hyd it wel, I telle it never to mo/For harmes mighte folwen, mo than two/If it were wist; but be thou 
in gladnesse/And lat me sterve, unknowe, of my distresse.” 1.612-617 
561 “But herke, Pandare, o word, for I nolde/That thou in me wendest so greet folye,        That to my lady I 
desiren sholde/That toucheth harm or any vilenye;/For dredelees, me were lever dye/Than she of me ought 
elles understode/But that, that mighte sounen in-to gode.” 1.1031-7. 
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more specific, especially when Criseyde herself begins expressing her reservations.562  In 
Chaucer’s telling, Criseyde is intensely aware of the behavior required of her as a widow, 
and deeply hesitant about doing anything to counter these expectations.  This is 
undoubtedly why Pandarus immediately zeroes in on Criseyde’s widow’s veil when 
attempting to soften her up for Troilus’s advances, encouraging her to “cast your widwes 
habit to mischaunce” and join him in a dance.563  Criseyde, however, is not so easily 
convinced, objecting that it is not “a widewes lyf” to dance and make merry, but rather 
“to budde, and rede on holy seyntes lyves.”564  If Criseyde sees an advantage to her 
situation, it is the liberty it affords her to handle her own affairs—though, in contrast to 
her Italian counterpart, this freedom has nothing to do with the potential for sexual 
adventures. Rather, Chaucer’s Criseyde wishes to avoid the ennui that inevitably comes 
with marital relations, vowing that “shal noon housbonde seyn to me ‘Chekmat!’ For 
either they ben ful of Yalousye, or maisterful, or loven novelrye.”565   Criseyde’s 
situation is desirable, therefore, so long as she remains within the narrow constraints of 
“honorable” widowhood, and does nothing to jeopardize her precarious, unprotected 
position within Trojan society. 
It is unclear to what extent Criseyde’s reluctance to remarry affects her prospects 
with Troilus, since Troilus and Pandarus’s intentions towards her are famously unclear.566  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
562 See Cathy Hume, Chaucer and the Cultures of Love and Marriage (Cambridge: D.S. Brewer, 2012), pg. 
244-65. 
563 “Quod Pandarus, `Now is it tyme I wende;/But yet, I seye, aryseth, lat us daunce,/ And cast your widwes 
habit to mischaunce:/What list yow thus your-self to disfigure,/Sith yow is tid thus fair an aventure?' 2.220-
4 
564 Troilus and Criseyde, 2.117-8 
565 Troilus and Criseyde, 2.755-6. 
566 As R.W. Hanning notes, Troilus’s desires are remarkably hazy compared with Boccaccio’s version, 
where they are clearly ennunciated by both Troilo and Pandarus. R.W. Hanning, "Come in Out of the Code: 
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While it is obvious that Boccaccio’s Pandarus is proposing a sexual relationship between 
Criseida and Troilo, Chaucer leaves things purposefully vague, never precisely naming 
what Troilus and Pandarus are looking for.  As Pandarus puts it, Criseyde is too young 
and beautiful to focus her love in an exclusively “celestial” direction, and so “it sete hir 
wel right nouthe, a worthy knight to loven and cheryce.”567  Criseyde echoes this 
sentiment in her own reflections, considering that nothing is stopping her from “myn 
herte sette at reste upon this knight,” since she is “nought religious.”568  Since Criseyde 
has not followed the idealized widow’s path of sworn lifelong continence, she is thus 
available to Troilus for some sort of liaison, though everyone pointedly avoids spelling 
out the exact terms.  Pandarus assures her that, in rescuing Troilus from his lovelorn 
angst, she needn’t go further than showing Troilus “bettre chere,” and that he wishes 
neither to “binde yow to him thorugh no beheste,” nor to be Troilus’s “baude.”569  Yet 
none of this seems to warrant everyone’s outsized concern for Criseyde’s reputation, the 
threat to which is also never clearly indicated.  Thus, while Boccaccio surrounds his 
Criseida with equally dangerous alternatives, Chaucer creates an atmosphere of 
indeterminate danger, suggesting that Criseyde’s position is tenuous no matter how she 
chooses to proceed. 
Whatever their intentions going into their liaison, it is clear that they quickly 
create something of importance and permanence, which throws both Criseida and 
Criseyde’s anti-marital vows into question.  Scholars have long entertained the possibility 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Interpreting the Discourse of Desire in Boccaccio’s "Filostrato" and Chaucer’s "Troilus and Criseyde," 
Chaucer’s Troilus and Criseyde: "Subgit to alle Poesie": Essays in Criticism, ed. R. A. Shoaf 
(Binghamton, N.Y.: Medieval & Renaissance Texts & Studies, 1992), pp. 120-37. 
567 1.983-6. 
568 Troilus and Criseyde, 2.759-61. 
569 Troilus and Criseyde, 2. 354; 2.359. 
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of a clandestine marriage between Chaucer’s lovers, and W.T. Rossiter has recently made 
a convincing case for marital undertones in Boccaccio’s text as well.  To be sure, there is 
plenty of evidence to support the claim that both versions depict elements of a clandestine 
marriage ceremony, in particular (as John Maguire has noted) Chaucer’s frequent use of 
church-door liturgical language such as “plight” and “trouthe.”  On the other hand one 
needn’t go so far as to prove a legally binding marriage between the lovers, given the 
abundant use, by both Boccaccio and Chaucer, of sacramental imagery and other pseudo-
conjugal tropes.  In Chaucer’s text we find the familiar “exchange of hearts” employed 
by Chrétien and others, wherein Criseyde dreams that Troilus’s heart is literally, 
surgically implanted in place of her own.  Later, Criseyde confirms the effects of this 
“open heart surgery” to Troilus, swearing, “Ye he so depe in-with myn herte grave, that, 
though I wolde it turne out of my thought, as wisly verray god my soule save, to dyen in 
the peyne, I coude nought!”570  The perfect union of Troilus and Criseyde is further 
affirmed by the narrator, who plainly asserts that after their night together the pair “were 
oon.”571  Boccaccio is equally concerned with creating a numinous, heart-to-heart 
relationship between his Troilo and Criseida, though he dispenses with the details 
somewhat more economically.  Their parting scene is also punctuated by a mutual 
remission of heart and soul, with Criseida referring to Troilo and “heart of my body” and 
Troilo declaring that he has “left his soul” in Criseida’s bedroom.572  This “soul swap” is 
revealed to be mutual when Criseida is contemplating her imminent departure, at which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
570 Troilus and Criseyde, 3.1499-1502. 
571 Troilus and Criseyde, 3.1405 
572 “cuor de mio corpo,” 3.50; “e teco lascio lo spirito mio.” 3.51. 
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moment “her body was there and the soul elsewhere, seeking Troilo without knowing 
where.”573 
However complete the mystical bond between the two lovers, the practical effects 
of this union are unclear, most obviously in Criseida/ Criseyde’s eventual betrayal.  If 
canon law is any indicator, clandestine marriages were made to be broken, and so 
Criseyde/Criseida would simply be enacting a common and contemporary conjugal 
anxiety.  But it is not entirely evident that this is what is happening.  On the one hand, 
both clearly consider their relationship to be of some permanence, a fact vehemently 
voiced by both Troilo and Troilus when Pandarus attempts to convince him that there are 
other fish in the sea.  The majority of the couple’s responses, however, are far more 
problematic, and call attention to the extremely ambiguous nature of their union as well 
as sacramental unity more generally.  Of especial importance is the pair’s reluctance, in 
both versions, to simply run away together, a proposition that should cause minimal strife 
for fully, legitimately married spouses.  Yet their reticence does make certain sense, as 
Karl P. Wentersdorf points out, if they consider themselves to be clandestinely married, 
as such unions did not leave one immune to social shaming and punishment.574  There is 
also the fact that both Troilus and Troilo describe the action of carrying off Criseida as 
“ravishment,” a strikingly technical term that implies an entirely different sort of marital 
irregularity.  Thus, while it is obvious that both parties consider themselves to be in an 
exclusive and indissoluble partnership, neither seems to know what sort of rights or 
boundaries this implies in terms of their actual life together. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
573 “Il corpo era quivi e l’anima era altrove/ cercando troiol sanza saper dove” 4.82. 
574 Karl P. Wentersdorf, ‘Some Observations on the Concept of Clandestine Marriage in Troilus and 
Criseyde’, ChaucerReview, 15 (1980), 101-26.  
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Yet nothing compares to the complete marital ambivalence of Criseyde/Criseida’s 
assertion, repeated prominently in both versions, that in being forced to leave Troilus she 
truly becomes a widow.   Most obviously, this statement once again begs the question of 
the exact nature of her relationship to Troilus, tipping the scales back towards full, 
legitimate marriage.  But on a wider plane, Criseyde/Criseida’s lament calls attention to 
the deeper ambiguities inscribed in widowhood and its challenge to the sacramental 
nature of marriage, especially when we recall the various sacramental nuances to her 
bond with Troilus.  This is doubly true since the details of her first marriage have been 
kept deliberately off-stage, leaving us to question whether such all-consuming unity 
existed between her and her late husband.  What is striking about this situation is that, in 
theological terms,  Criseyde/ Criseida’s statement is defensible, especially in light of 
Aquinas’s admission that a second marriage is only sacramentally imperfect when 
considered in relation to the sacramental signification of the first.  Without information 
on the nature of the bond between Criseyde/ Criseida and her first husband, the reader is 
left with the impression that the loss of Troilus would indeed render her, for the first time, 
a widow.  All of this is only possible, of course, because of the extreme ambiguity within 
conjugal theology itself, whose fault lines only become more exposed when Criseyde/ 
Criseida destroys this sacramental bond through her betrayal with Diomedes. 
It bears noting that this story obviously does not take place within the legal and 
social confines of Christian Europe, and so technically exists outside the bounds of 
ecclesiastical marriage regulations.  Yet this historical distance seems to work for 
Boccaccio and Chaucer’s purposes, allowing each to play with the doubts and lacunae 
within the conjugal theory of their time from a standpoint of true liminality.  Marriage in 
213	  
	  
the Troilus and Creseida story is “Christian” in the same way that Troilus and Creseida 
both are and are not “married,” with the indeterminate meaning of both of these terms left 
deliberately exposed.  By positioning the relationship of their lovers on the boundaries of 
marital validity, both Chaucer and Boccaccio ask the question of where these boundaries 
actually exist—or, as Chaucer’s Troilus puts it, “how coude ye with-outen bond me 
binde?”575 
How, when and to what extent one person is bound to another: these were the 
central practical questions at the heart of the theological debate about the sacrament of 
marriage, all of which grew increasingly urgent as this theology made its way into the 
expanding ecclesiastical court system.  If Chaucer and Boccaccio show limited interest in 
concealing the tortuous nature of marriage and marrying, then it is perhaps because they 
it was becoming more and more impossible to conceal, amply displayed every time a 
clandestine bride appeared to assert her rights in the courtroom.  Such uncertainty, as 
displayed above, provides plentiful fodder for deconstructing the already ambiguous 
bonds created by love and sexuality, and for laying bare their tragic potential.   
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CHAPTER 5 
Theology and “Experience” in the Literature of Laughter 
	  
“Marriage is really tough because you have to deal with feelings…and lawyers.” 
 —Richard Pryor 
It’s no surprise that marriage has been making people laugh for centuries, given 
its confounding mix of legality, social consequence, and chaotic human emotion.  These 
comic possibilities are only expanded, it seems, when sacred signification is added to the 
mix, particularly via the tortuous avenues of the Christian marital theology.  This chapter 
explores three specific ways in which medieval authors capitalized on marriage’s 
humorous potential—those displayed in fabliaux, French anti-marital polemics (or 
misogamous literature), and later Medieval comic texts.  As a whole, these genres create 
humor by juxtaposing marriage’s lofty sacramentality with the full spectrum of its messy 
experience, while simultaneously apposing the various internal inconsistencies within the 
marital sacrament itself. 
Fabliaux 
Exploring the role of marital theology in the fabliaux means tackling, however 
briefly, the complicated question of fabliau anticlericalism. Priests, in the famous 
estimation of Per Nykrog, constitute “les bêtes noires” of the fabliaux, contributing to the 
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general attitude that “plus il est purement ecclésiastique et moins on l’aime.”576 It’s 
perhaps no accident, moreover, that priestly misbehavior frequently involves some sort of 
incursion into lay marriages, with twenty-nine total fabliaux featuring a clerical amant or 
seducer.577 Such statistics make priests far and away the most effective producers of 
fabliaux cuckolds, which, according to Gautier le Leu, constitutes the worst of their many 
and various failings.578 What’s more, a priest’s illicit dalliances are often subject to a very 
specific sort of comic treatment, providing a humorous foil to his supposedly sacrosanct 
status. Such is the case in both Du prestre crucifié and Le prestre taint, each of which 
portray a priest attempting to escape an angry husband by “hanging himself” on an 
unfinished crucifix.579 As Jean R. Scheidegger points out, both tales also make a point of 
accentuating the presence of the naked priests’ genitalia, thus parodically complicating 
the relationship between these lustful clergy members and the divine being they are 
supposed to literally and figuratively represent.580 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
576 Per Nykrog, Les Fabliaux (Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1957), 132.  Likewise, D.D.R. Owen theorizes 
that the characterization of clerics in the fabliaux was the jongleurs’ “retaliation for some of the hard 
knocks which they class had received from the Church.” See D.D.R. Owen, “The Element of Parody in 
Saint Pierre et le Jongleur,” French Studies 9 (1955) 60-63.  Philippe Ménard sees a note of 
“schadenfreude” in the fabliau attacks on those in ecclesiastical office, as il semble donc que les fabliaux 
les plus virulents soient à attribuer à des conteurs qui ne sont pas des possédants, bien installés, dans la 
societé.”  See Philippe Ménard, Les Fabliaux: contes à rire du moyen âge (Paris: Presses Universitaires de 
la France, 1983), 128. Marie-Thérèse Lorcin has attributed an even more subversive note to the fabliau 
characterization of clerical figures, arguing that the jongleurs’ desire to roast clerics is so strong that they 
often end up ridiculing the rites and beleifs they represent in the process.  Marie-Thérèse Lorcin, “Un 
prêtre, pour quoi faire? Les rites religieus dans le fabliaux: des bribes significatives,” in Si a parlé par 
moult ruiste vertu: mélanges de littérature médiévale offerts à Jean Subrenat, ed. Jean Dufournet, CCMA 
(Paris: Champion, 2001), 355-65. 
577 Figure provided by Nykgrog, out of sixty-nine “love triangle” fabliaux total. Nykgrog, 110. 
578 In particular, this priest is a frequent source of “hone et enui” because “maint prodome avoir fait cous.” 
Gautier le Leu, Connebert, NCRF t. 7 (1993), 215-238 (see especially lines 1-8). 
579 Du prestre crucefié, NRCF t. 4 (1988), 91-106; Gautier le Leu, Le Prestre Taint, Fabliaux Érotiques, 
266-295. 
580 Jean R. Scheidegger, “Le sexe du crucifix: littérarité, art, et théologie dans Le Prêtre teint et Le Prêtre 
crucifié,” Reinardus 7 (1994), 143-59.  It is no surprise that Scheidegger also characterizes these two tales 
as deeply anticlerical. 
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The fabliau priest, however, does not limit his sexual appetites to married 
laywomen. All told, seven fabliaux also present priests with concubines of their own, a 
situation that is painted in varying shades of normalcy. In several tales the concubine is 
portrayed as an ordinary feature of domestic life, occasionally referred to as a wife 
(fame).581 More often, clerical concubinage is presented in the same way as clerical 
adultery: as an satirical desecration of the priest’s ecclesiastical stature. In Du bouchier 
d’Abevile, a priest responds to his concubine’s infidelity by swearing to “never again 
share [her] bed,” an ironic repetition of the vows he supposedly swore when becoming a 
celibate cleric.582 In De l’evesque qui beneï lo con, a priest is ordered by his bishop to 
cast off his concubine (also referred to by the narrator as his “wife”), an order he 
manages to defy by catching the bishop in the compromising position of “blessing” his 
own lover’s genitalia—in full ecclesiastical Latin, no less.583  
To interpret all of this as anti-clerical, however, would be to miss an essential 
register in the complex modalities of fabliau humor: that fabliaux likely emerged directly 
out of the clerical milieu they are supposedly skewering. Scholars have long recognized 
the possibility that many fabliaux were composed by ecclesiastically-trained scholars; 
four tales even go so far as to identify their authors as clerks.584 In this vein, fabliaux that 
portray priests in compromising sexual situations were also participating in one of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
581 For example, Do preste qui manga mores: et la fame au prestre se pasme,” 62.  Most often, however, 
the priest’s concubine is referred to as his “sweetheart” (meschine) or simply amie. 
582 “James en ton lit ne girrai,” 500. 
583Li evesque lo con seigna/ et puis a dit: ‘per omnia’/ Qan qu’il fait la beneïçon/ dit: ‘secul seculorum.’ 
lines 200-1. De l’evesque qui beneï lo con, t. 6 (1991), 193-205. 
584 Charles Muscatine, The Old French Fabliaux (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), 10; Edmond 
Faral, Les Jongleurs en France au môyen age (Paris: Champion, 1910), 32-43.  Also, As Peter Dronke has 
convincingly demonstrated, fabliaux most probably began as a vernacular outgrowth of the 12th century 
tradition of Latin comedy, a genre produced by and for the clergy. Peter Dronke, The Medieval Poet and 
his World (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura,1984), 145-65. 
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most prevalent ecclesiastical conversations of their day: the debate over clerical 
concubinage, as well as the more general concerns about priests’ sexuality. Hence, a 
certain “in joke” quality to fabliau ecclesiastical humor, accentuating (in Raymond 
Eichmann’s estimation), the likely distance between idealized canonical laws and 
humanized social realities.585 
All of this is corroborated by the fairly regular appearance of orthodox theology 
in the fabliaux—or at least, theological ideas that uphold the basic building blocks of the 
Christian worldview. By Brian J. Levy’s count, the devil makes forty appearances within 
the total fabliau corpus, and, as Philippe Ménard has noted, the sign of the cross will 
always make him disappear.  Several fabliaux are also devoted to exclusively theological 
themes, such as the subversively witty Saint Pierre et le jongleur.586 Here, Saint Peter 
sneaks down to the underworld to enjoy a friendly game of dice with a recently-deceased 
jongleur. The jongleur convinces Peter to allow him to wager damned souls, and then 
proceeds to lose spectacularly until every soul has been freed to paradise. In addition to 
its obvious parodic retelling of the harrowing of hell, the story also turns on an ironic 
“reversal of holiness,” as it is the damned jongleur, not Saint Peter, who affects this mass 
salvation. And yet, the humor here rests entirely on the truth of Christian theology, and a 
willingness to engage with it on its own terms. The basic plot of the story, that souls are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
585 Raymond Eichmann, “The ‘Prêtres concubinaires’ of the Fabliaux,” Australian Journal of French 
Studies 27 (1990), 207.  Some scholars, such as Anne Cobby, take this notion even further, seeing priestly 
misbehavior in the fabliaux as a way of defending Christian principles by mocking those who violate them.  
While I do not envision  the jongleurs’ intentions to be so pointed, I do take the general point that fabliau 
laughter was intended to be with, as opposed to against, the church.  See Anne Cobby, “L’anticléricalisme 
des fabliaux,” Reinardus 7 (1994), 17-29,  See also Muscatine, The Old French Fabliaux, 93. 
586 Keith Busby points out that these tales’ are paired in several important fabliau manuscripts, implying 
that their common theological motifs would have been easily recognized. Keith Busby, “Fabliaux and the 
New Codicology,” in The World and its Rival: Essays on Literary Imagination in Honor of Per Nykrog, ed. 
By Kathryn Karczewska and Tom Conley (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1999), 153. 
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accidentally saved by a dice-playing Saint Peter, could be seen as a comical defense of 
the notion of ex opere operato: that it is grace of the sacrament, not the merits of the one 
performing it, that effects salvation.587  
All of this theological orientation is brought to bear on the fabliau treatment of 
marriage, which, in many ways, appears perfectly in keeping with Christian conjugal 
doctrine.  Absent are the troubling realities of clandestine marriage and lay concubinage, 
so heavily discussed in the canon law of this period.588  Rather, fabliau couples 
sedulously follow the Church’s recommendation for a dowered and publically-celebrated 
marriage, with parental approval to boot.  In total, six tales portray dowry negotiations as 
an essential element of the nuptial process.  In Du Valet qui d’aise a malaise se met we 
are treated to a lengthy description of the couple’s fiancailles, culminating with their 
priest reading the banns. 589 Other fabliaux portray more informal nuptial rites.  The 
jeunes mariés in Jouglet participate in a very public “bedding” ritual, wherein the 
assembled wedding guests prepare them to consummate their marriage.590  Moreover, 
fabliau parents are universally depicted as being involved in—and approving of—their 
children’s’ conjugal decisions.  Jouglet’s marriage is entirely negotiated by the groom’s 
well-intentioned mother, who hopes that the chosen bride’s good sense will balance out 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
587 Another excellent example is Du vilain qui conquist paradis par plait ,wherein a peasant manages to 
talk his way into heaven by besting both Saints Peter and Thomas in a theological disputatio.  Here, the 
joke seems to be that heaven is portrayed as being reserved for the ecclesiastical elite, who may not be 
deserving of their spot.  To each of Peter and Thomas’s objections that a vilain does not belong in paradise, 
the peasant is able to provide a corollary reason why they themselves may have been excluded: Thomas’s 
doubting, Peter’s denials of Christ.  He is also able to provide all of the doctrinally-appropriate reasons why 
he should be saved: that he has performed good works, remained in good standing with the Church, and 
received Last Rites.  NRCF t.5 (1990), 1-38. 
588 See pages 147-52 of this text. 
589 “Le prestre fait ses bans haster/et le don pramet a donner,” 277-8. Du vallet qui d’aise à malaise se 
met,” NRCF t. 8 (1994), 319-338. 
590 “Au vespre furent li lit prest;/ la bru se se couche premiers.” 114-5, NRCF t.8, 207. 
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her son’s simplicity.591  In La houce partie, the groom’s father is so enthusiastic about 
arranging his son’s marriage that he cedes his fortune in order to secure it.592   
In following these decrees, however, fabliau spouses are also pointedly ignoring 
other aspects of the marrying process; specifically, anything that reflects matrimony’s 
sacred status.  Of the six fabliaux that discuss marriage preparations, only three mention a 
church ceremony, and none do so in any detail.593  The nuptial blessing, which was 
increasingly considered the sine qua non of public nuptials in both theology and canon 
law, is wholly absent from the fabliau marriage, and along with it any reference to 
marriage as a sacramental entity. And, while fabliau parents unquestionably consent to 
their children’s’ unions, the marrying parties themselves are never consulted, in direct 
violation of the church’s central principle of marriage as a union of free consent.594 This 
omission is not to be overlooked, as it was during this period that consent was emerging 
as the effective sign of the marital sacrament 
These lopsided preoccupations could be (as Marie-Thérèse Lorcin argues) just 
one manifestation of a marital ideology that makes marriage “une affair d’argent avant 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
591See Jouglet 1-47. 
592 see La houce partie, 115-192. 
593 In La dame escolliée, twenty lines of dowry negotiations are followed by two lines describing thre 
couple’s church wedding, mentioning simply that they go to church to be wed and exchange nuptial gifts 
(lines 208-10, NRCF 8, pg. 115).  Similarly, the church wedding in Jouglet is overshadowed by betrothal 
negotiations (twenty lines, 26-45), the wedding feast (100-114), and the couple’s disastrous attempt at 
consummation (which lasts from line 154 through the rest of the poem).  Of the church ceremony, by 
contrast, we are told simply “Epousa la, espousé fu!” (line 99).  Finally, in Du Valet qui d’aise a malaise se 
met the first 170 lines are devoted to the groom’s financial preparations and negotiations with his bride’s 
family, whereas the church wedding is once again glossed over with a quick one-line mention: Ceroit fait 
k’il l’a espousee, 296, NRCF 8, 336. 
594 In several cases (such as Auberee and Le vilain mire) marriages are conducted against the children’s 
expressed wishes. 
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tout.”595They could also be part of the more general fixation on “materialism” so often 
invoked in fabliau scholarship.596  As Roy J. Pearcy has demonstrated, however, material 
concerns in no way exclude the possibility of theological reflection, as the fabliaux prove 
slyly capable of simultaneously operating on both registers.597 With regard to marriage, it 
is unmistakable that the fabliaux de-emphasize some aspects of Christian marriage-
making while emphasizing others; specifically, anything involving money or social 
standing. Thus, the Church can have public dowry agreements so long as they give up on 
marriage’s sacramental components, forcing the question of which is truly important. 
This theological parody is also borne out in depictions of actual fabliau marriages, 
which continue to privilege the financial at the comic expense of the spiritual. While it 
would be going too far to take Nykgrog’s point that fabliau marriage is little more than a 
backdrop for various “misères conjugales,” it is certainly true that domestic life has little 
to do with emotional fulfillment, and even less to do with the Church’s marital goods.598 
Fabliau couples are mostly childless, and when children do appear they are primarily 
characterized as a financial burden. In La houce partie, any joy the couple might feel in 
the birth of their son is undercut by the husband’s ugly behavior towards his own aging 
father, which is then reaffirmed by the story’s moral: “a father should never give so much 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
595 Marie-Thérèse Lorcin, “Le mariage dans les fabliaux français,” Epopée animale, Fable, Fabliaux, 
Cahiers d’Etudes Médiévales 83 (1984), 337.   
596 See Muscatine, The Old French Fabliaux, 160-5. 
597 Roy J. Pearcy, “Realism and Religious Parody in the Fabliaux: Watriquet de Couvin’s Les Trois dames 
de Paris,” Review Belge de Philosophie et Histoire 50 (1972). 
598 Nykgrog, Fabliaux, 187.  This point is contested by Ingrid Strasser, who points out that, while fabliau 
couple rarely appear emotionally bonded, there are some examples of domestic harmony—usually when 
they are working together to best an unwanted extramarital suitor. Ingrid Strasser, “Mariage, amour, et 
adultère dans les fabliaux,” in Amour, mariage et transgressions au moyen âge: actes du colloque des 24, 
25, 26, et 27 Mars 1983, ed. Danielle Buschinger and André Crépin (Göppingen: Kümerle, 1984), 425-33. 
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to his child that he cannot get it back.”599 In Du valet qui d’aise a malaise se met, 
children render marriage such a financial hell that the protagonist closes the tale by 
swearing that “if he were to get out of this peril, never again would he struggle, by God 
and the Holy cross—but it is too late, he has tied the knot too tight.”600 It should not be 
overlooked that financial woes cause the spouses to regret marriage’s very 
indissolubility—the primary effect of the marital sacrament. 
Yet far and away, the main locus of conjugal parody in the fabliaux is a marital 
reality notably absent from the lofty realms of sacramental theology: the sexual desires 
and behaviors of women. The overly sexed nature of fabliau women, combined with their 
often dishonest means of satisfying these desires, has led to a longstanding scholarly 
dispute over whether fabliaux are essentially antifeminist, or whether their rowdy, 
devious ladies are meant as a celebration of feminine wiles.601 More recently, this debate 
has been shelved in favor of a more nuanced line of inquiry: the extent to which these 
tales reflect and caricature gender constructs more generally. In Simon Gaunt’s opinion, 
gender in the fabliaux functions as a “hierarchical structure,” and, as such, is “artificial 
and susceptible to manipulation.” It follows, then, that much of the fabliaux’s humor 
springs from an anxiety about the “artificial” nature of male dominance, particularly with 
regard to sex. As E. Jane Burns has demonstrated, fabliau men are often shockingly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
599 Ne donez tant a vostre enfant/ que vous n’I puissiez recouvrer,” line 402-3. 
600 “Or dist il, se dieus li aït/ qu s’il issoit de cest peril que ja mais ne s’il rembatroit/ se dieus l’aït et sainte 
Crois/ mais ne li vaut que c’est trop tart/ il s’est trop fort lachiés el lach.”  Lines 382-6. 
601 For a brief tour of “antifeminism” in the fabliaux, see Nykgrog, 193-207, Joseph Bedier. Les Fabliaux. 
(Paris, H. Champion, 1895), 324; Brian J. Levy (who argues that female sexuality in the fabliaux literally 
comes from the devil), The Comic Text, 170.  For the opposite view, see Lesley Johnson, “Women on Top: 
Antifeminism in the Fabliaux?” Modern Language Review 78 (1983), 298-307; Raymond Eichmann, 
Cuckolds, Clerics, and Countrymen: Medieval French Fabliaux (University of Arkansas Press, 1982), 8-
10; Norris J. Lacy, “Fabliau Women,” Romance Notes 25 (1985), 318-27. 
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ignorant about the ins and outs of the female body,602 a fact often exposed when women 
utilize their most dangerous orifice: their mouths.603 Other scholars have noted the 
frequency with which men are made the dupes in sexual scenarios, bested by the 
woman’s wit (engin) or superior sexual prowess.604 Whether fabliau women are “good” 
or “bad,” therefore, they are most certainly uncontrollable, particularly within the dubious 
confines of marriage. 
What’s more, fabliau women generally misbehave in a way that directly parodies 
marriage’s sacred or sacramental narrative. Perhaps the most obvious example is the 
parodic “immaculate conception” of L’enfant qui fus remis au soleil, wherein the wife’s 
“sexless” pregnancy is a simple ruse to conceal a tryst in her husband’s absence. The 
ironic nature of this faux-miracle, reaffirmed by the husband’s sarcastic remark that the 
child is “an assurance of God’s love,” serves to bring the chaste perfection of Mary and 
Joseph’s marriage humorously down to earth, wherein conjugal life involves both sex and 
the possibility of adultery.605 It also hints at anxieties within theological discourse, which 
struggled to find a place for Mary and Joseph within a sacrament that was partially 
signified by sexual consummation. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
602 Again, all puns intended 
603 As Burns puts it, “Women’s words can expose the fraud of male knowledge…in many key instances 
fabliau women’s speech reveals the extent to which male protagonists’ claims to absolute knowledge are 
based on an anxiety about sexual difference.” E. Jane Burns, Bodytalk: When Women Speak in Old French 
Literature (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993), 39. 
604 See Elizabeth W. Poe, “The Old and the Feckless: Fabliau Husbands,” in The Medieval Marriage Scene: 
Prudence, Passion, and Policy, ed. Sherry Roush and Cristelle L. Banks (Tempe: Arizona Center for 
Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 2005), 115-34; Natalie Muñoz, Disabusing Women in the Old French 
Fabliaux (New York: Peter Lang, 2014), 30-2; Holly A. Crocker, “Disfiguring Gender: Masculine Desire 
in the Old French Fabliaux,” Exemparia 23 (2011), 342-67. 
605 “Dame, ce soit a bon eür!/ Des or sui je bien aseür/ que Dieus m’ainme, soie merci/Quant ce bel oir qye 
je voi ci/ nous consent einsis a avoir/pour ce que nous n’avions nul hoir.” “L’enfant qui fus remis au 
soleil,” NRCF t. 5 (1990), 209-221, lines  (39-45) 
223	  
	  
Yet the most common female challenge to marital sacramentality comes in the 
form of women’s famously rampant promiscuity, which directly undercuts the one-to-one 
ratio of the marital sacrament. By Nykrog’s count, almost half of all fabliaux involve 
some kind of cheating on the wife’s part, and, as Lesley Johnson points out, the woman 
almost always emerges as the “winner” in these scenarios.606 Moreover, fabliau infidelity 
seems to draw deliberate attention to the numerical imbalance at play. The cheating wife 
of Les tresses, for example, engages in a dalliance with her lover while her husband 
sleeps in the same bed beside them, a fact the author highlights by reiterating that “they 
all three of them slept in one line.”607 Some fabliaux produce this effect by placing 
marital theology directly in a wanton woman’s mouth.  When Jouglet’s bride intones on 
their wedding night, “are we not one, we two?” this perfect equation is immediately 
destabilized by the revelation that la jeune mariée has already “become one” with a 
previous lover.608 Yet none of this approaches the ironic perfection of Connenbert’s 
parody of the “marriage debt,” wherein a cheating wife assures her lover that “yours is 
my heart, and yours is my body, both inside and out—but my ass belongs to my 
husband.”609 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
606 Nykrog estimates is 66 out of 160 fabliaux involve unfaithful wives. Nygrog, 60.  Se also Johnson, 
“Women on Top,” 299. 
607 “Tuit troi dorment en une tire.” Les tresses, Fabliaux Erotiques pg. 168, line 33. 
608 “N’esmes nos tout un entre nos?”  Jouglet, NRCF t.2 (1984),  line 154. 
609 “Amie doce/ Don estes vos trestote voie?”/Ele respont: “Se Deus me voie:/ Vostre est mes cuers, vostre 
est mes cors/ et par dedanz et par defors,/ mes li cus si est mon mari/Cui j’ai f’ait mainte.” Lines 175-179.  
Gautier le Leu, Connebert, NRCF t. 7 (1993), 215-238. Compare with Paul’s famous assertion that, “The 
wife does not have authority over her own body but yields it to her husband. In the same way, the husband 
does not have authority over his own body but yields it to his wife.” 1 Cor. 7: 4.  This of-cited passaged has 
been otherwise been interpreted by Anne Cobby as an inversion of the courtly tone that preceedes it 
(Cobby, Ambivalent Connections, 36),  Per Nykrog rightly points out that the wife’s assertion that “yours is 
my heart and yours is my body” is a clear reference to Cligés, of which the descent (both literal and 
figurative) in tone several lines later becomes a direct parody.  Nykgrog, 80. 
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All of this comes to a head in the fabliau portrayal of widows. Here, fears about 
sacramentality and remarriage are forced into contact with the sexual proclivities of 
“real” women, confirming theologians’ most outlandish fears.610  A foretaste of the so-
called “lusty” or “faithless” widow motif can be gleaned in Le vilain de Bailleul, wherein 
a wife tricks her husband into believing he is dead so as to enjoy a dalliance with her 
priestly lover.611  That this is intended as a parody of actual widowhood is signaled by the 
references to funerary and mourning rites scattered throughout the text: the priest’s giving 
of “Last Rites,” the wife’s operatic grieving, and most especially her Church-sanctioned 
lament that nothing is left for her but “to kill herself from grief.”612  All of this becomes 
deeply ironic as the “widow” and her lover begin to copulate in full view of the 
“deceased” husband, providing a literalized embodiment of widowhood’s numerical (and 
hence sacramental) challenges. 
Even more literal is the imagery offered by De celle qui se fist foutre sur la fosse 
de son mari, which depicts a widow engaging in the title’s, shall we say, rather explicit 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
610 The extent to which this figure parodies ecclesiastical expectations of widowhood has been noted by 
both Bernhard Jussen and Catherine Ann Clark, who argue (in Jussen’s words) that fabliau widows 
“explore the dimensions of the tensions between remembrance of the dead and remarriage.” (255)  Yet both 
limit their observations to social expectations placed upon widows, ignoring both the theological 
framework behind these expectations and the degree to which it is reflected in the fabliaux.  See Bernhard 
Jussen, “Challenging the Culture of Memoria: Dead Men, Oblivion, and the “Faithless Widow” in the 
Middle Ages,” in Medieval Concepts of the Past: Ritual, Memory, and Historiography, ed. Gerd Althoff, 
Johannes Fried, and Patrick J. Geary (Cambridge University Press, 2002), 215-31; Katherine Clark, Pious 
Widowhood in the Middle Ages. PhD Diss. Indiana University, 2002, see especially 293-355. 
611 For Muñoz, this tale serves as a prime example of female engin, and how it cam be used to underut male 
control in marriage. Muñoz, 72. 
612 Que fera ta lasse de mae, qui por toi s’ocirra de duel?”  Fabliaux Erotiques, 114, lines 62-3.  It’s also 
worth noting, with Keith Busby, that MS Berlin Staatsbibliothek Hamilton (haus 1) 257includes La vilain 
de Bailleul directly alongside the tale of literal “bad widowhood,” Celle qui se fist foutre sur la fosse de son 
mari, reaffirming the notion that this text is meant to reflect upon the behavior of “real” widows.  Busby, 
New Codicology, 150-1. 
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activity.613  Based loosely Petronius’  “Matron of Ephesus,” the tale introduces its 
protagonist at her husband’s graveside, pledging that she “will not leave the tomb again, 
dead or alive.”614  This sentiment is punctuated through her repeated wish to die and 
remain eternally with her spouse, thus perpetually preserving her marriage’s perfect 
sacramental ratio.  Help ostensibly arrives in the form of a passing squire, who claims to 
posses the ability to send a woman to her fate “by screwing.”  The effect, of course, is 
quite the opposite, and the widow loses any desire for either death or her husband.  Thus, 
the sacramental structure of marriage proves no match for the widow’s irrepressible 
sexuality, a truth rendered more troubling by the husband’s physical presence below. 
Yet no one personifies these anxieties better than the titular character of Gautier le 
Leu’s La veuve, who conforms to the pattern of “bad widowhood” as if cribbing from 
Tertullian’s De Monogamia.  To be sure, the opening pages find her engaging in all of the 
behaviors proper to a bereaved Christian matron: attempting to throw herself in the grave 
after her husband, wailing, “how heavy it weighs upon me to remain alive!”615  This 
performance is gradually subverted, however, by other aspects of her grieving process, 
which Gautier slyly describes as her “vocation” (mestier).616 Like any good Christian 
widow, she recounts a series of dream-visions involving her deceased spouse, though 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
613 Uncensored version: The Woman Who Got Screwed on Her Husband’s Grave. In Norris Lacy’s opinion, 
the widow of this tale is reduced to a “stock” character due to her obvious likeness to Petronius’ Widow of 
Ephesus, a story that found its way into the Old French corpus via Le roman des sept sages de Rome and 
the Lais of Marie de France. Lacy, Reading Fabliaux, 3.  See also Petronius, Satyricon, trans. Sarah Ruden 
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 2000); Marie de France, Fables, ed. and trans. Harriet Spiegel (University of 
Toronoto Press, 1987); Le Roman de Sept Sages de Rome: A Critical Edition of the Two Verse Redactions 
of a Twelfth-Century Romance (Lexington, 1989). 
614 “Mais ele dit ja n’I iroit/ ne a ne s’en departiroit/ de la fosse, morte ne vive.”  NRCF t. 8, lines 33-35, 
pg. 401. 
615 “Ce poise moi que je tant dure.”  Fabliaux Erotiques, pg. 300, line 11. 
616 Fabliaux Erotiques, pg. 26, line 302. 
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hers take on a decidedly prurient tenor.  Witnessing her husband’s attempt to smash his 
way out of a walled enclosure, she remarks that he has left her with “a hole no man can 
ever fill,” a detail that becomes even more ironically suggestive when a pigeon 
immediately comes along and fills it.617 
All of this is witnessed by the woman’s dead husband, whose perspective Gautier 
includes throughout the first third of the narrative. Gautier opens by imagining the 
weeping and wailing he might witness as he makes his way to his own funeral, a situation 
that has drastically changed by the time he finds himself in Purgatory.  Here, “”calling 
out, with  sadness for his wife whom he loved so much,” the dead man finds that she is 
now “in a different kind of mood.”618  Specifically, the widow is in a mood to remarry, a 
desire she prefigures by attending every wedding in the neighborhood.619 Her children, an 
awkward remainder from her previous marriage, are “chased away,” for “because of 
them, no one will take me.”620  In a passage that seems almost directly aimed at anxious 
theologians, she laughs off the suggestion of becoming a nun to one of her “gossips,” 
preferring instead to discuss her romantic possibilities.621  As in De celle qui se fist 
foutre…, the husband’s implied presence emphasizes the sacramental structure of the 
widow’s original marriage, and the extent to which it is endangered through her amorous 
intentions. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
617 “Sire, quel treu m’avés laissié! Ja mais n’ert par nul home plains.”  Fabliaux Erotiques 306, line 96-7. 
618 “Puis apele, a dolante criere,/ sa mollier, qu’il avoit mout ciere/ mais li dame est en altre point.” 
Fabliaux Erotiques, 310, lines 143-145. 
619 Fabliaux érotiques, 314, lines 216-221. 
620 “Je ne truis qui por aus me prenge.”  Fabliaux érotiques, 316, 230. 
621 “So vos dirai d’un mien parent/ qui ne maint mie ci par ent/ qui me voloit fait converse.”  Fabliaux 
érotiques, 326, lines 391-3. 
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Finally, the widow remarries, a decision that ends up both confirming and 
vindicating theologians’ worst fears.  Like her most famed literary counterpart, this 
widow chooses a mate who is both younger and poorer than herself, who lacks the 
stamina to keep up with her sexual demands.622  As a result, she finds herself broke, 
physically abused—and with a newfound appreciation for her original mate.  In a 
poignant lament, she bemoans the fact that she has “mistreated” her first husband by 
remarrying after his death, repeating her original wish to die and be forever by his side.  
Having enacted the Church’s worst-case scenario regarding widowhood, Gautier’s veuve 
now gives voice to its greatest hopes for inviolable marital sacramentality, which she has 
rendered impossible due to her womanly desires.623 
If Gautier’s tale seems especially theologically charged, it is no doubt partially 
because Gautier is widely acknowledged to be the fabliau author most concerned with 
clerical matters.624 But the world he portrays is also fully in keeping with the fabliau 
depiction of marriage in general, wherein theological structures become an ironic foil to 
the realities of marital experience. As such, the marital sacrament becomes a sort of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
622 For an in-depth look at the correlations between Gautier’s Veuve and Chaucer’s Wife of Bath, see 
Charles Muscatine, The Wife of Bath and Gautier’s La Veuve, in Romance Studies in Memory of Edward 
Billings Ham, ed. Urban T Holmes (Hayward: California State University Press, 1967), 109-14. 
623 A variation on this theory is posited by François Berriot, who argues that La Veuve’s theological 
subtexts serves to “discredit” the Church, since “elle est, comme eux, hypocrite, immorale, et conduite par 
le ‘mal des rains.’” François Berriot, “Les fabliaux de Gautier le Leu,” in id. Spiritualités, hétérodoxies et 
imaginaires: études sur le moyen âge et la Renaissance (Université de Saint-Etienne, 1994), 53. 
624 Ménard even goes so far as to speculate the Gautier was himself a “clerc errant et déclassé,” which 
would explain his clerical and ecclesiastical preoccupations.  Charles Livingston has also recognized 
references to various thirteenth century religious conflicts in Gautier’s work.  Ménard, Les Fabliaux 85 and 
Charles Livingston, Le Jongleur Gautier le Leu: Étude sur les fabliaux (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1951), see especially 95-8. 
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ideological equivalent to the fabliau linguistic tendencies so famously explored by 
Howard Bloch—unable to properly “cover” the protean truth of human experience.625 
French Misogamous Literature 
Of the bumper crop of misogamous literature produced between the thirteenth and 
fifteenth centuries, three works stand out as especially relevant to our purposes.  The first, 
the Lamentations of Matheolus, exists in two versions: the original Latin text of 
Matheolus himself (c.1295) along with its Old French translation by Jehan le Fèvre 
(1371).  Presented as the autobiographical rantings of an Italian cleric (the otherwise 
unknown Matheolus) on his ill-conceived marriage, the text was likely best known via le 
Fèvre’s largely faithful translation, from which I will primarily be quoting here.  This 
work is evaluated alongside two non-autobiographical treatments of women and domestic 
life: the anonymous Quinze joies de mariage (c. 1382), and Eustache Deschamps’ Miroir 
du mariage (c.1390).626  While different in form and focus, these texts share three 
essential features that place them squarely in our wheelhouse: each is structured around a 
theological framing device, voices obsessive disappointment with the marital behavior of 
women, and identifies widowhood as a prime locus of marital “woman trouble.”   
From the outset, each text introduces an ecclesiastical topos that places it firmly 
within the realm of theological parody.  In Les Quinze Joies, this paradigm is inscribed 
into the very structure of the work itself, which echoes the contemporary devotional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
625 R. Howard Bloch, The Scandal of the Fabliaux (University of Chicago Press, 1996). 
626 The subgenre of misogamous literature, especially as distinct from misogynous literature, has been 
nicely elaborated by Katharina M. Wilson and Elizabeth M. Makowski—in particular the reasons for the 
genre’s striking reemergence in the mid-twelfth century. Katrina M. Wilson and Elizabeth M. Makowski, 
Wykked Wyves and the Woes of Marriage (Albany: SUNY Press, 1990). 
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tradition  “Les quinze joies de la vierge.”627 The same might be said of Deschamps's 
Miroir, which calls to mind the popular genre of speculum literature and its frequently 
spiritual preoccupations. 628 Finally, ecclesiastical thought has a striking place in the 
Lamentations, whose narrator immediately proclaims himself to be a clerk barred from 
the church’s ranks for having married a widow.  This marginal position on Church dogma 
is accentuated throughout Matheolus’s lengthy complaint, which opens by quoting 
Jesus’s words in Gesthemane and builds towards a brazen dialogue with the messiah 
himself.629 
Like the fabliaux, these works concentrate much of their parodic energy on 
marriage’s “goods,” including the dubious good of procreation.  Les Quinze Joies even 
accomplishes this in true fabliau fashion, cataloguing the financial woes of enlarging 
one’s family, and calling into question whether a man’s child is even his own.630  Both 
Deschamps and Matheolus provide a more pointed response.  In the Miroir, the doctrinal 
position on proles is first laid out in the marriage-positive discourse of Folie, who 
declares that marriage exists “for recreating one’s own image through procreation…and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
627 Pierre Rézeau, Les prières aux saints en français à la fin du Moyen Age. Tome 1: Les prières aux 
plusiers saints (Geveva: Droz, 1982), 14-15. Such would be the most obvious refutation of the common 
assertion that the religious dimension of marriage is “passed over in silence” in the Quinze Joies. See James 
Dauphine, “Le jeu de la transgression dans Les XV joies de mariage,” Amour, mariage et transgressions au 
moyen âge: actes du colloque des 24, 25, 26, et 27 Mars 1983, ed. Danielle Buschinger and André Crépin 
(Göppingen: Kümerle, 1984),471-480. 
628 As Jeannine Quillet points out, Deschamps himself was a trained cleric, and a corresponding “doctrinal 
dimension” can be detected even throughout the least orthodox passages of the Miroir.  See Jeannine 
Quillet, “Le Mirior de Mariage d’ Eustache Deschamps,” in Amour, mariage et transgressions au moyen 
âge: actes du colloque des 24, 25, 26, et 27 Mars 1983, ed. Danielle Buschinger and André Crépin 
(Göppingen: Kümerle, 1984), 457-465. Jeannine Quillet, “Sagesse et folie dans le Miroir de mariage 
d’Eustache Deschamps,” in La Folie et le Corps, ed. Jean Céard, (Paris: Presses d l’École Normale 
Supérieure, 1985), 13-31. 
629 Specifically, the Lamentations opens with Mark 14:34: Tristis est anima mea. Lamentations 1.1. 
630 In the second Joy, a lengthy description of a young wife’s gallivanting culminates in her suspicious 
pregnancy; the tenth Joy is largely taken up by the many annoyances of domestic life with children, in 
particular the financial. See Les XV joies de mariage, ed. Jean Rychner, Textes littéraires français 100 
(Genève, Droz, 1963). 
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for doing so in a lawful manner.”631  This assessment is soon undercut, however, by the 
more critical stance of Repertoire des Sciences, who characterizes the God-given wish for 
children as “nothing more than a burden and an expense, risking death and wrecking 
one’s body.”632  Matheolus, who frames his thoughts as an attack on the “marriage 
goods” proper, lobs an even more brazen barb: “Anyone who has come into marriage to 
have children and a lineage, I do not doubt he does his line more harm than good, for one 
can multiply much more bountifully without being tied down by the bond of 
marriage.”633 
In all three works, there is also a sustained critique of the idea of marital 
indissolubility—linked, to varying degrees, to its roots in the conjugal sacrament.634  Les 
Quinze Joies opens by decrying the “inescapable prison” that is marriage, and then goes 
on to imagine a couple who attempts to escape this bondage by obtaining a court-
sanctioned divorce.  Sly parody can be detected in the author’s description of the various 
canonical loopholes often exploited by divorcing couples, as well as the fact that the 
couple in question is forced to the remain technically “married” despite the wife’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
631 “Que tu deusses prandre et henter/ pour ta forme representer/ toy et ton nom apres la mort/ selon la 
loy.”  Eustache Deschamps, Le Miroir de Mariage, in Oeuvres complètes de Eustache Deschamps, ed. 
Gaston Raynaud, 11 Vols (Paris: Firmin Didot, 1878-1903), vol 9, 1894, pg. 10, lines. 195-8. 
632 “Il peut tous seulz parler a Dieu/ que nos vault se pour hoirs avoir/ prenons femme, pour concepoir/ 
grande multidue d’enfans?/ Ce sont que charge et despens/ peril de mort, de corps essil.” Miroir de 
Mariage, pg. 68-9, lines 2014-2019. 
633“ Quiconques a fait mariage/ pour avoir enfans et lineage/ certes, il fist, j’en doubt mie/ grant prejudice 
a sa lignie/ car plus püest multiplier/ sans lyen que par le lier.”  Jehan de Fèvre, Les lamentations de 
Matheolus et Le livre de Leesce, ed. A.-G. Van Hamel, 2 vols (Paris: Bouillon, 1892-1905), pg. 188, lines 
3.1053-6.  Unless otherwise noted, I will be citing le Fèvre’s Old French, citing divergences from the Latin 
where they arise. 
634 As Wilson and Makowski point out, this concern with indissolubility is also a feature of medieval 
misogamous literature in general, and entirely absent from its classical counterpart (wherein Christian 
marital theology did not apply).  See Wilson and Makowski, 8. 
231	  
	  
incessant bed-hopping.635  This prison analogy is also employed by Deschamps, whose 
Franc Vouloir laments that marriage “cannot be undone by any mortal judge, for what 
God has wished to join together men cannot break apart.”636  
As always, Matheolus takes this a step further, questioning the very logical basis 
on which the law of indissolubility is grounded.  To be sure, he also engages in his share 
of grousing, proposing that wives, like cattle, should be subject to a six-month trial period 
in case of illness or undisclosed deformities.637  Yet his kvetching takes on a subversive 
tone due to the fact that his imagined interlocutor is Jesus himself—who, as Matheolus’ 
audaciously points out, might not have been so strict about marital permanence had he 
been married himself.638  This remark is made all the more brazen by the fact that, 
theologically speaking, Jesus in fact is “married,” and it is this marriage between him and 
his Church that forms the basis for the human marital sacrament.   
Having thus disavowed the marital res sacramentum, Matheolus goes on to take 
aim at its signifier: the bodily union of the human married couple.  Puzzling over how 
male and female flesh might be so perfectly unified as the sacrament requires, he calls it a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
635 “Ung homme n’as pas bon sens, qui est en joies et delices du monde come en jeunesse garnie de franche 
vounenté, et son propre mouvement, sans necessité, trouve l’entrée d’une estrouicte chartre douloureuse et 
plaine de plours et se boute dedans”.  See Les XV Joyes, pg. 1.  See also Joy X, pgs. 78-81. 
636 “Et plus prins et de grief servaige/ par le lein de mariage/ non desnouable et plus estraint/ qui toute 
franchise restraint/ et si n;en peut nulz desnouer/ car li fait si fort nouer/ et nouaint par tel veu veue/ qu’il 
ne peut desnouer le neu/ jusqu’a tant la mort le desnoue.” Miroir de mariage, 40-1, 1151-1159. His words 
are later echoed by Repertoire des Sciences, who argues that marries is “the worst bond of servitude” 
because, by divine order, “it cannot be untied until death unties it.” “…ne tel gaige peut deffaire/ juges 
mortelz que Dieu conjoindre a voulu: homs ne peut desjoindre.”  Miroir de mariage, 22, 587-9. 
637 “Aussi, selon la loy humaine/ qui achate vacht mal saine/…six mois a d’espace de rendre/ et le vendeur 
la doit reprendre/ Donques doit bien six mois avoir/ cils qui prent femme, pour scavoir/ s’il la veut laisser 
ou tenir.”  Lamentations, 169, 3.355-363.  This passage is also referenced by Deschamps (in lines 1539-45 
of the Miroir de mariage), and, as will be discussed below, by the  Wife of Bath. 
638 “Certres, se mariés feüsses/ tel chose establie n’eüsses/ mais tu eüsses ordené/ que tout homme de mere 
né/ peüst laisser son mariage.” Lamentations, pg. 165, lines 3. 185-189. 
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“lie” that two such disparate and variable entities could ever really become “one.”639  
Even the Church regards a wife’s flesh as distinct from her husband’s, as evidenced by its 
harsher treatment of female adultery.  Why is it, he wonders, that an adulterous female 
body “pollutes” the sacrament of marriage, whereas a male transgressor’s flesh is all but 
pardoned?640  In the perfect carnal union of the marital sacrament, shouldn’t both halves 
be treated equally? 
Indeed, it is the presence of female flesh that supplies the main locus of comic 
derision in all three texts, providing (as in the fabliaux) a corporeal foil for marriage’s 
allegedly ethereal status.  These authors, however, are most preoccupied by woman’s 
excessive sexual needs, which make a mockery of the “marriage debt” that was created to 
accommodate them.  In Les Quinze Joies, a wife generally does this by seeking 
satisfaction outside the marriage bed, leaving the debt she owes her husband in perpetual 
arrears.641  In the Lamentations, the wife’s inordinate desires are source of constant 
exhaustion and humiliation for her husband, who finds himself unable to pay her what 
she is “owed.”642  The interlocutors of the Miroir seem troubled by the very existence of 
sexuality in marriage, and the unseemly cravings it awakens in a man.  While the pro-
marriage Folie muses about what a “sweet thing” it is to “join two bodies in one flesh,” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
639 “Se tu dis, par raison commune/ que la chair d’eulx deux soit tout une/ par lien de dilection/ si comme 
nous dit la sanction/ tu nous decois apertement/ et qui ce te dit, il te ment/ car deux choses qui tant varient/ 
ensemble tant ne s’apparient.” Lamentations, pg. 173, lines 485-492. 
640 “Il y a trop de meprison/ en femme qui fait avoutire/…Avoutire est capital crime/  comme la loi le nous 
exprime/ et si comme je l’ay entendu/ le transigier est defendu/ sur tel crime et tel pechié/ dont corps de 
femme est entechié/ qui saint mariage pollue.” Lamentations pg 171-2, lines 3.437-445. 
641 See especially Joy 2, Les XV Joies, 13-17. 
642 See Lamentations 40-1, 1. 1321-1358. 
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Repertoire des Sciences brings these expectations down to earth where a woman and her 
incessant demands “nourishes lust” and prohibits worthier spiritual pursuits.643 
Of course, there is the possibility that all of this amounts to a simple exercise in 
misogyny especially given the lengthy catalogue of women’s faults that comprises much 
of these works.  But, as scholars have increasingly noted, there seem to be too many other 
factors at play for such a reductive explanation.  As evidenced above, Deschamps seems 
more concerned with issues of carnality and worldly temptations than he does with 
women per se, objecting primarily to the challenges they pose to male self control.644  In 
le Fèvre’s case, it is frequently remarked that his translation of the Lamentations was 
quickly followed by the woman-positive Livre de Leesce, rendering the latter a potential 
“apology” for the former.645  Such would suggest that le Fèvre saw something more than 
simple misogyny in Matheolus’ ravings; specifically, a chance to brashly critique the 
Church’s policies on bigamy and clerical advancement.646  All of this is in line with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
643“C’est tresoulce conjuction/ ce sont deux corps en union/ en une char par la loy joins.”  Miroir 10, 818-
21. Compare with: “Habiter avec creature/ feminine nourrist luxure/ et certes qui n’oste pas la paille/ qui 
l’embrasement du feu baille/ et l’esteule, ne cessera/ ce feu, ançois alumera/ tant comme les deliz charnelz/ 
seront en a char encharnez.”  199, 6093-6102. 
644 Laura Kendrick, “Transgression, Contamination, and Woman in Eustache Deschamps’s Miroir de 
mariage,” Stanford French Review 14 (1990), 211-230.  Added to this are Deborah M. Sinnreich-Levi’s 
observations that Deschamps actual female characters are often complex and sympathetic, as well as 
Michelle Stoneburner’s remarks on the various socio-political metaphors that drive and shape much of the 
Miroir’s conception of marriage.  See Deborah M. Sinnreich-Levi, “The Feminist Voice of the Mysoginist 
Poet: Deschamps’s Poems in Women’s Voices,” in Eustache Deschamps, French Courtier-Poet: His Work 
and His World, ed. Deborah M. Sinnreich-Levi (New York: AMS Press, 1998), 123-130. and Michelle 
Stoneburner, “Le Miroir de mariage: Misunderstood Misogyny,” in Eustache Deschamps, French Courtier-
Poet: His Work and His World, ed. Deborah M. Sinnreich-Levi (New York: AMS Press, 1998), 145- 162.  
645 See for example, Renate Blumenfeld-Kosinski, “Jean de Fèvre’s Livre de Leesce: Praise or Blame of 
Women?” Speculum 69 (1994), 705-725. Tiziano Pacciorotti also demonstrates that the Lamentations and 
the Leesce are paired in four extant manuscripts; “Les manuscrits du Matheolus et leur réception,” in Le 
Recueil au Moyen Age -- La fin du Moyen Age. Ed. Tania van Hermerlyck and Stefania Marzano 
(Turnhout: Brepols, 2010), 253-261. 
646 Such is that argument of Karen Pratt, who finds that the text “is exploiting the comic tradition of clerical 
misogyny in order to render more palatable the important political points Matthew makes about the 
Church's recent rulings on clerical bigamy.” Karen Pratt, “Translating Misogamy: The Authority of the 
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more general observations on misogamous literature offered by Katrina M. Wilson and 
Elizabeth M. Makowski, who point out that texts from this era display a keen  
awareness of contemporary developments within marital canon law—suggesting a 
corollary interest in the conjugal theology on which they are based.647  
This argument is further supported by the fact that all three works continue to be 
preoccupied with the remarriage of widows, the perpetual soft underbelly of the marital 
sacrament.  In Les Quinze Joies, this is manifested via a dark comedy of errors wherein a 
woman, mistakenly thinking herself a widow when her husband is captured in war, 
accidentally makes herself a bigamist by hastily remarrying.648  Reflecting contemporary 
concerns within canon law about remarriage without proof of death, the story also 
incorporates several literary aspects of “bad widowhood”: the wife’s ease in forgetting 
her first husband, her neglect of her children once remarried.649  Deschamps takes a more 
classic approach to his own widow-shaming, imagining a free-wheeling young widow 
much in the style of Gautier’s veuve.  “Crying and braying” upon her husband’s 
deathbed, the woman’s thoughts soon turn to other matters; namely, getting the greatest 
possible share of her late-spouse’s estate and remarrying, pronto. 650 
It is Matheolus, however, who presents himself as most uniquely qualified to 
speak on the subject of widows, given that he has abandoned his career prospects by 
marrying one.  In some moments, he seems to simply continue the tradition of painting 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Intertext in Lamentations Matheoluli and its Middle French Translation by Jean le Fèvre,” Modern 
Language Studies 35 (1999), 423.  Such an interpretation would be supported by manuscript evidence, in 
which the Lamentations is referred to as “Matheolus contre les bigames.”  See Pacciarotti, 254. 
647 Wilson and Makowski, 130. 
648 Joy XIII, Les quize joies, 95-8. 
649 For canon law regarding remarriage and proof of death, see page 168 of this text. 
650 Miroir de mariage, pg 66-7, 1935- 1981. 
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widows as faithless seductresses, most pointedly through is own retelling of the “Widow 
of Ephesus.”651  Much of his rancor, however is directed at the marital theology itself, 
and its contradictory grounds for preventing “bigamous” clerics from advancement.  The 
Church’s given reason, he summarizes, is that “the bigamist’s flesh is divided, and hence 
he can no longer celebrate the sacrament, which is one single whole and suffers no 
disparity.”652  And yet, he might have “divided his flesh” among hundreds of women 
without being excluded from the clerical ranks, had he not entered into a licit, honorable, 
Church-sanctioned marriage.653 In a shocking turn, Jesus seems to confirm this 
interpretation by revealing that  bigamists are placed before celibate men in the heavenly 
hierarchy, their mistreatment in life having formed an earthly purgatory.654 
Placed thus on the margins of both and clerical and marital life, Matheolus has a 
unique vantage point on the margins of marital sacramentality, and the way these 
marginal truths threaten the sacramental structure as a whole.  Likewise, both Deschamps 
and the anonymous Quinze joies author position themselves on these margins through 
their parodic appropriation of religious ideas and tropes, and use this perspective to 
adduce marriage’s less stable aspects.  The result, as in the fabliaux, is a vision of 
marriage that remains keenly aware of the various holes in the sacramental fabric of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
651 Matheolus’ retelling of the tale conforms most closely to the “classic” form put forth by Petronius in his 
“Widow of Ephesus,” including the widow’s desecration of her husband’s body and excluding her sexual 
encounter with the soldier.  See Lamentations, 60- 2, 2.451-578. 
652 “La char en pleusiers divisée/ ne peut celebrer sacrament/ it est entier et proprement/ n’a cure de 
disparité.”  Lamentations 12, 1.382-5. 
653 “Car avec cent me puis deduire/ sans marier, ce ne peut nuire/ se je veuil venir au prestrage.” 
Lamentations, 10, 1. 343-5. 
654 The line, “Leur ay fait pluseurs purgatories/…et entre lesquels est mariage” is, again, famously echoed 
by the Wife of Bath.  Lamentations, 206, 1688-90. 
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matrimony.  The explicitly clerical perspective of these authors, however, allows them to 
go one step further, pulling at the loose strands in this fabric to see what will unravel. 
Later Medieval Comic Literature 
 By the early fourteenth century marriage was firmly in the hands of the 
ecclesiastical courts, broadcasting what was by then a highly developed system of marital 
canon law.  Such exposure, however, also shed light on the various loopholes and 
inconsistencies that had worked their way into Alexandrian marriage formation, and the 
unease about these issues displayed by Gregory IX and his commentators.655  It is this 
discomfort that drives the depiction of marriage in later medieval comic texts, where 
conjugal bonds appear laughably ill-founded and unstable. This unique hermeneutic will 
be explored via three well-known texts that engage with marital issues the most directly: 
Boccaccio’s Decameron, Les Cent Nouvelles Nouvelles, and, of course, The Canterbury 
Tales via the successively-married Wife of Bath. 
 While not universally comic, Boccaccio’s tales do display what Giuseppe 
Mazzotta has termed a certain amount of “play”: a juxtaposition of “possibilities of 
imagination” with “necessary laws of the business of living.”656  It is this “playful” 
attitude that shapes Boccaccio’s assorted portrayals of marriage—as does his formal 
training in canon law.  This is particularly apparent in the depiction of marriage 
formation in the Decameron, which shows how the sacramental paradigm can be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
655 See pages 154-69 of this text. 
656 Guiseppe Mazzotta, The World at Play in Boccaccio’s Decameron (Princeton University Press, 1986), 
10.  Also helpful is Marga Cottino-Jones’s examination of the work’s “highly complex comic atmosphere” 
that exists independently from a “universal comic tone,” tracking the progression from the sick and broken 
world of Bocaccio’s prologue to the “healed” community formed by the storytellers.656 Marga Cottino-
Jones, “Comic Modalities in the Decameron,” Genre 9 (1976/7), 429-49. 
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stretched and exploited to fit the needs of human social life.657 In 2.10, we are provided 
with a marriage formed by both raptus and adultery, the couple elevating themselves out 
of sinful cohabitation only after the woman’s first husband has died.658  The fact that the 
cuckold in this case is a judge only adds to the sense of judicial parody at play.  On day 
five, Lauretta furnishes a tale that could be read as a direct spoof on the dubious status of 
parental consent, as the parents in question only consent to the union after having almost 
vengefully murdered both bride and groom—as well as the illegitimate child that sparked 
their rage.659 
 An even more direct canonical reference can be gleaned in Filostrato’s tale from 
day five (5.4), which finds an almost direct parallel in Gregory IX’s Decretales 4.17.9.660  
In both cases, a man is forced to marry his young neighbor after the couple are 
discovered in bed together by her father.  For Gregory and his colleagues, one of the main 
issues was that of potentially coerced consent, and whether the girl’s father would have 
instilled the standard impediment of “fear that would cause a steady man to fall.”  In 
Boccaccio’s version, this concern is echoed by the fact that the father does indeed present 
his “proposal” under pain of death, but then parodied by the relief expressed by the young 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
657 By taking this tack I am, obviously, rejecting Mazzotta’s narrower thesis about the status of marriage in 
the Decameron; namely, that it serves as the central metaphor for wholeness towards which the text 
gradually progresses.  See Mazzotta,  55-6.   
658 Briefly, the pirate Paganino da Monaco carries off Bartolomea, the wife of Ricciardo di Chinzica. 
Briefly distressed about her situation, Bartolomea soon acclimates to her new domestic life when it turns 
out that Paganino is able to satisfy her in ways that the elderly Ricciardo could not.  She thus refuses to 
return when Ricardo comes to collect her, declaring that “whereas at Pisa ‘twas as if I were your 
harlot…here with Paganino I deem myself wife, for he holds me in his arms all night long. Boccaccio, 
Decameron, ed. Amedeo Quondam, Maurizio Fiorilla, and Giancarlo Alfano (Milan: Rizzoli, 2013), 478-
90. 
659 Decameron 5.7, 899-909. 
660 For a fuller discussion of Liber Extra 4.17.9, see page 168 of this text. 
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bridegroom upon learning that death is not his only option.661  Each of these marriages, of 
course, are rendered acceptable only because of the extremely loose requirements 
imposed by Alexandrian marriage formation, which are in turn designed to accommodate 
the thorny conditions of sacramental signification. 
 Once formed, a marriage does not become more normative or more stable.  For 
the storyteller Neifile’s hapless Gillette of Narbonne (3.9), marriage is no guarantee that 
her much-desired Bertrand will remain by her side, maintaining the “undivided way of 
life” proscribed by canon law.  While there is no question that the two will remain 
technically (and indissolubly) married, Gillette is forced to engage in an elaborate 
subterfuge to gain a basic acknowledgement of their partnership, probing the actual social 
significance of “indissoluble” marriage bonds.662  This concept is also called into 
question by the wife-swapping couples of Tale 8.8, as is the numerical limit of marital 
sacramentality.  A plot that begins with adultery followed by “revenge adultery” 
unexpectedly veers into a happy, if unconventional, domestic arrangement, wherein 
“each of the ladies had two husbands, and each of the husbands had two wives, and they 
lived altogether as one, without any strife or argument.”663 
Boccaccio’s most sportive take on marital theology is voiced by Filostro in 6.7, 
through the story of an adultery trial gone amusingly awry.  Here, a dexterous wife 
manages to beat the charges against her by challenging the definition of “adultery” itself, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
661 The young man in question, Ricciardo, in fact opens the exchange by assuming that his death is 
immanent, proclaiming “Io conosco, sì come disleale e malvagio uomo, aver meritata morte.” It is thus an 
enormous relief to hear the girl’s father reply that he can reclaim his life by making “sposa per tua legittima 
moglie la Caterina.”  Decameron 5.4, 879. 
662 Decameron 3.9, 628-641. 
663 E da indi innanzi ciascuna di quelle donne ebbe due mariti e ciascun di loro ebbe due mogli, senza cuna 
quistione o zuffa mai per quello insieme averne. Decameron 8.8, 1304. 
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as well as the Church’s right to adjudicate such matters.  While she does not deny her 
husband’s accusations, she does deny ever violating the core clause of their own marital 
contract: the “marriage debt,” which she always paid immediately and in full.  She 
wonders, “if he always had from me all that was required for his solace and satisfaction, 
what was I to do with what was leftover…?”664  The very existence of this adultery 
statute, she goes on to argue, is invalid and unjust, since  “laws ought to be common and 
enacted with the common consent of all that they affect; which conditions are wanting to 
this law, inasmuch as it binds only us poor women...and the consent of no woman 
was…so much as asked before it was made.”  As Kenneth Pennington points out, 
Madonna Filippa’s logic is a close paraphrase of the medieval legal maxim Quod omnes 
tangit ab omnibus approbari debet, adding ironic weight to her general dismissal of the 
ability of canon law to justly govern the marital behavior of women.665  It also adds 
weight to her distinctly practical interpretation of the marriage debt—a concept whose 
rules were also written without a woman’s consent. 
All of this would seem to be  subverted by day ten’s final tale of Griselda, whose 
“happy ending,” in Mazzotta’s opinion, constitutes the curative “wholeness” towards 
which Boccaccio’s larger narrative is directed.666  Yet in theological terms Griselda’s 
story is decidedly odd, in that she is made to successively give up her marriage’s “goods” 
in order to ensure the union’s survival.  Having pledged that her desires would always be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
664 Se egli ha sempre di me preso quello che gli è bisognato e piaciuto, io che doveva fare o debbo di quel 
che gli avanva? 6.7, 1013. 
665 Kenneth Pennington, “A Note to Decameron 6.7: The Wit of Madonna Filippa,” Speculum 52 (1977), 
902-5. John Finlayson has also noted several paralells between this story and the Wife of Bath’s defense of 
female sexuality.  “The Wife of Bath’s ‘Prologue,’ LL. 328-336 and Boccaccio’s Decameron,” 
Neophilologus 83 (1999), 313-16. 
666 In particular, “in the story of Griselda, marriage itself is the metaphor for the reinstatement of the 
opposites to a prelapsarian and sacramental unity.”Mazzotta, 55. 
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one and the same with her husband’s, Griselda is forced to accede to a series of “desires” 
that are increasingly destructive to her marriage’s sacramental constitution, giving up first 
her children, then her claims to fidelity, and finally the indissoluble nature of her 
marriage itself, when her husband asks her to agree to a divorce so that he can “marry” 
again.  Far from being a perfect whole, marriage in Griselda’s story appears as something 
that is radically incomplete, a sort of empty vessel that cannot simultaneously exist in 
theory and reality. 
 Boccaccio solidifies this impression through his portrayal of widows, comprising 
a collection of literary stereotypes offered up for parody and play.  Widows can be 
“good,” as Emilia’s tenaciously continent widow on day eight.  They can also be “bad,” 
such as Pampinea’s promiscuous and mean-spirited widow, who receives her humiliating 
comeuppance just several stories later.  The fact that each woman’s potential seducer is a 
member of the clergy suggests a light jest at the Church’s famously ambivalent attitude 
towards widows, who, in these stories as in real life, end up dishing out to their clerical 
interlocutors as much trouble as they are served.667 
Of course, widows primarily cause trouble through their potential to remarry, a 
possibility borne out in  Decameron 10.1.  Here, a presumed-dead husband rushes back 
from captivity to prevent his wife’s remarriage, a close analogue of Les quinze joies de 
mariage’s tenth Joy.  The situation is rendered even more legally dangerous by the fact 
that the wife is remarrying at her husband’s request, having been told to consider him 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
667 Added to this is Millicent Marcus’s point that the vengeful cleric in Pampinea’s story serves as a stand-
in for scholars’ “simplistic and literal-minded” interpreter of scripture and law, particularly as it pertains to 
women.  See “Misogyny as Misreading: A Gloss on Decameron  8.7,” Stanford Italian Review 4 (1984), 
23-40. 
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dead after one year of absence. A more humorous perspective is provided in tale 3.8 by 
Lauretta, who offers up her own rendition of Jean Bodel’s Le vilain de Baileul.  This 
version is retooled so as to accentuate the woman’s standing as a faux-widow, adding a 
lengthy sequence in which the husband is drugged, buried, and tricked into believing he 
is in purgatory.   When the lady asks her confessor (who authors this plot for his own 
purposes) if she is “to remain a widow,” he responds that she will enjoy a temporary 
widowhood during which she “must be careful not to let yourself be married to another, 
because it would offend God.”668 The combined effect is to take the responsibility for 
“bad widowhood” off of widows and place it more squarely on the shoulders of the 
clergy, who created the labyrinthine theological situation in which widows find 
themselves. 
There is nothing in medieval literature, however, to rival the reflection on 
widowhood and remarriage provided by Chaucer, who surpasses his colleagues by ceding 
the stage to an actual widow.   His Wife of Bath, famous for her opinions on marriage, 
misogyny, and female agency, also proves to be one of fiction’s great sacramental 
theologians, pinpointing the various logical lacunae in the theology of remarriage.  It is 
Alisoun who provides the most direct and in-depth reflections of all the characters in 
Chaucer’s “marriage group,” a troupe that includes, via the Clerk’s Tale, the long-
suffering Griselda.669  While none of these conjugal situations could be considered 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
668 Decameron 3.8, 614-627. 
669 As Kathryn L. McKinley points out, the deficiencies in Griselda’s marriage are even more pointed when 
placed in the Clerk’s mouth, especially given that the Clerk himself repeatedly criticizes Walter for his 
“tests.”  As a result, the “monster” of this tale becomes “the medieval theology of perfection and virtue 
available only to a spiritual elite endowed with an extra dispensation of grace, namely saints and other holy 
persons.  See “The Clerk’s Tale: Hagiography and the Problem of Lay Sanctity,” The Chaucer Review 33 
(1998), 91. 
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normative (even “good wife” Dorigen almost ends up an unwilling adulteress), it is 
significant that Chaucer selected the most marginal of these figures to deliver his great 
oration on marriage and theology, betraying a subversive bent toward marriage as a 
whole. 
It is this marginal perspective that most profoundly shapes Alisoun’s speech, 
providing a sort of inverted response to Matheolus’s Lamentations.  Instead of presenting 
us with anti-marital rantings of a male narrator, Chaucer flips the lens to give us the 
wife’s point of view, echoing and answering several of Matheolus’s specific gripes about 
widows.  Alisoun lets on that she is fully aware of her peripheral status, most subtly and 
succinctly through her oft-quoted pronouncement, “housboundes at chirche dore I have 
had fyve.”670  Her marital history, therefore, has proceeded both inside and outside the 
lines of perfect conjugal orthodoxy, allowing the Church to publically officiate the exact 
the sort of successive unions they had hoped to avoid.   That Alisoun is aware of the 
doctrinal reasons for the Church’s discomfort is also beyond question, given that she goes 
on to quote several of them in her ensuing discourse.  Her apparent contempt for such 
logic might be attributed to the decidedly marginal viewpoint she espouses in the first 
line of her prologue: “Experience, though noon auctoritee/ were in this world, is right 
ynough for me/ to speke of wo that is mariage.”671   
The extent to which the Wife of Bath understands the “auctoritee” she claims to 
eschew is, of course, a hotly debated topic, as is the degree to which Chaucer intended 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
670 “The Wife of Bath’s Prologue,” 6.  The Riverside Chaucer, Third Edition, ed. Larry D. Benson (Oxford 
University Press, 1988), 105. 
671 Ibid, 1-2. 
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her to be taken seriously as an exegete or theologian.672  With regard to the Church’s 
theology of second marriages, however, it is clear that she has at least done her 
homework, given that her most frequently quoted source is the remarriage-obsessed 
Jerome.  Yet, as both Robert Longsworth and Warren S. Smith point out, her citations of 
Jerome are decidedly off-kilter, selecting only his most bizarre or dogmatically suspect 
points about successive marriages.673   In one striking example, she invokes Jerome’s odd 
notion that since Christ himself only attended one wedding, Christians should limit 
themselves to one only spouse, a point she soon counters (as Jerome himself is 
grudgingly forced to) with the Pauline decree that she is “free to wedde…where it liketh 
me.”   
Mostly, Alisoun seems to amuse herself with the conjugal numbers game, 
gleefully repeating her total number of husbands.674  However much Church authorities 
may disapprove of her actions, they are theologically unable to prevent them, a fact that 
has not escaped Alisoun’s shrewd notice.  “Men may devyne and glosen up and doun,” 
she remarks, but none has managed to arrive at a “diffinicioun” of the allowable number 
of spouses—not even Jesus in his rebuke to the Samaritan woman. Rather, “no nombre 
mencion made he of bigamy, or of octogamye:  Why should men thanne speke of it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
672 Traditionally, scholars have taken a dark view of the Wife’s exegetical powers.  Derek Pearsall calls her 
reasoning “joyfully illogical,” and both Douglas Wurtele and R. W. Hanning argue that Chaucer 
deliberately undercuts her by inscribing flaws into her exegetical technique.  See Derek Pearsall, The 
Canterbury Tales (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1985), 74, Douglas Wurtele, “Chaucer’s Canterbury 
Tales and Nicholas of Lyre’s Postillae literalis et moralis super totam Bibliam,” in Chaucer and Scriptural 
Tradition, ed. David Lyle Jeffrey (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1984), 89-107, and R. W. Hanning, 
“Roasting a Friar, Mis-taking a Wife, and Other Acts of Textual Harassment in Chaucer’s Canterbury 
Tales,” Studies in the Age of Chaucer 7 (1985), 3-21. 
673 See Robert Longsworth, “The Wife of Bath and the Samaritan Woman,” Chaucer Review 34 (2000), 
372-387 and Warren S. Smith, “The Wife of Bath Debates Jerome,” The Chaucer Review 32 (1997), 129-
45. 
674 See lines 6, 17, 44, 44f. 
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vileynye?”  This last passage is doubly significant in that it is, once again, an indirect 
citation of Jerome; namely, Jerome’s reluctant admission that, “I do not condemn second, 
third, nor, pardon the expression, eighth marriages.”675  Jerome only makes such 
allowances, however, because once the threshold of a second marriage has been breached 
“there is no longer a question of a single marriage,” and hence perfect sacramental 
monogamy.676  In Alisoun’s redaction, the theology of remarriage thus becomes a 
pastiche of disdain and ambivalence, lacking in resolution and internal coherence. 
To accentuate this point, Alisoun paints the tale of her own successive marriages 
with a familiar set of strokes, echoing the nightmarish vision of widows invoked by 
earlier authors.  Like Gautier’s Veuve, she undergoes an extraordinarily short mourning 
process, seeking out each successive husband once the last is scarcely buried. All of this 
is recast, however, by the fact that the Wife is telling her own story, imparting a note of 
knowing mimicry to her tale.  While it is Gautier who undercuts his protagonist’s 
graveside histrionics, Alisoun accomplishes this herself, boasting that she “made sory 
cheere, as wyves mooten,” when in point of fact she “wepte but smal.”677  Even more 
impertinent are Alison’s given reasons for her meager grief: the “faire legges” of her 
future husband, Jankyn, whom she begins pursuing (in shades of Celle qui se fist 
foutre…) literally over her late husband’s grave.678 
Such tendencies are even more noticeable in the Wife’s engagement with 
Matheolus, whose barbs become examples of the mean-spirited “preching” she is made to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
675 Adversus Jovinianum 1:15 
676 ibid 
677 588-592; ibid 
678 And Jankyn, oure clerk, ws oon of tho/ As help me God, whan that I saugh hym go/ After the beere, me 
thoughte he hadde a paire of legges and of feet so clene faire/ that al myn herte I yaf unto his hoold.”  595-
599; ibid. 
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endure on the part of her husbands. 679  Such is her manner of incorporating Matheolus’ 
famous suggestion that women, like livestock, should be returnable in case of defect, 
which she refers to as “that proverb of a shrewe.”680  Matheolus also provides the familiar 
words through which she celebrates how effectively she tortured her lecherous forth 
husband: “By God, in earthe I was his purgatorie, for which I hope his soule be in 
glorie.”681 
All of this culminates in Alisoun’s famous showdown over her fifth husband’s so-
called “Book of Wykked Wyves,” a text that includes not only Matheolus and Jerome, 
but also Tertullian—the author of monogamist extremism himself.682  It is here that 
Chaucer permits the wife her most pointed jab at the theology of remarriage: “For trusteth 
wel, it is impossible that any clerk wol speke good of wyves.”683  It is also here that 
Chaucer affords the wife her most decisive victory, a battle drawn on the familiar fabliau 
lines of female wit verses male physical strength.  While destroying Jankyn’s book might 
earn the Wife a blow to the head, her handling of the situation also allows her to regain 
control of her household and her marriage, Jankyn willingly tossing his book in the fire.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
679 The Lamentations are also a partial basis for the exaggerated funeral flirtations described above, 
particularly the notion that “as soon as her husband is in his grave, a wife thinks only, day and night, of 
catching another husband.” (Lamentations 2.847) For further correspondences see Ralph Hanna and 
Traugott Lawler, “The Wife of Bath’s Prologue,” in Sources and Analogues of the Canterbury Tales, ed. 
Robert Correale with Mary Hamel, 2 Vols (Cambridge: D.S. Brewer, 2005), 351-403. 
680 Thou seist that oxen, asses, hors, and houndes/ they been assayed at diverse stoundes/ bacyns/ lavours/ 
er that men hem bye/ spoones and stooles, and al swich housbondrye/ and so been pottes, clothes, and 
array/ but folk of wyves maken noon assay/ til they be wedded—old dotard shrewe!--/ and thanne, seistow, 
we wol our vices shewe.”285-292, pg. 109.  Also of note are 235-240, in which Alisoun parrots Matheolus’ 
description of how a wife beguiles her husband into buying her new clothes, and 269-238, in which Alisoun 
recounts Matheolus’ reasons why it is as bad to marry a pretty wife as an ugly one.  For a full list of 
correspondences, see Hanna & Lawler, “The Wife of Bath’s Prologue,” pg. 386-393. 
681 489-90; pg. 111. 
682 A partial reconstruction of Jankyn’s codex (along with a probable transmission history) can be found in 
Ralph Hanna III and Traugott Lawler’s Jankyn’s Book of Wikked Wyves, 2 vols (University of Georgia 
Press, 1997). 
683 688-9, pg. 114. 
246	  
	  
It also grants her, at long last, a happy and balanced domestic life, as she tells us “after 
that day we hadden never debat.”684 
With these misogamous voices thus consigned to the flames, the Wife seems free 
to stop acting out their expectations, becoming “as kynde as any wyf from Denmark unto 
Ynde.”  In this process, she has also freed herself from them in a more extra-textual 
sense, by divulging the theological inadequacies upon which they themselves are 
knowingly founded.  In Chaucer’s hands, the parodic stance of Gautier and Matheolus is 
thus turned inside out, exposing the raw seams of sacramental discourse embedded in 
their suggestive humor.  The result is a sort of double parody, in which these literary 
stereotypes are reflected, distorted, and finally, burned.  Hence one sense in which, as 
Carolyn Dinshaw argues, the Wife “articulates, makes visible, exactly what patriarchal 
hermeneutic necessarily excludes, necessarily keeps invisible.”  Or hence, to give the tale 
a more contemporary spin, the Wife’s own particular brand of “appropriation.”685 
These parodic tendencies reach their logical conclusion in the Cent Nouvelles 
Nouvelles, wherein marital theology finds itself completely overrun by the messy dictates 
of human nature.  In terms of direct theological parody the Nouvelles employ a relatively 
light touch, though several tales bear distinct markings of ecclesiastically directed humor.  
Tale Nineteen contains a retelling of the fabliau L’enfant qui fus remis au soleil, 
reimagined to accentuate the incompatibility between the tale’s “miracle” and the science 
of human reproduction.  Here, the wife explicitly brands her conception a miraculous 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
684 822, pg. 116. 
685 As follows from Judith Butler’s famous remark, “This is not an appropriation of dominant culture in 
order to remain subordinated by its terms but an appropriation that seeks to make over the terms of 
domination.”  “Gender is Burning: Questions of Appropriation and Subversion,” Bodies that Matter: On 
the Discursive Limits of “Sex” (New York: Routledge, 1993), 392. 
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event, exclaiming, “Praised be God, who sent [this child] to us!”686  Likewise, the 
husband’s initial disbelief is played up along biological lines: “How can this child be 
mine?  Did you carry him for much longer than the others?”687  Added to this is the “faux 
annunciation” of Tale Fourteen, in which a young maiden is informed an “angel of God,” 
that that she (with some help from a local hermit) will give birth to the next Pope.  Of 
course, this “angel” turns out to be none other than the hermit himself, whose ruse is 
uncovered when the child they produce turns out to be a girl.688 
For the most part, however, the Nouvelles deals with marriage and sexuality in 
more material terms.  In Tale Eight we are presented with a scenario anxiously 
anticipated as early as Hugh of Saint Victor: that a public wedding, properly contracted 
and ecclesiastically officiated, will be interrupted by the arrival of a former clandestine 
partner.689  While it does not seem that the groom and his ex-lover have exchanged vows, 
she is visibly pregnant, which proves enough of an impediment that he confesses the 
affair to his “official” bride before consummating their union.  This confession, however, 
only prompts the bride to confess to her own pre-marital dalliances, which in turn induces 
the groom to leave her for his original mate.690  In a strictly legal sense the groom’s 
decision is on the up and up, as publically-exchanged vows can (and should) be broken in 
favor of a previous clandestine arrangement.  Yet this zigzagging narrative also calls 
attention to the tenuous nature of such marriage bonds, and the messy situations they 
produce. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
686“Loé soit Dieu de ce qu’il nous envoye!” Les cent nouvelles nouvelles, ed. Franklin P. Sweetser, Textes 
littéraires français, 127 (Genève et Paris: Droz, 1966), 128. 
687 “Comment doncques pourroit ill estre mien?  L’ariez vous plus porté que ung aultre?” ibid. 
688 ibid, 97-104. 
689 See chapter 2, pages 118-9. 
690 Les Cent Nouvelles Nouvelles, 68-72. 
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Often the marriages of the Nouvelles appear even more indefinite than this, as it is 
unclear who is actually married to whom.  Tale Twenty-Two begins with another extra-
marital pregnancy, and the expectant father making careful provisions for his child’s 
mother before he is called away to war. No mention is made of the couple exchanging 
vows, yet the young man is still shocked to find, upon his return, that the girl has installed 
herself in the home of a neighboring merchant.691  In the ensuing confrontation, the 
young woman refers to this new paramour as her “husband,” though, once again, the 
formality of this “marriage” is never clarified.692  Though the protagonist seems more 
than happy to cede his claims to her hand, the legality of the situation is never so much as 
questioned, and the legitimacy of the child remains unresolved. 
This ambiguity is taken to new comic heights in Tale Fifty-Three, in which two 
marriages are thrown into uncertainty through the blunder of a myopic priest.  Two 
couples are assembled before Mass to be married, awaiting the moment when they will 
be jointly called forward to say their nuptial vows.  This sort of group wedding (common 
practice according to the author) poses a unique challenge for this particular priest, who 
accidently joins the wrong bride to the wrong groom.693  Undoing this simple mistake 
proves to be laughably difficult, even when one of the couples appeals to the bishop for 
relief.694  In real life, this situation could easy be remedied by the provisions of canon 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
691 Ibid, 145-149. 
692 “Helas!  Dit la gouge, que diroit mon homme?  Je seroye deffaicte, car il cuide certainement qu’il soit 
sien.” Ibid, 148.  As all we are told is that the young woman, “troussa ung soir…ses bagues et 
habillements, et avec elles a l’ostel du marchant se vint rendre,” so the audience is given no way of 
verifying this claim. Ibid, 147. 
693 The author tells us, “Et en la fin, comm ul est de coustume, devant luy se misrent ceulx qui espouser 
devoient, don y avoit pluseurs.”  Les Cent Nouvelles Nouvelles, 338. 
694 The older groom is, predictably, perfectly happy to remain with his unexpectedly nubile bride.  See ibid, 
341. 
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law, as each party’s consent was clearly impeded by an “error of person.”  The humor of 
the tale, however, derives from the thorny net created by marital indissolubility plus 
increasingly convoluted canonical regulations, which the Church seems to be more or 
less “blindly” administering. 
Yet marriages in the Nouvelles are not always indissoluble, as couples are also 
able to use ecclesiastical loopholes to their own advantage.  Tale Sixty-Seven introduces 
one such artful pair, who begin an affair while the lady’s husband is in the final throes of 
illness and old age.  Having promised to marry his paramour upon her husband’s death, 
the gentleman manages to weasel out of this vow on the grounds that he is technically a 
cleric, arranging an alternative marriage for her with a local barber.  Of course, the lady is 
peeved to discover that her lover has instead gone on to contract a more advantageous 
union for himself, at which point she petitions the bishop for enforcement of the original 
vow.  As this promise does, in fact, meet the full standards for canonical validity 
(technically qualifying as future consent followed by intercourse) the bishop annuls both 
subsequent marriages and orders the original couple to live as husband and wife.  The 
author seems keen to highlight the legal niceties of the situation, using language that 
would clearly invoke the requirements for such proceedings laid out in canon law.695 
Thus, the situation is thrown into disarray by it’s very legality, preserving the letter of the 
law at the cost of two jilted spouses.  The fact that the female protagonist is a widow, of 
course, adds all of the perplexing connotations of remarriage to the mix. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
695 Specifically, the author mentions the presence of witnesses and the fact that the couple continued to 
cohabitated following this promise: “Et illec son procureur remonstra bien et gentement sa cause, disant 
comment le chaperon fourré avoit promis a la cordoanniere, en presense de pluseurs, que si son mary 
mouroit qu’il la prendroit a femme.  Son mari mort, il l’a tousjours dentue jusques environ ung an qu’il l’a 
baillée a ung barbier.” Ibid, 417. The case also bears a striking resemblance to Decretal 4.17.9 (also 
referenced by Boccaccio), in which the status of the couple’s future consent remains a deciding factor. 
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Outside of this tale, the question of widows and remarriage is strangely absent 
from the Nouvelles, perhaps because marriage has already proven to be amusing enough 
when confined to the living.  The one major exception is to be found in the presumed 
widowhood of Tale Sixty Nine, which brings all of the troubling  theological implications 
of remarriage to literal, tangible life.  Much like Decameron 10.1, the tale introduces a 
knight who is presumed dead when captured at war, leaving his virtuous young wife to 
fend off the pressure to remarry.  Unlike Boccaccio’s heroine, the woman gives in before 
her husband is able to return and stop her, dying of shame once she realizes her 
mistake.696  In a sense, the woman’s death mirrors that of Roland’s ever-faithful Aude, 
who takes herself out of the picture once her survival has become numerically 
inconvenient.  But whereas Aude managed to head off even the slightest hint of bigamous 
impropriety, this woman has already made herself a bigamist, defiling the sacramental 
integrity of her union in the process.   
This woman’s fate, of course, is not particularly funny, but neither is the tragic 
irony that underlies much of marriage-oriented humor.  Even Richard Pryor’s 
lighthearted observation turns upon the possibility of painful and contentious divorce—
the current monkey-wrench in our own modern notion of indissolubility.  The many 
moving parts of marriage, and the conceptual and experiential planes on which they exist, 
create a dangerously unwieldy edifice, of which the Christian marital sacrament is a 
prime but by no means solitary example.  The narrative possibilities created by this 
instability, however, are universally abundant, ripe for comedy, tragedy, and all the 
registers in between. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
696 Ibid, pgs. 422-425. 
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CONCLUSION 
	  
Throughout the preceding chapters I have been careful not to make any hard 
claims about direct textual influence, unless such influence can be proven on the basis of 
explicit citation or exact quotation.  For example, while it is quite clear that Chaucer read 
(and intended to reference) the Lamentations of Matheolus, there is no definite proof that 
Chrétien was cribbing from Hugh of St. Victor in creating the single-hearted union of 
Cligés and Fénice, or that Gautier le Leu dreamed up La Veuve with Tertullian open on 
his worktable. What I have attempted to prove, however, is that these depictions of 
marriage are joined by a vast, invisible web of interrelated discourse, driven by the 
various concerns and anxieties that surrounded marriage as a conceptual entity. I 
conclude, therefore, with a chronological overview of this conversation, highlighting the 
moments at which these different ideas of marriage came into discernable contact. 
 At the dawn of the twelfth century, the Christian idea of marriage was still largely 
grounded in the Augustinian formula, as well as the many gaps and questions that came 
along with it.  It was Augustine who had provided the notion of marital sacramentality 
present in the incipient canon law collections of Burchard and Ivo, helping them to take 
the first steps in distinguishing Christian matrimony from the vast tangle of Roman and 
Germanic customs before them.  By the mid-1140’s Augustine’s marital theory had been 
joined by those of Peter Abelard, Hugh of Saint Victor, and Master Simon, all of whom 
began to tackle unresolved issues surrounding marriage formation, sacramental 
signification, and, most importantly, whether both of these marital components were 
initiated by consummation or consent.  The next two decades saw conflicting answers to 
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this question from two otherwise decisive sources in theology and canon law: Peter 
Lombard, who came down on the side of consent, and Gratian, who tentatively laid the 
groundwork for consummationist legal thought.  What was clear by 1150 was that 
marriage was firmly established as a sacramental entity in both theology and law, and 
that this sacramentality was based on a strict symbolic interpretation of its ability to 
reflect Christ’s union with the Church. 
 It was at this approximate moment that vernacular literature began to weight in on 
marriage as a Christian conception, and to consider how the more abstract elements of 
matrimony interacted with other forms of narrative representation.  The Chanson de 
Roland, whose text was likely finalized by 1145, represents an early attempt to negotiate 
both the theological problems of marriage (notably those involving widowhood) and 
marriage’s place within a feudal and military narrative atmosphere.  The conventions 
displayed by this text would be emulated within chanson de geste for more than a century 
to come, even when the theological and legal discourse shifted and complexified.  Even 
as theologians continued to discover fresh problems with the marital sacrament, chansons 
de geste continued to sublimate these problems, presenting a vision of marriage in which 
all forms of irregularity are rejected or irradiated. 
 At roughly the same time, a very different picture of love and marriage was being 
developed by French romance authors, who were more willing to entertain the conjugal 
theology’s increasingly apparent difficulties.  In particular, these romans were more open 
about the various inconsistencies between marital sacramentality and the demands of 
feudal society, in particular theology’s unease between the often socially necessary 
remarriage of widows.  Romance authors also went a step further by portraying what had 
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been, since the time of Augustine, one of conjugal theology’s biggest problems: the 
potential for it to unintentionally glorify non-marital forms of unity and love. 
 The next hundred years saw both canon law and theology consumed by two 
separate but related questions: whether marriage was formed by consent or 
consummation, and whether the marital sacrament could, as Peter Lombard’s formula 
required, confer the grace that it signified. By the late thirteenth century, these questions 
had been largely settled by the authoritative treatments of Pope Alexander III and 
Thomas Aquinas, dictating that marriage was formed by exchange of consent in the 
present tense, but sanctified by the remission of sexual sin after its consummation.  The 
possible contradiction between these two solutions hints at the many loose threads left 
dangling within the overall sacramental construct, in particular the persistently 
questioned issue of its ability to confer non-remedial grace.  The result was that 
enormous pressure was placed upon marriage’s signifying power, which, due to the 
perpetual confusion about consent or consummation, was itself unstable. 
 All of this exposed uncertainty made for excellent comic fodder, as humorous 
treatments of marriage became increasingly prevalent after the turn of the thirteenth 
century.  In the fabliaux we see a parodic take on these issues, whereas the comic tone of 
misogamous literature dug deeper into the marital sacrament’s unstable foundation.  Both 
of these genres were especially focused on the rift between marriage’s spiritual claims 
and this-worldly realities, as well as the perpetual anxiety surrounding remarried widows.  
This latter topic was famously taken up by Chaucer’s Wife of Bath, who overturned the 
misogynist strains of this discourse to uncover the real conceptual issues at stake.  
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This comic potential was only amplified when the loopholes in marriage’s legal 
makeup began to hit the emerging ecclesiastical court system, particularly via the flood of 
brides attempting to enforce clandestinely-officiated nuptials.  This public unraveling 
once again shifted the focus of fictional portrayals of matrimony, with both comic and 
non-comic texts becoming increasingly aware of marriage’s blurry boundaries.  Hence 
the fourteenth-century fascination with the quasi-marital saga of Troilus and Criseyde, as 
well as the increasing number of irregular nuptials wreaking havoc across the comedic 
literary landscape.  The real-life implications of this problem were finally addressed at 
the Council of Trent, as were the theological dangers of effectively solving it.  While 
clandestine marriage was officially outlawed via the monumental tametsi decree, the 
council, as Philip Reynolds has recently shown, “brought to light fundamental 
irreconcilable disagreements about reform, which in turn presupposed divergent 
conceptions of the sacramentality of marriage.”697 
These “divergent conceptions,” in sum, formed the core of what counted as 
marriage throughout the middle ages, as theologians, canonists, and storytellers added 
their own overlapping ideas of what it meant to be married.  In a sense that would seem 
uncannily familiar to contemporary Western judges and politicians, medieval thinkers 
found themselves in the uneasy position of having to redefine an institution that was at 
the cornerstone of their society, whose conceptual and practical elements often proved 
difficult to harmonize.  Twenty-first century Americans, who find themselves in the 
throes of their own iteration of this process, often look desperately to the Christian past to 
find answers to the questions before them, assuming that they will find a stable, reified 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
697 Reynolds, How Marriage Became One of the Sacraments, 810. 
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notion of marriage that they may either emulate or reject.   Such assumptions, however, 
dissolve under closer scrutiny.  Much like today, marriage was something that medieval 
people struggled to define together, for better or for worse.  
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